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This work is dedicated to the very special people we met on our professional 
road, some of them  flying airplanes and some of them curing people. We met 
highly professional and dedicated people willing to fulfill their mission perfectly 
but without compromising safety. 
 
Among these many wonderful people we will just mention a few: Colonel S. 
from the IAF, Prof. Aviram, Dr. Willff-Meron and Dr. Gindi from Maccabi. 
 
This work was absolutely without any chance of becoming real without the 
inspiration, patience, guidance and faith of Prof. Rijsman to whom we owe the 
deepest debt and express hereby admiration and gratitude. 
 
To our families, for being patient and empathetic, when in a sudden we 
became students again, this time absolutely committed. 
 
Writing this thesis, stressed our personal and professional partnership and 
companionship. We express hereby gratitude for this rare opportunity to join 







Risk management, from our point of view, has to do with the very core of 
human existence and beliefs. Being able to manage risks, means that we are 
not victims of some unknown forces, but rather in control of our lives, reality 
and fate.   A world governed by belief and means to manage risks, is a more 
optimistic, safe and satisfactory one. 
 
In our professional experience, we have witnessed people and organizations, 
acting in a total disbelief, that things may be controlled and changed for 
better. We believe, that Risk Management, can serve as a positive 
organizational drive,   based on a deep inquiry of past events, thorough 
learning of the present and visionary consideration of the future.  
 
In most of the cases, Risk Management is approached after all the 
conventional tools of management bankrupt and the organization is in deep 
distress. Meeting a successful organization, willing to start Risk Management 
activity, although rare, is a wonderful opportunity to make real progress in 
quite a short time. 
 
Risk management is a dynamic discipline, which has to adopt itself to the ever 
changing reality. Practicing the risk management concepts and methodologies 
of yesterday, poses a serious risk today. 
 
Being dogmatic and rigid in analyzing reality is a risk by itself, because of the 
very dynamic nature of risks. Risks may be considered as a negative potential 
energy, that has the power to destroy, harm and cause losses.  Thus, risks 
will forever be existent and striving to crystallize themselves in adverse 
events.  
 
We believe, we have proved in this work, that there is a great value of sharing 
knowledge and adopting knowledge, even when it doesn't seem feasible, like 
in the case of such remote domains as Aviation and Medicine. 
 
While writing this work, we have undergone many professionally maturating 
changes and have by doing it, actually discovered the Aviation Risk 
Management Model. This is to say, that whenever you are involved, as a 
professional, the intervention changes you, your tools and thinking forever.  
 
Risk Management in Healthcare, although originated from the first days of 
medicine, has still a long way to go, to become a fully mature professional 
discipline. We hope to share our experience and to contribute to its 
development, from our deepest motivation to save human lives. 
 
 
Yossi Tal and  Itzik Lichtenfeld 
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"Whosoever saves a single soul of Israel,  
Scripture ascribes it to him as though  
He had saved a whole world" 
 

















Why are we writing this book? 
 
One Friday morning about two years ago (2005), one of those Fridays, in our 
offices, on which we usually review the past week and plan the week ahead, we 
discussed this question – why are we writing this book and why did we choose 
this particular subject? 
 
The discussion started with the instant, with our motivation to deal with risk 
management in the present, and in the end, we came to our personal roots and 
to the national, Jewish roots.    
 
The psychological journey, on which we went that morning, made it clear to us 
why we are dealing with risk management, and why we are writing this book, but 
not only that – it made it also clearer to us who we are as persons.   
 
This chapter aims to explain to the readers and no less to us, why we have been 
dealing for so many years with risk management, in spite of the personal and 
organizational frustrations and struggles associated with dealing with this 
professional field.  
 
The field of risk management is a difficult field, abounding in challenges, but also 
in frustrations.  There certainly are easier ways to make a living. In our opinion, it 
is something like a calling, not just an occupation.  
 
Professionals active in the field of risk management may be divided into two 
groups: those for whom risk management activity is a stage in their professional 
career. Persons belonging to that group will, after a term as risk managers, return 
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to the occupational position they originally came from. On the other hand, there 
are those who are attracted by the fascination of the profession and consider it 
their calling. No doubt, we belong to the second group.  
How did it happen that we are dealing with risk management?  
 
 
 Yossi Tal 
 
In 1977, I graduated from the Bar-Ilan University with a B.A. in Psychology.  
Simultaneously with starting my studies towards the second degree, I was 
looking for a job to earn a living during my university studies. When perusing the 
vacancies advertised in the weekend edition of a newspaper, I noticed an ad 
saying "Research Officer wanted" for the Ministry of Defense, with an education 
in behavioral sciences.  
 
During the job interview I was informed that it concerned an Air Force research 
team, investigating the human factor in flight safety, in the framework of the  
Aviation Safety and Quality Directorate (ASQD - MAVKA). 
 
The  ASQD,  was established after the Yom-Kippur-War, 1973, as a result of 
lessons learned from that war. MAVKA is directly subordinated to the Air Force 
Commander and has two central objectives:  To integrate and guide flight safety 
activities and to carry out quality control in the domains of operations, 
maintenance and management.  
 
The research team, to which I presented my candidacy, had the task to 
investigate the human factor in flight accidents and incidents, in order to provide 
insights to the commanders for limiting the extent of involvement of air crew 
members in aircraft accidents.  
 
It is important to emphasize that, according to various estimates, both of the 
Israeli Air Force (IAF) and of the Air Forces worldwide, which existed at that time, 
approximately 80 per cent of the accidents, were attributed to the human factor. 
On this background, the team was founded, which I joined and managed in the 
years 1979-1990.  
 
Here is not the place to outline the activities carried out by the team, which 
involved ever growing circles of commanders on various levels, from Air Force 
Commanders to Squadron Leader, but I will only mention that in the course of 




From the time I joined that team until now, with short interruptions, I am dealing 
with Risk Management and in 1997, I began to be active also in medical risk 
management, through the "Maccabi Project", on  which this work focuses. 
 
In the perspective of time, I know that only few of those who became exposed to 
risk management in the framework of the Safety and Quality Control 
Administration, actually turned their job into their calling. 
 
Despite its power, the Israeli Air Force is a relatively small corps. At that time, 
almost everybody knew each other, so that each time somebody was involved in 
an accident or was killed, the personal and organizational trauma was very deep 
and affected everyone who was part of the Air Force. I believe, that particularly 
one occurrence shocked me and also many others. 
 
In 1978, I was involved in a study on the subject of "Collisions and close "near 
misses" during air combat exercises". The objective of that study was to 
understand the underlying human mechanism of collisions and near misses and 
suggest recommendations aiming to reduce the rate of these events. Not being a 
pilot myself, I required help from a combat pilot team, who would help me to 
analyze the events.       
 
The team included Captain G., who was considered to be an excellent and 
analytic pilot. We, two young Captains, spent many hours together, coming from 
different worlds, and joined forces in a common task: to understand how and why 
combat aircraft collide during air combat exercises.   
 
G. lived in a Kibbutz, was good looking and had a promising future in the Air 
Force. I was a young psychologist, lived in a city, and had immigrated to Israel 
from Russia.  
 
We became close friends. Our talks were not only about air combats, but about 
subjects, which interested young men in Israel at that time.  
 
Meanwhile, we finished our joint work; it was published and widely and seriously 
discussed and considered in the Air Force.  
 
In the course of the years, the rate of collisions during air combats decreased. 
Probably, G. and I have contributed to it in a way.  
 
At 29 September 1979, G. was killed in an aircraft accident, on the date, on 




From then on and still today, G. accompanies me on my professional career and 
perhaps it is because of him, or maybe thanks to him and on behalf of him, that I 
never left the risk management domain.  
 
What does risk management mean to me?  I am frequently asked this question 
and as frequently I am asking it myself.  Apparently, the deepest answer, as far 
as I understand, is related to my background, which led me to attach the greatest 
value to human life and to the fight for saving it.  In my view, risk management is 
a constant fight for saving human life.   
 
 
 Itzik Lichtenfeld 
 
In 1969, the day I was drafted into the Israeli Army, the I.D.F., a significant day in 
the life of every Israeli, both for himself and for his family, and certainly so for the 
son of parents, who survived the Holocaust. In all the hustle and bustle, 
excitement, fears, in the queue for inoculations, examinations, receiving the 
regimentals, I accidentally met Yossi Tal and spent some hours with him.    
 
We came from different backgrounds and had different characters.  In those few 
hours we became united in a common destiny and later on developed a rare 
friendship. At the end of the day of our recruitment our ways parted.  
 
During our military service, we happened to meet hurriedly for a few minutes. 
 
Four years later, by the hand of fate, we met again at the Bar Ilan University.   
We studied together with our wives towards the first degree in psychology and 
together continued our studies towards the second degree at the faculty of 
psychology, in the department of clinical research.   
 
During my studies, I worked in the publishing house of my family. The world of 
business in general, and the occupation with other, unique, new and unusual 
matters attracted my attention.  
 
In the course of approximately 20 years I implemented my practice in 
psychology, partly as reserve duty psychologist in an elite unit of the army.   
 
Indirectly, and from a totally different angle, I implemented my knowledge and 
understanding in psychology to comprehend the political motivations as a partner 
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to the Studio of Political Illustrations, which took part in numerous occurrences all 
over the world. 
 
This activity required the ability to analyze political events, the acquaintance, 
appreciation, understanding and reading of characters and leaders, media stars, 
artists and tycoons, who received exceptional treatment by the Studio.   
During those years I heard and knew about Yossi's work. I was fascinated by the 
subject and I used to say that the day would come when we would do something 
together in the business world to give expression to our experiences.  
 
In 1987, we, Yossi and I, decided to examine possibilities to implement the know-
how and experience of experts in safety, who acquired unique and exceptional 
experience in the I.A.F., in order to implement it in civil and other military fields. 
 
In the same year, an article was published in the American Fortune, which 
foretold which fields would be key fields in the next decade, fields worthy of 
investment and development; prominent among these fields was the field of risk 
management and safety.   
 
In those years, Yossi continued with his military career and I ventured my first 
steps into the world of risk management and safety. I recruited into the company 
professionals, who had served in the I.A.F. and were specialists in the field.  
 
During the first years, we studied, developed models and implemented risk 
management in military institutions, including the I.A.F., as well as in civil 
institutions, in various fields – aviation, banking and industry.  
 
After approximately 10 years of joint activity, we were looking for a new content 
world, offering opportunities for pioneering and implementing the vast know-how 
acquired, a content world comprising components and characteristics similar to 
the aviation world. 
 
And again it was the hand of fate, which brought me together with an 
organization consultant, who worked for a large factory. He told me about his 
work and the difficulties encountered with the customer and his occupation.  After 
this meeting, it became clear to me that our future would lie in the field of medical 
risk management.  
 
In the beginning, the road was paved with quandaries and misgivings.  We 
presented our view to a medical forum at the "Rambam"-Hospital in Haifa, and 




Dr. Daddy Sharim, a Lawyer and Physician, who had been acting in this field on 
behalf of the largest medical insurer in Israel, attended our presentation at the 
"Rambam"-Hospital. He was impressed and introduced us to people of the 
"Maccabi" Healthcare Fund, which, in those days, was in the first stages of 
establishing a risk management department.  
 
The unusual frankness of the Medical Director at that time, Prof. Aviram, and of 
the Manager of the newly established department – Dr. Rachel Wilf Miron, 
enabled our entering "Maccabi". Both were aware of our potential and our ability 
and were ready to take the risk to implement the aviation model in the risk 
management activity of their organization.  
 
 
Lots of differences, lots of similarities 
 
We have known each other for 40 years, since we queued up in the recruiting 
center and until this very day. We spent together the major part of our life, we 
studied together, enjoyed together, satisfaction and frustration  together.  
 
Despite all these years together, on that Friday morning, when we tried to 
understand why we are writing this book, we revealed new things about each 
other.  
 
Both of us belong to the second generation of Holocaust survivors. The parents 
of Itzik survived the Holocaust in concentration camp in Czechoslovakia and 
immediately thereafter immigrated to Israel. Yossi's father was the only survivor 
of his family in Poland, after having fled from the Ghetto of Lodz and joined the 
Red Army.  His heart's desire was to immigrate to Israel, which he made true in 
1963.  
 
Itzik grew up in Tel Aviv, in an urban center full of life, whereas Yossi grew up in 
an immigrant neighborhood in Rishon-LeZion.  However, when the two of them 
met in the recruiting center in October 1969, in spite of the many differences 
between them, they became attached to each other almost immediately.  
 
Although their ways parted on the day of their recruitment, as they were recruited 
into different army units, their ways crossed again and again until they finally met 
at the Bar Ilan University, when queuing up for registration to first year courses in 
Psychology. From that day on, they became friends and after several years they 




Trying to understand the reason why the two of us are active in risk 
management, brought us back to the past of our families, to the values on which 
we were brought up and which we adopted and which became our own life 
values.   
 
Although, both of us had various opportunities and despite the frustration  
involved in Risk Management, we were persistent in being active in this field.  
 
Without giving any thought to it, we both choose the same attitude of saving 
human life, whenever possible.  
 
We chose to ignore the difficulties involved in risk management activity, to bear 
the frustration of engaging in pioneering, being  glad with  small successes and 
saw therein a breakthrough, and for some reason, although we sometimes 
pondered about it, we never seriously considered turning to some other activities.  
 
The deep rationale we found in the risk management concept, is associated to its 
underlying meaning, which in our view, is an attempt to refer to risk as something 
which can be controlled and managed, as opposed to the attitude of waiting 
passively, until risk becomes reality and takes the lives and precious resources of 
human beings. It concerns an attempt to control something, which is mostly 
considered as being beyond control and as an inevitable outcome of reality.    
 
With all the differences between us, we agree on the deep meaning of risk 
management for us and on the strong will to bring about a deep change in the 
medical system, its target being to save the lives of human beings, not only by 
medical cure, but also by limiting the increased occurrence of errors and the 
harm caused thereby.  
 
 
The need to share and impact 
 
Yossi, who, in the Israel Air Force, had been dealing with the human factor in 
flight safety, witnessed in the years of his activity the far-reaching changes which 
occurred in the I.A.F., and which found expression in the drastic reduction in the 
rate of accidents.   
 
The Israel Air Force fought against accidents with the same measure of 
determination as it fought against his other enemies.  
 
Once the Air Force commanders understood that they are losing more air crew 
members and planes  in accidents than in combat, they decided to undertake 
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determined action in order to change the professional flight culture, including the 
basic definition of what was considered to be a "good pilot".    
 
As from the middle of the 70's until the middle of the 90's, the I.A.F. underwent 
many changes, among them a deep cultural change in respect to flight safety.  
Flight safety became the permanent companion of professionalism and 
operational activity, which found expression in a most significant reduction in the 
rates of severe and fatal accidents. Moreover, as a result of the cultural change 
process, the Israel Air Force not only became safer, but also more professional. 
The argument voiced by I.A.F. veterans, that a basic clash exists between the 
aspiration for operational achievements and the aspiration for safety, was 
fundamentally refuted. It was proven that there is no need to pay dearly by loss 
of life and aircraft in order to develop and reach a high professional level, but that 
rather the opposite is true: adopting a policy and culture which emphasizes 
safety, improves the professional and operational level.     
 
We sometimes discussed this significant experience of being part of and 
contributing to far-reaching changes in a system, as large and mission oriented 
as the Israel Air Force. 
 
The need to share and impact in the professional vacillations, achievements and 
frustrations was extremely powerful. 
 
Once the I.A.F. completed the deep cultural change and stabilized on the lowest 
rates of accidents it had ever known, we looked together for other high risk fields, 
where it would be possible to arouse the need and the fervor to undergo a similar 
process as we had witnessed in the I.A.F. 
 
The need to share the experience accumulated in the domain of aviation safety, 
constituted the profound reason for our entering the domain of medicine.  
 
We felt like having experienced a revelation, we saw how psychological 
knowledge succeeds in stimulating a fundamental change in a large system in 
order to improve the organization and to save human life and costly resources.   
 
This right to take part in a process as significant as this, gave  rise to the duty to 
continue further on this way in an attempt to repeat the success in other fields.  
 
During the discussion we had, it became clear to us that our commitment to risk 
management, over many years stemmed from the deepest meanings, which we 
attribute to risk management. The need to share the experience we accumulated 
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in aviation is related to the need to influence and change matters, which would 
make it possible for errors to manifest themselves.   
Doubtlessly, encouraged by the experience of the I.A.F., which succeeded in a 
period of about twenty years to change completely in its approach to flight safety, 
we fully believed that it would be possible to repeat the success also in other 
content worlds. The world of medicine fascinated us in particular, as we were 
exposed in many cases to errors by physicians, errors, which from our point of 
view, were not appropriately exploited in order to serve as levers for preventing a 
recurrence of similar cases. We felt a strong urge to make a change in the 
domain of medicine.      
 
We presume that this feeling was similar to the feeling experienced by 
missionaries - a strong urge to share their truth with others. Only that here it was 
not a matter of religious fervor, of miracles we had witnessed, but a methodical 
long-term process, which had succeeded in saving human life.  
 
It was said about William Carey, who is regarded by many as the missionary, 
who laid the infrastructure for the  modernization of India: 
 
 "He believed in understanding and controlling nature instead of fearing, 
appeasing or worshipping it; in developing one's intellect instead of 
killing it…" 
                                                         Vishal and Ruth Mangawaldi, 1999 
 
This book meets the need to share, out of the belief that the project described 
here, will stimulate the feeling of ability and belief among the managers of the 
healthcare systems to introduce the changes required in the organizational and 
professional culture in healthcare systems in order to prevent unnecessary loss 
of human life, harm to patients and traumatic experiences on behalf of the 
medical staff.  
 
 
Challenges and obstacles 
 
Those engaged in risk management as their main career, are encountered with 
the opportunity to learn a chapter in understanding what challenges and 
obstacles are. The field of risk management, with all its growing importance, is 
not yet the main focus of most of the business organizations. This holds 
particularly true in systems and organizations, where the subject of risk 
management does not take a prominent place on the agenda. The ability to 
absorb a wide scale of frustrations, without despairing and giving up, is a vital 
characteristic trait of the risk manager. It goes without saying that we 
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experienced and are experiencing these frustrations also in the present. 
Following, is a partial list of frustration sources, which might be encountered by 
risk managers and which he will have to face:   
 
 Considering risk management as a marginal field: In not a few cases, 
we have been told that the significance of risk management is ultimately a 
financial one, and as long as it is possible to purchase an insurance, 
which will cover the damages, there is no need for any special preventive 
activity. As the costs of healthcare, as well as the cost of insurance, are 
debited to the patients, this approach might have discouraged us. In 
cases, where these matters had been expressed openly, a dialogue could 
have been held and the benefits of risk management could have been 
pointed out, as described in chapter 6.13.  The problem was in those 
cases, in which, on a rhetorical level, there was agreement with us that 
risk management activity is of value for the organization, but on a practical 
level, it should be considered of no value.  Frequently, we were led astray 
by rhetoric, because it was pleasant to the ear, while on the other hand, 
we shunned those who spoke their truth openly, according to which, in 
their view, risk management is of no value to them . In the course of the 
years we learned that it is more correct to regard those who honestly are 
against the risk management concept, for reasons of their own, as 
potential partners, than those who, for political reasons, provide us with 
lulling rhetoric. 
 
 Cynic consideration of human life: As we expressed above, engaging in 
risk management, means for us a matter of life and death, particularly so, 
as the extent of errors and the harm caused by them, may be reduced by 
appropriate treatment. At times, we encountered cynic understanding of 
the eventuality of loss of human life as a result of improper consideration 
of risk management. Needless to say that, considerations of this kind, 
could have discouraged us, as without committed partners, from within the 
organization, no effective risk management activity is possible. 
 
 Disbelief in the possibility that a model, which had been successful 
in one content world, would be successful also in another content 
world:  In chapter 6.5, we are referring to the countless doubts we 
encountered, when we offered to implement our experience in the field of 
risk management in aviation also in other fields, among others the field of 
medicine. However, to give justice to the real facts, we must confess there 
was a strong desire to try to implement the aviation experience also in 
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medicine. For some reason, it suited the physicians to learn from the 
pilots. 
 
 Lack of belief in us as being able to bring about a process of change 
in the attitude to risk management, and later on to a decrease in the 
rate of errors:  The major argument, which we had to deal with, was that 
we lacked the required understanding of the content world, so as to be 
able to promote the subject of risk management in respect thereof. The 
point of view, according to which the domain of risk management 
represents a professional discipline in itself, unrelated to specific technical 
know-how, was prevalent at that time.  In this context, it is interesting to 
mention an episode, in which Yossi had been involved in the I.A.F. in 
1977.  When he was recruited by the Safety and Quality Control 
Administration to investigate the human factor, he expressed his doubts to 
his commander, Colonel S., a very experienced fighter pilot, about being 
able to carry out this task, without any background of flying. S. told him: 
"You will be the best pilot among the psychologists, and the best 
psychologist among the pilots". The truth is, in the perspective of time, S. 
was right. The know-how required to understand a certain content world 
may be acquired as necessary, so this would not pose any serious barrier 
to achievements in the field of risk management.  
 
  Our own doubts about our ability to realize concrete achievements: 
The expectation of our clients was mostly that, within a relatively short 
time, we would succeed in bringing about changes, which would generate 
concrete achievements in the rate of errors and in the extent of losses to 
the organization.  Although, we always attributed value to coordinating 
expectations and were careful not to promise something we were not sure 
we would be able to provide, it was clear to us that we must achieve 
results and to do so promptly. Quite often we had doubts about our ability 
to do it. We discussed above the background and atmosphere in 
organizations towards risk management concepts, which could give 




From all the aforesaid, a frustrating picture may arise. However, wherever we 
started working, we found many positive aspects, which were related to 
particularly dedicated people, to committed  managers with a  visionary attitude, 
to successes in domains, which, at first, appeared to be particularly complex, and 
to the genuine desire of most of our partners to fight the unnecessary loss of life. 
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Beyond business, the origins of our motivations 
 
Risk management is our source of income, although both of us have additional 
occupations. Quite often, we both thought about dedicating ourselves completely 
to our other fields of interest and to put risk management aside, due to the 
frustrations we described above.  
 
There is one frustration we did not mention in the preceding paragraph which is 
related to the economic aspects of dealing with risk management. Due to the fact 
that in all cases we had to convince our clients to enter into this domain, while 
they had never even considered this possibility in their work plans, we had to 
make significant concessions, among them financial concessions, at the stage of 
drafting the contracts. Thus, we found ourselves supplying substantial volumes of 
work, which exceeded by far the remuneration we received. Unrelated to the 
remuneration received, we did what we considered to be right to do, without any 
appropriate economic thought, as the life of human beings was concerned.  
 
It is interesting to point out that most of the people dealing with risk management, 
who regard their work as a calling, are providing to the system, in which they are 
working, larger volumes of work hours than their employment conditions demand.  
 
In certain cases, when negotiating with particularly difficult clients, we would 
make an exceptional offer, according to which we were ready to take 
responsibility for the risk of starting the project and to benefit, when the time 
came, from a certain percentage of the financial savings the system made as a 
result of a decrease in the rate of accidents. Much to our surprise, in no such 
case did the clients accept this offer.  
 
Is there a pay for saving the life of human beings?  As we consider our activity as 
an activity aiming to save human life, the question is, whether it is possible, at all, 
to state a price for our services?    
 
Our sages said: "Whosoever saves a single soul of Israel, Scripture ascribes it to 
him as though he had saved a whole world"   (Sanhedrin).                                          
 
This saying summarizes to a major extent the value of human life.  This conflict 
between an activity aiming at saving a whole world and the economic aspect is a 
conflict inherent in the world of risk management.  
The real pay is saving human life and sometimes this will serve as a hidden 




In summary, we are writing this book out of the belief and hope that our 
experience, which we are sharing here in a direct and honest manner, will be 
able to save human life, as a natural continuation of the deep-rooted motivations, 
which induced us to deal with risk management and to persist in doing so, 































The rationale for non empiric, experience based research, 











The Non empiric experience based research methodology - A personal 
view 
 
In 1973 when we were studying psychology at Bar Ilan University (Israel), the 
prevailing attitude, and the only one per se, at the psychology department was 
that empirical research was the only acceptable option for advancing the science 
of Psychology.  
 
The qualitative approach was marginally mentioned, particularly pertaining to 
case studies, but in the same breath it was dismissed as irrelevant and an 
excuse for sloppy research.  
 
In those days the Psychology department at Bar Ilan, had hired many new 
faculty, some of them were well known internationally.  They had started out their 
careers in the US and due to their Zionist attitudes; they wished to immigrate to 
Israel and impact the local arena with their vast research experience. Amongst 
those, were Prof. Babkoff, Prof. Lobov, Prof. Weisenberg, Prof. Milgram, and 
some others as well. They were all trained in the positivistic approach and were 
its foremost advocates. In the 70s of the last century, the Psychology department 
at Bar Ilan achieved excellent status as a respected research facility, particularly 




“..The Great tragedy of Science - the slaying of a 
beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact...” 
 




As young students, we respected this approach but did not necessarily feel 
comfortable with it. It was clear to us that Psychology in its desire to be a 
recognized and well established science field was mandated to function 
according to all the prevailing assumptions, rules and paradigms of Science. This 
is how it was explained to us. However, even then we were most uncomfortable 
within an environment in which only strict experimental structures and paradigms 
were an unquestionable condition for the acceptability of any premise making it 
impossible to express the great wealth of experiences, which occur, in the 
encounter of Psychology and reality.  
 
In retrospect, the fact that we were trained in positivism, prevented us from 
describing the dramatic turn of events in the Israeli Air Force in the area of Risk 
Management, during the 70's & 80's of the previous century, since this turn of 
events did not strike us as fitting the positivistic requirements. We notice this 
regretfully, as it was in those days that the Aviation Model for Risk Management 
was developed, with all its insights and principles.   
 
In Chapter 1, we detailed our great interest in pursuing this topic.  
Yossi served in MAVKA (Safety and Quality Control Administration) in the Israeli 
Air Force for nearly 15 years and was one of the major contributors to defining 
concepts and procedures of IAF Risk Management model. This long-term 
association was the prime asset that enabled us to initiate defining our aviation 
risk management model, and then transfer it to Macabi within the context 
described in this work. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that in another set of circumstances and particularly 
in the organizational reality of the Israeli Air Force, in which officers are 
















The History of Qualitative Research 
 
Tzabar Bar – Yosef (2001), states that in Israel the recognition in the legitimacy 
of qualitative research arised years after it was recognized in the West. This 
could be due to the lack of publications in Hebrew on this topic. This is in spite 
of the fact that this recognition and its contribution to social sciences has been 
growing in the west, over the past twenty years.  
 
 
Applying qualitative methodology, requires a change of the research paradigm 
to a post –positivist paradigm, whose principles, assumptions, terminology and 
applications are in many ways contrary to the positivist approach, upon which 
we were raised along with the rest of our professional generation.   
 
Every reality perception is based on working assumptions, which define the 
characteristics of reality, the options for exploring it and knowing it, the 
relationship between the researcher and his subject, and criteria for defining the 
validity, reliability and integrity of the study.  
 
In the positivistic paradigm, reality is total, ontological, external, independent of 
time and context, and can be described using basic components, which are 
statistically related. The researcher‟s task in this paradigm is to separate the 
components of this reality, investigate them with objective tools and thus create 
an ever-growing mosaic body of knowledge.  
 
In the constructivist paradigm, reality is a subjective construction, created by the 
cultural and personal characteristics of the subject and the researcher and thus  
has no existence without them. Reality is given meaning both by the researcher 
and subject‟s interpretation of it.  
 
Therefore, the goal of qualitative research is not to discover reality, as there is 
no one objective reality, but rather to examine and experience it, with the goal to 
understand it's the various meanings.  Qualitative researchers, use a variety of 
research methods, and cross-reference all sorts of information and sources. 
This approach enables them to understand the many facets of reality. According 
to the constructivist approach, it is impossible to isolate variables, but rather one 




Denizen & Lincoln, (2000), recognize six periods in the development of 
Qualitative research: 
 
1. The Traditional Period: 1900 up to WW2 – During this period, 
researchers wrote reports, meant to provide supposedly objective 
information about life in the colonies and dealt mostly with the odd 
and unusual. These reports described the “natives” and their habits 
from an outsider‟s position. The classical example of this period was 
represented by Melinovsky‟s work as described by Geertz (1988).  
 
2. The Modern Period: 1950- 1970 – This period is defined as the 
Golden Age of Qualitative research, and it was during this period that 
attempts were made  to formalize Qualitative research and create 
working assumptions which do not fall short of the positivist paradigm. 
Field data was analyzed with statistical tools using the accepted 
norms of positivism. Many Qualitative researchers also brought their 
social views, some subscribed to a Neo-Marxist view, whose 
proponents are the founders of the critical theory.  
 
Actually, we are looking at various mergers of two paradigms, which 
is also acceptable today. Examples of classical work in this field are 
(Becker et al 1961), on the socialization of medical students, as well 
as (Wolcott, 1973), describing the life of a manager.  
 
3. Blurred Genres – 1970-1986 – Qualitative research was at its peak 
and many theories abounded, some of these were symbolic 
interaction, constructivism, phenomenology, ethno-methodology, 
social theory, neo-Marxism, feminism, sexual preference, and others. 
In 1973, Geertz published his book “A Commentary on Cultures”, and 
coined the phrase "Thick description", which speaks about the scope 
and details of events, traditions and rituals.  
The borders between social sciences and the arts were blurred. 
Social Scientists turned to the arts to find theories for test analysis, 
and Arts scholars turned to the social sciences in a search for 
methodologies to study cultures. The era of pure Social science 
passed. Literary, style replaced the scientific research style of writing. 
The researcher was perceived as an eclectic entity making use of 
many disciplines and bodies of knowledge in order to express his 
views and observations. Alongside these developments, doubts arose 
regarding the validity and integrity of these findings, since the 
researcher was not bound by rules or requirements in his writing, to 
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define his own involvement and criteria for evaluating his research. 
The dominant paradigm of this period was constructivism, whose 
founding fathers include Piaget. This style is apparent in works from 
that period such as Lincoln & Guba (1985), Woods (1979), Erickson 
(1975), as well as many others.  
 
4. Crisis of Representation – 1986-1990 – This period is represented 
by a significant split between the various methodologies, as described 
by different authors primarily Marcus & Fisher (1986), who discussed 
the main issue of the split: Is it at all possible to represent reality, 
which by its very nature is subjective? What does this body of 
research represent?  Is it the researcher, his background and his 
political views?  Researchers are most often, white males, western, 
middle or upper middle class, and are these aspects represented in 
the research? These texts have raised significant doubts within the 
profession, regarding the conducting of these studies, their reporting 
methods, and the impact of gender, sexual and racial orientation on 
these studies.  
 
5. Post –Modernism – 1990-1995 – Typical to this period were new & 
experimental ethnographies, which attempted to respond to the 
“Crisis of Representation” which exemplified the previous period. The 
trend was  aimed   to replace general theories with theories and 
narratives that apply to specific situations and problems where it is 
possible to give voice to “the other”. Creation of new ethnographies 
was enabled due to the refusal to give an advantage to any of the 
prevailing research methodologies. Many scholars learned to express 
their own feelings in conjunction with their positions and conclusions 
and place themselves within the texts.  
 
6. Post Experimental 1995-2000 and the Futuristic 2000 - These two 
current periods, continue in the moral narrative regarding qualitative 
research. The post experimental period gets its appellation as it 
arrives after a long period of trial and  error in finding a solution for the 
issue of representation. In this period, the qualitative researcher 
poses questions of moral and ethical nature, while relating to literary 
ethnographies, poetry, multi – media, blogs etc. as relevant sources 
of information. Research deals with the issues of gender, race, 





With the current insights of qualitative research, it is clear that scholars are 
investigating reality from their own perspective of gender, status, culture and 
personal opinions. All these, actually define the scholar‟s system of ideas 
(Theory & Ontology); this in turn defines the research questions (Epistemology), 
which the researcher is trying to asses, using a variety of research methods 
(Methodology).   
 
In spite of the developments in qualitative research methods and its basic 
assumptions, over the past few years, its many shaded varieties, continue to 
live side by side with each other and any new structure that may appear, does 
not cancel out the existence of the previously existing structures.  
 
It is worth mentioning, that in our perception, the field of Risk Management is 
controlled by the qualitative paradigm, from its very roots, despite  many 
attempts, made  by scientists to define algorithms and methods to formalize  
this discipline. 
 
Although, there are some models implemented to understand  errors (Reason, 
1990), adverse events and accidents, and even though these are clearly 
defined models, it is common knowledge, that two risk managers, investigating 
the same event, will most likely arrive at different conclusions and different 
recommendations.  
 
In courses, we took on the basics of Aviation Risk Management at the 
University of Southern California, in the 1980s, instructed by leaders in the field 
such as Prof. R. Woods,  Prof. C. Mason, attempted to teach us models for 
developing an unified approach and methods, to ensure that regardless of the 
investigating team, investigation results would be similar.  
 
In reality, in cases where the same event was investigated by different teams, 
time after time, we witnessed the variety and difference, even when the basic 
facts and case information were quite similar, the background and makeup of 
the investigation teams made a difference.  
 
These days, as we write this chapter, we are also coordinators and lecturers of 
an advanced risk management course, as part of the Continuous Medical 
Education (CME) program at Tel Aviv University Medical School. As part of the 
course, we teach the basics of adverse event investigation and end the course 
run a hand on exercise. During this exercise, the class splits into 3-4 groups.  
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Each group investigates an event with identical facts. The results were as 
always, surprising.  Differences were observed throughout each stage of the 
investigation:  
 
 Definition stage – Answering the question: What is the event we are 
investigating?  
 Defining the event‟s boundaries - What was the initiating factor which 
started the chain of events and what was its final event?   
 Defining the event‟s outcomes.    
 Defining the chain of events which led to the event itself.  
 Defining the risks, which contributed to the events occurrence.  
 Defining the conclusions and recommendations aimed to reduce the 
probability of a recurrence.  
 
In some cases, the observed differences  were radical; one team did not even 
perceive the event as being adverse, claiming  that these types of events occur 
often in their workplace, therefore, there is no reason to handle them as adverse 
events, but rather treat them as normative. Another team discovered a number 
of adverse events in the report, whereas another team found the administering 
physician as being solely responsible for the error, whilst another team found 
the system to be at fault.  
 
The obvious conclusion is that in spite of our attempts to provide these students 
with identical tools and formal procedures for conducting the investigation, their 
backgrounds, professional culture & training, status, basic attitude towards 
human error   and the special circumstances in which these errors occur, are 
contributing factors towards the many versions, procedures and outcomes of 
the same event. Each person constructs the adverse event according to his or 
her personal perspective and organizational context.  
 
The modern perception of the phenomenon of errors is that it is a systemic 
phenomenon, enabled and influenced by many factors.  One of the prevailing 
models is 5M, Man, Machine, Mission, Management and  Medium, encourages 
a systemic approach and a possibility of a multi factor contribution causing the 
error. Despite this, many risk managers, both senior and  new to the field, tend 
to favor certain factors over others. For example, some risk managers tend to 
explain that errors are a result of overload and fatigue, whereas others focus 
primarily on negligence or malpractice. Some stress a lack of managerial 
involvement and improper supervision; others see the ergonomic interface 
between the operator and the machine (MMI – Man Machine Interface) as a 
prime factor etc. One of our main roles as risk management trainers is to enable 
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the novices to see a wide spectrum of possibilities and factors, in order to 
understand the errors, not only based on their personal experience and 
preferences. 
 
Shkedi (2003), analyzes the influence of the positivistic school on the research 
of educational systems. He argues that concepts such as “the average student”, 
or the “average teacher”, are abstract models that do injustice to truly 
understanding the world of teachers and students. His premise, suggests that 
after conducting “statistical acrobatics”, we are eventually able to explain only a 
small percentage of variation in the studied phenomenon. He goes on to say, 
that the quantitative approach has in all effect neutralized all educational 
research for years, since the questions asked, were only those, for which 
objective measurement  tools could be  provided. 
  
 
Types of Qualitative Research 
 
Qualitative research, by its nature, allows for many possible structures. Under 
the definition of “Qualitative Research” come many different research paradigms 
whose broadest common denominator is that they are definitely not positivistic.  
 
As there are many types of qualitative research, it is impossible to favor one 
over the rest, but rather one should choose the approach suitable to the task.  
 
There are several classifications of qualitative research such as (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990), which differentiate between these types of qualitative research: 
Grounded Theory, Phenomenology, Life Histories and Conversation Analysis. 
Moss (2004), uses the term tradition in order to separate the different types of 
qualitative research and has observed five main traditions: Ethnography, 
Harmonious, Phenomenology, Critical –Theoretical and  Post Modernism. 
Creswell (1998) also suggests five types of qualitative research, although his 
are somewhat different: Biographical, Phenomenological, Grounded Theory, 
Ethnography and Case Studies. Tesch (1990), presented a very detailed list of 
types of qualitative research and her list includes over 40 different types.  
Denizen & Lincoln (2000) suggested an all-encompassing definition for 
Qualitative Research, as they found the term Qualitative Research has different 
meanings in different situations:  
 “Qualitative Research is  context related , offering an observation point  on the 
world… the meaning of which is that qualitative scholars examine the objects in 
their natural setting , trying to uncover meaning  or interpret the phenomenon in 
a language common to the laymen" (Translated from the Hebrew version).  
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Guba & Lincoln (1998), suggest differentiating between using the term 
qualitative to describe different methodologies of research and the concept of 
“Qualitative” to denote different research paradigms.  
 
In this context, a research paradigm describes the basic assumptions of a 
specific research method. Accordingly, in Guba & Lincoln‟s opinion, both 
quantitative and qualitative methods may be applicable in any research 
paradigm.  
 
Based on this argument, they offer differentiating between four research 
paradigms of qualitative research, Positivistic, Post – Positivistic, Theoretical – 
Critical and constructivist. In each of these paradigms, there could be both 
qualitative and quantitative methods in accordance with the specific 
requirements of the research.  
 
The authors stress, that they prefer the constructivist paradigm as the most 
appropriate paradigm for qualitative research. We could reduce this to two 
extreme paradigms, Positivistic – Quantitative and Constructionist – Qualitative.  
 
Clearly, adopting one paradigm or another, involves the use of specific research 
methodologies. Thus, adopting the Positivistic – Quantitative approach, would 
involve using formal mathematical methods providing generalized results 
lacking any specific context. Adopting the Constructivist – Qualitative paradigm 
on the other hand, involves the use of narrative analysis, which is context 
specific.  
 
We can therefore continue to claim that the assumptions stemming from one 
paradigm cannot be examined with methodologies  based on a different 
paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 1998).  The question of whether we can even 
discuss the validity of qualitative research with quantitative research tools has 
been discussed at length and qualitative researchers, such as Kvale (1989), 
have questioned the validity of the initial query. He stated,  that in our ignorance 
we have attempted to adjust the characteristics of action research to the eternal 
debate, regarding the validity of quantitative research, which hardly address 
qualitative research.    
 
In reference to the problem emerging from a lack of uniform terminology, Shkedi 
(2003), suggests sorting the currently prevailing terminology of qualitative 
research into four groups. Each term can belong to more than one group and 




1. Terms related to the Research Approach – In this group we find the 
following terms: Qualitative research, Ethnography, Narrative based 
research, Naturalistic research, Constructivist research, Descriptive 
research, field research, and Interpretive research. When used in 
reference to the research paradigm, these terms speak of the same 
paradigm, which Guba & Lincoln (1998), named The Constructivist 
Paradigm. 
 
2. Terms related to the Research Strategy – this group is often called the 
Research tradition, type of study, or genre. This group of terms refers to 
the research from an operational standpoint. The prevailing terms in this 
case are case study, multi case study, action based research, 
ethnography, anthropology, biography, phenomenology, life histories, life 
stories, and field-based theory, quality evaluation etc. Despite the fact 
that all these strategies are typical of the constructivist - qualitative 
paradigm, several, such as, case studies or quality evaluation, can also 
be included in the quantitative – positivistic paradigm.  
 
3. Terms related to the Research Methodology - this group refers to the 
research method, particularly data gathering techniques. There are 
research methods more applicable to the constructivist – qualitative 
paradigm that is participatory observation, in-depth interviews, focus 
groups and different ways of analyzing observations, interviews and 
written materials. Qualitative researchers may use some methods 
associated with the Positivistic- quantitative paradigm, which would be 
pure observation, structured interview, closed questionnaire and 
processing and analyzing of content.  
 
4. Terms related to the Final Research Report - this group of terms refers 
to the character of the research written report, among which are: 
ethnographic description, biography, case study description, multi- case 
study description, phenomenological description, etc. All reports in the 
Qualitative – Constructivist paradigm have similar characteristics: they 
are descriptive, include background and cross-referencing, and are all 
very different form the report style based on the quantitative – positivistic 





Assumptions of the Qualitative - Constructivist Research 
 
Kuhn (1962) was the first to coin the term "Paradigm" in reference to the history 
and  sociology of science. He differentiated between two stages in scientific 
development, the normative and the revolutionary. The normative stage is 
exemplified by trying to piece a jigsaw puzzle by using acceptable, 
preconceived scientific working assumptions. However, the more pieces to the 
puzzle, the more chances that some pieces may not fit, the more pieces we find 
that do not fit the puzzle, and the harder it becomes to support the current 
theory.  
 
Each research paradigm is supported by   basic assumptions, these cannot be 
proven or refuted and they reflect series of beliefs held by a group of 
researchers. Basic assumptions form the infrastructure upon which scientists 
build their puzzle of accumulated knowledge in any given domain.  
 
The positivistic paradigm also termed as quantitative, conventional and 
scientific, is the prevailing paradigm for the past few hundred years. The 
Constructivist Paradigm also known as qualitative, phenomenological, 
naturalistic, harmonious and interpretive has also been around for hundreds of 
years but was unpopular with researchers who preferred the former.  
 
According to Lincoln & Guba (1985), Denzin & Lincoln (2000), as well as others, 
a paradigm is defined as capable of answering three central questions:  
 
1. What is the nature of reality? 
2. What is the relationship between “the knower” and  the object of his 
knowledge? 
3. In what ways is this knowledge acquired?  
 
Accordingly the qualitative - constructivist paradigm, is inherently different from 
the quantitative – positivistic, in the manner it  addresses  these three questions.  
 
1. The 1st basic question: What is the nature of reality? 
This question has the air of an ontological question (a branch of philosophy 
dealing in meta-physics, which tries to understand existence). Any answer to 
this question influences the manner in which we investigate reality; thus, when 
we conduct research we view our role and ourselves in relation to the subject of 




The term Positivism, was coined by Auguste Comte in the 30's of the 19th 
century, as a synonym to “Science”, meaning concrete facts which can be 
observed (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). On the other hand, the qualitative- 
constructivist paradigm considers reality as a whole, and therefore its attitude 
towards reality is holistic (Stake, 1995). Therefore, constructivist researchers try 
to study  and understand occurrences and events,  as whole entities in their 
natural context (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).  
 
As an outcome of these arguments, the constructivist school claims that 
understanding the context of the observed phenomenon is critical to 
understanding its reality. There is great importance as well to the historical 
reality in which this phenomenon takes place, its uniqueness, the state in which 
it takes place, the background for its occurrence, and its associations to other 
events and conditions.  
  
It is noteworthy to mention that when we investigated errors, which led to 
accidents, an error could have been disastrous many cases, whereas in other 
instances it was only a “near miss”. In such cases, we raise the question: what 
factors create the extreme difference in the error‟s ramifications. We found that 
close study of this difference, which in most cases is closely connected to the 
interaction of “the error maker”, with himself, his physical and  social 
environment, proved of great value in the prevention of future errors, rather than 
a uniform definition of the error. For example, a similar   error, when made by a 
senior pilot or by a rookie, received a completely different meaning, and 
following that, led often to different recommendations.  
 
In the positivistic paradigm, the relationship between bits and chunks of 
information is defined in a hierarchal system, drawn up in a flow chart, therefore 
there will always be higher level and lower level of information.  In comparison, 
in the constructivist school, the relationship between the bits of information is 
complex and varies according to each situation. One can see the manner in 
which the information is organized by this school as a multi dimensional 
hologram (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994).  
 
The explanation given to the conclusions in the positivistic paradigm is usually 
linear and causal: A causes B and B causes C. On the other hand, in the 
constructivist paradigm cause is reciprocal: An affects B, B affects A, A & B 







2. The 2nd  Basic Question - What is the relationship between “the knower” 
and  the object of his knowledge? 
It is possible to rephrase this question to: How can we be certain that we know 
what we know?  Usually this question is regarded as an epistemological 
question*. Supporters of the positivistic paradigm claim that the researcher can 
and should maintain an objective position towards his the study. Whereas, 
those supporting the constructivist paradigm claim that it is impossible to 
separate between the researcher and his study, (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000).  
 
It may be assumed, that in the constructivist school, man has no existence 
outside reality, and reality has no existence outside man (Maykut & Morehouse, 
1994).  
 
According to the constructivist viewpoint,  the reality in which we live, is created 
through structure, meaning that it is not there in advance, but is constructed 
gradually based on the meaning , which we bestow to  all that we experience 
(Bruner, 1996).  
 
According to the constructivist school, the researcher cannot understand human 
behavior from a position of an outside observer, taking up only the physical 
space in which he stands. More so, the researcher must comprehend what the 
“actors” mean by their behavior, from their point of view. (Sciarra, 1999, p. 43): 
"Constructivist Scholars are on the inside, assimilating themselves in the social 
setting and minds of the participants…..”     (Translated from Hebrew) 
 
Accordingly, if reality is the result of construction and there is no separation 
between the” knower” and the object of his knowledge, then the values if all 
participants in the study, are relevant to understanding the studied phenomenon 
(Moss, 1996). Nevertheless, if reality can be broken into components, and if the 
researcher can place himself outside his object, as the positivistic school claims, 







* Epistemology- the science of knowledge, a branch of philosophy dealing with nature and the 




3. The 3rd  Basic question -  In what ways is knowledge acquired?  
This question is actually a methodological one, as it deals with methods and 
means for obtaining knowledge about reality. According to Guba & Lincoln 
(1989, p. 83), methodology is a practical field in philosophy of science, dealing 
with methods, systems and rules for conducting research.  
 
If we adopt scientific ontology and objective epistemology, it is reasonable to 
assume that we will tend towards a Quantitative - Positivistic methodology. 
However, if we believe in relative ontology, interactive epistemology, it is 
possible that we would tend towards qualitative – constructivist methodology.  
 
Guba & Lincoln (1989, p. 88), described it best: “Just as the response to an 
epistemological question depends on the response to ontological question, thus 
does the response to a methodology question depend on the other two”. 
 
The qualitative – constructivist researcher, believes that he himself and other 
people as well, are the primary means for data collection. The most effective 
way to gather relevant data on reality is to observe it, talk about it, listen to what 
others have to say, and take an active part in all its activities. Contrary to the 
quantitative- positivistic school, the qualitative – constructivist researcher is not 
attempting to manipulate and control  variables isolated from reality, but rather 
he accepts the complexity and the holistic nature of reality as a given.  
 
Contrary to studying behavior and interactions under artificial laboratory 
conditions, in which the positivistic researcher attempts to control and 
manipulate, what he believes are the relevant variables, the constructivist 
researcher strives to learn about the people in their own environment, inner 
world, and routine daily activities (Reason & Rowan, 1982): 
 “...Research doesn‟t have to be another brick in the wall. It is obscene to take 
young researchers who actually wants to know more about people, and to divert 
them into manipulating “variables”, counting “behaviors”, observing “responses” 
and all the rest of the ways in which people are falsified and fragmented. If we 
want to know about people, we have to encourage them to be who they are, 
and to resist all attempts to make them - or ourselves - into something we are 
not, but which is more easily observable, or countable, or manipulable...” 
 
While writing these lines, we feel a need to share an experience, from our early 
days as psychologists in the Air Force, entrusted to understand the meaning of 
human error in flight accidents.   
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In 1977, about a year after Yossi, started to work for IAF's ASQD (MAVKA), a 
fatal accident occurred in southern Israel, in which Lieutenant G. was killed. 
Lieutenant G., was a young pilot, who graduated from the flight school, about a 
year before. G. was considered to be an excellent fighter pilot, with a non-
conformist fiery personality .His basic attitude was that   Procedures were 
meant for others, not for him.  
 
The Air Force formed a committee to investigate the accident which was 
comprised of senior pilots and technical staff, to eliminate any possibility of a 
technical failure.   
 
The accident occurred during an air to air combat training manoeuvre, during 
which Lt. G. lost control of the aircraft and consequently crashed. At the time I 
asked the head of MAVKA, Col. S. why isn‟t the human factor being 
investigated and only the technical and operational facets are on focus? He 
gave me a long hard look with his deep blue eyes, (I was at the time a young 
Lieutenant), making me almost regret that I had even asked, and then he 
replied; “Because what happened is absolutely clear, it was a typical pilot 
error...” I continued my probe, “But why did he committed that error? It was well 
known that he was an excellent pilot. Col. S. gave me another long gaze and 
asked me in a semi joking manner, “Young man, do you believe that you can 
teach us something new?” I smiled in embarrassment and answered, “I am not 
sure, but I would really like to know what happened there... why he was killed…” 
He responded softly, stressing each word pronounced, “You know, in our Air 
Force, we do not ask such questions, he erred and he paid for it and we must 
move on”. I thought about what he meant for a few minutes and turned back to 
him: “But if we don‟t understand what happened there…how can you be sure it 
won‟t happen to another young lieutenant tomorrow morning”? 
He asked for some time to think about it and promised me to discuss the issue 
with the Air Force Commander in Chief.  
 
A few days later, Col. S., showed up in my office, sat in the chair facing mine 
and said: “I cannot believe that he would approve it…. But he did…perhaps he 
knows something I don‟t”.  
 
The IAF, for the first time since its inception and after sustaining quite a few 
critical accidents, gave a green light to conduct an in-depth investigation into the 
human factor contribution in Lt. G. accident. It is important to note that there 
were no precedents from which I could learn how to do this. Not in Israel and 
not in any of the Western air –forces with whom we were in contact.  
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The mandate I was granted was to “Ask any question, interview any person of 
any rank, review every document, visit any flight squadron, and observe all 
activities, all in order to bring us closer to understanding why Lt. G. was killed".  
 
Over the course of about three months I have interviewed all G. commanders, 
his friends both in the squadron and outside of it, and studied every scrap of 
paper that documented his entire Air Force service: from his first flights at flight 
school and up to the briefing he attended just before the fatal flight. I studied the 
G.'s selection file including a great deal of information about his personality and 
skills.  I studied the record of similar flight accidents in the Air Force and abroad. 
I studied the technical specs of the aircraft type, and the maintenance record of 
the aircraft that crashed. I went into the specifics of air  combat training, during 
which the accident occured. I reconstructed all Lt.. G‟s steps and behaviour for 
the week preceding the accident, and in even greater detail. The 24 hours 
preceding the fateful flight. 
 
My report was unprecedented, both in its scope and detail. Over 60 typed pages 
in which I described every detail I thought was relevant to understanding the 
underlying roots of G's errors. The report addressed also the general ambience 
of the squadron, the relationships between Lt. G. and the squadron commander 
as well as other pilots. I covered the common norms in the squadron for 
monitoring and supervising young pilots, and compared these norms with those 
of other squadrons. In addition I detailed   Lt. G's achievements, professional 
development and other relevant information.  
 
Towards the end of the report I felt that the expression “pilot error”, showed 
some sort of disparagement and misrepresentation of the complex system, in 
which the accident occurred and which had many contributors, other than the 
pilot who paid with his life.  
 
When I presented the report to Col. S, he smiled and asked “So, do you think 
psychologists need 60 typed pages in order to have their say, while we pilots 
can say it in 2 words?”  
 
After reading the report, he invited me to his office and stated:  "We cannot 
publish the report, as it would be too dangerous". I asked him to hand the report 
as is, to Air Force Commander in Chief, which he did.  
 
The Air Force Commander in Chief, read the report carefully, made a number of 
meaningful corrections, trimmed it down and asked me to accept the changes. 
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I corrected the report accordingly and gave it back for approval. He called me in 
to his office along with. Col. S. and asked us: "Is this how you intend to 
investigate Air Force accidents from now on?" I responded that I thought it 
would be appropriate, as we have many pilots in the Air Force, whose lives we 
might save by learning what really causes the accidents. He was a bit aghast 
when he asked, “So you think it was not his fault, but all of ours?” And 
immediately added, "I don‟t think you are wrong, I just think it is too early to 
come out with these ideas… we‟ll start the revolution slowly but sure enough 
and we will make it happen”. He suggested that the report remain confidential, 
albeit added to the official accident report, in a sealed envelope, with the highest 
security code. However, he approved this type of investigations for all future 
accidents involving human factors.  
 
From close examination of Lt. G‟s accident and its aftermath, I can safely say 
that although my report was basically shelved, all its recommendations and 
conclusions were fully applied.  
 
Later, many more accidents were investigated by this method, which provided 
the Air Force with new opportunities to understand the phenomenon of flight 
accidents and reduce their rates significantly.  
 
We shared this experience to illustrate that without realizing it, and without even 
being aware of the constructivist paradigm, we acted according to its basic 
principles. We did so, as we have not found any other way to describe the 
wealth and complexity of the conditions, factors and background that 
contributed to G.'s error and its fatal outcome. 
 
 
Action Research  
 
 Reason & Bradbury, ( 2006), describe action research as follows: 
"Action research is participatory, democratic process concerned with developing 
practical knowledge in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a 
participatory worldview which we believe is emerging in this historical moment. It 
seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation 
with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to 
people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and 
communities..” 
 
Action researchers plan their research much like qualitative researchers when 
dealing with engaged and longitudinal field research. They utilize several 
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methods which include: interviews, focus groups and data collection through 
social networks.  
 
One of the main differences between action research and other qualitative 
research paradigms is the fact that in action research the differentiation 
between the researcher and his object is often blurred, in the course of long 
term cooperation. Action research is mostly exemplified as a working “with” 
rather than working “on”. Research subjects, become over the course of time 
research partners (Reason & Bradbury, 2006).  
 
In order to put some order into the broad range of action research Reason and 
Tobert (2001),   suggested three broad tracks for application of action research:  
 
1. First person action research – Relates to the researchers ability to 
espouse an investigative method for observing his own life, to be 
constantly aware, and to choose to evaluate the effects of his behaviour on 
the rest of the world. This type of action research may contribute too many 
daily activities.   
 
2. Second Person action research – Deals with our ability to conduct face 
to face research with others on issues of mutual interest, for instance, 
improving our professional ability as individuals and as teams. This type of 
action research begins with a dialog and includes the development of 
research communities studying organizations and learning.  
 
3. Third person action research – A type of action research geared to 
broaden the scope of projects and include people who have no previous 
acquaintance. Writing, as well as other reporting methods, describing the 
process and its outcomes, may provide an important standard for this type 
of research.  
 
The philosophical foundation of action research is attributed to John Dewey 
(1933), in his book “How We Think”. Dewey encouraged his students to learn 
how to think and not cite facts and others ideas. He argued, that education 
should make greater use of team work, hereby student can generate 
hypotheses together, which later they should examine in reality.  
 
Nevertheless, Dewey did not coin the phrase Action Research and according to 
French and Bell (1990), this phrase was attributed to two scholars who operated 
independently of each other, John Collier and Kurt Levin. Collier coined the 
phrase while working with Native American Indians and whites in attempt to 
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improve their relations, while working as the commissioner for Indian affairs 
between 1933-1945.  
 
Levin‟s work was formed in the context of his Jewish German background, 
suffering from Anti-Semitism who eventually immigrated to the US and showed 
an interest in the pressing issues raised in the wake of WWII, particularly the 
organizational and social issues. These were the circumstances, which formed 
his views regarding action-research as a democratic research tool, used to take 
advantage of the power of science to understand and change human behavior.  
 
Shein (2006), claims that some of the best opportunities for research are in 
situations that were not created by the researcher. In his opinion, data 
collection, structuring a concept and developing theories are the result of a 
research attitude, which is the desire to clarify events and communicate these 
clarifications to other researchers. Shein states, that the best opportunities for 
research are present in situations structured by others, needing assistance, and 
not those made by the researcher. Collection of useful data in an area defined 
as a “client” in need of help is the definition of a clinical research (Shein, 1987).  
  
Shein (2006) does not oppose positivistic research, but he worries that the 
academic community does not prepare students in social sciences to conduct 
useful fieldwork using qualitative research tools. The students are not provided 
with basic tools for conducting an interview, observation, and developing 
insights, to enable them, as early as possible in their careers to get in touch with 
their natural tendencies:  “…We need to legitimate clinical research as a valid 
part of our field and start to train people in helping skills as well as research 
skills. And we need more insight into our cultural assumptions to determine how 
much they bias our perceptions and interpretations of what is going on…  " 
 
Shein (2006), goes on to summarize by saying that he feels that the positivistic 
research paradigm has an imperialistic tendency, and that it presents itself to 
the imperator  in its nudity much too often, therefore it is time to change and  to 
innovate. This innovation is a return to good solid observation of the old-
fashioned type, and clean research in situations where we try to help clients 
solve real problems: "Isn‟t it more important to try to help them and learn in the 
process, than make a sacred cow of research paradigm that produces neither 




Summary: Thoughts on our study and its linkage to the Qualitative – 
Constructivist paradigm.  
 
As we have previously mentioned, we unknowingly conducted our Risk 
Management consulting work, with accordance to the Qualitative – 
Constructivist paradigm, as this was the paradigm, which enabled us to conduct 
Risk Management activities, which fit in with our views and insights, acquired 
through the course of our work for the Israeli Air Force.  
 
Investigation of errors, adverse events or accidents, is a basic    process in Risk 
Management, which serves as a constructive response of the involved parties 
and the system to a fault. The goal of the investigation is to try to understand:  
What happened? How did it happen?  Why did it happen? And what can be 
done to prevent reoccurrence of the error? In addition, the investigation seeks to 
answer the following questions: What caused the accident? What were other 
contributing factors? What enabled it? To answer these questions, collection of 
a lot of data is required. The data is collected from different sources, utilizing a 
variety of methods, in order to understand the process of the error within its own 
unique context.  
 
It is clear, that the investigation is a constructivist process; it asks many different 
questions, according to the particular circumstances of the error, the involved 
parties, the organization and the particular investigation board. The 
investigators, who are risk managers,   bring their own backgrounds into the 
arena, their biases, the professional mold by which they operate, their 
professional and organizational culture. Risk Managers, are by no means 
objective, reserved observant in the error arena. 
 
One of the main goals of Risk Management is to identify the risks proactively, 
asses  their potential  harm level, estimate  the probability  of occurrence and 
create procedures for critical risks, which provide appropriate controls and 
gauges,  able to alert and neutralize them . This activity is called “The Risk 
Management Cycle”.  It is far more structured than the investigative process and 
it utilizes many tools to help the risk manager in his work. In order to decide 
which risks have a higher priority than others do, the following formula is used:  
 




Although, this is a very useful tool, often when we try to apply it we encounter 
some difficulties. Our partners ask often these typical questions:  How can we 
evaluate the severity of a risk? How can we assess the probability of a risk that 
has not been yet real? Since we are talking about a common methodology in 
Risk Management, we find that in many cases an organization is forced to play 
along and use it to rank the risks, when actually the targets were marked before.  
 
Actually, first, based on prior experience, the high risks are marked and then 
they are evaluated accordingly on the severity and probability scales. This 
proves, that professional intuition will be reflected in the outcomes of the 
mathematical formula.  
 
In our opinion, the situation described above, clarifies the intersection matter of 
the two paradigms. The positivistic paradigm receives greater credibility as it is 
perceived by the public as “more scientific”, more professional, more valid and 
reliable. The way we were brought up, forces  us to  believe that numbers reflect 
reality more precisely than our own basic instincts, knowledge and experience.  
We have been taught not to believe our own ability to observe and understand 
reality. Supposedly, the power to understand reality by examination is held by a 
sect privy to some unique rules enabling it to discover the essence of reality. 
Although, in our opinion, the more appropriate paradigm for Risk Management 
is the constructivist, it is forced to masquerade as positivistic, in order to gain 
credibility.  
 
Reisetter et al. (2003), have conducted a qualitative study amongst 
postgraduate students of educational psychology and counseling, who were 
participating in a qualitative research methods course. They found, that some of 
the students showed resistance to the qualitative methods, which they believed, 
would not be accepted, as credible later on in their professional lives.  
 
We noticed, that many professionals are willing to play the positivistic game, 
even though it is perfectly clear to them that in the professional world in which 
they operate, it is useless and could even be seen as a real detriment, as it 
cancels, distorts, and invalidates the weight of experience and knowledge of 
professionals.   
 
From our experience, using quantitative models of the type we have presented 
here is often regarded as a sign of the Risk Manager‟s professional ability and 
coherence. While, posing a question like, “Which risks are you most concerned 
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with in your daily operations?" is perceived as shallow and lacking in formal 
training in Risk Management.  
 
While writing this work it became perfectly clear to us, that the area we are 
operating in is not positivistic – quantitative in its nature, but rather 
constructivist, as it involves people trying to get their work done, with as little 
error as possible, and yet occasionally err. The attempt to create a reality, in 
which errors are rare, can only succeed if we understand the reality in which 
these errors do occur. With all its complexity, we must study this reality, and 
glean insights on behaviors and environments to reduce the possibility of error 
in the future. We often found unexpected paradoxes, such as an inverse relation 
between the volume of error reporting and the prevalence of severe errors. We 
learned to explain this paradox and use it as an insight.  
 
With the understanding that we are operating in an open field, with very few 
professional anchors and definitions, and with the understanding that we all 
have biases and tendencies, we chose to use orientation tools, in order to keep 
us grounded and keep us from erring to often. These orientation tools, some of 
which existed, and were  adapted to our needs and some were  developed by 
us. We teach new Risk Mangers to adopt  not as rigid and compulsory modes, 
but rather wider margins for their perspectives. These may help them achieve 
their goals with less confusion. Amongst, these tools are models for mapping 
out error factors, tools for evaluating the quality of recommendations, for 
describing course of adverse events, tools for writing reports and tools for 
proactive risks management.  
 
We chose the Qualitative – Constructivist paradigm to describe the Macabi 
project, we were and are still involved in, since the cooperation with Macabi has 
the characteristics of action research, as previously outlined.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out, that our study is different from that of 
action research, particularly as when we started the project we did not plan any 
research activity but rather set out to help Macabi build its own Risk 
Management practices, based on our professional experience from aviation.  It 
was only in 2003, six years after the project‟s inception, that we began writing 
this study. We could say that this turn of events created a certain “cleanliness”, 
which often is not possible in action research, where boundaries are often 
blurred between the researcher and the object of research, where in effect the 
researcher plays a dual role: helping the organization solve a real problem and 





This state of affairs enabled three types of action research modes to function 
together side by side, according to Reason & Tobert (2001):  
 
1. 1997-2002 – First person action research- we focused on the consulting 
job for the Risk Management department in order to help them define a 
model and working procedures. During this period, the focus of our work 
was turned inwards, towards our relationship and ourselves in order to 
maximize our strengths to go through this process. We learned and 
identified each other‟s strengths and learned to put them to our client‟s 
best advantage by being more effective in doing our job.  
 
2. 2003-2006 – Second person action research – From the insights gained 
while writing of this work, new opportunities opened up for additional 
cooperation with Macabi. We developed new tools, the working model was 
reviewed and revised, new experience based training modules, were 
developed, new teaching methods for risk managers were revised and 
added as well. 
  
3. 2007- To date- Third person action research – Cooperation between the 
Risk Management department, at Macabi and other clients is expanding 
beyond the department and beyond its regular client base.  New working 
procedures have been defined to widen the circles of Risk Management 
impact, interactions between Macabi and other organizations such as: 
MRM- the malpractice insurer, IMA - The Israeli Medical Association, Tel 
Aviv University- Scholl of Medicine and The Center for Medical Simulation, 
were established.   
 
 
We are convinced that the qualitative constructivist paradigm is the right 
paradigm to support our practice as Risk Management consultants. It provides 
us with a frame of reference for the phenomena we work with, and it enables us 
to contemplate our performance, understand our work, our partners and 










In this chapter, we also observed how the Hebrew language has enabled the 
constructivist paradigm, long before anyone even knew about paradigms, 
positivism or constructivism.  
 
 
Hebrew morphology links the verb "to understand" (Le HAvin) and the verb "to 
construct" (LiVnot), this linkage makes us wonder if perhaps, Hebrew alludes to 
the fact that understanding means to construct reality. Meaning to say, that 
comprehension is an active process of building reality, form a variety of 
information from many sources, which is accrued about reality.  This 
morphological linkage is similar to the one between another two verbs, "to 
define" (Le Hagdir) and "to fence" (LiGdor), defining therefore, means to set up 























"A life without adventure is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is 
allowed to take whatever form it will, is likely to be short". 
 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) 
 
 
"All stable processes we shall predict. All unstable processes we shall control.  
There's no sense in being precise when you don't even know what you're talking 
about".  
 






Safety, Risk Management, Quality improvement  Models, 




Prologue – We are now at a different  point 
 
This chapter was written at the beginning of 2009, in the midst of the worldwide 
financial crisis. Presumably, if this chapter had been written several years earlier, 
it would have been different, have a better fit with the headlines but be less 
relevant to the current state in which the original Risk Management concepts 
were found to be insufficient. 
 
Paradoxically, banks and other financial institutions were first to adopt the 
concept of Risk Management and to implement them as  a mandatory protocol. 
 
In most Western financial institutions, an organizational infrastructure was 
created to deal with Risk Management, and senior managers, often in Vice 
President Positions, were appointed to manage it. Innovative models were 
developed to help in analyzing risks. International Banking Associations 
regulated mandatory protocols such as SOX, Basel2 and COSO. 
 
However, these tools were unable to prevent the current economic crisis, and 
this raises some very challenging questions with regard to the effectiveness of 
the current Risk Management approach. Three possible hypotheses were raised 




 The Risk Management methods which were adopted were essentially 
faulty. 
 Current Risk Management tools are unable to track the fast changes 
which are part of today's business world. 
 Both of the above mentioned hypotheses are correct. 
 
Based on our experience, we believe that the 3rd hypothesis describes in a better 
way the current crisis of Risk Management Models.   
 
We believe that the Risk Management arena has become too dependent on 
complex mathematical models and created the feeling, although unsubstantiated, 
that risks are being managed well.  
 
In addition, Risk Management methodology has not provided proper response to 
the constantly changing reality in which so many systems are not only 
interrelated, but are co- dependent on each other for their performance and 
success. 
 
All these, are the reasons for re-writing this chapter in order to deal with the 
economic crisis and its  implications to the field of Risk Management.  
 
 
Major  approaches to Risk Management 
 
There are two different approaches, aimed for achieving safety conditions which 
implies the absence of accidents and adverse events. 
 
1. The "Fly-Fix-Fly" approach is a trial and error approach. Using this 
approach, a system or process prototype is built and tested under real 
conditions. Anything that goes wrong is fixed and tried again, until the 
desired level of reliability and safety is achieved. This approach is based 
on learning from errors, providing that the errors are well examined, and 
recommendations are implemented in updated versions of the 
system/process. The drawbacks of this approach are numerous and the 
most noted of all are; uncertainty with regard to system reliability during 




2. The System Safety Engineering approach which tries to analyze and 
foresee the possible failures of the system/process during the design 
stage and to implement solutions in order to reduce possible failures 
already in the prototype. Once the system/process is built and operational, 
it is possible to use the "fly-fix-fly" method, in order to continue and 
improve the system and processes. 
 
As an example, analysis of serious flight accidents shows, that often the 
accidents are related to failures in airplane design as well as operations and 
management. According to Leveson (2003), the "fly-fix-fly" approach is not 
sufficient since, in the best of cases, it helps in preventing the repeat of similar 
accidents. In systems such as nuclear reactors or civil and military aviation the 
fly-fix-fly approach is unacceptable because even one accident is considered 
catastrophic.        
 
The system safety approach utilizes theories from the disciplines of systems and 
system engineering in order to prevent future failures. The concern is not only to 
loss of life, but also to property and environmental damages. The main target is 
managing risks by identifying them, analyzing them, reducing them and 
monitoring them proactively.  
 
Another way to distinguish between different approaches in the field of risk 
management is to refer to the main methodology utilized by the approach in 
question.  Accordingly there are three main approaches: 
 
1. The quantitative approach: this approach emphasizes the use of 
mathematical models, based on past data, in order to evaluate the 
severity of risks in two dimensions: the severity of the potential damage 
and the probability that the risk will occur. The drawback in using this 
model stems from the fact that in most cases past data does not 
necessarily represent the phenomena, but rather gives an indication as to 
the level of reporting.  Also, it cannot assist us in identifying and analyzing 
new risks which did not realize in the past. 
 
2. The Qualitative approach: This approach is based on the use of soft 
methodologies such as interviews of managers, employees and experts,  
field observations, studying basic company documents, focus groups, 





3. The combined approach:  This approach makes use of soft tools, past 
data and mathematical models in order to evaluate the risk level while 
presenting the methodological problems inherent in this approach.  
 
It goes without saying that we believe in the third approach, even though we are 
often asked by our clients, especially those with a background in science and 
engineering; to use the quantitative approach. 
 
We have often asked ourselves the meaning of this request to use mathematical 
tools in a field which, we believe, is qualitative in its core. We assume  that risks 
are associated with deep existential fears which are related to uncertainty 
regarding the future. Mathematical models may offer the feeling that the risks are 
under control, while soft models, may just amplify the fears. 
 
Soft models are based on a process which basically asks questions while 
mathematical models give numerical answers which might offer a sense of 
security which is sometimes baseless.  
 
Mueller (1968), described the new System Safety Engineering discipline as 
"organized common sense". This is a planned and systematic approach to 
identifying, analysis and control of risks, during the life cycle of the system, 
intended to reduce accidents. 
 
Lederer (1986), describes the safety of the systems as an activity which starts in 
the early stages of concept definition and continues through the planning, 
production, tests and implementation. One of the main characteristics of this 
approach, which differentiates it from other approaches of Risk Management, is 
the emphasis on early identification and analysis of risks so that actions to 
reduce risks will be discussed, before final decisions regarding the system are 
made. 
 
Among the main principles of system safety we may mention the following 
(Leveson 2003): 
 Building of safe systems and not just adding safety measures to existing 
systems. 
 Treating the system in a holistic manner, rather than a collection of sub 
systems and components.  




 Emphasizing the system analysis over past experiences and standards. 
 Emphasizing the qualitative approach versus the quantitative approach.  
 Early detection of conflicts and tradeoffs of costs/ benefits decisions. 
 System safety is more than just system engineering. 
 
In writing about the history of Risk Management during the period 1900-2002, 
Rubin (1999), claims that risk management is one of the ideas which has, in its 
core, the belief that a rational systematic approach to future uncertainties, will 
allow us to live prudently and creatively, while preventing the unnecessary waste 
of resources.  
 
The author of the book "Against the Gods: The remarkable story of Risk” 
(Bernstein, 1996) wrote:  “If everything is a matter of luck, risk management is a 
meaningless exercise. Invoking luck obscures truth, because it separates an 
event from its cause.” 
 
Therefore, Risk Management is deeply imbedded in cultures, beliefs and 
personal approaches, which we develop as individuals, companies and 
organizations. As an example, the Risk Management approach is based on the 
belief that risks can be managed, that is, a belief that risks are not the results of 
random luck or lack of luck but rather results from our own doings or lack thereof. 
 
Moreover, it is possible to perceive the reality which we create and of which we 
are a part, as a result of our attitudes to risks and the belief that we either can or 
cannot manage them. Dramatic events in human history, wars, inventions, 
natural disaster, and manmade disasters, have all left their mark on the way we 
perceive risks and believe in our ability to manage them.  
 
At any rate, risk management, stands in complete contrast to the approach which 
sees everything which happens to us as a consequence of random luck and that 
the future is totally uncertain. 
  
As an example, humankind's approach to risks was influenced by big disasters 
which were burned into our collective awareness.  Such as the sinking of the 
Titanic, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire,  Minamata disease,  Seveso, Bhopal, 
Chernobyl, Valdez, Enron,Three Mile Island, Challenger, Columbia Piper Alpha, 
Exxon  and of course the economic crisis which the entire world plunged into in 
2008 and the collapse of banks and large industrial concerns. This is in addition 





Holland is an excellent example of a continuous epic war against risks resulting 
from the North Sea. Flooding of the Dutch lowlands by the North Sea, has always 
presented a risk to the survival of the Dutch people. The way the Dutch chose to 
deal with this risk, represents their belief that this risk can be managed, otherwise 
they would have given up. 
 
The Dutch have always exploited the most up to date know-how and technology 
in order to manage the risk of floods. Big disasters accelerated the efforts and 
brought about unique and creative solutions. This is what happened after the 
1953 flood disaster in Zealand, in which 1850 people lost their life and many 
others lost their homes and property. The disaster prompted one of the most 
creative and effective technological solutions which included a series of projects 
and among them the Oosterschelde Dam*, labeled as the 8th wonder of the world 
and the Maaslandkering near Roterdam that was finalized in 1997.      
 
As part of the project, a series of dynamic dams were erected. The dams protect 
the people against floods, while at the same time they do not hurt the 
environment significantly. There is a Dutch saying: "God created the world, but 
The Netherlands were created by the Dutch" 
 
In her reference to the meaning of “feeling secure” Leydesdorff (2001), after 
interviewing several of the survivors of the great flood in Holland (1953), made 
the following observation: the sense of invincibility in face of disaster is a relative 
one.  A sense of security, according to her, is defined by the culture in which we 
live. For example, similar  disasters which affect nature and our environment 
these days, took place 20 years ago, however the public is more aware of them 
now.      
 
According to Leydesdorff, the survivors, because of their religious background 
grasped their fate as God given and as a result the disaster was understood by 
them as a punishment by God for their sins. She also maintains that the way 
historical disasters are kept in our memory and re-evaluated, influences the way 
we perceive the probability the event will happen again 
_________________. 
* Following each meeting with our supervisor, Professor John Rijsman, we used to spend several 
days in Zealand. This was pure coincidence, while we were looking for a place to rest and talk. 
We chose Zealand, where we spent time in a small village called Domburg, which was also 
flooded during the flood disaster of 1953.  Out of curiosity, we traveled in the area and saw the 
Oosterschelde dam. Each time, we were filled with renewed amazement and it reinforced our 
feeling that risks can be managed. This provided, we hold the opinion, that we are not victims of 
risks, but rather have the ability to manage them. As a result, we regard the project of protecting 
the people of Zealand, not only as a technology project of the first degree, but also as a 




Erickson (1976), who investigated the demise of the Appalachian community as 
a result of a flood, found that contrary to the people of Zealand, they thought that 
blaming God for the disaster was an act of blasphemy. In their eyes it was 




Safety, Risk Management, Quality Assurance , Similar goals, different     
approaches 
 
It is our opinion that the three terms - Safety, Risk management and Quality – 
represent the evolution of people's attempt to reduce the exposure to risks and to 
reduce the damages when risks do realize.  
 
Safety, as a professional discipline, preceded the other two areas and its 
purpose was to protect, as much as possible, workers in areas which are prone 
to risks. Items such as safety goggles, helmets, designation of activity and rest 
hours, etc. are defined as safety means. These means were developed in order 
to perform missions in dangerous environments while protecting the operators. 
This is akin to the shield that knights in the middle ages wore in order to protect 
themselves from their enemy's weapon, but not to prevent the war itself.    
 
At the heart of the safety concept lays an assumption that risks are an inherent  
part of life and so are the mission‟s one has to perform in risky environments. 
Therefore, the only way to reduce risks is by developing and using safety 
equipment.  
 
It is worth noting that high risk activities are traditionally better rewarded than low 
risk activities, which makes them attractive and even heroic. The interest 
associated with the protection of operators is often an economic one. It is 
cheaper to protect than to pay compensation to the families. Similarly, if 
damages can be reduced because of increased protection and thus decrease the 
risks associated with the profession, perhaps there is an option to reduce the 
reward. It is acceptable that some professions, such as fire fighting, diving, flying, 
nuclear reactors operation etc. are risky and additional "risk payment" is added to 
the basic salary as an appreciation for the increased risks that the operator is 
exposed to. 
   
The field of Risk Management was developed when the safety field had reached 
its limits and could not solve the basic problem which is the existence of risks.  
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Risk Management discipline evolved with the development of probability models, 
which enabled risk evaluation, and with the spread of risk concept to other fields 
and not only risks to human life.   
 
The basic concept of Risk Management received its inspiration from the 
insurance world as will be described later. The insurance world is coping with 
issues which have to do with selling insurance policies for future risks. That is, 
while I purchase a policy, I purchase insurance for the event that the risk will 
actually materialize. Then I will get a compensation which is intended to cover 
the amount of the damage. The question is: how does the insurance company 
know how to evaluate which risks will materialize and which will not, and what will 
be the damages in case the risks will materialize? Without this knowledge, the 
insurance company might lose lots of money. Therefore, in order to manage its 
risks, the insurance company evaluates various risks by their probability of 
occurring and the amount of damage they can cause, based on past experience, 
analysis of future trends and probability models. In light of that, it is possible to 
calculate the total amount of compensation that the company will pay to its 
insured customers. This amount, together with overhead and profit, creates the 
basis for the methods, policies are priced. A change in the risk projection will 
cause an increase in premiums.     
 
This basic model, which includes risk identification, methodology of risk 
evaluation and insurance premium calculation, that maintains a positive cash 
flow for insurance companies, is the corner stone of traditional Risk 
Management. We are referring, of course to the Risk Management of the 
insurance companies and not of its customers.  
 
Saying so, a question may be raised: Do insurance companies have an interest 
in reducing the risk level of their customers? Theoretically, if the risk level is 
reduced, the insurance company will need to reduce premiums and consequently 
its revenues and net profits might be influenced. On the other hand, one can 
argue, as evident with medical malpractice arena, that as the number and 
volume of claims rises, the premium level becomes so high, as to risk the 
economic viability of the insured.  
 
The basic concept behind all Risk Management programs is the idea that future 
risks can be identified and analyzed. Based on past experience and proper 
models, suitable controls can be devised in order to reduce the probability of 
risks materializing and the damages caused by them. This is a proactive concept, 
meaning that there is no need to wait for the risk to materialize, but one can take 
proper steps in advance to reduce it. 
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An important tool in Risk Management is learning from adverse events' in which 
the risks were materialized, in order to improve risk assessment and the quality 
of controls. 
 
The field of Quality Control, evolved as a natural evolution of the Risk 
Management field. It may be stated, that in many cases, successful risk controls 
were actually improved work processes. The basic assumption is that good and 
safe products are the results of good and proven work processes. Therefore, 
Quality Control is aiming at improving the critical work processes by measuring 
them standardizing them, thus lowering the risks to which individual and 
companies are exposed to.    
  
The following table presents a summary comparison of the three fields: Safety, 
Risk Management and Quality Control  
 
 
Approach Safety Risk Management Quality Control 
Work 
Assumptions   
Risks are part of 








It is possible to manage risks 
by reducing the probability of 
their occurrence and the 
severity of the potential 
damages. 
It is possible to 
improve processes 
and thus reduce the 
risks while at the 
same time producing 
better quality products 
at higher efficiency. 
Strategy for 
reducing risks 
Protection Study the risk and lower the 
probability and/or the level of 
potential  damage  
Reduce risk by 
Improving work 
processes.   











the use of these 
means. 
Changing the attitude from 
"protecting against risks" to 
"proactive approach". 
Investing resources in risk 
identification and reduction. 
Maintaining  systematic and 
ongoing process of risk 
assessment and improving  
control systems. 
Commitment of top 
management. 
Encouraging learning from 




control methods and 
implementing them 
intensely in the 
organization. 





No influence on 
risk itself 
Reducing the  probability of 
occurrence and/or level of 
damage if risk materializes. 
Risk elimination by 
improving and 
monitoring processes. 




Often there is some confusion between these three terms. We can safely say 
that Safety, defined as a state without  risks, will forever be the goal towards 
which we strive, whereas Risk Management and Quality Assurance, are the 
means at our disposal, by which we can achieve this goal.  
 
 
The History of Risk Management 
 
Vesper (2006), studied the history of Risk Management, simultaneously 
examining the linguistic roots of the word risk, whose origins are apparently in old 
French – risqué, whose meaning is “ danger that holds some opportunity” (Littre, 
1863). The word hazard which is often mentioned in reference to Risk 
Management, finds its roots in Israel, site of the Hasart Fort where the game of 
dice was invented while it was under siege (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). 
Actually,  the  real name of the fort was Ain Zarba.  
 
Bernstein (1996), in his book “Against the Gods”, describes how thinking and 
attitude to Risk Management developed as a result of the changes in 
mathematical concepts, understanding probability and expanding that knowledge 
into gaming and the rules that govern them.  
 
Although, gambling was prevalent even as far as in  ancient Egypt, as many of 
their old wall paintings shows, it was only in the Renaissance era that a statistical 
and mathematical base for the theory of gambling began to form. This was due to 
the fact, that the numeric system,   known to us today, whose origins are Indo – 
Arabian, appeared in Europe around the 10th -12th centuries. But it was only 
during the Renaissance, that that this numerical system replaced the old Roman 
numeric system.  
 
Girolamo Cardano, a mathematician, physicist, and gambler of the 16th century, 
published a first of its kind essay, examining probability in the game of cards, 
dice and others. “Liber de Ludo Aleae – Book on Games of Chance”.   
 
According to Bernstein (1996), other prominent philosophers contributed their 
understanding to this field, amongst them was Galileo who wrote a short essay in 
1630:  “Sopra le Scoperte dei Dadi – On Playing Dice”  
  
Additional mathematicians, especially those studying  the basic organization of 
large data bases, such as  registration of births and  deaths, developed sampling 
methods, actuary charts, and other methods for predicting behaviors and events, 




Insurance, which is a financial tool, intended to reduce the individual‟s risk,  by 
creating a large group to bear the burden, has its roots as early as the 18 th 
century BCE, when it  was used to finance sea voyages of ships in ancient times.  
 
A  form of life insurance was used in ancient Rome and Greece and was 
supplied by the various trade guilds. In the middle Ages, as commerce spread, 
many new types of insurance against disasters (including floods and droughts) 
were developed.    
 
Lloyd‟s, which is probably the world‟s most famous insurance brand, was 
established in 1687, in a café near the Tower of London. It was a popular 
meeting place for commercial sea captains. It was a place where they could 
exchange information on their recent and future voyages, the weather, dangers 
they had encountered, etc. Those interested in shouldering the risk of a certain 
voyage, could write their names on a designated board and thus accept the 
terms of the contract. This is the source for the term "underwriter” 
 
The need for insurance continued to grow, out of a desire to protect individuals 
and groups from an ever growing list of risks.  
 
The industrial revolution brought this issue to the foreground, as a result of the 
new technologies that were constantly being developed at the time, for both 
industry and personal use. Of these, the steam engine was probably the most 
influential, in changing the public‟s perception toward personal and public risk.  
 
According to Burke (1997), between the years 1816-1848, there were 233 steam 
boats accidents in the US, which involved 2563 casualties.  After years of 
discussions, the US Congress passed a groundbreaking bill in 1838, whose goal 
was to impose regulations on all aspects of steam engines. As a result of the bill 
“The Steamboat Inspection Service” was created.  But the service was not 
effective enough and during 1850-1851, the accident rates continued to rise and 
685 more people were killed. This prompted the congress to pass another bill, 
which defined higher safety standards and transferred the regulatory agency 
from the Justice Department to the Treasury.  
 
Since the industrial revolution, the scope of exposure to risks continues to grow 
in both type and magnitude. Nuclear power plants, Giant tankers, Aviation, 
Space, Chemical and Biological Industries, are but a few examples of the new 
hazards, which were unknown prior to the industrial revolution.   
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Pioneering  implications  of  Risk Management 
 
We believe, the scope of pioneering implications of risk management is 
enormous. It may be assumed, that risks troubled human mind from the very 
beginning. There is no way to pay the right tribute to all the pioneers, most of 
them being anonymous. The field of risk management is still evolving, being far 
from its maturity. In this paragraph we will mention only few documented 
milestones and try to cover the issue in a more orderly manner in the next one. 
  
As a response to the widespread proliferation of risk to individuals, society and 
the environment, some new approaches were adopted. One of the more extreme 
approaches which was implemented in the US was the “Delaney Clause”, which 
stipulates that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Administration, could  
enforce a total ban on pesticides, food coloring or additives, that were found to 
be carcinogenic, (in 1954, 1958, &1960 respectively).  
 
The law was based on the premise that there is no low level point at which a 
material is no longer carcinogenic, it either is or isn‟t.  It runs on the “One hit 
model", which states that any contact of the material with a living cell is sufficient 
to cause cancer. The goal of this law was to reach 100% safety levels.  
 
Contrary to this approach, which is most prevalent in Industrial medicine, whose 
intent is to protect workers exposed to hazardous materials, which could cause 
immediate harm or long term cumulative effects; another approach was 
developed called the TLV: “Threshold Limit Values”, which offers tips, 
recommendations, and interpretations developed by experts in the field to 
prevent “An unreasonable risk of disease or injury” (ACGIH,  2005).  
 
The TLV is continuously updated and evaluated as a result of information 
accumulation following adverse events debriefings, involving employees in 
hazardous work environments.  
 
Industrial medicine, has adopted the risk management methodology for 
uncovering and inspecting potential hazards. It requires companies to comply 
with the OSHA – Occupational Health & Safety Administration (OSHA Act). 
Likewise, companies are required to conduct safety inspections and ensure that 
hazardous work procedures are in compliance with the Code of Federal 
Regulations, (1992).  
 
In 1975, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission mandated the implementation 
of PRA (Probabilistic Risk Analysis), which utilizes real and empirical data, in 




In 1990 the FDA (US Food & Drug Administration), began requiring food 
manufacturers to implement a system for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points (HACCP), for the purpose of identifying and monitoring risks.  
 
The program started with manufacturers of low acid canned foods and moved on 
to seafood, and as of 2001 progressed to the juice manufacturers. In addition, 
the USDA requires meat manufacturers to use the HACCP. The goal is that  all 
US food manufacturers will use the HACCP protocol.  
 
Starting in 1997 the FDA requires a risk analysis under the auspices of “Design 
Validation” which includes updating software and a risk analysis in cases where 
its application is appropriate.  
 
 
Major Milestones in the development of Risk Management Thinking.  
 
In the following table, a number of significant milestones, in the development of 
Risk Management in the 20th century, are presented. It is important to point out, 
that the choice of these milestones is of a somewhat personal nature, though it is 
based largely on the works of Rubin (2002) and Vesper (2006). 
 
The overview refers to events of  legislation and standardization, publications, as 
well as establishment of institutions with important ramifications on the 
development of this discipline.  
 
The overview covers over 100 years, starting at the beginning of the 20th century 
to date.  
 






Indemnity law based on 
a similar law from 
Bismarck's Germany 
(1881) was enacted in 
the U.S. Similar laws 
were enacted in most 
western countries by 
1930. These laws 
triggered the 
transferring of 
responsibility for errors 
from individuals to 
corporations and 
governments.  




Year Event Legislation- 
Standardization 
Publication Institutions 
1920 British Petroleum 
Corp. establishes 
Tanker Insurance 
Company one of the 
first “captive” 
Insurance companies.  
Insurance  Starting “Captive” 
Insurance 
companies. As of 




1921 Frank Knight 
publishes his book 
“Risk Uncertainty & 
Profit” which 
becomes a basic text 
in Risk management 
studies.  
 The book differentiates 
between uncertainty 
which cannot be 
quantified and risks 
which can be.  
 
1926 John Von Neumann 
publishes a paper on 
games and  strategy, 
at Gottingen 
University. In 1953, 
Von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern 
publish The Theory of 
Games & Economic 
Behavior. 
 The article suggests that 
the “don‟t lose” law 
supersedes the “win  
law".  
 
1952 Harry Markowitz 
publishes in the 
Journal of Finance an 
article called 
“Portfolio Selection”. 
In 1990, Markowitz  
wins the Noble Prize.   
 The article elaborates  
various aspects of return 
on investments in a 
portfolio. The article 
becomes  a cornerstone 
for sophisticated 
measures of financial 
risks which are applied 
















Year Event Legislation- 
Standardization 
Publication Institutions 
1956 Russell Gallagher, 




publishes in the 
Harvard Business 
Review, an article 
called “Risk 
Management: A 
New phase of Cost 
Control”.   
 Philadelphia becomes a 
center for Risk 
Management 
development, from 
Wayne Snider of the 
University of  
Pennsylvania, who 
suggested that the 
professional insurance 
manager should be a risk 
manager, to Herbert 
Denemberg also of the 
university of 
Pennsylvania, who 
focused on risk 
management research.  
 





concept of “Cost of 
Risk”.  
 The concept compares 
the self-financed losses, 
insurance premiums, the 
cost of losing control of 
the company, and 
administrative costs to 
revenues, assets and 
stock value. This concept 
separates Risk 
Management from 
Insurance.   
 
1966 Insurance Institute 
of America 
develops 3 tests 





  This is a first of its kind 
license for practicing 
Risk Management. 
Although in their early 
stages these tests 
were biased  towards 
the  insurance industry 
they were 
subsequently adjusted 
to a broader approach 














Year Event Legislation- 
Standardization 
Publication Institutions 
1970 The OSHA act 
was passed by 
the US Congress 
and signed by 
President Nixon.  
In spite of the fact that as 
early as 1880 the Federal 
Government embarked 
upon safety legislation to 
instill safety standards 
and awareness in the coal 
mining industry, it was 
only in 1970, after many 
years of discussions that 
the OSHA bill was 
approved. Its goal was to 
ensure the health & safety 
of workers.  
  
1974 Gustav Hamilton, 





concept  “Risk 
management 
process”.  
 The process defines 
graphically the interaction 
between all the process‟ 
components: Starting with 
the risk system 
throughcommunications 
and financing.     
 











That same year the 
publication: Risk 
Analysis was first 
published.. In 
1999, the society 
numbered 2200 
members, with 
activities in the 
USA, Europe and 
Japan.     




London. A few 





for conferring the 
associate of Risk 
Management 
Degree  
  The institute 
developed the first 
career 
development   
program (CME ) for 




Year Event Legislation- 
Standardization 
Publication Institutions 







 The book became a basic 
text for understanding 











1993 James Lam from 
GE Capital, first 
uses the term 
Chief Risk Officer  
  CRO is 
responsible, 
professionally, for 
all aspects of Risk 
Management in a 
company.   




publishes the first 




updated in 1999.  
The standard was the first 
of its kind and was 
generic in his approach, 
meaning that it is not 
specific to any particular 
discipline. The standard  
defines principles and 
work processes in Risk 
Management. Canada 
and Japan published 
similar standards in 1997 
and Israel in 2006. 
  
  
1996 Peter Bernstein 
publishes the 
book “Against the 
Gods; The 
Remarkable Story 
of Risk”, which 
quickly becomes 
a best seller, in 
Europe and  the 
US and brings the 
subject of Risk 
Management to 
the forefront of 
public discussion.  
 The book was translated 
into 11 languages, and 
enjoyed a wide 
distribution. This book 
gave Risk Management 
more public exposure, 
than any other 
publication, legislation or 












Year Event Legislation- 
Standardization 
Publication Institutions 
1997 James Reason, of 
Manchester University, 
published his book 
“Managing the Risks of 
Organizational Accidents”.  
 This book is the 
turning point for 
understanding 
accidents and 
adverse events. The 
basic thesis of the 
book states, that an 
accident is an 
outcome of the 
systems structure, 
rather than individual 
errors. The book 
illustrates the 
accident process, 
utilizing the Swiss 
cheese metaphor, 
which became a 
widely acceptable 
explanation for how 
























1998 First Medical ISO for medical 
equipment – Standard 14971, 
was published.. 
This standard is meant 
to ensure that medical 
equipment is developed 
and manufactured 
according to strict safety 
standards for protecting 
the medical staff and 
the patients.  
  
2008 World economic crisis was 
evident and announced.  The 
crisis has forced new ways of 
thinking about the way 
financial organizations 
manage their risks. 
This is an important matter as 
these organizations protected 
themselves via regulation and 
Risk Management protocols 
such as SOX, COSO and 
Basel.2.   
    
2009 ISO – the international 
Standards Organization 
publishes an international 
generic standard for Risk 
Management, ISO/DIS 
31000, Risk Management 
principles and Guidelines on 
implementation.  
The international 
standard was published 
after several countries 
had published their own 
standards following the 
publication of the 
Australian /New 







Year Event Legislation- 
Standardization 
Publication Institutions 
2009 Announcement regarding the 
need for Risk Management 
2.0 following the economic 
crisis. Researchers at 
Wharton University declare 
the need for a new paradigm 
for Risk Management. Which 
they call Risk Management 
2.0. 
   
2009 The Authority for 
Governmental Companies in 
Israel, publishes a circular 
that mandates all the 
Governmental Companies 
(more than 40, amongst them 
Water and Electricity supply) 
to establish Risk 
Management activities. 
The circular mandates 
the companies to assign 
a Risk Manager as a 
part of the company's 
managing board, to 
establish procedures for 
reporting and analyzing 
adverse events and 
periodical risk 
assessment and 





From the historical overview outlined above, we may learn that Risk 
Management has developed along the following discernible steps:  
 
 First step:  the field developed based on the motivation of individuals to 
protect themselves from known risks.  
 
 Second Step: An attempt was made to divide the individual risks amongst 
those with a vested interest, in order to lower each individual‟s risk; this 
brought about the demand for insurance.  
 
 Third stage: scientists began to show an interest in RM and tried to 
formulate the rules of probability in statistical and mathematical terms.  
 
 Fourth stage: at the onset of the industrial revolution, there was a 
significant increase in the number of risks and their magnitude. A need 
arose for government involvement in order to restrain new technologies 
and ensure their safety by legislation.  
 
 Fifth stage: which we are currently in, attempts were made to design 
systems and procedures for reducing risks, procatively, as well as to 





 Sixth stage: whose early signs we are currently witnessing, is the point at 
which the principles of Risk Management are completely immersed in the 
culture of Risk Management, which affects all areas organizational 
activities and not only the traditional areas marked as High Risk.  
 
It may be observed,  that the development of Risk Management is the result of 
an ever-growing exposure to risks on the one hand, and an ever increasing 
public awareness to the cumulative effects of exposure to personal and 
environmental risks, along with the development of philosophies and 
methodologies for Risk Management, all in conjunction with the belief that risks 
are manageable.  
 
Current thinking on the subject vacillates between rigid rules and indications, 
defining each individual‟s place in the organization and their response to any risk, 
to a more flexible paradigm which relates to specific risks as well as mundane 
ones, problems as well as opportunities. (Coburn et. Al.,  2005).  
 
It was stated in The Economist in 2004:   “Managing risk is one of the things that 
bosses are paid for, yet most companies still don‟t  have any idea what is 




What  motivates Adopting Risk Management Attitudes and Behaviors  
 
We cannot discuss the motivation for Risk Management without expounding on 
Maslow‟s theory (1943), which stipulates the need for safety in his article: “A 
theory of Human Motivation”.  
 
According to Maslow, the need for security is paramount, superseding even our 
physiological needs. When our physiological needs are relatively satisfied, a 
whole new set of needs arises which are called „safety needs”. If these needs are 
not met, just as in the case of physiological needs, they become the practical 
sole “organizers of behavior“, so that our safety needs become not only our 
present behavior organizers but also formulate our philosophy for the future. 
Everything else pales in comparison to safety. Safety becomes the focus of our 
lives, often at the expense of our physiological needs.  
 
Maslow concluded that in general, people prefer a safe world, with rules and a 




In our practice, we have noticed difficulties in organizations, whose safety needs 
have been met, (meaning, that the organization has not experienced any threat 
to its existence), to undertake any Risk Management action.  
 
An organization, just like any organism, is driven toward Risk Management 
activity, when its safety  needs are not being met, and not when it feels safe and 
in control of its destiny.  
 
Following the current crisis, and until the public‟s faith and feeling of safety are 
restored, the safety needs of an organization become its “behavior organizers”. 
In this situation, the organization is even willing to forego its basic requirements, 
its raison d‟être, in order to restore safety.  
 
The nature of risks is that they occur more often and cause more damage to 
organizations which do not feel threatened, and are less harmful to those 
organizations who manage their risks systematically.  
 
According to Maslow, people clearly prefer familiar situations to over unfamiliar, 
the known is preferable to the unknown. The tendency to adopt religious beliefs, 
philosophical principles and values is driven by the need for safety.   
 
Thus, we can also understand the motivation for the acceptance of approaches 
to Risk Management. Risk Management holds a promise to make the unfamiliar 
familiar, make the unknown – known, based on knowledge and thereby uprooting 
all the fear-inducing elements inherent in uncertainty.  
 
A neurosis, in which the strive for safety receives its most extreme expression, is 
the “obsessive compulsive neurosis”. People suffering from this disorder, attempt 
in the most extreme manner to exert control and stability in the world, thus 
ensuring that unexpected or unfamiliar events will ever occur.  These neurotics 
protect themselves through rituals, rules and formulas for every situation, all to 
prevent surprises.  
 
In our opinion, the manner in which the world economic system managed its risks 
is reminiscent of the symptoms of this neurosis. Over the past few years, the 
banking system suffered a series of giant embezzlements, which may explain the 
obsessive steps this system took in order to protect itself from any further 
embezzlements. Strict protocols, such as Basel2, COSO and SOX are examples 




The obsessive need for safety, may explain the demand of many organizations 
for complex mathematical models, in which known values are entered to project 
results which are the predictors for future risks.  
 
Many studies have looked at the motivation for employee safety, but few have 
examined the motivation for organizational safety and risk management. 
However, it seems reasonable to deduce to some extent from personal 
motivators to organizational motivators to handle risks.  
 
Stojanovic and Zdravkovic (2002), found a strong correlation between 
motivations for safety  as part of occupational safety, meaning, .employees who 
developed a strong motivation for “on the job safety”, also showed motivation for 
Job security and vice versa. It is our opinion that this finding reinforces the 
general concept of safety as a behavioral organizer. Therefore, it is possible that 
organizations in which many accidents occur, experience a diminished sense of 
security, and the reverse is true as well.  
 
Recently, studies are published, based on Andriessen‟s (1978), proposal which 
recommends not looking at safety  behavior as a monolithic unit, but rather at 
sub groups which comprise it.  For example, Ford (2008) differentiates between 
two types forming safe behavior: 
 
1. Safety Compliance – observing safety regulations, such as wearing 
protective garments, working according to procedures, etc.  
 
2. Safety Participation – Taking an active part in activities which enhance 
Safety awareness in the organization, such as voluntary safety activities.  
 
Psychological empowerment of employees has caught the attention of a number 
of scholars over the past few years. Lippin et al., (2000), studied this issue in 
several industries and found that over half of the participants in empowerment 
based safety training, reported that they or a colleague had improved attitudes to 
health and safety as a result.  
 
Psychological empowerment is defined from the employee‟s perspective. The 
state of empowerment is a cognitive condition characterized by a sense of 
control in a given situation, a feeling of competence, and internalizing the 
organization‟s goals and objectives (Manon, 1999).  
 
The most researched area and most closely related to external safety motivation, 
is management‟s influence towards motivating the employees for sounder safety.   
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Management‟s commitment has been found to have a significant impact on the 
organization‟s safe environment, (Zohar 1980), as well as influencing the safe 
behavior and outcomes thereof in the organization (Clarke & Ward, 2006).  
 
Zohar (2003), claims that a variety of aspects in the workplace environment, 
affect different cognitions such as, the goals and expectations, resulting from 
certain behaviors, which subsequently affect further behavior. This behavior is 
what ultimately impacts the accident rate at work.  
 
Ford (2008), suggested a four dimensional model of safe behavior and examined 
which variables affect them. The premise is that it is possible to analyze safe 
behaviors according to a time frame: future or present, according to object which 
they might affect: self or others. The following chart details different safe 
behaviors according to the four dimensions.  
 
 
 Self-Focus Other-Focus 
Present-Focus • Self-protective behaviors to 
prevent acute injuries. 
• Safe performance of work 
tasks that do not impact 
others‟ safety.  
• Helping others perform 
work tasks safely. 
• Safe performance of work 
tasks that impact others‟ 
Safety. 
Future-Focus • Becoming knowledgeable in 
work hazards and legal 
issues related to safety. 
• Behaviors that prevent 
cumulative injury and health 
decrements. 
• Participating in health and 
safety committees. 
• Behaviors that contribute to 
the shared responsibility for a 
safe working environment. 
(Adapted from Ford, 2008) 
 
Ford (2008), found that psychological empowerment of employees, management 
commitment to safety and identification with the organization, are more closely 
linked with safe behaviors related to others, than those related to personal safety. 
Of all the examined variables, psychological empowerment had the most 
profound influence on behavior with far reaching ramifications, ergo relating to 




In this regard, we must say, that in many interactions with medical staff, 
regardless of profession or seniority, we have witnessed almost universally, a 
lack of any sense of psychological empowerment. Oftentimes, medical staffs 
perceive themselves as being caught in a catch 22, between management‟s 
demands to provide high quality and safe medical services on one hand, and 
strict observation of time and resources devoted to each patient, on the other.  
This of course, in addition to pressure from patients to provide them with the 
most advanced medicine, and threat of litigation and legal issues as well.  
 
Under these circumstances, it seems that medical staff has no cognition of 
empowerment but rather the exact opposite. It can be said, quite safely, that they 
have no sense of control in this situation, they do not feel capable and it is 
reasonable to assume that they lack a strong sense of identification with the 
organization, its goals and objectives.  
 
Psychological empowerment, which has lately received a lot of attention in 
understanding worker motivation, particularly in light of its obvious affect on 




The implications of the current global financial crisis on Risk Management 
Thinking 
 
The world economic crisis, which came to public awareness in 2008, and which 
is still with us, raises fundamental questions with regard to the way large 
corporations and governments manage risks. 
 
Paradoxically, financial institutions in the West were pioneers in managing risks 
in a systematic way. Protocols such as SOX, COSO and Basel2, defined how 
and what a financial institution needs to do in order to manage its risks properly. 
Despite their uncontested importance, these tools were unable to prevent the 
collapse of large financial institutions to the point of a global crisis. 
 
In our opinion, formal bureaucratic processes of Risk Management can deal with 
known risks, but they are unable to deal with unknown risks.  This is a major trap 





We believe that risk management is a soft discipline, which functions in a 
constantly changing reality, both inside and outside the organization. It is 
constantly searching, analyzing, controlling and monitoring risks, while examining 
its own mechanisms and learning from adverse events. It is dangerous for Risk 
Management to rely too much on quantitative models while ignoring the 
qualitative approach and the value of common sense. 
    
An article published in "Knowledge Wharton" (2009), presents a model of Risk 
Management and the current financial crisis. The article mentions that complex 
mathematical models that were developed in order to predict business results 
and probabilities, based on past performance, failed miserably to prepare 
companies for the current crisis. 
 
Richard J. Herring, Professor of International Banking at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Wharton Management School, writes in the above mentioned 
article: "I think we've learned a lot recently about the limitations of models. We've 
also seen that the governance of risk is not as good as it ought to be."  
 
The current economic crisis emphasizes two important points with regard to Risk 
Management, which reflects on the future of this discipline:  
 
1. Business people, economists and academia treat risks differently than 
managers of companies. The most important issue for the first group with 
regards to risk is the diversity, whereas for company managers it is the 
potential damage as a result of risks materializing. If the risk for loss or 
damage is too high, managers, in most cases, will retreat. 
 
2. Risk Management does not have a magic solution (Silver Bullet) for 
solving all risk problems all the time. As a result, companies wishing to 
deal with risks in a serious way need to develop a more integrated 
approach to the subject, rather than classifying them into groups: 
operational risks, market risks, credit risk, etc.  
 
Herring,  says that most managers in the area of risk management specialize in a 
particular type of risk, for example credit risks, and therefore do not have the 
expertise to think about other type of risks. He feels that without an integrated 
view of Risk Management activity in an organization, serious problems may 





Michel-Kerjan Erwann (2009), Managing Director of the Risk Management and 
Decision Processes at Wharton School, while referring to the current events in 
the global economy, says that a new risk management format is rising, which he 
terms Risk Management 2.0. He says that every field exhibits similar trends: 
changes are faster and this requires making immediate decisions based on data 
which is not always available. It is always better to collect all relevant data before 
making a decision, but in reality according to Michel-Kerjan, managers must 
make decisions in situations of uncertainty and sometimes in situations of no 
data whatsoever. In order to deal with the new reality, many companies around 
the world are moving beyond the traditional  Risk Management model  labeled as 
"Risk Management 1.0", which deals more with the current situation of the 
company and an analysis of what might go wrong. Actually, for companies to 
manage their risks properly, they must look outside, because companies 
worldwide have become depended on each other, more than ever before.   
 
Michel-Kerjan continues and says that we have become accustomed to solving 
problems in which the questions are clearly stated and based on clear scientific 
know-how and knowledge of the historical profile of the problem. However, 
historical data can not predict the future in situations where the rate of change is 
so high. We used to study past data and draw nice diagrams, on which the 
severity of the damage appeared on one axis and the probability of risk occurring 
on the other axis. This was Risk management 1.0, which in many ways has 
become irrelevant.  
 
As part of our consulting business in Israel, we also consult to Mekorot, Israel 
Water Company. Nine months ago, during the 2nd quarter of 2008 we were 
asked to perform a Risk audit for Shacham Ltd., a daughter company of Mekorot, 
which provides most of  the infrastructure work for water network to the tune of 
100 M euro per year. The Risk Audit was performed  during Q III and QIV of 
2008. A series of risks became evident and they were evaluated according to 
their severity and probability , utilizing the traditional models of risk management. 
Out of the critical risks, we emphasized the risk of difficulties in recruiting 
professional employees and the uncertainty with regard to the actualization of 
several large projects.   
 
Towards the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, when the report was presented 
to Shacham's management, it was evident that the world is in the midst of a deep 
economic crisis which will undoubtedly affect the employment market in Israel 
and the Israeli government‟s policy with regard to the execution of large water 
projects. This received further emphasis when it became apparent that 2008/09 
is a drought year.  
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The government of Israel appointed a special committee to investigate the 
reasons for delay in the development of Israel's water infrastructure and 
especially the development of desalination plants.    
 
In less than six months, risks that were determined as significant for Shacham 
and Mekorot turned out to be less critical, since it is much easier to recruit high 
quality people among the many laid off workers and also the Government 
approved the start of many new projects, which had been delayed for many 
years. Obviously, the new reality created a favorable environment for the creation 
of new risks that were previously unknown. 
 
Our conclusion, which was our position from the onset of our Risk Management 
activities, was that Risk Management must be as dynamic as the rate of change 
in the specific discipline for which the Risk Management is being conducted.  
Otherwise, Risk management is both unnecessary and even risky.   
 
According to Michel-Kerjan, Risk management 2.0 will have to deal with unknown 
risks and the relationships between the different risks since it will no longer be 
possible to treat each risk separately.  
 
Tony Blair, former British Prime Minister, was quoted in the WEF (World 
Economic Forum), Global Risk Report 2007: “Interdependency is the defining 
element of the 21st century”. 
 
This situation has many advantages, but it also exposes the economy of a 
certain country to risks, which result from its relations with other economies, and 
not only from risks, which are inherent in its own economy.   
 
Philippe Hellich, Vice President of Risks at Danone, was quoted in "Knowledge 
Wharton" (2009) article, saying that he is implementing the new approach. He 
said he makes little use of mathematical models, although they are used for risks 
which are certain. His company relies more on interviews and benchmarking with 
colleagues outside the company and in sister companies around the world. The 
current approach is based on listening, challenging the operations managers with 
questions, analysis of risks based on common sense healthy judgment and good 






Peter Bernstien (1996), in the last pages of his book “Against the Gods” 
predicted the difficulties which many companies worldwide face today: 
"Nothing is more soothing or more persuasive than the computer screen, with its 
imposing arrays of numbers, glowing colors and elegantly structured 
graphs…..As we stare at the passing show, we become so absorbed we tend to 
forget that the computer only answers questions; it does not ask them.... Those 
who live only by the numbers may find that the computer has simply replaced the 
oracles to whom people resorted in ancient times for guidance in risk 
management and decision-making." 
 
Rosenzweig (2007), in his book "The Halo Effect and Eight Other Business 
Delusions That Deceive Managers" agrees with Bernstein's approach and writes: 
"I would caution executives not to rely on models that are appealing for their 
apparent sophistication. They may delude us into thinking we've understood the 
underlying factors, when really we've done nothing of the kind. It's what I call the 
Delusion of Rigorous Research -- if the quantity of data is impressive, we forget 
the underlying quality may be bad. 
 
Seems like, the field of Risk Management in large corporations is changing and 
with it the position of the Risk Manager. 
 
Risk Management, after the current crisis, places the Risk Manager in a position 
which is different than that of just applying techniques, methodologies and 
models. He is now in a position of integrated strategic thinking, while observing 
all the various activities of his organization and the relationships between them, 
as well as studying the outside reality and its influence on the organization.  
 
Risk Management 2.0 is no longer a field which is detached from the main 
activity of the organization, but is part of it – influenced by the activity as well as 
influencing the activity. Risk Management 2.0 is flexible and constantly 
examining existing paradigms. It challenges managers and workers in the 
organization with fundamental questions, without worrying about the slaughter of 




















Risk Management – From Aviation to Healthcare: A personal perspective  
 
With the publication of the IOM reports (Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson, 1999, 
2001), and even back in the 1990‟s, as interest increased in  medical errors due 
to  increased cost to the public,  Healthcare leaders started to search for 
solutions from other professional  content worlds  ( chapter  6.1). 
 
Aviation, following the progress displayed over years since the end of WWII, and 
the decrease in errors and failures causing  accidents, formed a model for 
imitation.  
 
The trend towards getting inspiration from Aviation, emerged during the 90's and 
was prevalent in every aspect, starting from papers dedicated to presenting the 
scope of the problem in medicine (Leape, 1994; Berwick and Leape 1999), to 
analyzing the unique criteria of aviation risk management in areas relevant to 
medical care systems (Leape 1994), and as far as President Clinton‟s 
pronouncements following the release of the IOM report (President Clinton, 1999, 
2000). 
The airplane has unveiled for us the true face of the earth.  
 
Antoine de Saint-Exupery Aviator and Writer - (1900-1944) 
Give me the courage to understand my errors today, so that tomorrow I will be better 
able to see that which I could not see in yesterday‟s muted light.  
 






As we mentioned previously (chapter 6.1), during the mid 90's, as a result of our 
professional development and our exposure to the medical field, we have 
decided, out of professional challenge and business interests, to offer the 
experience we had accrued  in aviation  risk management to healthcare 
organizations. 
  
From the onset, we encountered  two major reactions: 
 
 “It won’t work” – as there are distinct differences between aviation and 
healthcare, it was assumed that what works for one would not for the 
other. Most supporters of this approach presented a long list of contextual 
differences. Some of these differences were meaningful and we were 
compelled to address them. One of these was the, manner in which 
medical tasks are performed, variations which inherently increase the 
uncertainty in which medical practitioners perform, compared to aviation, 
which strives for standard and uniform performance.  
 
 “It sounds interesting” - Supporters of this approach, did not 
immediately dismiss our proposal to learn from the aviation industry, 
based on two factors; firstly, there was no better option in sight and 
learning from a successful model was appealing. And, if there is a need to 
choose an industry to follow, aviation due to its image and credibility, 
appealed to the doctors, who felt good about aligning themselves with the 
pilots.   
 
As mentioned, we dealt with these issues in depth regarding the Macabi project 
(Chapters 6.1-6.3)   It was clear to us that unless we fully comprehend Macabi‟s 
attitude both in favor and against the aviation model, we will be unable to 
proceed beyond the initial enthusiasm towards a solution. Macabi‟s risk 
management team was in a state of both ideological and practical dearth, as they 
searched for a solution to their needs.  
 
At this point, our familiarity with health care was minimal and did not enable us to 
manage the project‟s risks while being aware of the cultural, organizational and 
political nuances, which are part of risk management in healthcare.  
 
It is reasonable to assume that were we to start this project today, we would pay 
greater attention to the differences and not just to the similarities, as we did at the 
time. It could be said, that at the onset of our work with Macabi, we choose to 
focus on the similarities and assume that these outnumbered the differences.  
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Therefore, we had a firm base to believe that the principles which worked for 
aviation would indeed succeed in Healthcare.  
 
The common elements to which we attributed special importance, were those 
related to the high quality committed professions; the need to be capable of 
executing tasks with utmost concentration, the constant change and innovation of 
technology and procedures, the high sense self awareness particularly in the 
psycho professional components and less in the environmental, organizational or 
tasking aspects. It seemed to us at the time, that there was a common thread in 
the psycho professional profile of pilots and physicians and that was a promising 
starting point.  
 
Macabi asked for assistance in risk management, we accepted their request and 
hoped to provide them with assistance, based on the experience and insights we 
gained in aviation. We should mention that this was our preferred mode of 
intervention. Our communication with Macabi was a verbal one, which included 
many hand signals, in order to create a cross-cultural communication mode and 
enable us to share our insights with them and for them to explain their needs to 
us.  
 
Actually, today it is quite clear that we learned a lot about aviation and aviation 
risk management from the Macabi project. In addition, in order to provide a 
solution to this cross-cultural “transplant”, which required us to delve more deeply 
and refine the practice of Aviation Risk Management, as we were implementing it 
with Macabi.  
 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the similarities and differences in Aviation 
and Medicine, pertaining to risk management.  
 
 
Pilots & Doctors 
 
We believe that pilots & doctors, share several professional characteristics. 
However, the more significant question is whether healthcare systems and 
aviation systems share anything in common? This question is most important in 
light of the fact that we are advocating  the case for a systemic approach to risk 
management.; an approach, in which the system has its own significant weight, 
contributing to accident prevention versus the professional at the “sharp end“, 





Eric and Helmreich (2002), argue that doctors and pilots share many similarities. 
Both, are highly trained professionals who must go through many years of 
training, both operate in very complex environments, in which teams are 
constantly interacting with advanced technology. In both working environments, 
risks vary from very low to very high and the professional teams are forced to 
deal with varied threats from a variety of sources. Safety is a major concern in 
both disciplines, but financial considerations often have crucial impact on 
investments in risk management. When an error occurs, litigation and a demand 
for tougher standards present a threat in both sectors.  
 
The similarity in tasking can be observed especially in the operating theater and 
intensive care units, compared to the cockpit of a passenger plane. In both 
situations, success hinges on communications and good teamwork involving all 
members of the team.  
 
Helmreich & Merritt (1998), examined the different aspects of professional culture 
amongst pilots and operating theater physicians (surgeons and 
anesthesiologists).  They have developed a questionnaire to determine the 
attitudes in their relation to different approaches, stances and professional 
performance (FMAQ – Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire). 
 
The questionnaire was administered to 40,000 pilots in 40 different airlines in 25 
countries. A similar questionnaire, adapted for doctors, was presented to over 
1000 medical staff personnel in 4 countries.  
 
The responses to the questionnaires by both the doctors and the pilots exhibited 
similarities between the two groups, some could be considered as positive and 
others less so.  
 
On the positive side, both groups exhibited a discernible level of pride on 
belonging to an elitist group which demands stringent selection and extensive 
training. On the negative side, both groups tend to deny personal vulnerability, 
claiming that their ability to make decisions is equally good in both emergency 
and routine situations, Both claim that they are able to leave personal 
considerations behind, while working, and that their skills are not diminished 
when working with less experienced team members.  







These aspects of professional culture have an impact on flight safety as well as 
on the quality of medical care and thus on patient safety.. The authors continue 
to argue that professional pride pushes the doctors and the pilots to do their best, 
but the attitude of personal invulnerability potentially harms their perception of the 
criticality of teamwork and the need to take preventive measures needed to 
reduce the probability of risk.    
 
 
The Pilot  
 
Studies which attempted to present “a profile of a typical pilot” usually found a 
number of profiles and not a dominant one. Therefore, there is no ground to 
define one personality type, which could explain success as a pilot. 
  
Christy (1975), in an excellent study describing “The outstanding fighter pilot”, 
found that most were first born, or some facsimile of a first born, with close 
relationship with the father, who strengthens the “positive male identity”. One of 
the interesting outcomes of this study states, that 21 out of 23 of the first 
astronauts were first-born sons. The outstanding pilots were described as self 
confident, challenge seekers, ambitious for success and not introspective. In 
addition, they were characterized as intelligent, mature and emotionally stable, 
action oriented and easy to adjust.  
  
A follow–up study of 350 air cadets in the US Air Force over ten  years, which 
was published by Berg et al. (2005), revealed three typical types of pilots in their 
sample:  
 "Typical military pilot" – 58% of the sample was described as being 
competitive, dominant, easy going and stable.  
 
 "The right stuff" – 21% of the sample, was found to be similar to the first 
type and in addition was described as being particularly aggressive, 
dominant, self-aggrandizing and exhibitionist.  
 
 “Wrong Stuff” - 21% of the sample were described as cautious, 
obsessive and anti social.  
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A similar study conducted on experienced military pilots by  Picman (1991); using 
the OPQ- Occupational Personality Questionnaire, found three different profiles: 
  
 Methodological Extroverts – 48% of the sample. This group was 
characterized by a strong need to control their environment and a need for 
innovation and  change. 
 Introverted Worriers – 36% of the sample. This type was described a 
worrier, emotionally controlled introverted and not very social.  
 
 Competitive Individualists - 16% of the sample. This type was 
described as competitive, very independent and decisive.  
 
It seems, that there are similarities in the types as described in the two studies 
presented herewith, in spite of the fact that they were conducted on differing 
samples and at different times. 
  
The three latter profiles were also found in a study on space pilot candidates in 
the final stages of assessment (Musson et al. 2004).  
 
It should be noted that most of the studies conducted on pilot personality profiles, 
focused on the top percentile of outstanding fighter pilots or astronauts, primarily 
men. Information is missing regarding the relevancy of these studies in regard to 
transport pilots, helicopter pilots, civilian pilots and women.  
 
In an attempt to find a relation between the personality traits and performance, it 
has been found that Conscientiousness is the best predictor of the five big 
personality traits; this is in comparison with neuroticism, extroversion, being open 
to new experiences, and agreeability. (Siem, 1994).  
 
Boyd et al. (2005), explored the differences between personality traits of pilots 
flying different types of aircraft; fighter planes versus transport/fuelling planes. In 
the 5 big personality traits, the fighter pilots got higher marks for 
conscientiousness and lower on the agreeability scale. Likewise, fighter pilots 
ranked higher in assertiveness, activism, challenge/satisfaction seeking. Fighter 
pilots ranked lower on fears, self-awareness, vulnerability, warmth and 
gentleness as compared to transport/fuelling pilots.  
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Helmreich and Merritt (1998), pages 6-12, describe the world of commercial 
airline pilots in the following manner:  
"Although separated from their company and its managers, crews don‟t operate 
in a vacuum. They are members of an airline that has formal rules governing the 
conduct of their jobs. Their flights are conducted as a part of a complex and 
regulated aviation system that has formal rules for the operation of the aircraft. 
The specific direction of flight is coordinated by air traffic controllers who issue 
commands by radio regarding navigation, speed and destination, based on 
formal flight plans filed by each company. During flight, crews must also 






It is worth noting that just as most studies on pilot‟s personalities were conducted 
on fighter pilots and space pilots, thus most of the research conducted on 
doctor‟s personalities, have focused on surgeons and anesthesiologists, and very 
few on family practitioners.  
 
King et al. (1975), tried to confirm or debunk the established stereotype of the 
surgeon versus the internist. The stereotype of surgeons versus internists, 
according to this study, was described as following: Surgeons are more 
aggressive, intransigent, insensitive, aloof, hostile, extroverted, impulsive, 
energetic and ambitious.  
 
At least at the stereotypical level, these traits are reminiscent of the “Right Stuff” 
fighter pilots mentioned by Berg et al. (2002). The study was conducted by 
interns at Boston City Hospital. Most of the traits mentioned in the stereotype 
were not verified by the study.  
 
Surgeons were indeed found to have impulsive tendencies, more intransigent in 
their approach to problem solving and demanding more information and detail, 
they were more realistic, tending towards formal procedure and fact based.  
 
Shuenman et al. (1985) studied 141 surgical Residents using an array of 
psychological tests. It may be stated, that no correlation was found between the 
test results and surgical performance. There were a few predictors of surgical 
ability, but they seemed rather baseless. For example, “left handed women were 






It could be assumed that motor dexterity is paramount to surgical success, but 
several facts dispel this thought. Psychometric capabilities do not differentiate 
between gifted & mediocre surgeons. (Squire et al. 1989; Steel et al 1992).  
 
Wanzel et al.(2002), conducted tests to evaluate surgeons‟ special vision 
abilities. They chose complex surgical procedures as a measure for results and 
proved that these tests could predict the performance of novice surgeons. 
  
Greenburg et al. (1984), examined senior surgeons‟ positions regarding their 
views on what constitutes a “characteristic surgical personality”.  There was a 
high level of correlation between the respondents regarding the following: 
honesty in cases of error, discipline, ability to incorporate all available 
information, motivation and staying power. 
   
Shuenman et al. (1984), found that the foremost personal trait which is the best 
predictor of a surgeon‟s ability, is “stress tolerance” as tested in the State  Trait 
Anxiety Inventory. 
  
Two additional studies show that surgical residents are more introverted and 
conscientious (Deary et al. 1992), they are more intuitive and cautious. “Intuitive” 
was defined as a tendency to gather information using the 6 th sense and then 
attaching meaning to the information. “Caution” was defined as organizing and 
structuring of information in order to make logical and objective decisions, 
Fitzgerald, (1993). 
.  
Ferguson et al. (1994), examined what were the predictors for success during the 
course of 5 years of medical school. They discovered that teacher‟s assessments 
did not predict achievement levels. Responses given on a Personal Statement 
Questionnaire were predictors of success in clinical studies, whereas an A grade 
was better able to predict the Para clinical success. Personal traits, such as 
conscientiousness was found to be the most stable predictor during school. 
Conscientiousness was found to be directly related to A grades and to Para 
clinical performance and a negative correlation to clinical grades.  
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Clarke et al. (1994), handed over 300 anesthesiologists a questionnaire on 
personality assessment (16PF), in addition to a demographic questionnaire and a 
job satisfaction survey. They found that the anesthesiologists‟ personality profile 
described by Howat (1977) was unfounded. Howat claimed that a typical 
anesthesiologist wants to be part of a team, naturally gregarious with a sharp 
sense of humor and seeking change. Both Clarke et al., and Reevel (1980), 
show that contrary to the accepted stereotype, claiming that most 
anesthesiologists have high job satisfaction, and are classified as highly 
intelligent, dominant yet sensitive, independent yet slightly lacking in confidence 
and somewhat tense. Likewise, they are tolerant, bashful and serious. There 
were some differences between differing age groups, married and unmarried 
doctors and between men and women. 
  
Helmreich & Merritt (1998), pages 12-17 describe the operating theater 
environment: 
"A milieu where a number of professionals must come together to perform 
multiple and complex task in a noisy and cluttered environment… A number of 
subgroups- surgeons anesthesiologists, nurses, technicians and orderlies, must 
coordinate their activities to complete the operation successfully.  Other than the 
well-being of the patient, individuals and subgroups may have different and 
competing agendas and requirements. Adding to the complexity of the 
environment, the condition of patients is highly variable and frequently 
unpredictable….. Status inequalities in the OR are pervasive and readily 
observable. However, the authority structure in the OR is not clearly defined…" 
 
 
Aviation and Healthcare: A Comparison 
 
In the chart below, we have presented a comparison of the typical characteristics 
of the two professions based on Helmreich and Merritt (1998), and also insights 
based on our professional experience. The comparison relates to the 
characteristics of the environments of commercial aviation and medicine, with an 












Topic Aviation Medicine 
Professional 
Training 
Lengthy- LLL- Life Long Learning Very lengthy - LLL- Life Long 
Learning. Physicians are obliged to 
be continuously updated and to 
practice accordingly to the state of 
art medical knowledge. 
Type of Training Some theory , mainly practical, 
hands on and simulators 
emergency training 
A lot of theory and increased 





Regular assessments, formally at 
least once a year. Failing to pass 
minimum requirements results in 
loss of license.  
Performance is assessed regularly 
as part of training until receiving 
formal expertise degree. No further 
routine assessments.  
Type of Tasks In civil aviation, usually routine, 
very seldom requires coping  with 
problems or emergency situations. 
In ,military aviation, especially 
fighters, many uncertain scenarios 
pushing the aircrew to the edges of 
physical and psychological 
performance. 
In some types of civil aviation e.g. 
flight rescue operations or air fire 
fighters, the task profile resembles 
the military one..  
Non-routine. There are many 
differences between patients, even 
when conducting  similar 
procedures. In the hospital setting, 
frequent emergencies and 
complications. In the ambulatory 
setting many "false alarms" 
requiring continuous alertness to 
be able to identify and treat timely 
the real emergency conditions. 
Applying New 
Technologies  
Many years between “generations” 
of evolving technologies.  
High rate of change & innovation. 
Large amount of new findings 
published continuously  in 
professional journals. 
Teamwork and  
professional 
interfaces 
A clearly structured hierarchy, 
including a clear job allocation. 
Teamwork is part of initial training 
and essential factor in success or 
failure.   
Undefined job interfacing is 
common, also systems interface is 
blurred, relations within the team 
are not defined, and teamwork is 
not part of basic professional 
training.  
Recently, teamwork is getting more 
attention due to malpractice 
investigations that highlight the 
importance of sound teamwork and 









Routine checks are part of the task, 
including audio and  video 
recording for debriefing  at end of 
each flight  
Hardly any. There is no recording 
of any routine activities and no 
debriefing and study- only in cases 
of severe adverse events and 
complications. The basic 
assumption is of “Master –
Apprentice”.   
Commitment to 
the profession 
According to Helmreich and  Merritt 
(1998), who canvassed 40,000 
pilots in 25 countries on job 
satisfaction,  got an average of: 4.7 
out of 5. This degree may be  
compared  to job satisfaction of  
senior managers conducted in  
Cornell (1995), which found 54%,  
to be satisfied.  
According to Helmreich & Merritt 
(1998), who asked 500 medical 
professionals in 3 countries, the 
same question, job satisfaction 
was ranked on the average of 4.2 
out of 5.  
 
In one of Israel‟s hospitals, in which we assisted the risk manager to build a risk 
management plan, we revealed how difficult it was to apply clinical results of any 
significance to patient safety. When we asked, why the new procedures were not  
Being implemented, we were told that it was due to a disagreement between the 
chief of anesthesiology and the chief of surgery, regarding who would be the one 
in charge to carry out the implementation.  We understood that despite its 
importance for patient safety, a lack of designated authority and manager‟s egos 
were a hurdle in the implementation of the new findings,   aimed at improving 
patient safety.  
 
Following is a comparison chart between Aviation and Medicine, according to 
selected Risk Management parameters.  
  
Topic Aviation Medicine 
Frequency of 
Accidents 
Very  Low. Civil Aviation is 
considered  to be the safest means 
of transportation and it becomes 
safer each year. Military aviation, 
by its nature is accident prone, but 
the western military aviation, is 
making great progress in lowering 
accident rates in the  last decades.  
High: 2.5% -  4.5% of all in- 
patients, according to various 
sources. There is a large dispute 
over the issue of the accident rates 
in medicine, mainly because its 
difficult to separate the iatrogenic 
factors from the patients condition, 




Topic Aviation Medicine 
Public 
Visibility 
Very High  - In most of the cases 
an aviation accidents involves 
many people and becomes easily  
and rapidly a leading news  item.  
Low, except in cases of litigation, 
complaints or a dramatic case 




High- large scale loss of life and 
resources. In all of the cases the 
crew is exposed to similar risks as 
the passengers.  In some cases 
the accident involves loss of 
reputation and professional credit. 
Usually harm and losses are on the 
individual level. Nevertheless, we 
witness more and more considerations 
to the issue of "The second victim" 
according to which the involved 
medical staff, suffers psychologically 
from the error and  in some cases 
even from PTSD.  
Detriment to 
team 
Crew is as vulnerable to 
injury/death as the passengers.  
Team is not susceptible to physical 
injury, but rather to psychological, 




Usually documented in a 
dedicated database and in-depth 
investigation & enquiry ensue. 
Results are published as well as 
recommendations for risk 
reduction. In cases the failure was 
technical, worldwide fleet of 
similar airplanes may undergo 
checks. 
In-depth, investigation & enquiry are 
rare. Publicity is mainly from a media 
viewpoint or in cases of litigation or 
patients complaints.. Insights and 





Procedures are in place for 
receiving, sorting, managing, 
investigating and documenting the 
adverse events as well as making 
them public.  
Separation exists between 
procedures aimed to compensate 
the victims and their relatives and 
between the need to learn 
lessons from the accident in order 
to prevent the next one. 
No standard procedures. Each 
organization creates its own 
standards. In Israel, legislation hinders 
debriefing adverse events without 
exposing involved parties to claims. In 
other western countries e.g. Denmark, 
the system provides compensation to 
the harmed patient without legislation 
and without the need to prove 
malpractice. This kind of approach, 
similar to that of Aviation, enables 
separation between the need to 
compensate the harmed and to learn 




Topic Aviation Medicine 
Approach to 
Errors 
Encourages reporting, including 
near misses, as an opportunity to 
learn and derive insights in order to 
prevent reoccurrence 
Resources are allocated for 
systematical procedures of 
debriefing and learning from errors 
in order continuously to improve the 
system. Culture of "No Name, No 
shame and No blame" is promoted 
and backed up by senior 
management. 
A philosophy of no tolerance for 
error, forces doctors to strive to 
achieve error free performance.. 
Errors are perceived as 
carelessness and malpractice. 
Doctors and nurses are taught that 
perfection is attainable and that 
error is a result of carelessness 
(Jones 2002). Change is underway 
leading to more transparency in a 
“No Fault” culture.    
Victims 
response 
Morrison & Harris (1991), found 
that  even 5 years after an accident, 
victims and their  relatives will still 
be suffering emotionally and often 
exhibit PTSD.   
Victims demand litigation and  
compensation, mostly for physical  
injury but also for “anguish”. The 
issue of "The second victim" is 
recently getting more attention. 
There are recorded cases of 
doctors involved in serious errors 
suffering from PTSD (Bub, 2005).  
 
Odegard (2000), compares the formal aspects of risk management in aviation 
and medicine and recommends adopting the aviation approach. He recommends 
developing organizational systems at a national level as well as multi national 
health organizations whose function will be risk management as currently 
managed by the aviation industry. Additionally, he recommends that healthcare 
follow the aviation industry‟s routine testing of health care practitioners to ensure 
their proficiency   as well as reducing shifts and constantly learn from adverse 
events.  
 
The following table shows Odegard‟s (2000) comparison between aviation and 










A variety of resources developed by the aviation industry, serve both for 
immediate response as well as crisis management of  adverse events as they 
unfold. They also serve as investigative and learning tools, both during and after 
an event and aid in outlining large-scale action plans capable of revealing 
substantial risks.  
 
Over time, the aviation industry has placed safety as a primary focus of air 
transportation safety and has developed a series of methodologies and data 
gathering systems geared to enhance aviation safety.  
 
Healthcare attempts to adopt these methodologies, understanding that lacking 
quality, systematic and current information about errors, risks and adverse 
events, the industry will be unable to make any substantial steps to improve 
patient safety.  
 
The following table exhibits information sources for risk management used by the 
aviation industry and the manner in which it implements each of these methods 
for improving its safety practice, as compared to those utilized in medicine. 
 




Lots of available systems exist for 
reporting adverse events and "near 
misses'  on international,  national 
and  organizational levels. All of the 
systems are characterized by a "No-
Fault" policy being  non-punitive and 
anonymous. Of note: ASRS – 
(Aviation Safety Reporting System), 
(Reynard 1986). FAA- (Federal 
Aviation Administration). ASRS) 
which   receives over 30,000 reports 
annually. ASAP – (Aviation Safety 
Action Partnership), which enables 
pilots to report adverse events to 
their companies under the same 
anonymity conditions as ASRS.  
Since all this reporting is on a 
voluntary basis this information 
cannot be used to assess the actual 
level of potential risks. (March, 
Sproul & Tamuz, 1991).  
There are numerous systems for 
reporting errors and & adverse 
events. In most of the cases the 
systems are on a organizational 
level.  Most common is the report to 
the malpractice insurer, for whom a 
comprehensive report is a 
precondition for insurance coverage.  
Compared to aviation, there are 
hardly any national level reporting 
systems and most of the existing 
systems are organizational. 
According to (Barach & Small 2000), 
there are more reporting systems for 
anesthesiology events, cytology, 
trauma, occupational medicine, heart 
surgery, pharmacology and nursing.  
From our experience it is more 
commonplace to encounter reporting 
systems on nursing errors, and 
medication and rare to find such 
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systems for doctor errors. 
 In 2000, the VA- Veterans 
Administration, announced the 
establishment of a national database 
for medical "near misses", in 
cooperation with NASA (VA Plans 
No Penalty Medical error reporting, 
2000).  
Also, the JCAHO (Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations), requires hospitals to 
establish reporting systems and 
investigate Root Causes (RCA), 
which are part of the reported 
events. (Kohn et al 2000). The main 
impediment for reporting is and has 





Investigation boards are assigned in 
cases of events with severe 
consequences or serious “near 
misses”. There is a methodology in 
place as well as specific investigation 
training. These investigations are 
often conducted by outside risk 
management specialists.  
Routine events are handled and 
debriefed by in-house investigators.   
  
Investigations are rarely conducted, 
except high profile cases of public 
interest. Occasionally the 
government (Ministry of Health) 
investigates when it receives 
complaints. The connotation of these 
investigations is often disciplinary 
and they are published long after the 
event.  
There is no standardized 
methodology for investigation of 
adverse events in Healthcare and 
formal training is still rare. 
In the 2010 academic year, a risk 
management certificate program will 
start at the University of Beer-Sheba 
Medical School, sponsored by IMA 
(Israel Medical Association), aimed 
to qualify professional risk managers 










Widespread use of data collection  
tools, as part of operations 
protocol and ongoing as tasks are 
executed, (i.e. FOQA – Flight 
Operations Quality Assurance), 
data for each task is constantly 
recorded,  and  investigated in 
cases of deviation from required 
procedures   
We do not know of any such system in 
place for Health Care. Clinical records 
for medical purposes, may serve as 
data source for debriefing adverse 
events.. The quality of the records may 





A methodology called LOSA (Line 
Operation Safety Audit), 
developed by Texas University 
over 15 years (Helmreich, Klinect, 
Wilhelm & Sexton 2002) is utilized 
by some airlines. This procedure 
conducts a well-structured 
observation during routine flights 
and records flight risks, errors & 
error management. LOSA was 
carried out in 40,000 flights and 
revealed, at least two errors and 
two flight risks in every flight.  
In 2006, the FAA (Federal 
Aviation Administration) approved 
the LOSA procedure as a means 
of enhancing flight safety, which is 
not mandated by regulation, but 
enables aviation companies to 
apply it voluntarily. (Ballough 
2006).  
 
According to Helmreich & Eric (2002), 
operating theaters are the primary 
medical entity; it is in that context that 
flight risk management was applied to 
healthcare.  
Andrews et al (1997), observed surgical 
teams in a Chicago academic hospital 
and found that 17.7% of surgical 
patients suffered at least one adverse 
event during the surgical procedure.  
Similar studies of this type found that 
problems in surgical teamwork and poor 
communications were serious 
impediments to surgery safety. 
However, it must be noted, that this was 
not part of an ongoing routine 
observation of operating theaters, but 
rather a sporadic episodic observation, 
as   part of a study. . Tal, Segal, 
Lichtenfeld et al. (2007), presented an 
experience-based approach to the study 
of risk management in health care. 
Which One of its components is PRMC 
(Personal Risk Management Coaching). 
In this component, risk management 
professionals observe the behavior of 
medical staff at work and provide them 
with feedback directly related  to 





Source Aviation Medicine 
Simulation  Simulation is widely used as part 
of training and certification 
process. Simulation is a primary 
source of information regarding 
flight safety risks. 
Emergency procedures are 
mainly instructed in simulation 
facilities.  
Use of simulators is on the rise for 
training of medical personnel; 
Particularly procedural simulations and 
most specifically in anesthesiology 
(Kapur & Steadman 1998).  In Israel‟s 
Sheba Medical Center, operates a 
medical simulation facility which 
conducts a wide range of activities; 
starting with selection of medical school 
candidates, preparation courses for 
interns, and topic specific programs for 
advanced medical teams.   .  
  
Since we believe in the organizational approach, as a hotbed for error and as this 
is the main playing field of risk management, we will address a common problem 
in patient safety namely   the “continuity of care” problem or Transient Patients.  
 
We will compare how the aviation industry copes, as an organization, with a 
challenge that resembles the risks involved in “Continuity of Care”.  
 
The problem is both well known and one of the most crucial in Healthcare and as 
such, can be a risk factor for patient safety (Coleman and Berenson, Haggerty 
2003, 2004).  
 
The problem consists of several variants:  
 Interface between the hospital and the community; moving patients to and 
from the hospital. The inherent risk factors are: lack of knowledge on the 
patients‟ medical background and the difficulty in ensuring continuing care 
in the community.  
 Hospital care – Lack of integrative and updated information of the patients 
care program, what needs to be done and what has already been done. 
The inherent risk factors are over- treatment or lack of critical treatment.  
 Community Care – Moving between many caregivers. The inherent risks 
are:  insufficient communication between the various caregivers, 
depending on the patient as the conduit for information between 
caregivers, lack of a single integrated and updated clinical record so all 
caregivers can see what has been done and what needs to be followed 
through, and who needs to do it. 
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 Post discharge information –results of tests conducted while hospitalized, 
which are received post discharge. In some cases, these results may be 
pathological and may require immediate attention and treatment.   
 Transfer between different departments – while moving the patient 
between different departments in the same facility, information may often 
not be  transferred along with the patient, which may be necessary for 
ensuring quality and safe care. 
 
It is possible to conclude that the information available to the caregivers in each 
interaction with a patient is at best partial and by and large is based on what the 
patient is able to report on his condition. It is important to note that there are 
healthcare systems which have existing protocols meant to minimize the risks 
inherent in patient transfer. Recently, some medical organizations, e.g. Maccabi, 
introduce a centralized EMR (Electronic Medical Record), which enables, each 
physician to review patients entire medical background. Still even this centralized 
EMR doesn't solve the problem of interfaces between different medical 
organizations treating a particular patient.  
 
The phenomenon of “transfer” between "caregivers" is common in aviation as 
well. Each aircraft is supervised by the control tower at each airport, and while on 
route he passes through a number of control units on the way to its destination.  . 
At any given moment, during the flight from taxi and take off at airport A to 
landing and switching off at airport B, every step of the flight is monitored and 
supervised. There are clear international standards for passing between 
checkpoints. The minute contact with an aircraft is lost, one of two things have 
definitely occurred; failure in the aircraft‟s communication systems (highly unlikely 
in today‟s advanced technology), or that the craft is in some kind of distress. The 
time lapse from loss of contact to discovering that the plane is in distress is 
usually miniscule. Control and Supervision provide the plane‟s crew with data 
and constant updates, for ensuring flight safety; including distance from other 
aircraft, and weather forecasts.  In emergencies, all these assist the pilot for 
optimal emergency management. 
 
Control and monitoring systems for patients actions, while in treatment process, 
are practically non-existent in health care. Continuity of care depends mainly on 
the attitude and mind set of the doctors and other caregivers at the various points 
of treatment.  
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Errors such as misdiagnosis or delayed diagnosis, lack of vital medical treatment, 
over- treatment, losing track of the patient for follow up, non-administration of 
urgent care, etc. are typical of the problem. The problem also exists in the 
administration of preventive medicine, such as in screening of high-risk 
populations for serious illness 
.  
It may be stated, that the above example is a clear expression of one of the 
paramount differences between aviation and health care. Aviation operates as an 
integrative system, both locally and globally, it incorporates monitoring and 
controls, as a primary value at each and every step of its operations. Whereas 
Healthcare still operates on a “point of service” approach in which each station 
provides the best possible service but does not function as an integrative system. 
The patient can easily get lost between the different points of service as we often 
observe in adverse events. This issue becomes even more explicit in countries 
with minorities, immigrants, language barriers etc, which complicate 
straightforward communication between caregivers and patients. 
 
 We suggest the establishment of a new position among the healthcare 
professions, a supervisor/monitor to oversee all patients‟ transitions and thus 
ensure “continuity of care”.  
 
In all fairness, we must add that many Health Management Organizations (HMO) 
worldwide, are doing their best to find solutions to these issues, not in the least 
Macabi, which has taken a series of steps in order to reduce risks involved in 
patient transfer. Amongst these are the following:  developing a central electronic 
medical record, designating the primary care provider as the “personal doctor” to 
coordinate all treatments and procedures of each patient, appointing nurses as 
communication facilitators and as monitors in leading hospitals as well as training 





 When we started the Macabi project, between the years 1997-1999, we were 
fascinated by the similarity between aviation and healthcare, particularly the 
similarities we discovered between doctors and pilots. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that in our enthusiasm with this insight and willingness to assist 
Macabi, may have caused us to overlook the differences between the disciplines, 




As we mentioned in this chapter, in any professional group, doctors and pilots 
included, there is a significant heterogeneous profiles. The studies conducted on 
this matter were based on elite groups of fighter pilots and astronauts in aviation 
and surgeons and anesthesiologists in health care. There may be some doubt as 
to how much these two groups actually represent their respective professions. 
The majority of pilots are neither fighters nor astronauts, but rather commercial 
pilots and most doctors are not surgeons or anesthetists, but rather family 
practitioners, pediatricians, gynecologists, etc. In spite of this, both these 
professions share many similarities, particularly in their professionalism, mission 
orientation, and professional pride in belonging to an elite group.  
 
The two main differences between the two groups and the most relevant to 
establishing a risk management model are not their personality differences but 
rather the differences between their tasks and the systems in which they operate.  
 
Commercial airline pilots‟ tasks are mostly structured and standard, they operate 
under strict international guidelines and it definitely comes under the definition of 
a system. This was exhibited in the examples provided under “continuity of care” 
and how the aviation industry copes with this issue. On the other hand, 
healthcare has yet to complete the switch from a decentralized, individualized 
and fragmented system to a comprehensive integrated one, in which patient care 
is closely monitored and supervised. Additionally, HMO's, due to financial 
restraints, function as reactive systems rather than pro-active. Rather than treat 
illness, they should spearhead preventive health care. As in aviation, where the 
system does not wait for something to break in order to fix it, or for a pilot to fail 
his mission due to poor vision or health problem, it preempts it by providing 
protocols for constant aircraft care and maintenance, and by requiring pilots to 
undergo annual health checks.  
 
The three parameters we used to compare aviation and healthcare were: 
professional characteristics, risk management, and resources for risk 
management applications. We pointed out the similar characteristics, especially 
the individual‟s perception of the profession; however here too, there exist 
several significant differences. These are mainly related to the lower level of 
awareness that doctors have regarding their limitations and the inherent 
probability to err.  
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Unfortunately, there is very little published reference comparing aviation and 
healthcare as systems. Since early attempts at applying aviation risk 
management methodology were attempted in the operating theater, clearly 
reminiscent of an airplane‟s cockpit, in which each designated person has a clear 
assignment and role in the procedure. The comparisons conducted in this 
chapter between aviation and healthcare, are an attempt to compare systems 
while focusing on the parameters relevant to risk management.  
 
From our standpoint, it is important to understand how the aviation system 
functions in order to ensure flight safety and not only how they manage errors. 
That is, how the aviation industry constructs its organization and working 
procedures in order to achieve maximum flight safety.  
 
 We believe that there is room for a comprehensive comparative study of aviation 
and healthcare from both an organizational and cultural stance as a basis for a 
successful conceptual exchange between the two disciplines, primarily the risk 












Verum esse factum (truth itself is constructed  (  
 


















The basis of modern medicine is empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of 
drugs and   treatments. This approach is known as EBM. (Evidence Based 
Medicine), is in fact representative of the positivistic school of research, 
according to which there is an "objective truth”, and science is obligated to reveal 
this truth, while conducting rigorously controlled scientific observations . 
 
On the other hand, most approaches to Safety and Risk Management are usually 
the result of  " expert experience”, of field operators, who provide effective 
solutions to urgent issues ,by incorporating changes in a variety of work 
environment. While working, those experts, gain insight as to what works and 
what doesn‟t . 
 
This was our modus operandi, applying the insights we had gained in our 
Psychology studies and our Risk Management experience in the varied 
environments of aviation ,medicine, military, insurance, banking, industry and 
infrastructure . The aviation model for safety and risk management was 
developed along similar lines . 
 
Accordingly, we may assume that the aviation model for safety and risk 
management, represents the Constructivist approach . 
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The attempt to assimilate  the ARMM in medicine, took an interesting turn of  
events, since we are not only transferring a model from one content world to 
another, but  rather transporting an entire philosophy, which is contrary to the 
basic tenets of the  receiving (medicine) content world. Actually, we are 
transferring a constructivist approach into a content world which is mostly 
positivistic. This situation is somewhat like, forcing a cat and a dog to live 
peacefully together . 
 
In this chapter, we will differentiate between an “imparting” content world, the one 
in which the model was originally developed and a “recipient” content domain, 
considers  to assimilate an “alien” model . 
 
 
The rationale for transferring models  
 
The question of why we should transfer models, methods and insights, is a valid 
one. Although, the answer is practically intuitive; in order to start from the point 
that others have already reached. It is inefficient and ineffective to reinvent the 
wheel, and to dismiss the experience of others, gained over time at great effort, 
as irrelevant . 
 
The human race develops and advances by gaining knowledge, passing it on to 
others and incorporating it to new situations. According to Piaget‟s learning 
theory (1983), we generalize information and thereby develop our cognitive skills. 
We create schemes, called "constructs” of generalized knowledge, and apply 
these “constructs” to new situations . 
 
Actually, the process of cognitive development exists in the tension between 
assimilation and adaptation. Assimilation occurs when a construct (previously 
developed scheme), can be applied to a new situation, and it changes as a 
result.of the new application.   Adaptation occurs when the existing scheme is 
irrelevant to the new situation and there is a need to adjust the scheme or 
develop a new one.  
 
Therefore, the rationale for transferring a scheme or construct or model from one 
setting to another is aimed for resources conservation, which means, attaining 
maximum effectiveness with minimal waste of energy . 
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The main question is how do we define the problem field, regarding the tension 
between assimilation and adaptation, meaning, will the characteristics of risk 
management in healthcare enable assimilation of  the existing model of aviation 
risk management, or are  the differences between these two environments so 
vast, that they require adaptation; development of a   new scheme, unique to 
healthcare . 
 
Even if adaptation is needed, since we are in a complex field, it may be advisable 
to learn from the aviation risk management model, in order to create one unique 
to healthcare, based on lessons learned, gleaned while implementing the 
aviation model . 
 
 
Choosing the right model, choosing the right organization  
 
As previously mentioned, it is not a question of principle, whether it is appropriate 
to transfer a working model from one content world to another, but rather a 
practical one of choosing the right model for transfer and the right organization 
for the model‟s application . 
 
Within this context, we will discuss the criteria for a “correct model” as well as 
criteria for choosing the “right” organization for its application. We will explore 
both questions from the perspective of the project described in this work.  
 
The “right” model, in our opinion should answer the following criteria. Although 
Macabi‟s management did not specify these, we felt however, that they were 
present anyway:  
  
 A proven model – a model whose application, under a variety of 
circumstances, achieved the goals for which it was designed; 
significantly and consistently reducing risks. We can witness, that the 
aviation model, is indeed such a model, as observed   by the results 
yielded in civil aviation, which has been quoted in many studies, 
including this one. We may add, that from our own experience in the 
Israeli Air Force, the Aviation Risk Management model proved itself as 
a working one. 
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 A model with clearly defined principles – we have already 
mentioned in this work,  that the aviation model is more of an idea than 
a clear set of principles, well defined procedures  and tools. The 
aviation model stresses aspects of the professional culture and not 
defined methods of one kind or another. Therefore ,it is not the “right” 
model according to this criterion. But, this attribute turns it into a 
generic model versus specific models, thus easing its transition into 
another content world. For example principles such as transparency, 
teamwork, placing a premium on safety and equaling it to performance, 
investigation, a pro-active approach, and others. These principles, 
although successfully applied in the aviation industry, are not 
necessarily unique to this industry . 
 
 A flexible model which can be adjusted to changing circumstances -A 
narrow model designated for one specific context or use, is not easily 
transferable to other areas of activity. Flexibility may in fact be one of 
the model‟s principles or an outcome of the model‟s features and the 
experience accrued while applying it in other areas . 
 
 A model which serves the needs of an entire organization, for both 
management and employees -This criterion reflects the motivational 
aspect of the employees. If workers perceive that the model is 
designed to only serve organizational goals, important as they may be, 
and will not contribute anything to them, directly or indirectly, its 
chances of being adopted are very slim. If the workers are not 
committed to the successful assimilation process, its chances of 
success are very slim. It is therefore imperative that the right model will 
be one which the workers perceive, as in some way, improving their 
position, their status,  their value and contribution . 
 
  A model with an ideological appeal and not just a functional one 
– Assimilation of a new model within an organization is a large-scale 
change. In organizational culture as well as in work procedures, an 
investment in resources and worker motivation is required for 
successful application of the model .Therefore, if the model is meant to 
solve a specific problem and has no value driven context, it is fair to 
assume that it will be hard to harness the workers to make the extra 
effort needed to assimilate it into the organization. The workers must 
sense that they are partners in a large and meaningful process . 
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 A model already applied successfully in several contexts – it is 
reasonable to assume that if a model has already been applied 
successfully in different contexts; it can be successfully applied to 
healthcare. The aviation risk management model has been applied in 
several variants in parts of the Western hemisphere, in both civil and 
military aviation. This fact makes it a flexible model which can be applied 
in different cultural, social and political settings. However ,this being said, 
we do not know of any recorded transfer of the aviation model to a content 
world so different such as the worlds of aviation and healthcare . 
 
 A Model originating in a content world, which the recipient 
employees perceive as prestigious as their own – as we discussed in 
previous chapters, aviation answers this criterion in the eyes of medical 
professionals. 
 
The second question, concerns the characteristics of the recipient organization. It 
is important to assess the recipient organization‟s ability and willingness to 
receive a model from another content world, according to the following criteria : 
 
 Presence of a real problem within the model’s context – The 
motivation for applying the model, by an organization, which at face value 
seems totally unsuitable, is more probable in case  that a real and chronic 
problem exists,  which pertains to the organization‟s main activity. This is 
indeed the perception of healthcare risk management since the publication 
of the IOM reports in 1999 and 2001 . 
 
 Lack of a similar existing model in the content world of the 
organization- If there is specific model within the context of the recipient 
organization, adapting a model from a different discipline will be nearly 
impossible. The naysayers for assimilating the aviation model for risk 
management in healthcare claim that they have accumulated sufficient 
experience and expertise in risk management to develop their own model 
specifically for healthcare. This attitude would certainly be more adamant 
had there been a healthcare specific model in existence . 
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 Awareness to essential differences between imparting and recipient 
organizations – Denying the differences between content worlds and 
organizational differences, may bring about total rejection of the model .
Healthcare‟s context is in many ways different from that of aviation. Any 
attempt at minimizing or denying these differences, could create 
antagonism from management and medical staff.. Alternately, presenting 
the differences and analyzing them, can promote trust in the process 
making it seem in –depth and not ad-hoc.  These considerations   may 
prevent it as being seen as a “default” decision due to little choice, but 
rather one in which all the parameters were taken into account . 
 
 Attention to the differences in the assimilation process – By attention 
we mean defining action plans from a deep understanding of the 
differences in context between the two environments, e.g., making 
adaptations in the model to adjust it to the recipient organization, investing 
resources for training and implementation, as well as handling resistance . 
 
 Clear definition of the recipient organization's goals by adopting  the 
“alien” model – Any large-scale change, arouses resistance and 
expectations.  It is advisable to identify expectations, primarily in order to 
manage them, and to prevent straying from them. The success of such a 
large-scale process is not certain. This is especially true when assimilating 
an “alien” model whose chances of success are not clear . 
 
 Management commitment to assimilating the model -Since we are 
talking about a process whose prospects of success are not clear, 
management must commit to support this process. Not only must they 
provide encouragement and a safety net to all those whose positions may 
be threatened should it fail, these organizational pioneers must not be 
made to feel that they will be blamed, abandoned or fired in case 
something should go away. In addition, management must be committed 
and available to respond at very short notice to changes in strategy and 
tactics, which are a natural outcome of specific and generic problems that 
can be encountered during the assimilation process . 
 
The following table presents our assessment of the “right" model and the “right” 
recipient organization. On a scale of 1-5,  we evaluated the ARMM and Macabi 
healthcare services as the recipient Organization. The assessment was made 
during the writing of this chapter, but it relates to the early stages of our 





The Suitability of the ARMM  
 
Macabi’s Suitability 
Topic Score* Topic Score* 
Proven model 5 Existence of a real problem 5 
Defined Principles 2 Lack of a specific Model 5 
Flexibility of the Model 4 Awareness to differences 3 
Serves the entire Organization 5 Attention to differences in the 
assimilation process 
3 
Ideological Model 5 Clear definition of Goals 4 
Applied in a variety of contexts 3 Management Commitment 5 
Prestige of the imparting party 5   
Total   83% 92 Total   83% 92 
___________ 
*1= low, 5= high 
 
In spite of our awareness to the bias in the above table, still, in our opinion it 
reflects closely enough, the actual state of affairs in 1997-8, when Macabi 
adopted the aviation risk management model. The above assessment clearly 
shows that “Model suitability" was assessed at 83%, as was the Maccabi's 
suitability to receive the model. 
 
In 2001, AHRQ (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality), published a 
comprehensive report dealing with risk management and healthcare safety. The 
report addresses, amongst others, the issue of transferring risk management 
models and insights from other industries, in order to advance the issue in 
medicine. According to the authors, in medicine, only empirically proven 
practices are adopted, and that it owes its development to this scientific 
approach. Therefore, medical practitioners will wonder at the lack of scientific 
proof in safety procedures and risk management taken from other disciplines. 
Also, one could argue, that adopting unproven methods, from other contexts, 
could more likely than not, bring harm to healthcare safety. However, the report 
continues, in spite of the scientific criticism, it is undeniable that the 
achievements of other industries in this matter and civil aviation in particular, are 
by any standard higher than those of healthcare . 
 
The report proceeds to introduce the method used by Reason (2002), which 
recommends adopting general organizational models, which are able to advance 
the field of risk management in high-risk organizations, rather than adopt specific 
methods from other industries . 
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As we further mention in chapter 6 of this work, upon recommending the aviation 
risk management model to Macabi, we too were challenged to find any 
publications describing the model and empirical evidence regarding its 
effectiveness. Likewise, Kirwan (1998) ) ,  Hollinagel (1999), and others, claim that 
even precise engineering methods, used in  applying risk management 
procedures, may be relevant for  healthcare safety, were  lacking empirical 
evidence. For example, many methods promise that they can detect "human 
error”, predict human error and profess to have developed monitoring tools to 
reduce these errors. A small number of these methods have been documented 
and fewer yet were empirically tested for their claims. Additionally, even if we 
ignore the demand for hard evidence, we will find that there are very few cases in 
which assessment of the capabilities of these various techniques was actually 
conducted . 
 
In another case, when Healthcare attempted to incorporate TQM (Total Quality 
Management), an approach  which had impressive success in industry, but there 
was little empirical evidence to support  its success in healthcare .Gerovitz, 
Blumenthal and Kilo (1998)   , Shortell et. Al (1998), Shortell ET. al. (2000 )(  
 
It seems that when discussing complex procedures of change, such as 
assimilation of a risk management model in a large organization, it is impossible 
to assume that an empirically proven model  under certain circumstances, would 
be any more successful than a model developed on the basis of extensive field 
experience. 
  
We suggest that the “right model”   and the "right organization" assessment 
techniques, described in this subchapter,   as well as proper and well planned 
deployment, are most critical towards successful assimilation of an "alien" model.  
 
 
Establishing the organizational infrastructure for the adaptation of the 
model – Professionals and Consultants . 
 
What is required of the recipient organization in order to successfully assimilate a 
model developed in a completely different discipline? We will address the 
question from a perspective of the experience we acquired in several 
organizations where the aviation ,risk management model was adopted . 
 
In chapter 6, we described in detail the process which Macabi followed in order to 
assimilate the aviation risk management model. It is important to mention that 
during  7997-8 , when we embarked on this project with Macabi, they were the first 
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organization with whom we assimilated the aviation model. A significant number 
of our current insights were not mature at the time . 
 
We assume that part of the insights brought forth in this paper, are pertinent to 
any major change in a large organization  . It is our opinion that assimilation of an 
“alien” model must include the necessary components from 3 major categories : 
 
1. Management participation – as previously mentioned, assimilation of the 
risk management model is a major change, engaging the entire 
organization. Unless management is explicit, involved and committed, the 
chances of success are nil.  Many of the reasons for this lack of success 
are mentioned throughout the paper . Following we have detailed the 
requirements for management participation :  
 
• Top management commitment and participation -This was always 
our first demand from the start, with each organization. One reason for 
this is the organizational structure required for risk management. In 
most organizations which have a risk management tradition, the 
person in charge of Risk Management reports directly to the General 
Manager . Therefore, it is imperative that all managers are aware of 
this from the start. This is particularly important when the assimilation 
of a new model is at stake. The level of commitment is not just a 
theoretical one in support of the project but a daily routine involvement. 
Management needs to be available to discuss issues, make decisions 
and understand that this is a critical component of the project‟s 
progress. More so, we might add that in most cases the risk 
management officer has no managerial responsibilities, but rather 
serves the organization in a consulting and facilitating capacity. In this 
situation, the risk management function draws its authority from top 
management, who base their decisions on the formers 
recommendations . 
 
• Policy – This means a clear and explicit statement by the General 
Manager and the board of directors regarding the following issues: the 
meaning of Risk Management for the organization, areas of 
responsibility, interfaces and the core principles of risk management in 
the organization and major risk management procedures. Macabi 
issued a policy statement three years after the Risk Management 
Department was established. It dealt with the issue of managerial 
immunity, which was necessary in order to encourage medical staff to 
report errors in patient care. The caregiver‟s reluctance to report their 
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own errors ,from fear of repercussions, without a clear-cut policy, 
created a modicum of confusion in the interfaces between the Risk 
Management Department and other organizational organs, both in the 
headquarters and field.  . With this insight in mind, upon starting to 
work with MEKOROT (Israel National Water Company), to implement 
the Risk Management model, we recommended that a policy 
statement be issued and approved (after lengthy discussion), and 
made public, in the first few months of our activity in that company. 
They did so and the policy statement was in effect long before a risk 
manager was appointed. 
 
• Steering Committee – The purpose of a Risk Management steering 
committee is to gather periodically all those with a vested interest 
around a table, in order to discuss all aspects of the assimilation 
process. The Steering Committee chair should be the General 
Manager and all other top managers should be a part of this group as 
well. Each manager should report on his contribution to promote Risk 
Management in the organization, and receive new tasks to be 
completed before the next meeting. The committee should also 
address failures and successes in the process and learn from them. 
The minutes of the committee meetings should be disseminated to all 
lower level managers . 
 
• Assimilation Program -despite the uncertainty of such a project, and 
perhaps because of it, it is most important that a yearly schedule and 
operative plan be followed for the model assimilation. This program 
should include action items, those responsible for each task, 
checkpoints ,overall supervision, etc . 
 
2. Resources and Infrastructure -In order to assimilate the model under 
the special circumstances previously delineated, a significant investment 
of resources is required. More so, there should be willingness to a 
continuing and growing investment in the process, since the scope of Risk 
Management activities is continually expanding. This issue is discussed in 
chapter 6, where we described the process of establishing employee 
standards and job descriptions for the Risk Management Department of 
Macabi. Once the department‟s contribution to the organization is 
apparent, a growing number of managers join in and willingly begin to 
apply the process. This ongoing development demands a constant 
availability of training supervision and follow-up personnel in conjunction 




• Professional Manpower -In chapter 6.6, we discussed the recruiting 
process of employees for the Risk Management Department in 
Macabi. Clearly, selecting and assigning  the manager, is the most 
critical  act with the most ramifications for the long run, including the 
department‟s progress, and its success in assimilating the “alien” 
model. We can safely say that the basic attributes of the first manager 
in Macabi outlined in chapter 6.6, are the ones required for this job . 
This holds true at the outset of the project, but at any rate, recruitment 
of new staff, must be stringent and uncompromised by hiring readily 
available candidates . 
 
• External Consultants – After 12 years of working with Macabi ,we are 
still assisting the department, both in ongoing activities and in 
development of new ideas and projects. Consultancy has an important 
part to play in the assimilation of a new model and therefore it is a 
basic ingredient of the process. The external consultants are supposed 
to be the ones who have already successfully assimilated a similar 
model in the original setting. In a situation which is not an empirically 
controlled environment, in which each any action affects its 
surroundings and interacts with it, the actions and their  outcomes 
continue to affect more people and more events down the line. It is of 
cardinal importance to have consultants on hand who have already 
experienced this complex process. They are then able to provide 
explanation to the events and assist in overcoming obstacles. The 
consultants perform several functions, e.g. they pass on information, 
using several different methods they train the Risk Management staff 
internally, conduct various activities with the department staff .Prepare 
the staff for activities outside the department assist in crisis managing, 
support the department staff individually and as group .In fact, through 
this modus operandi they develop a professional partnership with the 
Risk Management Department's staff.  
 
• Organizational Structure – The department must be established 
under the direct responsibility of the General Manager. The department 
should be placed in the second managerial tier, just below senior 
management. It is important for the department to be budgeted and 
functional from its inception .Throughout the first year, recruiting of new 





• Information System – An information system for handling adverse 
events and risks is an absolute must. From the moment ,the 
department begins to receive reports, the information system is a tool 
for assimilating working procedures of the unit and standardizing them 
to a uniform format. In chapter 6.9 we described the process of 
establishing the computerized system for risk management in Macabi. 
The system serves the Risk Management department in Macabi to this 
day. Even though it is about to be replaced by a newer more 
technologically advanced system, it will maintain its original principles 
of operation. Macabi‟s system was based on the principles of the 
Israeli Air Force Risk Management system from the early 80's of the 
20th century. It is important to mention that there are many off the shelf 
software packages for organizational risk management. However, it is 
most effective if the system is specifically geared to the needs and 
parameters of the organization and the model which it is planning to 
implement. One could compare the information system to the genetic 
code of Risk Management activities. Since it retains the memory traces 
of all adverse events, the risks involved decisions and 
recommendations by the Risk Management Department.  Since 
Macabi‟s system was based on the insights gained by the Air Force ,
we could claim that the Air Force “genes” were thereby transmitted 
through the model to Macabi. We could also add that the information 
system is the hard-core base for assimilation of an alien model . 
 
3. Working Procedures – Work procedures in Risk Management, must be 
based on the assimilated model, be supported by policy, and executed via 
the computerized system . 
 
• Defining the working procedures in Risk Management – By 
working procedures we mean to define the following functions: 
reporting of adverse events, managing and handling those events, 
development and execution of a pro-active annual Risk Management 
program. The working procedures, must be based on the principles of 
the assimilated model, clearly defined from the very beginning and 
updated according to developing needs. It should be noted that since 
we are " importing” a model from an “alien” world, the expectation of 
management and  employees is that they are not getting a “cat in a 
bag”, or an unknown commodity, but rather a tried and tested well 
proven model. Therefore, the working policies and procedures, which 
are in the immediate interface with organization, must be properly 
defined from the earliest stages . 
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• Applying Risk Management into the assimilation process – The 
assimilation process, originating in a totally alien content world, is in 
and of itself a risky undertaking. It is therefore advisable to conduct the 
assimilation process in a pro-active Risk Management mode. The goal 
of this approach is to uncover the risks, evaluate them, define 
checkpoints for the cardinal risks and monitor these checkpoints and 
their efficacy. This stage is of utmost importance, most of all in order to 
instill the Risk Management staff with the understanding that their own 
work is fraught with risks which must be dealt with and handled pro 
actively . 
 
• Training – This is one of the most crucial components of the 
assimilation process and especially when dealing with a new model 
whose origins are from extraneous sources. Training must encompass 
a broad spectrum as possible of manager, and employees and to 
impart as much information as possible about the model, work 
procedures, and expectation thereof. Training must well planned as an 
integral part of a model assimilation . 
 
We will discuss our own strategy for assimilating the model with Macabi, 
according to the parameters brought herewith. We will mention that the above 
strategy was developed with the writing of this chapter in 2008, and not upon 
embarking on the Macabi project in 1997-8. The assumptions are subjective on a 
scale of 1-5, and is based on insights gained over the years of working with 
Macabi and other organizations. The following table presents our assumptions 










Involvement  of senior 
management  
5 Professional staff : 
Quality and 
quantity 








5 Risk Management 
for the assimilation 
process 
3 
Steering committee 3 Organizational 
structure   





4   
Total   70% 14 Total  80% 16 Total   47% 7 
*1=low, 5= high 
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According to the assumptions above, management involvement received 70%. 
Tools Infrastructure 80%, and working procedures 47%. Today, we can clearly 
say that had we been aware of the importance of preparedness for model 
assimilation, according to these parameters, we would have invested more time 
and effort in preparing for assimilation of the model, and most particularly we 
would focus on working procedures . 
 
The following table illustrates our current viewpoint regarding the appropriate 
timing for each of the stages and segments of model assimilation. In the first 
year, we are able to observe that Q1 is the busiest and requires large investment 
of resources in order to get it off the ground. This is also the reason that the first 
stage holds the greatest risk factors for the entire project. Lacking proper 
resources, compromises are made; these are not always the optimal choice for a 
successful assimilation process . 
 
Activity Q1 Q2 Q3 Q3 
Management 's  Involvement     
1. Commitment and Involvement  of senior management  V V V V 
2. Written Risk Management policy V    
3. Steering committee V V V V 
4. Annual assimilation program V    
Tools and Infrastructure     
5. Professional staff : Quality and quantity V V   
6. External consultants V V V V 
7. Organizational structure   V    
8. Dedicated Information system V V   
Working Procedures     
9. Defined work procedures for Risk Management V V   
10. Risk Management for the assimilation process V V V V 

















Resistance to Change and practices from other content worlds  
 
Initial theoretical ideas about the resistance to change were attributed to Kurt 
Lewin  , (7947) in an article published in Human Relations, he argued that 
organizations just like  biological creatures, strive for homeostasis. This being the 
tendency to maintain stability by resisting change and/or retuning to an original 
state in case homeostasis is subverted . 
 
Accordingly, the success of any change is dependent on melting away the 
balance, by altering the dynamics between those championing change and those 
resisting it . 
 
Coch and French (1948), also published in Human Relations, an article dealing 
with overcoming the resistance to change . 
 
Lewin‟s model (1947-1952), was adopted and further developed by Shein, (1969-
1980  .(  The model presents a three phase cognitive process of change: 
unfreezing, displacement , and refreezing . 
 
These works were the foundation for many studies thereafter on change and 
resistance to it. As well as changing attitudes and the relation between changing 
attitudes and behavior, (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). According to these 
assumptions, there is a consistent relation between attitudes, intentions and 
behaviors. Also, there is sufficient evidence to assume that beliefs and attitudes 
will have bearing on management and employees ability to accept a planned 
change . 
 
Zaltman and Duncan (1977), defined change as; “Any behavior which serves to 
maintain homeostasis in response to stress to change it"  
 
Piderit (2000), states that “People seldom develop a resistant behavior, act out 
this resistance, without the source of this resistance stemming from their fear of 
negative personal repercussions from this change”. Meaning, people resist 
change when they perceive it as a threat on their homeostasis, their status in the 
organization, loss of control and loss of income . 
 
We have already mentioned that the assimilation of the Risk Management model 
carries many large scale organizational changes. Following is a list of some of 
these changes, which are outcomes of the Risk Management model assimilation. 




 Changing the basic paradigm of positivism, common in Western Medicine 
as a sole method of adopting new practices and attitudes. In our case, the 
suggested   model is the result of a constructivist approach . 
 
 A change in the traditional work habits whereby patient care is the main 
task ,developing a greater awareness of the inherent risks of healthcare 
and making patient safety central in healthcare . 
 
 Changing the professional culture, which until a few years ago, was 
intolerant of medical errors towards a culture which understands and 
accepts that “to err is human".  
 
 A change in attitude from blame and  ostracism of erring healthcare 
practitioners to  one of support and understanding accompanied by a frank  
effort to learn from each mistake in  order to minimize future reoccurrence . 
 
 A change in the doctor/patient relationship from a lofty attitude to one in 
which the doctor may err and when he does, he discloses this to the 
patient . 
 
 A change in the attitude wherein the error was blamed on those involved,  
versus the current  concept  in which  failures are attributed to chronic 
systemic shortcomings, which enable  physician's error . 
 
 A change from an attitude in which medical errors should be secreted to 
an attitude of partnership with the patient, aimed to manage the error and 
minimize current and future harm. 
 
 A change in interfaces with external parties  such as suppliers , 
malpractice insurance companies, medical malpractice litigators, labor 
unions, government agencies  etc . 
 
 A change in the basic tenet of medicine as being professionally 
conservative, to a  new openness enabling the assimilation of an "alien" 
model  
 
These changes are only the tip of the iceberg of the many changes occurring as 
result of adopting the Aviation model for Risk Management in healthcare. Some, 
are perceptions and some are very practical, as they address and challenge 





In chapter 6.4, we describe some of the resistant behaviors, which we 
encountered in the Macabi project. . 
 
Odegard (2000) compares the formal aspects of Risk Management in Aviation 
and Medicine and recommends using the aviation methods as well as developing 
standards at the national and the international level of health organizations, 
similar to those of   Aviation.  He goes on to say that healthcare should follow 
aviation, in this matter, such as doctors annual proficiency testing and drawing 
conclusions from adverse events. Although this is a very thorough study, it does 
not address the possible resistance to all these suggestions, which may reduce 
the chances of accomplishing these suggestions and working along these 
suggestions . 
 
Thomas and Helmreich (2002), analyze the similarities and differences between 
medicine and aviation, referring to studies, which compared the operating theatre 
and emergency room to   airline crews operating in the cockpit. . Although they 
found several common components, there were differences in routine activities 
as well as in emergencies. One of the most apparent differences was the 
complexity of medical tasks: “Patients are far more complex than aircrafts”. 
However, that being said, they point out that these differences do not necessarily 
hinder the adoption of the aviation model. They foresee a risk as resulting from 
the stress on the healthcare system to improve care practices, which could bring 
them to adopt the aviation model, without actually examining it sufficiently. This 
work too, does not take into account the profound implications of adopting an 
"alien" model and the resistance it could arouse . 
 
Lacking relevant professional literature in this immediate matter under 
discussion, we  turned to two disciplines which had been studied in greater 
depth; one was doctor‟s  resistance to insertion of  information  systems into 
healthcare , and the other was business based  –  Mergers and  Acquisitions. We 
assume, that the greater body of literature on these issues is closely related to 
financial arguments and greater popularity of these topics compared to risk 
management  
 
Freudenheim (2004), mentions a case from 2003, where doctors in the 
prestigious Cedars Sinai Medical Center of Los Angeles, rebelled at the 
installation of CPOE (Computerized Physician Order Entry), which was supposed 
to improve their work efficiency. The physicians   perceived it as an impediment 
to their caretaking work. The system was removed, after it had already been 




Mergers and Acquisitions of companies has been thoroughly studied due to the 
enormous financial impact to large corporations and the scope of their activities. 
Between 1998-2000, Mergers and Acquisitions generated a total of 2,851 billion 
dollars, 1,526 in the USA alone (Thomson 2001). According to the consulting firm 
of A.T. Kearney, failures in Mergers and Acquisitions range from around 58% 
(Habech 2000), to 83% according to KPMG consultants (KPMG 2001.   
 
According to Bertoncelli and Kovac (2007), the main causes for these failures are 
managers focusing only on the “hard” parameters of the transaction, such 
financial  statements, markets, production capacity, etc. while ignoring  the “soft” 
parameters such  as cross cultural differences and employee expectations . 
There is a tendency to marginalize the human factor in Mergers and Acquisitions 
so that in  effect it is often overlooked (Huang and  Kleiner  ,2004). 
 . 
Majidi (2007), also analyses the many failures of Mergers and Acquisitions, 
particularly international transactions. He claims that one of the main reasons for 
failures in this area ,especially in multinational mergers, is lack of attention to 
cross cultural differences between the different nationalities involved in the 
merger. He recommends using a reference called “cultural distance” (Kogut and 
Sing 1988), to assess the scope of the problem and define appropriate solutions 
based on it . 
 
In spite of dealing with two very different processes, Risk Management model 
assimilation and Mergers and Acquisitions, it is our opinion that that we can draw 
important insights from comparison of the two. Thus, we learn that failure in 
attempts to merge large organizational systems is quite frequent and their results 
affect large numbers of people and can cause management and employees 
severe financial harm. These failures are mainly attributed to lack of attention at 
all stages of the transaction, to the “soft” differences between the merging 
companies, these include cultural, national, and organizational differences, 
employee expectations etc . 
 
In our opinion the assimilation of an “alien” model like in Macabi, it is imperative 
to pay significant attention, far more than we did, to the cultural differences 
between aviation and healthcare, between the Israeli Air Force and Macabi, and 
to plan and implement activities to reduce resistance which developed due to a 
lack of awareness and sensitivity to these” soft ”differences . 
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The issue of managing change in organizations is one of the most popular in 
management . Close to 2000, books on the subject are published yearly, and a 
significant number of those deal with organizational change. In a search in 
Current Content (2002), 1300 articles were found, since 1994, all dealing with the 
topic . 
 
Kotter (1995), of the Harvard Business School, in his reference to Organizational 
Change said the following :"A few… corporate change efforts have been very 
successful. A few have been utter failures. Most fall somewhere in between, with 
a distinct tilt toward the lower end of the scale ". 
 
According to Strebel, (1996) also of Harvard ": Change management isn‟t working 
as it should. In a telling statistic, leading practitioners of radical corporate 
reengineering report that success rates in Fortune‟s 1000 companies are well 
below 50%, some say they are as low as 20%.  
 
Champagne (2002), In reference to non-implementation of necessary changes in 
Canada‟s healthcare system over the past 15 years, states : "Recommendations 
to reform Canada‟s health systems made over the last  fifteen years, have rarely 
been given effect, although often commanding a broad consensus ” .  
 
Champagne claims that the overall conclusion from analysis of professional 
literature  dealing with failures in Organizational Change, is that they are all about 
changes  themselves which are all highly complex processes, unexpected, ad 
carrying an array of  risk factor,  whose role and intervention changes over time. 
Likewise, she raises the hypothesis that successful implementation could be 
related to preparation for change, paying attention to the social and emotional 
implications, organizational structure and political dynamics. 
 
Berwick (2005), president of the IHI, Institute for Healthcare Improvement, and 
one if  the foremost leaders in the field of  patient  safety in the USA, compares 
the  reactions  of  the medical community, to the IOM reports of 1999 and  2001, 
which he helped  to write , to  mourner‟s reaction to death, as described by 
Kubler – Ross (1969) 
 . 
The mourner is the medical community, mourning the demise of the traditional 
image of medicine, as a caregiver and savior, who suddenly realizes the harm 
and to patients and its scope. . The medical establishment in general and 
medical staff as individuals in particular, are  going through a complex grieving 




1. Denial – the data is incorrect and there‟s no actual problem 
 
2. Anger – If there is a problem it has nothing to do with me and " Who are 
you to judge my practices ?" 
 
3. Bargaining – "My patient‟s condition is more critical, therefore these 
methods are not applicable for me "…  
 
4. Depression – general drop in morale, as manifested in the following 
statement:  "I consider leaving the profession ”.  
 
5. Acceptance – "Whether I like it or not, we need to sit down and be 
capable of playing by the new rules". 
 
6. Leadership – "Let‟s actually participate in putting together the new playing 
rules and lead in this direction". 
 
This insight, which Berwick turned towards the medical profession, illustrated that 
although its intention is to cure, it causes also harm. This reflection helped 
physicians to make the mental switch, needed to realize the call for a change in 
the system and reframing the rules of the game as, highlighted in stages 5 and 6, 
above. 
 
We often use this reflection in lectures and workshops which we conduct for risk 
management professionals and medical staff, in order to assist them in 
evaluating their current stage. It is not rare to find out, that many physicians are 
fixated in the early stages, challenging us to assist them to proceed to the more 
constructive stages of the mourning process. From these encounters we have 
learned, that many care providers, are well aware of the of the grim statistics and 
that many of them are stuck somewhere between stages 1-4, most of them in 
stages 1-2. .  Without the Kubler –Ross reflections, their chances of participating 
in the Risk Management model assimilation from an “alien” world are very low . 
 
Denham (2005), argues that one of the biggest myths about medicine, is that it 
readily adopts innovations. It is true that that medicine leads in developing new 
products and processes . However, if there is no significant financial 
remuneration in the short term for practitioners or hospitals, it takes 17 years for 
clinical studies to be implemented in standard medical practice.   (Balas, Austin, 




Denham adds that, regarding safety in healthcare, the time required for adoption 
of new procedures, could be even longer. Unfortunately, the strongest catalysts 
for changes are the new codes of remuneration for caregivers in computerized 































“Give me a fruitful error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its 
own correction. You can keep your sterile truth for yourself” 
















In the United States of the late 1990's, the administration of President Bill Clinton 
launched an unique  initiative to tackle the subject of risk management. The work 
of the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which published two reports that shed light on 
the phenomenon of medical errors, was the principal trigger for the initiative. The 
reports staggered the professional medical community, the Clinton administration 
and American public opinion. The two reports – "To Err is Human: Building a 
Safer Health System" (1999) and "Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health 
System for the 21st Century" (2001) – impelled the administration, headed by 
President Clinton, to take very clear positions and set in motion processes that 
within five years would reduce deaths due to medical errors by 50 percent, 
estimated at the time at about 100,000 each year.  
 
From a speech by President Clinton on December 7, 1999: “….Last week the 
Institute of Medicine released a disturbing report about patient safety and 
medical errors in our nation‟s health system (refers to the 1st report by IOM). 
According to the study, as many as 98,000 Americans lose their lives each year 
as a result of preventable medical errors….” 
With this speech, President Clinton set in motion actions by the administration to 






In another speech two months later, on February 21, 2000, given in front of  the 
committee, he had appointed to submit the operative work plans that would 
reduce the extent of medical errors, President Clinton said:  
“…..Have we given all of our care-givers adequate training? Do they adequately 
coordinate with, and communicate with, one another? Do all settings have the 
right kinds of teams and systems in place to minimize mistakes? These were the 
kinds of questions that were asked and answered in our landmark efforts as 
Americans to improve Aviation Safety and workplace safety. And if these 
questions are properly asked and answered in the context of the health care 
system, they will dramatically reduce errors there as well….” 
The president‟s clear and resolute positions set in motion a large number of 
processes within the American medical system that led to the adoption of risk-
management models borrowed from the aviation system.  
 
In 1996, about three years before President Clinton‟s milestone speech, when 
Maccabi Healthcare Services (in Israel) decided to establish its risk-management 
department, the field of risk management still represented virtually untouched 
ground.  
 
After making the organizational decision to enter into the field of risk 
management, in the expectation that engagement in the subject at the 
institutional level would improve the quality of the medical care provided by 
Maccabi and perhaps also reduce the number of claims against it, it was realized 
that a model to guide the risk-management department in its nascent steps, and 
perhaps at the later stages too, had to be immediately found. It was clear to the 
policymakers at Maccabi as well as to the founders of the department that it 
would be impossible to invent a new model, test and validate it in the narrow time 
frame at their disposal. They realized that they had to make every effort to 
minimize the possibility of error on the part of the department. As paradoxical as 
it may sound, the department, one of whose principal goals was to legitimize 
errors on the part of physicians, felt that it had no right to make any mistakes in 
its work, because the organizational tolerance for such mistakes appeared 
minimal.  
The department was given the authority to begin its work on risk management at 
Maccabi Healthcare Services with the expectation of rapid results, “clean” work 
that would be free of errors, with a minimum of organizational “noise” on its way 
to success. It was clear that the window of opportunity given to the department in 
its early days was small. The immediate and urgent goal that faced the 




The feeling among the founders of the department was that the mandate that 
they had been given would not last forever. They would have to very quickly 
prove that there was justification for the establishment of the RMD and attain 
legitimization for its work within a period no longer  than a year. The sense of 
urgency stemmed from a number of factors:  
1. In the mid 1990's, in the State of Israel as well as in the Western world, the 
subject of risk management in health services was still in its infancy. A 
number of initial projects had been carried out, especially in medical 
organizations that had inpatient services, but these projects involved 
processes related to nursing-care staff rather than to the clinical processes 
(Mills and von Bolschwing, 1995). Because the principal motivation for 
approaching the subject of risk management was to reduce number of 
malpractice claims against medical staff and institutions and because it was 
easier to sue hospitals for cases of nursing-staff malpractice than physicians 
malpractice, until recent years, medical risk management focused principally 
on non-clinical malpractice, e.g. falls by patients, surgical staff leaving 
sponges or surgical instruments inside patients, mistaken identity of patients, 
etc. It was discovered, for example, that simply introducing a defined 
procedure into the third equipment count before closing off the surgical area 
was sufficient to prevent most cases of sponges and surgical instruments 
being left inside patients. Nonetheless, no medical organization having a 
significant scope of activity was known to have taken upon itself the subject of 
risk management in a systematic and consistent fashion (Wilf-Miron and 
Levenhoff, 2001; Wilf-Miron et al., 2003).  
2. Risk management in general and particularly in medicine is perceived as a 
double-edged sword, because it awakens the hope that real improvement in 
the quality of health care can be achieved as a result, while on the other 
hand, the very discussion and occupation with the subject, stimulates 
awareness of problems, that require action, because they may have inter/ 
extra-organizational repercussions. This involves shedding light on problems 
traditionally viewed as an inherent part of medical activity, the result of the 
constraints within which the medical organizations work and bringing them to 
public awareness. The involvement in risk management often requires the 
breaching of existing paradigms, a process of slaughtering sacred cows, as it 
were, which is often perceived as undermining the very foundation of the 
organization. An organization that decides to move in this direction must 
make sure that certain guarantees exist to ensure that if the process does not 
succeed, it will at least not cause damage. This in fact involves managing the 
risks that are part of the assimilation of risk management within an 
organization. In their book, Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive through the 
Dangers of Leading (Linsky and Heifitz, 2002), the authors note that 
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managers who decide to introduce changes into their organization, are taking 
considerable risk upon themselves, which is the result of the tendency of 
organizations to resist change. This is because every organizational change 
comes at a cost the organization must pay and which the organization resists 
to pay. In 1996, the decision to implement risk management in a medical 
organization was a dangerous one for those who conceived it.  
3. The Israeli Medical Association (IMA), which represents physicians vis-à-vis 
their various employers and protects their rights was liable to view the 
treatment of risk management as potentially harming  doctors‟ rights. It was 
important to take quick action that would focus on dealing with the elements 
of risk management that support and aid doctors in distress, following their 
involvement in adverse events in the wake of which they are sued for 
malpractice.  
IMA defines its activities in the area of quality improvement as follows:  
"The IMA focuses its activities on the medical community in the area of quality 
assurance and risk management: informed consent forms, scientific activity in 
the area of clinical instructions and following up surveys and tests. It also 
periodically takes all the steps necessary to advance the goals of quality 
assurance in medicine.” (From the Internet site of the IMA: 
http://www.ima.org.il/) 
It seemed self-evident, that the IMA viewed itself as a player in the area of 
quality assurance and risk management and that the formation of an internal 
department within Maccabi to deal with these subjects would be compatible 
with the activities of the IMA.  
4. The major medical malpractice insurer in  Israel is MCI (Medical Consultants 
International)  and the overwhelming majority of medical personnel in Israel 
are insured by it. MCI conducts activities in the area of risk management, 
particularly from a legal standpoint. The insurance agency publishes a 
periodical in which it discusses medical errors from various aspects, but 
especially legal ones. MCI has not taken proactive steps in the area of risk 
management. It was feared, that the insurer would not to view Maccabi's 
internal risk management activities favorably. In retrospect, this fear turned 
out to have no basis in reality because the insurance company and Maccabi 
focused on completely different areas of activity in the context of risk 
management and in the later stage even acted conjointly to promote RM. But 
this was viewed as a factor that could work against independent risk-




It was clear to the founders of the risk-management department that the clock 
had begun to tick the moment the organizational decision to enter into the area of 
risk management had been made, that the window of opportunity was small and 
that there were certain expectations among certain parts of the organization and 
beyond that the project would fail so that they could declare the situation 
“business as usual.” There was without doubt a sense of urgency, pressure and 
mission.  
 
Already at the earliest stages in the establishment of the risk-management 
department, it became clear that it was necessary to find a model and 
organizations implementing risk-management methods that could serve as 
possible prototypes and role models for the activities of Maccabi ‟s department. 
Due to the shortage of time and the danger the department faced, it was 
necessary to come up with clear, proven steps that had maximum chances of 
success. To find a proven model that had been assimilated well into a medical 
community, and which had proven positive results, both from the point of view of 
its assimilation, as well as the results that it attainted, was the goal of the search.  
 
The initial definition of the required model was very specific.  In order to optimally 
address Maccabi‟s needs, it would have to be:  
1. A risk-management model, rather than a model dealing with safety or  quality  
A comprehensive, complete model applied over time on a broad scale within 
an organization and which integrated well with the medical organizational 
culture.  
2. A model that had already been applied in an Ambulatory health care 
organization on the scale of Maccabi (about 3,000 physicians and 1.5 million 
members) that successfully implemented risk-management activity.  
3. A proactive model that underscored two main goals:  
a. The drawing of systemic conclusions and actions from adverse events 
reported by caregivers. 
b. Personal and professional support for reporting caregivers based on 
empathy with the emotional and professional distress they are subject 
to in the wake of their involvement in an adverse event, and especially 
in cases in which a malpractice claim may be pending against them.  
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The model defined for the search was an optimal model that if found, needed 
only to be adopted and implemented.  
 
Already at the initial stages of defining the model, three central problems, 
working against the chances of finding an optimal model were identified: 
  
1. Maccabi Healthcare Services as a community health organization was the 
youngest of the organizations providing services of this type in Israel. 
Progress and quality were its watchwords and it made every effort to position 
itself apart from the competing health caregivers from the day of its inception. 
It was obvious that there was no Israeli organization that could provide a 
suitable model. Additionally, the structure of the medical system in Israel, in 
which the insurance carrier and the provider of healthcare services in the 
community with government subsidization are one and the same, was unique. 
Organizations of this type are almost nonexistent in the Western world.  
In other words, the unique characteristics of the Israeli health care system 
and the distinctive nature of Maccabi as an organization that provides 
community health care in Israel were incompatible with the expectation of 
finding an optimal risk-management model.  
2. The subject of risk management in medicine was still in its infancy in the mid-
1990s and there was no medical organization in Israel that dealt with the 
subject on a systemic level.  
3. In the mid-1990's, the United States health care system was occupied with 
the accreditation of medical organizations in the belief that standardization of 
medical treatment, inspired by the principles of TQM as applied in the fields of 
industry and services, would improve the quality of medical treatment. A 
model implementing proactive risk management was unknown.  
The picture that emerged following intense efforts to locate an optimal model was 
both disappointing for the founders of the department. They learned that no 
optimal medical risk-management model that could be implemented in Maccabi 
existed. Moreover, it emerged that involvement in risk management in the field of 
medicine was extremely limited for the reasons outlined in Chapter 4, which 




The working assumption of the medical world today, that a doctor as an 
individual and a medical organization as a system are doing their best to provide 
the finest medical treatment to patients, hinders reflective thought, the factor that 
enables individuals and organizations to learn from adverse events. Systemic 
reflective thought is one of the most central elements upon which risk-
management activities are based. However, if you believe that you are already 
doing the best you can and that you are working under unremitting systemic 
constraints, there is nothing you can do to improve, what you are doing, because 
you are already doing the best you can.  
 
Most doctors and medical systems do not view themselves as likely to benefit 
from the results of risk management since they believe that they are already 
extracting optimum output from themselves within the system in which they are 
working.  
 
The efforts to locate a suitable model focused on conversations with colleagues, 
a study of existing risk management activities in  closely related fields: safety and 
quality in Israel and the rest of the Western world, participation in professional 
conferences and attempts to find information over the Internet.  
 
Neither an optimal model nor one even close to it was found. The results of the 
search were frustrating, but on the other hand, it was clear to the founders of the 
Maccabi risk-management department, that they would be pioneers and 
trailblazers in a new field and this filled them with a sense of mission. 
  
The decision that was finally made, established the need to form an 
interdisciplinary team that would include doctors, nurses, psychologists and 
aviation experts with experience in the field of risk management in the Israeli air 
force, so that principles used in the aviation risk-management model could be 







“As soon as questions of will or decision or reason or choice of 
action arise, human science is at loss” 









The role of pioneering: What to do without a benchmark in 









Redefining the needed model:  Proactive RM with proven results. 
 
After failing to find a working model for risk management in medicine, there was 
place to ask what is the meaning of the absence of a model to follow in the 
healthcare risk management realm? 
 
How is it possible that in 1996 one couldn't allocates even a single healthcare 
organization, implementing fully and as a primary effort, risks management with 
proven results? 
 
As we have already mentioned, there was some activity in hospitals for specific 
and focused purposes, for example, preventing errors of leaving sponges and 
surgery tools inside the operated patient, but there were no explicit signs of  risk 
management in ambulatory healthcare systems.  
  
The insight that risk management is taking its first steps in the medicine realm 
was very surprising.  Being an entrepreneur, alongside the excitement of creating 
“Something from the scratch” you ask yourself why no one has done it before 
you, doubts begin to rise for it is possible that many did try but fail and this is the 
real reason why the issue have not come into fruition yet. 
 
The feeling of entering a new domain, without the alternative to  learn from others 
and utilizing  their experience to avoid unnecessary mistakes, made the 




The first step was, to redefine the specified model:  “A proactive risk 
management model with proven results”. 
 
Since there is no documentation of these first phases of searching for  the model 
and various  parties participated in it, such as the departments‟ founders, Head of 
the Medical Department, Head of the Procurement  Department and us as 
consultants, there are different  views, regarding the events, procedures, 
considerations and decision-making in these initial phases. It is important to note 
that the point of view represented here is primarily ours, despite the attempt to 
support it by other partners‟ points of view. 
One of the issues on which there are diverse theses, is the one related to the 
definitions of the compromised model, after the failure to find the optimal model. 
Was the term “proactive” defined as an important parameter of the specified 
model, or only in retrospect, after a couple years of activity,  when it was already 
obvious that Maccabi's model, based on the Air Force‟s model, is very much 
characterized by its proactively, this aspect was added. In any case, we will refer 
to the thesis according to which the search was after a proactive model. 
 
What is a proactive model? Proactive models have two major characteristics:  
 
 The existence of procedures aiming to identify potential risks before 
coming into realization, by using various tools and methodologies.  
 
 An attempt to handle the risks revealed in a particular event, beyond the 
specific circumstances aiming, to generalize and eliminate the entire 
phenomenon.   
 
Proactive models reflect a more advanced development level of risk 
management than the conventional reactive models, since they oblige planning 
and investment of resources before the potential risks realize. In most cases, 
when an organization starts risk management activities, it adopts a reactive 
approach, meaning, when an adverse event occurs; actions are taken in order to 
understand the causes leading to the event and to prevent its recurrence.   
 
The organizational motives for adopting the reactive models are usually related 
to legislation, social pressure, the organization‟s public image, and the will to 




One can identify a tendency of moving from reactive to proactive models in 
organizations that are active in the safety and risk management domains. The 
reactive models are associated more with external focus of control, while the 
proactive models are more internally motivated. In other words, organizations 
that adopt organizational culture of risk management and ascribe great value to 
that issue, seek means to manage risks and not only to follow the letter of the  
law, or succumb to public pressure. 
 
The second characteristic of the specified model, a model with proven results, 
relates to two significant sub-characteristics:  
 
 A model that has proved its success in large scale organizations. Success 
in this context has many meanings: The management‟s commitment to the 
model‟s implementation, establishing cooperation on behalf of the 
management  and achieving positive results – reducing the risks.  
 
 The model does not have to stem from the healthcare realm; there is a 
place for learning from other realms, sharing common characteristics. This 
insight formed a revolution of thought. The healthcare world perceives 
itself as very professional and committed, thus the idea that it can learn 
from other professional sectors, was a significant breakthrough that 
shattered this set of thought. 
 
It can be claimed, that in a second thought, after it was clear that a successful 
risk management model couldn‟t be found within the medical realm‟s boundaries, 
Macabbi‟s Risk Management department founders have come to the following 
insights that guided them up the road:  
 
 The risk management sector in medicine is relatively new. 
 
 A lack of healthcare organizations, implementing risk management in a 
systemic and integrative approach, raised the need for cautious, 
deliberated and controlled moves.  
  
 Maccabi does not go in a well-known way but takes the role  of  
pioneering. 
 
 It is too early to abandon the search for a model, but it is necessary to 
expand its definitions without waiving the basic principles of the specified 
model: a proactive attitude and proven results. 
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In case there is no model, is it wise to define one based on  personal 
experience and  organizational goals ? 
 
The redefinition of the need, after failing to allocate a model that is congruent 
with Maccabi's specific needs and the insight that it is a new domain taking its 
first steps, gave rise to the thought that it may not be possible to find a model, 
even in its redefined and alleviated definition. 
 
The dilemma of what is the better way rose -  to search for a model that will 
congruent partly with the specifications or maybe to develop a new model that 
will congruent with Maccabi's specific needs perfectly. 
 
The insight that the healthcare risk management sector is underdeveloped was 
the decisive factor in setting the goal of searching for a new model, even if it is 
not the ideal model that will guide Maccabi in its first steps in the risk 
management realm. 
 
Looking back at the events, it became clear that this was a right decision since it 
allowed relying on a relevant model from another realm on the one hand, and 
focusing on routine risk management procedures, that have gradually expanded 
during the years on the other hand. 
 
The idea of developing a model in the department‟s first days, would have kept it 
busy for a long time, not allowing the establishment of work interfaces with its 
customers, the caregivers, and the establishment of working patterns with the 
managers in the center and the districts, thus causing its failure.  
               
 
Many buzzwords, lots of papers, lot of ideas, but no benchmarks, neither 
model that can exhibit proven results. 
 
The organizational need, to learn lessons from its own activities, motivated vast 
organizational activities in order to utilize knowledge resources accumulated 
during activity. Terms such as “Knowledge Management”, debriefing and lessons 
learning, have become very trendy during the nineties.   
 
Along with the traditional organizational structure, a new position of Chief 
Knowledge Officer (CKO), was instituted for the purpose of managing the 




The evolved concept stated that along with the organization‟s work procedures 
which aim to achieve its defined goals, great deal of knowledge, regarding the 
implementation methods of diverse procedures, have been accumulated which is 
not necessarily utilized in order to improve the quality of procedures and 
products. 
 
A wise utilization of this knowledge, can improve the competitiveness of the 
organizations by improving their work procedures. 
 
In Aviation and especially in combat/operational aviation, it is customary to 
debrief every sortie  in order to learn lessons in the individual level and impart it 
to the whole system. The emphasis is on debriefing every flight rather then flights 
in which adverse events took place. There is no doubt that aviation owes its low 
accidents rate and qualities of performance to the debriefing procedures.  
 
The basic concept of all of the attempts to have a benefit from the knowledge 
accumulated in organization, is expressed in the term “reflective thought”, which 
is , the thought about the activity and decision procedures as an integral part of 
the organizational culture. 
 
Sullivan and Harper, in their book “Hope is not a Method (1996), present a new 
approach that has significantly advanced the US Army to be capable of dealing 
with the new characteristics of the modern battle-field. Among other, Sullivan 
served also as the Chief of Staff in the US Army. Gordon and Harper believe that 
the most significant progress was a result of implementing the AAR – After Action 
Review concept,  that is basically a reflective thought aiming to derive  insights 
from activities  and decision making processes, in order to implement them in the 
next mission in a better way.  
 
 
What about other industries that share some common specifications? 
 
In retrospect, in the mid nineties first thinking of association between medicine 
and aviation have become apparent, demonstrating the relation between 
medicine and aviation in the aspect of risk management. It is interesting to 
notice, that the striving towards the meeting between the two sectors was born 
almost simultaneously from three directions: 
 
 By national factors, such as the American presidents Clinton and Bush, 
following the IOM‟s studies (1999, 2001) were published and after it 
became clear to the Federal Government that it is not possible to ignore 




 By healthcare factors, feeling that they have to move fast in order to 
present  activity and results in relatively short time periods.  
 
 By aviation risk management factors, willing to contribute from their 
successful experience in aviation.  
 
We assume that these authorities‟ motives were complex and included the 
following elements:  
 
 The awareness to the extent of errors and their criticalness has permeated 
the consciousness of the aviation risk management professionals and they 
felt they have the knowledge and experience through it is possible to 
assist the healthcare realm to manage its risks. Thus for example, in the 
11th Aviation Psychology Symposium, was sponsored by the Ohio State 
University (OSU) in 2001, Uhlig, Haan, Nason et al. presented an article 
titled: “Improving patient care by the application of theory and practice 
from the aviation safety community”. It is important to mention that the 
conference has been dealing for more than 20 years with the diverse 
aspects of the human factors in aviation and flight safety, and is intended 
to a professional community of aircrew members, psychologists, 
managers and aviation risk management professionals.  
 
 We all need healthcare services in one time or another. Those are 
relatively frequent interfaces of ours, of our family members and of friends. 
Each one of us has heard “stories” of dissatisfaction due to the care given 
and is some cases of negligence.  Aviation risk management 
professionals have noticed the risks prominently, due to their professional 
experience and identified the need to improve the healthcare system. 
 
 Some of the risk management professionals, after many years in the 
aviation, looked for other professional and business sectors. The 
healthcare sector has the needed characteristics: It is a highly  
professional sector with a vast extent of activity, that is becoming aware of  
the risk management  issue, that pays an  enormous price for  errors,  in 
human life,  growing budgets and lose of public  image . The healthcare 
sector was definitely perceived as a professional and business opportunity 




This was the situation with Maccabi‟s as well. Maccabi was looking for a risk 
management model and Eilat – Consulting and Accidents Prevention Means ltd. 
that dealt with risk management in aviation and other sectors, has come to the 
conclusion that the healthcare sector might need the risk management 
experience accumulated in aviation.  
 
In retrospect, it seems that what appealed to the healthcare sector in the Aviation 
was the explicit and prominent characteristic of risk management in aviation: The 
reporting system. The hope that physicians will report adverse events in which 
they were involved and also “ near miss” events, was perceived in the healthcare 
sector as a significant breakthrough, even before the question of “what should be 
done with the reports? “ was discussed. Liang and Storti (2000), believe that the 
healthcare realm will adopt the successful reporting model from the aviation 
sector in which the reports  are received, processed and stored  by  a third and 
uninvolved party. 
 
In many occasions, the issue of taking inspiration and adopting processes from 
aviation, regarding risk management, was  raised and discussed, after the 
publication of the IOM reports (1999, 2001). Here are some illustrative examples: 
 
Selecky, (2000), the secretary of Health, stated, following the publication of the 
1st IOM report, to err is human" (1999): 
"There is no “magic bullet” to solve the problem of medical errors.  A 
comprehensive approach to improving patient safety is needed.  Such a large 
and complex problem needs a thoughtful and multifaceted response.  A 
combined response is suggested to both compel health care organizations and 
providers to take action and to enhance knowledge and tools to improve safety 
and break down legal and cultural barriers.  The authors urge healthcare 
providers to adopt strategies, processes and technology that other high-risk 
industries (e.g., aviation) have implemented to reduce error…" 
 
At AMIA, Annual Symposium (2000), it was stated by a panel dealing with slips, 
mistakes and faulty reasoning: 
"Several industries (e.g., aviation and nuclear power plants) have been very 
successful in preventing human errors and there is much that health-industry can 
learn. As an interdisciplinary field for the study of information processing in 
humans and machine, cognitive science can make a significant contribution to 




The will to adopt the aviation approach to risk management, in which one of the 
basic principles is "Blame free Culture", had to challenge the traditional 
professional healthcare culture of caregivers personal responsibility for errors. 
This cultural discrepancy was stressed by Renhard (2001): 
"Most of the evidence and argument about the effectiveness of punitive 
approaches comes from the health sector; however, the experiences of other 
industries like the aviation industry in the USA suggest that the basic findings 
about punitive approaches are transferable. There is the question of the 
transferability of evidence from high risk (where people die or are injured directly 
as a result of mistakes) to low risk industries. However, if the problem is 
understood from a behavioral perspective, the appeal of the argument that 
punitive approaches suppress problem-solving information is apparent". 
 
At the beginning of 21th century, the awareness that healthcare systems are high 
risk systems, spread widely amongst healthcare leaders, public and politicians. It 
also became evident, that healthcare may benefit by learning from other high risk 
industries, like aviation and nuclear power plants, rather than trying to invent 
specific tailored made approaches. 
 
 
Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care 
 
In a conference that took place in Annenberg in November 1998, which was 
defined as a multidisciplinary conference and in which some of the leading 
organizations from the healthcare, science, government and medical 
accreditation sectors participated, a reference was made to the first conference 
in 1996, stating:   
 “….. More than 300 participants from around the world discussed case histories 
of human injury during patient care, reviewed research findings on patient safety 
and medical error, and studied parallels between health care and other 
endeavors-including aviation and high-technology industries-in which safety and 
human error are of concern….”.  
 
In the setup of the 11th Aviation Psychology Symposium, Wood presented the 
adverse events reporting cycle, the debriefing, analysis and feedback, as 
principles of the accustomed reporting procedure in the US Aviation and its 
potential contribution to medicine by adopting it. 
 
According to Reason (1994), in the mid eighties several multidisciplinary studies 
were initiated with the purpose of understanding the human err phenomenon in 
medicine. In his opinion, one of the most significant conclusions of these 
initiatives was that causative models of accidents, that were developed in a 
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specific content world, such as aviation or nuclear power stations, are congruent 
with most of the medical environments. Moreover, this conclusion is also valid for 
many recommendations and remedies that were developed in other realms.  
 
In retrospect, after Maccabi adopted the aviation model, it became evident that  
the insight that the healthcare sector can learn from other high risk sectors such 
as aviation and nuclear power sites , when it comes to  understanding the 
diverse factors causing human error  and implementing organizational activity, 
aiming to reduce the extent of the phenomena, has validity.  The principle of 
reporting of adverse events in an atmosphere that encourages reporting and 
learning rather then punishment was especially stressed. 
 
From the point of view of the departments founders and mangers, it was 
elementary  that the issue of errors during medical care, is a complex and 
sensitive issue and that it will be helpful to allocate a sector that shares common 






































Eilat’s - Experience and practical “know how” in search of opportunities for 
implementation. 
 
In 1996, the Eilat Company, which we established in 1987, provided consulting 
services focusing on safety consulting and tool development (especially 
computerized tools), for the Israeli Defense Forces, Air Force, El-Al and other 
large organizations. These clients were characterized by their high awareness of 
safety issues due to the high price they had to pay when safety was 
compromised, and had a long history of dealing with this subject. It can be said, 
that our clients hired our services, since we had many years of expertise in 
dealing with safety issues in the Israeli Air Force, which serves as a model of 
excellence in the human, technological and organizational aspects in Israel. 
 
 
Aviation has a proven model for accident prevention -  Can it be 
implemented in other areas that share the criticality of errors outcomes -
Healthcare? 
 
Since Eilat‟s marketplace was small and limited and since it had no interest in 
safety training, which is the main occupation of safety experts, we began to think 
of new markets: content worlds that traditionally have not dealt with safety issues 
and Risk Management. 
 
We thought of three new optional domains: 
 
1. Large insurance companies - The concept we established for them was 
based on risk management work with their larger clients.  The target was to 
minimize the risks the companies are exposed to, and thus lower their claims. 
However, after several intensive attempts and expressions of interest by 
them, we realized we were still unable to get a full scale project. After several 
years, and accomplishing several limited projects in the insurance arena,  we 




the underwriting  departments were separated, so that actually there were two 
organizations in each company, each organization having its own agenda, 
sometimes contradictory. So we decided to give up insurance and to  look for 
another marketplace. 
 
2. Banks – Israeli Banks, lost hundreds of millions of dollars every year due to 
irrecoverable client debts. The concept we developed for the banks was to 
treat each  case of lost debt as an accident and a debt, that was eventually 
redeemed as “near miss”. Our suggestions , generated much interest among 
the senior management of the Israeli banks, but at that period, we did not 
receive any requests for projects from them.  . Several years later, we ran a 
risk management project for one of the leading banks in Israel. In the crucial 
discussions on whether to address the subject and  start  the project or not, 
the dominant argument was that there are already guidelines and policies 
covering the risks of giving credit to clients, and all there is to be done is to 
enforce them, and therefore,  there is no need for risk management activities. 
We learned, that the banks are conservative organizations, that as long as 
they make profit, despite the lost debts, they are not going to get involved in 
any proactive risk management action. 
 
3. The Healthcare domain – There, we discovered an almost “virgin land” with 
only minimal and local activity of few devoted professionals, but with no 
significant methodology and infrastructure. The need to manage risks in 
healthcare, seemed valid, appropriate and timely. We chose to apply our 
expertise in risk management in the aviation area to the medical field. In 
addition, to the business considerations, we felt that we might be able to 
contribute significantly to the improvement of healthcare quality in Israel and 




The Rambam hospital encounter. 
 
In the middle of 1996, in social circumstances, an introduction was made 
between an organizational consultant, who worked on organizational 
development at the Rambam Hospital in Haifa at the time, and us. During that 
social encounter, we told the consultant about our expertise and our ideas of 
expanding our knowledge and applying it to the medical risk management field. 
 
He thought it was a great idea and it was decided that we would make a 




conducted  on June 4, 1996. Our presentation was titled “The human factors in 
risk management in aviation and medicine”. Tens of physicians and nurses 
participated in the conference and the presentation received much applause as 
an “eye opener”. In the same conference, other prominent speakers were: Prof. 
Moshe Revah, the hospital director, Prof. Shimon Polak, director of quality 
control, Dr. Ran Lin, director of the risk management unit, IMA representatives, 
legal advisors and  Dr.  David Shram,  then a risk manager with MRM, a 
subsidiary of an malpractice insurance company, specializing in medical risk 
management. 
 
During the conference, a professional association  was made with Dr. Shram, 
who was deeply impressed with our unique perception and expertise in the area 
of risk management in aviation and its potential applications in medicine. 
Following the conference,  it was decided to conduct a one-day workshop on 
safety in medicine, based on the Air Force model, to the nursing staff at the 
hospital, as part of the “management skills” course they participated in. 
 
The workshop took place on September 9th, 1996, in which  and seventeen 
people of the nursing personnel participated. The workshop included, among 
others, the following topics: basic concepts (accident, risk, near miss), human 
factors in safety, analysis of risks and risk situations, models, incident analysis 
and application of the principles in the hospital set up and more. 
 
The feedback for  the workshop was positive  - on a scale of 1-7, the scores on 
the different items were between 5.5 and 6.7. In the open section of the 
questionnaire, we received comments such as: 
 
 “I think the subject is very important and should be given two days of 
study, since there was a lot of material and time pressure…” 
 “Training in the area, might prevent tragedies and exposure of the erring 
person to harmful situations.…” 
 “A very important subject. There should be a training program for the 
subject for all nurses in the hospital”. 
 
Despite the workshop‟s success, there was no continuation of the project at 
Rambam. At that period of time in 1996 it was very discouraging, since there was 
no obvious reason to stop the activity, especially with such a positive feedback . 




Looking at it after some time, with a different perspective, we understood that it 
was not enough to be right: we also had to be smart, and that the relations we 
made at Rambam were not with the decision makers but with practitioners, 






Eilat is introduced to Maccabi. 
 
During our activity at Rambam hospital, a cooperative relationship was built with 
Dr. Sharm, who presented himself as a “risk management expert” and had both 
medical and legal education. Dr. Shram was the one who made the initial 
introduction between Maccabi and us. Dr. Shram was aware of Maccabi‟s 
attempts to find a working model and experts in the area of risk management to 
assist them in their first steps. 
 
In the beginning of 1997, we had a professional relationship with Dr. Shram, 
which was aimed at preparing a presentation to decision makers of Maccabi that 
would focus on our experience and perceptions regarding risk management, 
based on the aviation experience. 
 
Dr. Shram's approach was based on a combination of medical and legal issues 
aimed at providing a legal umbrella for all the activities in a medical organization, 
especially with regard to risk management, since work processes in risk 
management create a relatively wide exposure to legal risks.  .As opposed to Dr, 
Shram's approach, we had the “clean” approach of aviation risk management, in 
which legal aspects of human errors and accidents were irrelevant to risk 
management experts, whose efforts are directed at understanding the causes of 
errors and generating organizational processes to prevent their recurrence. This 
separation between risk management and legal aspects is a unique feature of 
the aviation attitude, but in the medical field, the inherent conflict between the 
need to reveal and investigate errors and the need to provide legal protection to 






Maccabi: This is what we are looking for, finally. 
 
Our presentation to Maccabi was given on April 15, 1997, and following it, we 
offered Maccabi our services for conducting an initial assessment in order to be 
able to establish an operative working plan. 
 
A month later, in May 13, 1997, the medical director of Maccabi, Prof. Aviram, 
approved our proposal for the assessment, and conditioned it with our signature 
on a confidentiality agreement. 
 
Dr. Racheli Wilf-Miron, director of the risk management department, participated 
in November 1997 in the 19th annual conference of the American Society for 
Healthcare  Risk Management (ASHRM) in health care systems which have 
taken place in Atlanta, USA. 
 
In her report, Dr. Miron wrote that the opening lecture in the conference was 
given by John Nance, a pilot, legal expert and specialist in the area of aviation 
safety. This lecture focused on the common characteristics between the cockpit 
and the operating room, and what can be learned from crew resource 
management, which was applied in aviation, to the improvement of the work of 
the surgical team in the operating room. Dr. Miron remarks that the audience‟s 
response to the lecture was very favorable as if saying, “How come we did not 
think of it before…?” 
 
It seems that the initial work done at Rambam hospital, though did not continue, 
generated the opportunity for the relationship with Maccabi. The approach of 
studying the organization and its current work in the area of risk management in 
order to establish a working plan was the right one, since it allowed for the 
expression of expectations and fears of the interim directors in the area of risk 
management. 
 
The assessment work itself allowed for a mutual exposure between the 
organization and us and for the creation of a basis of trust between us. The 
participation of Dr. Racheli Miron in the 19th annual conference of risk 
management, in which the resemblance between the worlds of aviation and 
medicine was shown, gave the final legitimacy to the way Maccabi chose to 





Retrospectively, it seems that the process was led by chance or even incidental, 
but we believe that it was a meeting of real needs, in the right timing, with 












"Discovery consists of what everybody has seen and thinking what nobody 
has thought" 
 











After the initial enthusiasm and the feeling  of Eureka,  proof is needed. 
 
Eilat‟s capabilities met Maccabi‟s needs for risk management with perfect timing, 
with the USA professional community opening a dialog between medicine and 
Aviation, aimed at learning from the successful experience of the latter, in order 
to apply it to the world of medicine. 
 
The initial feeling was one of enthusiasm, both on the part of Eilat, with the 
possibilities for entering a new domain  and the approval  for  it‟s professional  
approach,  stating that  the aviation risk management model can be transferred 
to the world of medicine, and on the part of Maccabi that an entity exists in Israel, 
rich in experience in the world of aviation, with an approach similar to that 
presented in the USA, willing  to  transfer the aviation experience in the world of 
risk management to the realm of medicine. 
 
The risk management staff and the Head of the Medical Department were 
enthusiastic. The administrators were much more hesitant and skeptical, 
regarding the association between Eilat and Maccabi.  
 
With hindsight, and from the perspective of time, we realized that two forces with 
differing agendas and interests operate in medical organizations: professionals 
versus the administrators, some of whom have a medical background. 
 
In most medical organizations in Israel, the authority for taking decisions is held 
by the administrators, due, amongst other reasons, to the claim that the doctors 
should focus on providing the patients with optimal treatment and need to be free 




however, represent the general systemic view that includes budgetary 
constraints, procedures and regulations of the Ministry of Health, familiarity with 
the health market and so on. 
 
Accordingly, following the enthusiastic reaction of the professionals in Maccabi, 
we conjointly with them had to persuade the administration of: 
 
 The need for external  consultants to  develop and promote  the case of 
risk management in Maccabi 
 The justification for choosing the firm that specialized in aviation and 
lacked any real experience in the medical arena. 
 The justification of the specific choice of Eilat, a small consultancy firm, 
with a narrow field of specialization: Risk management, focusing on 
aviation.  
 
Some of the administration‟s attitudes towards medical professionals, came to 
light in meetings with them, primarily with the Head of the Procurement and 
Logistics who noted, amongst other things that: 
“I didn‟t think about risk management. I don‟t like this concept. There should be 
quality control for doctors. They have complete academic freedom, they don‟t 
want to be computerized since this might inundate them with information and 
endanger them. The correct approach is: information, procedures and control.” 
 
In 1989, Eilat was involved in a CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) project in 
El-Al (Israeli Airlines). 
 
While considering this attitude of the administrators in Maccabi, we had a kind of 
de ja vue as to the initial stages of the El-Al project. Prior to the approval of the 
project, we had to convince the administrative managers there, that the project is  
of high importance, while  they claimed that:“…Pilot‟s should act according to the 
regulations and everything will be fine…”  
 
Another representative on behalf of  the administrators  wondered:  “What will 
you provide us with ? What has been ordered from you?” 
 
 
On February 26th 1997, the IMA (Israeli Medical Association) and the Ministry of 
Health signed a treaty on ”Advancing the Quality of the Health Services”. This 




to  each of them. The first subject to which the treaty related was Risk 
Management: 
“A joint risk management administrative forum will be established that will include 
a representative of the Ministry of Health, the Clalit HMO, representatives of the 
IMA, a representative of the public hospitals and of MCI (The medical 
malpractice insurer). Once in a while, and in the beginning, once a month, this 
forum will discuss adverse events that will be selected for it, after removing any 
identifying details from them, and will draw and distribute conclusions on the 
national healthcare level. The forum will be entitled to recommend on 
establishing clinical and administrative procedures in order to maintain quality 
healthcare”. 
 
A flow chart was also attached to the treaty outlining the adverse events 
reporting process in hospitals and community up to the point of drawing and 
disseminating conclusions on a national level. 
 
The treaty was signed by the Minister of Health,  Mr.Yehoshua Matza, the 
Director General of MOH, Prof. Barabash and the chairman of IMA, Dr. Balashar. 
 
In clarifying the treaty, Dr. Udi Kantor, Head of the Healthcare Policy Department 
in the IMA states, amongst others: 
“The hasty demand to receive a report of an individual event before the 
Committee for Quality Control was appointed and met, contradicts the 
declaration of intentions, as formulated in the treaty. In our opinion, a national 
view of risk management of the present style that necessitates immunity on the 
one hand and cooperation on the other, will demand transferring assembled lists 
on a periodic basis. The reporting procedure, the events to be reported, the 
method of reporting and so on will be drawn up by the committee to be 
established.” 
 
Thus it happened, that a step of a national character, totally ignored Israel‟s other 
health funds, apart from the Clalit HMO, and from the beginning  there were splits 
over differing perspectives, as can be noted in Dr. Kantor‟s comments. 
 
 
The above is cited, in order to complete the general background, creating a 
feeling that the authorities, as well as the professional medical organizations, 
view risk management as an extremely important issue. Moreover, Maccabi was 
apparently not included in the “Forum” that was supposed to be the engine 







Trying to define the relationship: Professionalism and business 
 
In order to overcome the doubts of the administrative elements in Maccabi, 
following several presentations to them, and in order to commence the project, 
we offered them to perform a preliminary  assessment of the existing risk 
management activities in Maccabi at our expense. The basic idea behind such a 
proposal was a gesture of good will that would enable us to start working. We, 
assumed that the joint work and the product of the assessment,  would create the 
trust necessary to launch the full scale  project. 
 
In previous cases in which we proposed and performed  assessments of the type 
offered to Maccabi the rates of success were not high. In other words, we 
invested considerable amounts of work, and when the diagnostic report was 
submitted to the organization‟s managers, they usually recoiled from its meaning  
and the need to  establish  risk management activities, preferring to deny the 
existence of such problems. In retrospective, considering some of this 
experiences sharing these common characteristics, one can wonder why these 
organizations were willing to do  the assessment process without being ready to 
act upon it‟s findings ? 
 
This entailed an additional  business risk, since we received no compensation 
and nevertheless had  to invest about 45 man-days  , It would have been 
possible, due to overload and pressure of other activities, to devote less time 
than necessary to the assessment process, which was liable to fail us. In order to 
avoid this   attitude risk, we submitted a detailed diagnostic program, including a 
Gant chart, to Maccabi, so that the planning would protect us from the possibility 
of inadequate attitudes to the work done for free, and which, in some of the 
previous cases, did not lead to prosperity. 
 
On May 13th. 1997, we received permission from the Head of the Maccabi 
Medical Division to perform the assessment according to the proposal and the 
program submitted, and on the condition that we sign confidentiality documents. 
This was the first formal step in a long term relationship, with many ups and 
downs and with a continuous watchful eye from the administrators to check 














The criticality of initial stages: about organizational politics 




Managing the possible risks of establishing a Risk Management 
Department. 
 
The decision to establish the Risk Management Department preceded by a year 
and half our acquaintance with Macabbi. 
 
The main reasons for the Risk Management Department establishment, are 
reflected in an interview with Professor Aviram, (Head of the Medical Department 
in Maccabi, during the establishment period in 1996) ,which we conducted in 
November 2003.  
 
From Professor Aviram‟s considerations it is evident that the establishment of the 
department was the result of several external and internal factors: 
 
 As we have already mentioned IMA, Israeli Medical Association (1996) 
has come to an understanding with the Ministry of Healthcare to act 
conjointly in order to improve the Quality of Healthcare in Israel. 
 
 A reporting procedure for adverse events was defined. According to these 
understandings. Healthcare organizations in Israel, particularly, the Klalit 
HMO (the largest Healthcare fund in Israel) and the hospitals, should 
report adverse events to a special committee, comprised of 
representatives from the Ministry of Healthcare, IMA and Klalit HMO. 
 
 The first foundation of Maccabi‟s Risk Management Department, was 
materialized by a half-time employed nurse, financed equally by IMA and 
Macabbi, whose major role was to transfer the reports, received from 




 MCI, Macabbi‟s malpractice insurer, demanded to get adverse events 
reports, as part of the insurance agreement, in order to enable them to 
asses the extent of claims they may face. This requirement was based on 
the insurers need to maintain financial stability.  This requirement obliged 
the existence of an internal mechanism that gets the reports, processes 
them and passes them in an agreed format to the insurer. Even though, 
theoretically, there were two other ways to perform this task: by the 
legislation department and the ombudsman. 
 
 Anyhow, Maccabi's senior management has decided to separate the legislative 
and ombudsman activities from adverse events processing, and by this decision, 
actually, paved the road towards the establishment of Risk Management 
Department. 
 
After studying the reported adverse events, the Head of the Medical Department, 
came to the conclusion that Macabbi does not utilize efficiently  the reported 
events in order to prevent their reoccurrence. This insight led to decisions and 
actions that aimed for a better utilization of the risk management potential found 
in adverse events, in addition to Macabbi‟s external commitments in respect of 
adverse events: reporting to the Quality Committee and MCI (the insurer). 
 
In the mid ninetie's, new voices that challenged the traditional ones, became 
evident, especially in the US, claiming that physician errors are not an inevitable 
result of the medical doing. These voices demanded to relate to the healthcare 
system as a system in which errors are the result of systemic failures, rather than 
merely the result of the individual physician‟s malpractice. Additionally, those 
voices suggested approaching other industries, such as aviation, in order to learn 
from their successful experience in minimizing the extent of errors and losses 
 
Macabbi‟s management was not indifferent to those voices, while taking into 
account other above-mentioned-factors, decided to establish the Risk 
Management Department, based of the half-time nurse that was already working,  
and the assignment of the department manager – Dr.  Rachely Wilff-Meron. 
 
The initiative was pioneering and daring in Israel. Risk Management units were 
already operating partially  in  Israeli hospitals, based on an approach that 








In the state of low awareness for Risk Management issues in Israel of the mid 
nineties, this move  had several clear inherent risks: 
 
 It was unclear to what level the caregivers will cooperate and will be willing 
to report adverse events, in which they were involved, and might expose 
them to criticism from their managers.   
 
 It was unclear how to protect legally a caregiver that has reported an 
adverse event for which he might be held responsible. In  such cases, the 
court of law might use the report as a confession for being guilty in case of  
a claim. 
 
 It was unclear how to prove the contribution of the Risk Management 
Department to Maccabi, when taking into account its relatively high 
operating cost.   
 
 It was unclear, based on what concept or model the Risk Management 
Department should operate. 
  
Our partners in Macabbi, professionals from the healthcare sector that were 
appointed to lead the task of establishing the risk management infrastructure in 
Macabbi, needed our support in order to convince the administrators, that the   
adoption  the aviation model, is the right and necessary step.  
 
In practice, a professional coalition between us and the department‟s managers 
was created, having one declared goal: to convince the administrative people 
that the department‟s managers made their homework well in searching after a 
proper model in Israel and abroad, and that their choice of us is right both in the 
professional and business aspects. 
 
The department managers‟ statement: “We have checked well and this is what 
we want” is a statement that administration people found hard to accept. 
Administrative people in healthcare organizations, earn their organizational 
accreditation by assisting the professionals, by finding the optimal administrative 
and procurement solutions for them, while the physicians have to focus on care 
giving only.  
 
The mutual need to convince the administrative people, has actually created the 






The first shared goal was defined and a team work was established, aimed to the 
right marketing of the general idea of cooperation between Maccabi and us, and 
the operative plans to adopt the risk management aviation model in Macabbi.  
  
From reflections we have conducted in the framework of this work, we have 
realized  that the mode of birth of the department into the reality described here, 
influenced its first steps. We do not know, to what extent this reality was clear to 
the decision makers in Macabbi, before and during the department‟s 
establishment.  
 
By analyzing the state of things in the in Israeli healthcare system in the timing of 
Risk Management Department establishment, it is evident that the department 
was not born into a supporting, mature, and encouraging reality, but into a reality 
in which the main players such as the Ministry of health , IMA, the insurer, and 
internal factors such as the legislation department, procurement and the 
ombudsman, had different apprehensions, sometimes contradictory, to the road 
map by  which risk management, should be implemented in a healthcare 
organization according to our experience.    
 
Nevertheless, we have found in 1996-1997, at the time of the department‟s 
establishment, three crucial national events took place in Israel and assumedly 
influenced the department‟s first steps:  
 
 Publishing the patients rights law - 1996  
 Publishing the Quality promotion treaty in Healthcare in Israel, by the 
MOH and IMA – 1997. 
 Publishing the report of the committee assigned to examine the issue of  
responsibility for harm in the care giving process - 1999  
 
In retrospect, it is possible to explain many of the attitudes towards the 
department‟s establishment, by  the difficulties it faced setting its agenda and 
defining the further steps, by understanding the public atmosphere, that could no 
longer accept the lack of activity aimed to handle the physician's errors and trying 





Among the other factors that influenced the establishment of the department, we 
may refer to the attitudes of the major players in the sector, among them the 
MOH, IMA and the insurer, who stressed the reactive approach that focuses on 
minimizing the losses after the adverse event has already occurred  and internal 
Maccabi factors, that perceived the department as a threat, who may criticize 
their operation on one hand, and expose the physicians to claims, instead of 
protecting them on the other hand. 
 
We realized that despite its pioneering, Maccabi‟s risk management department 




Who is responsible for managing the risks?  
 
Basically, three alternatives were considered:    
 
 The Physicians 
 The “Center”  - Risk Management Department (RMD) 
 Risk Management Department will define the policy and guidelines and 
support physicians whenever they err and the physicians will be 
responsible for the patient safety. 
 
The issue of responsibility for  Risk Management is complex. First, it is necessary 
to distinguish between different kinds of responsibilities: 
 
 Legal responsibility – The law system perceives the caregiver 
and the organization in which he practices as responsible for the 
malpractice in a case a patient decides to submit a claim. 
 
 Professional responsibility – The perception of professional 
responsibility is directly related to the character of relationship 
between the individual physician and the organization in which he 
works. Thus, for example, a physician working in a solo practice is 
fully responsible for the professional level of the care giving he 
provides his patients. Macabbi employs physicians in two different 
ways: full time and part time freelancers, so it  is fully responsible 
for  the full time physicians‟ professional level and partly 
responsible for the freelancers. Macabbi‟s professional and 




fully employed physicians by guidelines, selection, training, 
professional supervision and quality control.  
 
 Moral responsibility – an individual physician or a healthcare 
organization are morally responsible to provide a patient with the 
best available care, avoid harm during the medical care and take 
responsibility in case harm was done. The moral responsibility is a 
result of the values on which the profession of medicine is based 
and a kind of an unwritten agreement between the physicians and 
their patients that creates the basic trust, which is a necessary 
condition for achieving treatment success. 
 
Therefore, in regard to risk management in medicine, it is more appropriate to 
consider it as a mixture of professional responsibility with moral responsibility. 
Even though, the legal responsibility is occasionally part of the overall 
responsibility for a medical error, it is not the direct interest of this work. For this 
reason we will relate to the notion of responsibility as professional responsibility 
solely.  
 
The issue of who is responsible for the physicians‟ professional level is not 
solved since a substantial part of the physicians work in several organizations 
simultaneously: Hospital, Private clinic, Academy and HMO's. In addition, many 
of the physicians are employed in different work formats: Salaried, freelancers, 
consultants per hour etc. 
 
Under these conditions, it is difficult for the employer to develop and control 
physicians professionally, and in the same time to act in order to promote risk 
management. On the other hand, relying on the alternative, that the individual 
physician will take responsibility for his own professional level and manage his 
risk,  is not always reasonable. 
 
Therefore, It seems that the optimal solution to the issue of responsibility for risk 
management, is one that is based on a risk management entity that functions at 
the headquarters level and is in charge of : developing and bequeath the risk 
management methodology, collects adverse events reports, investigates them 
and derives recommendations to prevent reoccurrence, provides feedback to the 
reporting physician along with professional guidelines aimed to reduce the 
probability of future involvement in adverse events, herein  improve patients‟ 




The Management has to be committed  
 
We refer to the process of risk management concepts transfer, first and foremost 
as an organizational cultural change. From our experience, two major reflections 
may be concluded:  
 
 A process of organizational culture change is a marathon run and not a 
sprint. It took more than 10 years in the Israeli Air Force, till the 
organization, as organization, begun to adopt and internalize the culture of 
safety and risk management.   
 
 Since it is a long term process, which entails every individual in the 
organization to change, the management‟s commitment to the process, 
which requires investment of substantial resources at the beginning of the 
process, without seeing any results, and later on consistency despite 
difficulties, is absolutely necessary.  Not many managers are willing to 
sow today in order to make it possible for someone else to harvest 
tomorrow. It is a process with inherent risks and various obstacles, 
substantial resources must be invested, different organizational priorities 
must be set, so it is understandable why many managers withdraw from 
initiating risk management activities.  
 
In any case, the persistence of Macabbi, who deals with risk management for the 
second decade  by now and ascribes great value to the subject, indicates 
management‟s strong commitment to the process and understanding that it 
involves  a  cultural change and not a short term process. 
 
In the preface to the booklet “Preventing the Next Error”,  published by Macabbi‟s 
Risk Management Department on  May 2001, Maccabi's CEO at that time, Mr. 
Shabtai Shavit *, mentions, among others: 
 “From the standpoint of public commitment to take care of the patient‟s safety 
and the quality of care, Macabbi Healthcare fund has made a strategic decision 
to develop the risk management domain as a part of the Quality Assurance 
System. Accordingly, we have decided to do any effort in order to treat the 
factors for healthcare errors in a professional and long term approach, based on 
cooperation between the medical and managerial teams in Macabbi". 
_______________ 






The booklet was distributed to all of the 3,500 Physicians in Macabbi, an action 
that reflects by itself the value ascribed by the organization to the risk 
management issue.  
 
Mr. Shavit was quoted as saying more than once, that he is willing to pay one 
million dollars for a claim that is the result of a physician‟s reporting, if the 
adverse event  is  investigated in order to prevent its  reoccurrence. He stated 
this uncompromising statement, when opponents to the establishment of Risk 
Management Department, tried to convince him that this might be a risky step 
because of the exposure of physicians to claims due to their voluntary reporting. 
 
One of the most significant expressions of the management‟s commitment to an 
issue,  is allocation of resources to certain activity. It is even more prominent in 
times of financial difficulties that require re-organization. Most of the healthcare 
organizations in Israel are in a budgetary deficit for years and work under 
continuous government pressure to re-organize and cut off expenses. This state 
of events is even more evident in the last three(2001-2003) years due to the 
economic decline in Israel. 
 
The expansion of the department‟s manpower, from its foundation day till the 
beginning of 2003, is presented in the following table: 
 
Year 1996 7997 7998 7999 2222 2227 2222 2223 
Staffing of the  RMD  2.5 2 4 4 5 6.5 7 7.5 
 
It is evident, that during its first eight years of activity, the department has 
impressively grown from 0.5 employee to 7.5 employees, a growth of 1500%. 
This indicator is especially impressive, when considering the restrictions to 
expansion of other headquarter units in Macabbi. Risk Management 
Department's growth over the years is a result of appreciation of its contribution 




The position of IMA  (Israeli Medical Association) 
 
We do not know about an explicit position taken by IMA towards the risk 
management activity in Macabbi. IMA joined the Ministry of Health and the 
leading malpractice insurer in Israel - MCI, in order to lead an national initiative 
aimed to improve the quality of healthcare in Israel. This intention was 




Actually, as we have already mentioned, the first active risk manager in Macabbi 
was financed by IMA and Macabbi conjointly. We know that IMA didn't support 
the initiative to establish a sovereign Risk Management Department with no 
relation to IMA, but we have no evidence to support this notion. IMA‟s concerns 
had to do with the argument that Macabbi‟s adverse events investigations, might 
be used as evidences in the court of law against physicians who reported 
adverse events. 
 
IMA perceives itself as a major player in the risk management arena in Israel, but 
its position towards independent risk management activity in the healthcare 




The position of MCI (The Israeli leading Malpractice insurer)  
 
In the initial stages of the Risk Management Department's activity, the insurer 
objected Macabbi‟s independent risk management activity, claiming he already 
has a risk management activity which is  based, among others, on Macabbi‟s 
reports. MCI deals with risk management activity as part of the secondary 
insurer‟s requirements to conduct such an activity. The activity is operated by 
MCI‟s subsidiary named MRM – Medical Risk Management. 
 
The main insurer‟s argument for the objection is related to the approach 
according to which the relationship between the insurer and the physicians is 
similar to a lawyer-client relationship. This kind of relationship provides 
confidentiality to the reporting physician, whereas there is a possibility of 
exposing the reporter to claims and a usage of investigation findings as crucial 
evidence in the court of law, in case an internal risk management department is 
investigating the adverse events.   
 
The insurer‟s preferred model, according to which the Risk Management 
Department serves as a relay for transferring field reports, was implemented in 
Klalit HMO. According to this model, all the reports are transmitted to MCI and 
processed in a triple mode: 
 
 A reactive risk management, in order to learn lessons from adverse 





 Estimation of the financial obligations extant (Quantum), it is expected 
to face as a result of claims following the adverse events and 
conducting the legislative procedure. 
 
 Conducting Risk Management activities conjointly with the insured in 
order to prevent adverse events reoccurrence. 
 
  
The commitment Macabbi,  was ready to take upon itself towards the insurer, 
was to report to MCI on the occurrence of an adverse event in order to supply 
legislative protection to the physician and to make it possible for MCI to asses 




The position of Israeli Ministry of Health 
 
In 1999, the Israeli Ministry of Health has published a special report of the 
committee appointed by the government to handle the issue: "The report of the 
committee for examining the responsibility for  harm during medical care". In the 
committee‟s report it is mentioned that the government‟s motives to appoint it are 
unclear and documentation regarding the possible motives was unavailable. 
 
The presumption is that the government‟s motives were related to the increasing 
number of claims due to malpractice, following the "Patient Rights Law" 
published in May 1996 which made the medical record accessible to the patient, 
and the attempts to prepare accordingly to deal with this issue. 
 
Physicians and jurists were appointed to the committee and Judge Dr. Gavriel 
Klinger was appointed as Chairman. 
 
The committee‟s report presents actually the approach of the Ministry of Health, 
regarding the issue of risk management in Israel. 
 
Chapter 9 of the committee‟s report: “Insurance and Risk Management” clarifies 
the Ministry of Health attitude towards risk management in Israel, at the time of 
the report publishing. As a matter of fact, the chapter‟s title clarifies the attitude in 
an undisputable manner - risk management is considered as a mean of the 
insurer to control and minimize losses of adverse events in medical practice. A 





 “Risk management is intended to document every adverse event in a healthcare 
institution, in real-time. The documentation is independent and not related to the 
complaint or financial claims. The documentation is intended to assure the ability 
to asses potential claims and the existence of documentation in case a claim for 
compensations will be submitted in the future". 
 
A reference to risk management, aimed to improve patient's safety and quality of 
care appears after the previous statement:  
"Risk Management is also of great importance for another purpose that has 
public significance and eventually will also decrease costs. Risk Management 
may help in allocating problems related to caregivers or circumstances that might 
lead to malpractice. A  truthful  reporting at real time, to a system,  experienced in 
learning lessons and deriving conclusions, might lead to a significant 
improvement in the quality of  care in a relatively short time". 
 
As we have already stated, in February 1997, a treaty was signed between the 
Ministry of Health and IMA aiming to structure the issue of “Promoting the Quality 
in the Healthcare Services”. According to this treaty, a Risk Management Forum 
will be established including representatives from the Ministry of Health, IMA, 
Klalit HMO, hospital managers and MRM on the behalf of the insurer,. 
 
From the above said, one can conclude that the Ministry of Health did not take a 
clear position regarding the establishment of internal risk management organs in 
Israeli healthcare organizations.  
 
Moreover, according to the committee‟s report, addressing the issue of 
responsibility for harm during care giving and the treaty for promoting the quality 
in the healthcare services, the Ministry perceived risk management as a reactive 
function,  aimed mainly to reduce costs, rather than  a proactive one .  
 
 
Establishing interfaces with the Legislation department and the 
Ombudsman. 
 
Allegedly, there is a contradiction between the Legislation department‟s activity 
and the Risk Management Department that pushes both sides to be in the 
opposite trenches.  
 
The Legislation department is expected to supply legal consulting and deface to 
the healthcare organization and its employees, in order to set the appropriate 





The RMD gets the adverse events reports, investigates them and provides 
personal feedback to the involved caregivers and to the organization in order to 
reduce the exposure to risks.  
 
From the Legislation department‟s point of view Risk Management Department's 
activities create an exposure of both, organization and caregivers to claims. 
 
The "Patient Rights Law" published in 1996, provides immunity to   a healthcare 
organization regarding information created by its Control and Quality Committee. 
The act doesn't formulate the immunity conditions for information generated by 
internal Risk Management Department activities.  
 
In this state of affairs, it was understandable why the legislation department 
tended to adopt one of three following solutions:  
 
 The caregivers will report adverse events to the Legislation 
department, which will allow defining these reports as a part of lawyer-
client relationship, thus immune. 
 
 The caregivers will report to the insurer and he will be in charge for risk 
management activities, which will allow a similar lawyer- client 
definition of the relationship.  
 
 Establishment of organizational and functional relationship between 
Legislative department and Risk Management Department, which will 
enable the possibility to interpret Risk Management Department and 
reporting caregiver's relationship as lawyer-client relationship, thus 
immune against claims. 
 
This position was expressed  dramatically when one of Legislative department 
lawyers, in a presentation  to physicians, recommended to stop reporting adverse 




In retrospect, the Legislation department‟s considerations were not verified even 
once - there was no a single instance in which a caregiver was sued as a result 
of reporting to Risk Management Department or as a result of an investigation 
conducted by it.  
 
From time to time, the tension between Risk Management Department and the 
Legislative department arises again, as if refusing to quit, especially when 
malpractice is discussed by the media or when new lawyers join the Legislative 
department of Maccabi.  
 
There are two systems in Macabbi receiving reports, which may serve as quality 
indicators: Claims regarding the Quality of service, reported by patients to the 
Ombudsman, and adverse events reported to Risk Management Department by 
the caregivers. In many cases patients claims, reported to the Ombudsman 
include an adverse event too. This issue was studied in 2002 by the Risk 
Management Department and it was found that about 60% of patient claims are 
actually adverse events that should be reported by the physicians to Risk 
Management Department. 
 
Facing the reality of a small percentage of adverse events being reported (about 
5%, according to several references in the USA and Great Britain), adverse 
events being reported as patient claims, is a valuable resource for Risk 
Management activities. 
 
Working interfaces with the Ombudsman had to be established at the very initial 
stages of Risk Management Department activities, in order to feed the Risk 




 Documented, Initial organizational  decisions regarding the  RMD 
 
Due to the criticality of the unsolved issue of confidentiality, regarding information 
associated with adverse events reporting by physicians, few documents were 
compiled dealing with Risk Management decisions.  
 
In many cases, although decisions were made regarding general approach 
questions and specific issues, they were not documented. 
 
In this section we will present and reflect on two documents, from the first months 





 Risk Management reason de etre' – a presentation by Dr. Willf – 
Meron to the CEO and the secretariat of Maccabi ion  March 1997. 
 
 A Summary of the first decade of operation: 21.11.1996-12.6.1997 and 
the first working plan for the year 1998 published in July 1997 and sent 
for the approval of Maccabi's CEO Mr. Shavit. 
 
The mission statement that opened the presentation was: 
“Decreasing redundant expenses and improving the public image of the 
organization by identification and improvement of procedures being risky to 
healthcare services” 
  
The mission statement, presented to the secretariat, which serves as the board 
of directors, stressed the financial benefits of Risk Management activities. 
 
In retrospective, this was a marketing argument, aimed to convince that Risk 
Management will be of value to Maccabi, in terms of cost-effectiveness, although 
nor we nor Risk Management Department managers knew how to measure the 
financial benefits, at that time. 
 
The argument was based on the Aviation experience in which the financial 
benefits, proved as valid, by saving many lives and resources. 
 
The presentation to the secretariat focused on the following issues: 
 
 Risk Management’s History and current trends– Changes in the 
litigation atmosphere towards recognizing patients rights and 
physicians responsibility for errors, insurers demand to establish Risk 
Management activities as a condition for insurance renewal and 
financial aspects  considering Risk Management as means to 
decrease the entire healthcare expense per capita.  
 
 Current approaches to Risk Management – Integration of Quality 
and Risk Management activities, utilization of statistical methods, 
characterization of behavior and patterns that lead to harming patients 






 Problems encountered by Risk Management – Unclear policy 
regarding the  issue of information confidentiality, the psychological 
barries to reporting and avoiding reporting due to fears of being 
punished, threat to the physicians autonomy due to managements 
involvement, geographically dispersed clinics and the character of 
working agreements Maccabi has with the physicians. 
 
 Suggested solutions -  Senior management commitment, 
establishing a Quality improvement forum headed by clinical leaders,  
wide dissemination of adverse events lessons learned, Risk 
Management  participation in physicians professional meetings, 
frequent presence in the “field” and stressing the benefits for the 
physician from early reporting of adverse events. 
 
 Maccabi’s Risk Management Department goals –Reducing the 
expense per capita due to malpractice, Risk Management as a 
countermeasure to malpractice and improving accountability – the 
manner the public perceives the Healthcare services approach to 
physician‟s errors. 
 
 The suggested work plan consisted of five major activities: 
1. Identification and mapping of risks. 
2. Improving the Quality of care 
3. Claims management 
4. Participating in Maccabi‟s strategically thinking and 
planning. 
5. Establishing a Risk Management forum with 
representatives from: Risk Management Department, 
Legislative Department and Head of Medical Division 
to discuss and decide periodically upon Risk 
Management activities and its organizational 
implications. 
 
Following this presentation, Maccabi‟s secretariat, approved the initial work plan 
suggested by Risk Management Department‟s managers. 
 
The presentation served actually as the Risk Management Department‟s first 
work plan and although being general, addressed the major issues anticipated to 





While analyzing the work plans in the following years, as presented in chapter 
6.11, we realized that Risk Management Department‟s focus has changed from 
financial benefits to preventing errors reoccurrence, as the major goal. After 
convincing the secretariat with financial arguments, Risk Management 
Department managers realized that the real and immediate challenge is in 
preventing physician's errors reoccurrence, by deriving lessons learned from 
actual adverse events. 
 
The summary of the first decade of operation, sent to Maccabi's CEO for 
approval, published four months after the presentation to the secretariat, was 
held, had some significant modifications as compared to the presentation. 
 
Two major conceptual modifications are evident: 
 
 The first was recognizing the urgent need for: “Developing means 
for quantitative and qualitative assessment of the goals mentioned 
above". RMD managers felt as if they have still to prove their case. 
Being able to monitor the progress in fulfilling the goals and to 
report this progress to senior management, was crucial for building 
trust and breaking the opposition to Risk Management Department 
establishment and its activities. It became evident that to conduct 
Risk Management activities isn‟t enough, being able to prove its 
contribution to the organization isn‟t less important. 
 
 The second modification had to do with proactive rather reactive 
approach to Risk Management, following our promotion of the basic 
ideas of the Aviation Risk Management model :  “The philosophy 
behind the proactive approach, states that it is more cost-effective 
to prevent the harm, than trying to control the damage 
afterwards…” 
 
Three additional differences may be found, that share common characteristics of 
being operational issues to be addressed at the initial stages of Risk 
Management Department‟s activities: 
 
1. Formalization of the relationships with the insurer – the summary states, that 
discussions were conducted with the insurer and the flow of information 





2. Allocation of a dedicated Risk Management computer system, able to support 
the evolving methodology of handling reported adverse events. The summary 
states, that the only available systems, are with inpatient orientation, 
supporting retrospective handling of adverse events and lacking the proactive 
approach adopted by Risk Management Department, following the Aviation 
model. 
 
3. Promoting the Risk Management approach – a goal was set to meet with 
additional 1,750 physicians, in order to present them with the goals and 
activities of Risk Management Department. In addition, a half day workshop 
was intended to be developed and delivered to various professional sectors, 






In this chapter, we tried to describe and reflect on the initial operational steps, 
taken by the Risk Management Department and modifications they underwent 
while being held.  
 
As we have already mentioned, the establishment of the RMD in Maccabi, was 
revolutionary and visionary, thus evoking many ambivalent reactions inside 
Maccabi and its external interfaces. 
 
Thus, the first Risk Management challenge of the recently established Risk 
Management Department had more to do with establishing and maintaining its 
case, rather than immediate handling of physician's errors.  
 
The environment in which the RMD  was established was quite hostile and not 
welcoming. 
 
We believe that hiring us, was one of the decisions that served as 
countermeasure and protection means against this hostile and sometimes 
cynical setup, as if saying: 
”It can be done; these guys have already done it in the Aviation, so give us 








"Many people dream of success. To me success can only be achieved through 
repeated failure and introspection. In fact success represents 1% of your work which 
results from 99% that is called failure '' 
 









Recruiting the right staff 
 
 
First  Assignments – the criticality of assigning the right people to lead the 
change.  
 
It may be stated that the department‟s character, goals and ways of action were 
highly influenced by the personal and professional characteristics of the 
“Founders Generation.” The two department founders were outsiders to Maccabi, 
before their assignments in the Risk Management Department. It may have been 
coincidental, but maybe an intuitive decision that could have stemmed from 
several reasons:  
 
 The department‟s establishment, was accompanied with oppositions   
from various sources in Maccabi, as we have outlined in the previous 
chapters. Assigning a department manager and deputy from  outside 
Maccabi, could partly neutralize, at least in the beginning, biased attitudes 
towards the subject as a result of acquaintance with the leading 
functionary. 
 
 The department‟s chances of succeeding were unclear at that time. 
Macabii's employees, were not keen to man a position with vague future 
and certainly a difficult one. 
_______________ 
* It is important to mention that this chapter, more than other parts in this work, is based mostly 
on our impressions, since literature on this subject is unavailable, and documentation of staffing 
the department in Maccabi is almost unavailable as well. It is of course, an important question on 






 Due to the virginity of Risk Management domain in medicine, there was a 
shortage of people, with medical background and experience in risk 
management.  In this state of affairs, the professional background and 
personality‟s characteristics had crucial weight in choosing the candidates.  
 
More than once, when meeting people who are involved in safety or risk 
management in various domains, we have asked ourselves: “Do they share any 
common characteristics?”, and if the answer is "Yes", what is the meaning of it? 
 
Whenever, we met new risk managers in the framework of our work, these 
questions raised again and again. For some unknown reasons, we had the 
feeling we “know” them, their attitude, their way of thinking, their ambitions and 
determination. 
 
Although it is not based on evidence, from our experience, we can draw several 
common lines of risk managers, whoever they are. It is important to mention that 
we refer to full-time risk managers who have been operating in  this function for a 
long period, and not with  risk managers, who  function  in  risk management 
additionally to their defined duties and for a short period of time. Most of the risk 
managers we have met and worked with shared the following characteristics: 
 
 High level of morality-  Risk Managers, are people with definite values 
and high morality, which is expressed in many areas, including outside 
their job such as social involvement and activity in various association for 
the benefit  of other humans. 
 
 Ascribing a great value to human life and high sensitivity to cases in 
which this value is offense. People who practice risk management,  have 
the feeling that they can save life's by their work, a feeling that gives high 
validity to what they are doing  and a strong motive to make every 
possible effort and  utilize any given opportunity to save human life. 
 
 A belief that a change is possible - The domains we practiced in, mainly 
Aviation and Medicine are characterized by traditions and conservatism. 
We view the basic aims of risk management to be focused on conditions 
and processes modification, which allow the making of errors. We found, 
that most of the risk managers, preserve a positive attitude regarding the 





 A total commitment to the mission - .  Even though, most of the risk 
managers are employed as wage earners, they invest more effort and 
time,  than is required by their position. This extra effort is aimed to 
produce a greater and a more significant impact. More than once, we 
found ourself telling a risk manager, in late evening hours: “Maybe it would 
be better to call it a day; you will not be able to solve all the problems 
today, leave something for tomorrow...” 
 
 A Personal Trauma – Even though, this issue was seldom raised, 
especially in cases where a personal relationship was established 
between us and risk managers, we had the impression, that most of the 
risk managers have a personal motive in preventing errors that might 
harm  severely  humans. In some cases it was a personal involvement in a 
severe error or a serious harm to someone close, as a result of a 
preventable medical error.  
    
 Intrinsic motivation - Internal Locus of Control. In most of the cases, risk 
managers are motivated by the will to reduce the extent of errors, 
believing that their work truly promotes the achievement of this goal. 
Unlike other employees that need, from time to time, to be motivated by 
their managers, it may be stated that most of the risk managers are 
motivated by a feeling of a “mission.” 
 
 Assertiveness – In the first years of the department‟s activity, the 
managers experienced a professional dilemma - on the one hand, they 
lacked knowledge in risk management, but where assured they know how 
things should work on the other hand. It may be stated, that risk managers 
are assertive.  
 
 The courage to challenge the system and to express personal points of 
view, even if it is not a normative and popular attitude. In many cases, 
managers prefer not to confront problems, that are brought up to agenda 
by risk managers. Managers are busy with promoting their business, 
providing service to their clients and keeping an eye on their competitors, 
and usually they are not willing to spend management attention to risk 




Every time the department indented to recruit new risk-managers, it encountered 
difficulties in defining their profile. The department managers, had the feeling 
they have to look out for someone with some kind of uniqueness, someone that 
does not fit to a specific profile, since they valued more the personality 
characteristics than the professional background.  In retrospect, two of the 
important criteria's were “glittering eyes” and a strong will to deal with the subject. 
 
In retrospect, we may say, that all the risk managers that were recruited by the 




Assigning the Head of Risk Management Department and her Deputy 
 
When professor Aviram, Head of the Health Division in Maccabi, was looking for 
candidates for the departments managerial positions (manager and deputy), he 
did not find them among Maccabi's employees. 
 
In an interview we had with professor Aviram on this matter, on December 5th 
2003, when referring to the issue of allocating the department manager, he 
mentioned: "It was obvious that he or she should be a physician with a lot of 
clinical experience, with a dynamic character, someone who will adopt the 
mission as his/her “baby” and together we will learn... We did not know what risk 
management is...good instincts are necessary as well, someone who managed 
something in an intermediate level, made decision and is familiar with 
organizational politics and practice". 
 
Dr. R.Willf Meron was about to finish her obligations at Tel-Hashomer hospital as 
a deputy manager of the pediatric department, and approached Maccabi to 
check whether there is a position for her. She was not familiar with the topic of 
risk management and did not necessarily look for a position in this domain. 
 
The position was offered to Dr. Meron by Professor Aviram, after he considered 
her as an appropriate candidate  for founding and managing the department. 
Trying to understand what  RM is  about, Dr. Meron has done for two weeks a 










When referring to Risk Management, Prof. Aviram stated: “…Regarding risk 
managers it was even harder to characterize them, but it was clear they should 
not be lawyers.” The possibility of nominating lawyers as Risk Managers, was 
raised because a part of Risk Management duties had to do with interactions with 
the insurer and the legislation department and because it was crucial to provide 
the reporting physician an administrative immunity. 
 
When examining the participant's composition,   at ASHRM (American Society for 
HealthCare Risk Management) conventions, it becomes evident that most of the 
people who deal with Risk Management are nurses, few are physicians and few 
are lawyers. We have analyzed the background of the presenters in the ASHRM 




When examining the table, we came to the following conclusions: 
 
 Physicians are rarely active participants or presenters in the conventions, 
and this state of things did not change during the years. 
 
 Nurses are the ones who deal with the professional aspect of risk 




Number % Number % 
MD 2 2.9 2 5.7 
Lawyer 13 18.8 6 17.1 
MD-Lawyer 1 1.4 3 8.6 
Nurse 13 18.8 14 40.0 
CP 5 7.2 2 5.7 
Manager: Judical, 
Insurance,Consulting,  
Medical firms 35 50.7 8 22.9 




 The convention‟s character has changed: In the 1997 convention,  more 
than half of the presenters belonged to the second professional circle of 
people who deal with Risk Management: lawyers, insurers, managers and 
consultants, while in the 2003 convention they comprised less then a 
quarter. Opposed to that, the share of nurses in the convention was 
doubled.  
 
 The total number of presentations in 2003 convention has decreased to 
50% of the 1997 convention. 
 
Since the ASHRM convention is a major event, for those who deal with risk 
management, based on the assemble of presenters in it, it may be stated that the 
risk management profession was in those days perceived as   a nurses 
profession.  
 
It became apparent, that Risk Managers should be nurses with sound clinical 
background and with experience in clinical and administrative decision making. 
The rest of the  skills were summarized by Prof. Aviram:  “They should be good 
inspectors...” 
 
The department‟s deputy, Mrs. Irena Levinhoff, was previously to  arriving to 
Macabbi, a department's chief nurse at Ichilov hospital. “Irena was a wonderful 
nurse professionally speaking, but nonconformist in her attitude...” (Prof. Aviram).  
 
 
The deeds of the pioneers as the model for the followers. 
 
The impact of Dr. Meron and Mrs. Levinhoff, the first  head of Risk Management 
Department and her deputy, was so crucial, that only with the nomination of Dr. 
Gindi, in 2002,  the basic questions regarding the RMD operation, were raised 
again. These questions addressed issues like: What are the criterions for 
investigating an adverse event? What is the proper methodology  to debrief an 
adverse event?, What is the right approach to implementing recommendations?  
 
Most probably, if Dr. Gindi, a senior radiologist would have been different in her 
approach, the previous basic perceptions would be still dominant.  
 
Dr. Gindi‟s basic approach was to test and challenge basic assumptions. It may 
be stated that Dr. Gindi doesn‟t take anything for granted and doubts any given 






It is important to mention, that close to the nomination of Dr. Gindi as Head of 
Risk Management Department, the Risk Management Department was defined 
as and independent department in the Quality Directorate. This closeness of 
events made it easier for Dr. Gindi to revise Risk Management Department‟s 
basic work assumptions. 
 
The issue of challenging the basic assumptions of the founders generation and 
the proper timing for it is an important topic in organizational development (OD). 
 
Edgar, H. Schein, in his book “Organizational Culture and Leadership”  (1997), 
dedicates a whole chapter to the way in which founders embed and bequeath a 
culture. Schein, distinguishes between Primary Embedding Mechanisms, which 
is  the basic mechanisms by  which an organizational culture is rooted, among 
them: issues to which the managers pay attention, measure and control 
regularly, the way in which managers react to critical events and crisis etc, and 
between Secondary Articulation and Reinforcement Mechanism, by  which 
managers guarantee the continuation and transformation of culture, among them: 
The organization‟s structure, organizational system and work procedures, the 
organizational physical structure, ceremonies etc. 
 
In our opinion, it is indeed possible to say, that after years of activity the 
department has developed a unique culture. One, who joins the department, 
senses almost immediately the existence of this unique culture and its power.   
This culture had numerous unique characteristics; some of them were discussed 
in the previous chapters. Among the main characteristics of the developed 
culture, we may refer to the following: 
  
 Maintaining the reporters and reports immunity as a central value, and 
providing it with a confidential framework. 
 
 Supporting physicians involved in adverse events as the department‟s 
core activity. 
 
 Emotional involvement in the department‟s activities. 
 
 Very close and direct relationships among the Risk Management 
Department staff, beyond the formal relationships imposed by the 





 Total commitment of the staff to handle adverse events in order to allocate 
the right means to prevent its reoccurrence. 
 
 A feeling of “They and Us” when promoting risk management issues was 
considered. It should be noted, that this feeling was prevalent at the early 
stages of the departments' establishment and in the last years it almost 
diminished and gave place to a cooperative approach between  the center 
and districts. 
 
 Managing the external affairs solely by the department‟s managers and 
only rarely by risk managers. 
 
As already mentioned, with the nomination of Dr. Gindi, as head of Risk 
Management Department, all of the cultural characteristics listed above, were 




Defining the right mixture of professions -  Physicians and Nurses.  
  
As we have already mentioned, it was clear to the Head of Healthcare Division, 
as well as to the new Risk Management Department managers, that most of the 
department‟s  operations will be based on nurses that will be recruited and 
qualified  for the job based on OJT (On the Job Training). 
 
In their qualifying process, nurses are accustomed to work according to defined 
procedures, whereas physicians focus mainly on decisions making.  
 
Since most of the department‟s activities, especially in the first years, were based 
on processing advese events, and since most of the risk managers worldwide 
are nurses, it was necessary to base the department‟s activity on nurses.   
 
At the same time, in order to provide validity to the department‟s activity, 
especially when evaluating adverse events against the criterions of   best 
practice  medicine, it was important to integrate in the process a valued 
physician. The role of this physician was to represent the physician's standpoint 
and level of practice.  
 
Dr. Meir Liron, a senior internist, previously a division manager at Ichilov Medical 





Even though, during the years, the department has constantly changed its face 
and grew in order to address the challenges of increase in reporting rate and 
starting new activities. It may be stated that the professional mixture didn't 





The ideal risk manager  
 
It is important to mention, that despite the department's excessive efforts to 
allocate, screen and recruit risk managers, a profile of an ideal risk manager that 
will serve as a yardstick for candidates, was never defined.  
 
The department‟s managers preferred to screen the candidates one to one, using 
their experience, intuition and personal  preferences.  
 
Nonetheless, there were several characteristics of the ideal risk manager that 
were discussed, whenever new candidate compatibility was assessed. These 
characteristics were raised in the case of their absence or weakness. In some of 
these screening processes, we took part and observed that three characteristics 
were especially dominant: 
 
 Relevant professional background - a nurse with administrative and 
managerial background as a mandatory condition. 
 
 Enthusiasm to deal with Risk Management issues and the ability to 
express and communicate it. 
 
 Unfitness of personality that exhibits itself in attitudes, professional 
approach, values and career. 
 
It appeared as if the RMD, managers looked for candidates similar to their self 
perception. 
 
Based on our experience in aviation, especially in the IAF, we can state that the 
quality of human resources assigned to deal with safety and Risk Management 














It is important to make several remarks regarding the above illustration: 
 
 It is based merely on our impression, which obviously, cannot be 
supported and validated by documentation. 
 
 The illustrated milestones, are the result of our retrospective on flight 
safety activities, over a period of 20 years in the IAF. 
 
 The suggested milestones, may endure different periods of time, 
according to the organizational setup. 
 
 It seems as if the suggested milestones may be generalized to activities of 
new organizational entities, with a defined mission, not of the core 
organizational activities. 
 






The illustration consists of six principal stages: 
 
1. The establishment stage – in order to raise the issue into the 
organizational attention and define appropriate directives, an  initial core 
staff of high quality is assigned. The achievements in this stage are basic, 





 routine stage – After positioning the issue on the organizational 
agenda, the organization returns to its original attitude regarding that issue 
and prefers to appoint quality manpower to positions that are in the core of 
the organizational making. The accomplishments improve, thanks to the 
activities of the founding nucleus. 
 
3. The organizational enthusiasm stage – Together with improvement in 
accomplishments in risk management, the organization‟s managers show 
more interest in this activity. They consider risk management as means to 
reduce expenditure, to improve the organization‟s public image and 
ascribe the compliments to them. This stage provides a good opportunity 
to get resources for the activity as well as manpower of higher quality. 
Accomplishments keep improving, even though the improvement rate is 




 routine stage – After the enthusiasm‟s stage, the organization 
starts to consider risk management activity as a well-based one, with 
proven results, and assigns quality manpower to other areas - core areas 
and new activities.  There is a consistent improvement in 
accomplishments, as a result of continuity, standard procedures, and 
perseverance and positive changes in the organization‟s attitude towards 
risk management. 
 
5. The “Search for the impact” stage- The second routine period creates 
in the entire organization and among the Risk Management Department 
staff an atmosphere of stagnation. It looks as if nothing of real significance 
is happening. Overcoming this situation is, of course, dependent on the 
organization‟s and risks management managers. The second routine 
stage, might last until, a severe adverse event will occur and stir the 
organization to conduct a revision of its basic concepts regarding the risk 




The accomplishments during the second routine stage, are usually 
satisfactory and there is no reason to change the situation.  Realizing this 
stage requires quality manning, which the organization is willing to provide 




 routine stage - We consider this stage as a stage of maturity and 




No need to advertise - candidates are willing to join the RMD 
 
We  may state, that the Risk Management Department was in a continuous 
process of looking for personnel in order be able to cope with the increasing 
amount of reports and compensate for abandonment of staff- two risk managers 
and one physician in charge of departments  R&D activities. Abandonment of 
staff from the Risk Management Department was a rare occurrence, due to strict 
recruiting procedures, which succeeded to allocate the right people for the right 
job. The few cases of abandonment were attributed to personal problems and not 
due to incompatibility. 
 
The RMD's working procedures involved wider and wider professional circles - 
nurses and physicians in debriefings and defining recommendations. These 
encounters eventually produced interest in the department's activities and from 
time to time willingness to become a part of it. Actually, there was no need to 
advertise in order to recruit quality manpower for the Risk Management 
Department.  In most of the cases there were several good candidates from 
which the most appropriate were chosen.   
 
 
The screening process – a family like decision making.  
 
Even after becoming larger, the department was still a relatively small 
organizational entity, characterized by high degree of involvement of the 
employees in each others life, professionally and personally. It is unclear, when 
and how it was decided that all of the department‟s employees, should participate 





The decision who  will be accepted was eventually always taken by the 
department‟s managers, but the department‟s employees had the opportunity to 
get to know the candidate by an interview, and express their opinion on the 
nominee‟s fitness for the position. 
 
Some of the nominees, those who passed successfully the initial interviews, were 
sent to a screening institute to take psychometric tests that focused on cognitive 
and interpersonal capabilities  
 
In some cases, the diagnosis results from the institute were controversial, that is, 
they didn‟t meet the expectations from the nominee. In at least one case, we are 
familiar with, the diagnosis results were less than expected  in the personality  
aspects, nevertheless, the department accepted the nominee, since during the 
interviews, they have got the impression he/she can function well and has the 
"right personality".   
 
To conclude, the selection process consisted of the following phases: 
 
 The initial classification of the candidates, according to curriculum vitae 
and an initial interview, conducted by the department‟s managers. 
 
 Personal interviews by each and all members of the Risk Management 
Department. 
 
 Passing an aptitude battery in an   external psychometric institute. 
 
  Risk Management Department's summary meeting, integrating all the 
impressions and information. 
 




The training process – OJT (On the Job Training) 
 
The training process of new risk managers was a mix of formal training with OJT 
and hands on  and consisted of the following elements: 
 
 The risk management principles: theories, terms and models 
 





 The RMD's  working  processes - among them: receiving a report, 
managing and handling adverse events differentially, according to their 
classification, working with the  risk management computerized 
information system, formulating and implementing recommendations.  
 
 Receiving calls via the “Hot-Line” and giving support and feedback to 
physicians involved in adverse events. 
 
 Representing the subject of risk management in different frameworks 
in the Maccabi's headquarters and districts. 
 
The department‟s deputy had the global responsibility for the qualifying process. 
Theoretical “lessons” were given by us and practical ones by experienced risk 
managers.  
 
Instructor's team‟s meetings took place from time to time, in order to evaluate the 
progress rate and identify specific problems that demanded a focused training or 
a different approach. 
 
The qualifying process that had characteristics of OJT (On the Job Training), 
lasted a year averagely. The criterion to finish the formal qualification was: being 
able to manage all classes of adverse events and the ability to manage an 
independent investigation of level 3 (including a field investigation). 
 
It is important to mention that even after the formal qualification has finished, the 
qualification process actually continues   with professional supervision  of the 
department‟s managers, medical and Risk Management  consultants. 
 
To compare, the qualifying process of an Air Accident Investigator in the US Air-
Force was conducted in a framework of a formal course, which lasted three-four 
intensive months and consisted of about 500 class and hands on hours. 
 
 
Sharing the experience - supervision, department meetings 
 
Over the years of its existence, the RMD, has accumulated unique experience, in 
handling adverse events from a risk management point of view, with the sole 
purpose of preventing reoccurrence. To our best knowledge, this experience is 





This unique experience focuses on understanding the factors and processes that 
enabled the occurrence of errors and adverse events, by methodical 
investigation of the events, as well as defining and implementing 
recommendations that stem from those investigations. The basic assumption of 
these activities wasn't aimed to defend the involved parties in case of claims, but 
rather to minimize the probability of error reoccurrence and thus harm to patients.  
 
That kind of attitude towards adverse events characterizes the Aviation‟s Risk 
Management model, which despite its fashionability in medicine, is not 
implemented methodically and continuously by any organization we know, except 
Maccabi. VA (Veteran Affairs) in the States has established procedures for 
adverse events handling, without blaming the involved medical staff (PSRS, 
Patient Safety Reporting System).. VA's solution is based on the principles of the 
ASRS, Aviation Safety Reporting System.  VA's medical staff reports the events 
to a third party (NASA), preserving this way the reporters anonymity and 
immunity. This approach seems to be a good solution for encouraging medical 
staff to report their errors, but, in our opinion, is of less value in   formulating and 
implementing valid recommendations, aimed to decrease chances of error 
reoccurrence. Saying this, we believe that Maccabi's approach, is unique in 
preserving reporters' immunity, against claims on one hand, and debriefing 
adverse events, internally on the other hand. 
 
Since the Risk Management Department's experience was unique, in the first 
years of its operations,   it was almost impossible to inspire and enrich it by 
external resources. Therefore, the department‟s development was driven by 
three major factors: 
 
 Experience accumulated among the department‟s staff, while handling 
adverse events. 
 
 Our professional supervision and guidance, based on the Aviation 
experience. 
 




Sharing personal experience is of great value in RMD's professional processes 
and culture, which was expressed in shared work-processes, in which a risk-
manager involves the medical consultant, the department's manager, the deputy 
manager and us in his routine work. It is possible to say, that even though the 
responsibility to handle a certain event is of a specific risk-manager, it is actually 
a team work, which in its framework the professional and personal experience of 
each individual in the department is expressed and shared. 
 
Additionally, a “cases review meeting” took place once a month, which in its 
framework, exemplary adverse events were reviewed and discussed.  In the 
meeting, risk managers presented cases that were chosen for review by Risk 
Management Department's managers, and got feedback from all the participants, 
addressing the investigation‟s process, its findings, conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
Nevertheless, in our opinion the internal lessons‟ learning process, regarding the 
errors made by the department‟s staff, while handling adverse events, despite 
improvement in the last years, still needs an upgrade, in order to enable the 
department to learn from its own errors on the one hand, and assimilate the 

























“Admitting an error was made, is taking the most significant step in preventing its 
reoccurrence" 
 




Establishing the Adverse Events Reporting System  
 
 
Motivating physicians to report their own errors  
  
Studies conducted in the USA have shown that immediate reporting of adverse 
events by the involved clinicians, can serve as a forewarning in the identification 
of future claims regarding medical negligence and creation of a knowledge base 
for improving the quality of medical care (Lindgren, Christensen and Mills, 1991). 
 
The researchers conducted an empirical study aimed to test the hypothesis that 
immediate reporting of adverse events may improve claim management and its 
results. The research confirmed the hypothesis that indeed, immediate reporting 
reduces the time needed for handling claims and their costs. According to 
Lindgren and Secker-Walker (1995), estimates regarding the scope of reporting 
by clinicians prior to claims, show a rate of 5-30% in the US and 0-2% in the UK. 
They claim that there are three alternatives for the establishment of reporting 
structure for adverse events in the health care systems: 
 
1. Systematic survey of medical records in order to screen out adverse 
events in advance. According to this approach, there is no need to wait for 
the physician‟s reports of his own error, but to review patients files actively 
and manage them professionally. The disadvantage of this method is its 
inapplicability. At Macabbi, more than 12 million physician-patient 
encounters take place and about 3.5 million encounters with other health 
care professionals, yearly (data as of 2000). There is no practical way to 
conduct professional quality control over such an amount of information. In 
addition, even if it was possible, this effort   would be intended at 
minimizing the damages from claims (the reactive approach) and not 
preventing them. This method proved beneficial for research purposes, 





2. Active risk survey in the medical environment in order to screen in advance 
for risks before they were expressed in an adverse event. This alternative is 
especially common in quality control activity, but is usually unacceptable for 
minimizing damages or risk management. 
 
3. A reporting system in which physicians and other professionals report 
adverse events immediately after they occur. The reports are classified and 
investigated by one central entity. This alternative is the one adopted by 
Macabbi, with changes and modifications and it is also the most common 
alternative in health care systems taking risk-management actions. 
 
The blame-free approach is presented in works regarding error reporting by 
physicians, as an essential condition for the establishment of physician error-
reporting systems. Frankel (2001), remarked in a symposium dedicated to patient 
safety, the golden rules of the reporting system in aviation ASRS (Aviation Safety 
Reporting System), as rules the medical field should adopt as well: 
 
 Limited immunity 
 Time limitation for disciplinary action 
 Analysis of reports: two analysts read each report 
 Involves everyone 
 Ensures protection: prohibits the use of any reports submitted (on any 
disciplinary action, except for information concerning criminal offenses) 
 De-identification 
 
Cohen (2000) and others, list a number of error reporting system characteristics 
in medicine. In the following table*.  Those characteristics are presented, 














7 No punitive Reporters are free of fear of punishment 7 
2 Confidential 
The identity of the patient, reporter, and 




The program is independent of any 






Reports are evaluated by experts who 
understand the clinical circumstances and 




Reports are analyzed promptly, and 
recommendations are rapidly disseminated 
to those who need to know, especially 





Recommendations focus on changes in 
systems, processes, or products rather than 
on individual performance. 
6 
7 Responsive 
The agency that receives reports is capable 
of disseminating recommendations, and 
participating organizations agree to 




* The basic table (Characteristics and Explanation)  was  adopted from Leape, 2002 





As a matter of fact, the table above can be used as a tool for evaluating existing 
reporting systems on adverse events in medicine. The picture that emerges 
regarding Maccabi's reporting system is rather positive, among other reasons, 
since it is based on the Aviation reporting model. Characteristics 2 and 3 are 
linked to Maccabi's organizational structure and to its obligation to report to its 
insurance company, and therefore cannot be modified. 
 
Nevertheless, in our opinion there are two characteristics that still require 
improvement: 
 
 Timely – the time span between the event occurrence and the reporting 
should be reduced, as well as the time between reporting and  finalizing the 
investigations and the time between finishing the investigation and releasing 
recommendations. In most cases, the whole process, from the time of 
occurrence to the time of releasing recommendations lasts no longer than six 
months. 
 
 Responsive – the working interfaces with the patients in charge for 
implementing the recommendations should be improved.  We suggest 
considering the process of making the managers understand their 
responsibility for implementing the recommendations as a long term   
assimilation process and a cultural change.  
 
In general, it can be said that the reporting system at Maccabi is a very good 





Organizational decisions to provide administrative immunity  
The risk management department began to work as an organizational unit in 
Macabbi in the beginning of 1997. Still, the organizational decisions as of 
mandatory reporting at Macabbi and providing administrative immunity to the 
physicians, reporting their own errors, were accepted only in August 2000, when 
the board of Maccabi approved the “Adverse event reporting protocol”. 
 
The protocol defined the term “adverse event” as an “Unexpected occurrence 
during medical intervention that caused, or may have caused, physical or mental 
damage to the patient”. 





1. Establishing a uniform system for reporting adverse events in order to 
identify areas of malfunction and prevent risks with commitment to patient 
safety. 
 
2. Defining a reporting process for adverse events to the risk-management 
department, that is in charge of investigating the events and reaching 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
3. Establishing adverse event reporting procedure to the Ministry of Health. 
 
The protocol states that clinicians, as defined in the Patient Rights Law (1996), 
must report every adverse event to the risk management department. 
 
In order to eliminate the clinicians‟  reluctance to  reporting  of adverse events, 
because it  might expose them to claims, the medical director of Maccabi then, 
Prof. Alexander Aviram, sent a written assurance to all  Maccabi‟s physicians  
stating that “No disciplinary actions will be taken against a clinician reporting an 
adverse  event”. 
 
This was an extraordinary and a pioneering  step in the Israeli health care 
system, and was intended to assure that the risk management activity at Maccabi 
will have a decent chance to succeed. Without this commitment, it is reasonable 
to think that it would have taken much longer to achieve the reporting rate seen 
today, if at all. This statement was termed “administrative immunity” and was 
implemented by the assigning the risk management activity as an operational 
subdivision of the “Committee of Control and Quality”, according to its functional 
definition in the Patient Rights Law (1996). 
 
The commitment of the head of the medical division raised several questions: 
 Should it be applied to all types of events? If not what should be the 
exceptions and under what conditions? Will the legal structure adopted by 
Maccabi withstands the court test? 
 
 To what extent will the doctors trust this commitment? And will it 






Why should a physician report? The direct and indirect benefits. 
 
Coles et al. (2001), conducted a study in the UK regarding clinicians‟ attitudes 
toward reporting adverse events. They have interviewed clinicians as well as risk 
management experts. A citation from one of those interviews shows the 
complexity of the problem: 
“I think you have to address the fears and say why people don‟t do these things. I 
am sure some people don‟t do it for fear that they might lose their jobs, or being 
pilloried in the press. There could be a chief executive who says anyone in my 
Trust who instead of employee of the month is risk taker of the month and his or 
her names will be put around the Trust. They wouldn‟t lose their jobs, but they 
would lose the respect of their colleagues. I think you have to address those 
issues and give someone security – say we all make errors, no one is perfect.” 
 
The code of ethics of 2000 (E8, 12) of the American Medical Association, states 
that: 
 “…. Situations occasionally occur in which patient suffer significant medical 
complications, that may have resulted from physicians error or judgment. In 
these situations, the physician is ethically required to inform the patient of all the 
facts necessary to ensure understanding of what has occurred” 
 
Understanding, what might motivate and what might prevent a physician from 
reporting an error is a major issue in each risk management activity. A risk 
management system cannot exist without physicians reporting their errors, since 
it is the basis for every reactive and  proactive activity of risk management, both 
in the short and long term. 
 
The motivation to report adverse events can be intrinsic or extrinsic. In most 
cases, where a risk management operation exists, issues regarding nursing were 
taken care of first (Mills and Bolshwing, 1995), while physician's adverse events 
were taken care of at later stages, if at all. The question why, traditionally, risk 
managers agenda was determined by nursing events and not physician events, 
is another question, which should be addressed in order to understand doctor's 








Physician's main role is perceived as decision-making (Badihi, 1993, among 
many others). The doctor-patient encounter, conducted in the form of SOAP 
(Subjective, Objective, and Assessment Plan) is a classical example of decision-
making process. The doctor listens to the patient's complaints (subjective), 
checks the patient and his medical record (objective), analyses the data and 
makes an assessment, according to which he makes decisions regarding the 
care plan. Since it is a decision-making process, the alternatives are numerous 
and in most cases there isn‟t a clear cut solution. 
 
The determination of adequateness of the decision, is in terms of reasonable or  
unreasonable. Thus, in most cases in which an error has been made, the 
physician has not always been aware of it, except in cases in which the decision 
had actual harming consequences to patient's health. Even in this case, a 
causative relationship between the available information the physician had at the 
time of making the decision, the decision made and the negative consequences 
is very difficult, if not  impossible, to establish. 
 
The meaning is that in a large portion of the cases, in which there was an error 
made by a physician, he was not aware of it, whether because the error didn't 
result in significant or obvious harm, or because of the difficulty in  establishing 
an association between the physician's decisions and the patients deteriorating 
health. 
 
Unlike physicians, the nurses' duty is to carry out doctors' orders, or the “plan”, 
and provide the doctors with feedback regarding the treatment results and the 
patient's condition. Therefore, in the nurses work, there is a reference point to 
which it is possible to compare the nurse's actions. For example, if the doctors 
order was to inject the patient with a certain drug, in a certain dosage, it can be 
relatively easy to find out whether  the nurse had performed the order accurately 
and according to certain standards or not. 
 
From our observations, we can conclude that doctor's errors, are in the majority 
of instances, the result of faulty doctor-patient communication and decision-
making, while nurse's errors are performance errors. In addition, nurse's errors 
are more easily pinpointed than physician's errors, since the nurses have to 
document their work in the patients chart. This documentation, makes it difficult 
to disguise errors and to move on with the routine. These maybe some of the 





We believe that all doctors, wish not to err and that if they have already made an 
error, they should be used to learn from and prevent their reoccurrence. 
 
Still, a very high portion of doctors refrains from reporting adverse events. As we 
have already noted, estimates regarding reporting rates prior to claims, range 
from 5-30% in the US and 0-2% in the UK (Lindgren and Seckler-Walker, 1995). 
The data refers to reporting events, that ended up with legal claims. Thus, the 
reporting rates of events that have not ended up with claims are even lower, 
probably significantly lower. 
 
It is important to note, that events that ended up with harm to patients do not fit 
into the intrinsic motivation to report, since the physician has a good reason to 
believe that his error, would lead to a complaint, and therefore it is better in his 
perception to report it beforehand. 
 
We can summarize and say that doctors‟ reporting rates of their errors in cases 
of “near misses” and no harm to patient, are very low and amount to few 
percentages only. 
 
Studies  of physicians reporting of clinical errors, present many barriers to 
reporting, including fear, shame, lack of trust in the system, lack of time, 
arrogance and individualism (Anderson et al., 2001; Coles et al., 2001 and 
others). 
 
It seems that doctors have a strong dilemma, regarding the reporting of adverse 
events. On one hand, they acknowledge the value of reporting as a basis for 
improving the quality of medical care, but on the other hand, they refrain from 
reporting due to the following reasons: 
 
 Fear of damage to their medical reputation – the medical community is a 
relatively small and intimate community in which intense professional 
relationships take place. The doctor‟s reputation is a significant asset for him, 
both with regard to his patients and with regard to his colleagues. Doctors 
fear, that reporting events might damage their reputation. Since the 
organizational culture of most health organizations don‟t stress  the distinction 
between blaming and learning from errors, the reporting physician might be 
pictured as a Don Quixote, fighting the windmills of the medical institution, 





 Fear of claims – the issue of legal immunity for doctors reporting their errors, 
which we discussed in the beginning of this chapter, still remains unsolved 
and doctors do not feel fully secure that they will not be sued after they report 
an adverse event. There are some creative solutions to this problem, such as 
reporting to an   insurer, whose relationships with the doctor can be 
considered as  lawyer-client relationships, or activity as the operating  
subdivision of the Quality and Control Committee, which is the solution 
adopted by Maccabi, and more. These are intermediate and not full solutions 
of the problem. 
 
 Fear of being “the village fool” – since physicians are expected to perform 
with no errors, and the senior physicians tolerance of younger doctors is low, 
physicians make every effort to acquire all the knowledge that might prevent 
them from erring. Doctors image of a good doctor is still that of one that does 
not make errors and not of one that learns from errors. This might be the 
reason why the title of the first report of the Institute of Medicine is “To Err is 
Human” (1999). The authors claim that there is a need to break the cultural 
and perceptive paradigm according to which doctors do not err and those who 
do err could not be “good doctors”. Breaking this paradigm is a necessary 
condition for creating the adequate foundation for improving the quality of 
care and patient safety. In current healthcare systems, a doctor reporting his 
errors by his own will,, with no legal action standing against him, might see 
himself as the "village fool". 
 
Currently, when the concept of medical error is not clear enough, due to the roles 
of the doctor as the decision maker, to the professional culture that does not 
allow for making errors and to the high personal and professional prices a doctor 
might pay for reporting his errors, it is clear that without significant changes in the 
organizational and professional culture, reporting of errors can‟t be expected to 
increase. 
 
It was clear to the department managers, from the beginning, that without due 
reference to this central issue, it will not be possible to create and establish a 





Statistics – How did the reporting statistics develop ? 
 
On June 1997, in an interim report of the risk management department at 
Maccabi: “Department activity – underlying principles”, the desirable situation 
regarding reporting, was defined as follows: 
“Increasing the amount of self reporting by doctors. It is impossible to define the 
desirable or optimal amount at this stage”. 
 
This objective was defined as the first among other objectives, that will be 
described in more detail later. The emphasis in defining the objective was on 
“self reporting”, meaning reporting initiated by doctors themselves, with the 
intrinsic motive to prevent reoccurrence of errors. This in contrast to the 
reporting, due to fear of legal claims, actual claim or complaint by a patient. The 
value of self-reporting to the risk management is great, for two aspects: 
 
 It points to a potential risk, before it was fully actualized and as such, it 
has much value for a proactive risk management activity. 
 
 It points to the depth of cultural change taking place in the organization, 
regarding identification with and commitment to risk management 
objectives. The self-reporting portions of the total reporting rates can be 
used as a measure of the assimilation of risk management culture in the 
organization. 
 
In the interim report, a comparison between reporting rates at two time periods 
was presented: 
 
 Time period A – 1.9.95-20.11.96, in which there was only a basic activity 
of risk management, based on the half time position of a nurse, whose 
main role was to transmit reports to the insurer. 
 
 Time period B – 21.11.96-12.6.97, in which the department was 
established, with a physician in a full position as the director of the unit. 
 
The analysis of the data shows that in the second time period, the rate of 




The increase in the total reporting rate and especially in the self-reporting rate 
was attributed to the following factors: 
 
 The strategic decision to establish the department and assign a physician 
as its director. 
 
 Presenting the issue of reporting and its significance to all administrative 
doctors, by the department director. 
 
 Field work in branches, institutes and administrative units aimed to raise 
the awareness to the activities of the risk management department and 
the importance of adverse events reporting. 
 
  Promoting the subject in the doctors‟ quarterly newsletter.  
 
Analyzing the data on adverse events, reported during 1995-2003, in the 
following figure, leads to identification of three typical periods: 
 
 1995-1997 – characterized by a steep increase in reporting rates. 
 1997-2001 – characterized by relative stability. 
 2001-2003 – characterized by an increase in reporting rates of adverse 
events and starting handling “near misses”. 
 
It seems, that the reporting of adverse events, which includes mainly events that 
were followed by complaints, claims or in which there was a reasonable chance 
of a claim, was reaching close to saturation by 1997. The doctors understood 
that the department‟s activity in this area might be beneficial to them and that it 
would be better for them to report than deny the complaint, claim or a potential 
for a claim. 
 
“Near misses” were reported to the department prior to 2000, but only toward the 
end of 2001, the department began recording them into the computerized risk 
management system. 
 
Two major hypotheses can be formulated, regarding the causes for the second 





1. It may be, that due to the activity of the risk-management department in 
previous years, the self-reporting rate increased, and that this was the 
reason for the observed increase in the total reporting rate starting 2001. 
 
2. Another possibility, that can‟t be tested, is that the handling of the near 
misses, led to the second wave increase in reporting adverse events. 
 
It is also possible that a combination of the above two factors operated conjointly. 
 
We will try to test these hypotheses based on data accumulated in the risk 






In the following figure, data regarding "near misses" and adverse events is 
presented according to the medical specialty categories. Categories, in which the 












* Due to lack of data regarding the number of medical encounters in each specialty (exposure 
index), it was impossible to calculate reporting rates per specialty 
 
In order to analyze the reporting rates, by reporting sources, four categories of 
reporting sources were comprised: 
 
 External sources – the report was received from sources outside Macabbi, 
such as the media, Ombudsmen or Ministry of Health. This category refers to 
cases in which the initial report, arriving at the department, was from a 
newspaper article or from the Ministry of Health or from any other external 
source. This scenario happens, when from unclear reasons, the event was 
reported to the Ministry of Health and then to Macabbi, instead of being 
reported directly to Macabbi or when a patient choose to tell his story to a 
reporter or to submit a complaint to the Ombudsmen. It should be mentioned, 
that it isn‟t rare for the medical staff to be unaware of an error, in the 
ambulatory setting, due to the fact that the treatment is inherently fragmented 
and many instances may be involved in such a process. 
 Administrative source – when the event was reported by an 
administrative physician or manager in the center or in the districts and 
was not reported directly by the physician to the RMD. Most events in this 





 Self initiated reporting– in case the event was reported  directly by  a 
physician or another health care professional, based on their awareness 
that an error has occurred, that should be reported to the RMD. Cases in 
which a complaint was received, but it was preceded by a medical staff 
member report, are considered as being self initiated reports.   
 Miscellaneous - all those reports, that could not be related to any of the 
above categories. 
 
In the following figure, adverse events and near misses are presented: according 




By analyzing the data, it can be observed that almost 60% of the adverse events 
were reported by administrative sources and only 30% by clinicians self initiated 
reporting.  When considering near misses, the ratio is the exact opposite, 
meaning that most of the reports were self initiated by the medical staff. 
 
In order to analyze the development of self initiated reporting trends, compared 
to administrative reporting, we examined the data according to the annual 











It can be observed, that the increase in reporting between 1995 and 1997 
resulted from an increase in the reports from administrative sources. From 1997 






In 2002, a transformation occurred: the relative portion of self initiated reporting 
was, for the first time, higher than the reporting from administrative sources. This 
stable trend of increase in the portion of self initiated reporting from 1997 can be 
considered as a success of    the activities of the risk management department at 
Macabbi. While the relative portion of the administrative reporting, which is the 
result of claims, complaints, or potential for legal action decreased from 70% to 
40% over the years, the relative portion of self-reporting increased from 20% to 
50%.*  
 
Despite the limited scope of  the data, it can be stated that with regard to adverse 
events reporting, as for "near misses" reporting, there was a change in the 
relative portions of reporting sources: the portion of self initiated reporting 
increased, while the portion of administrative reporting decreased over the years. 
 
It seems that the change in relative proportions of self and administrative 
reporting supports the hypothesis that it was the activity of the risk management 
department that brought the second increase in reporting from 2001 on. The 
meaning is that the combination of two trends: The second wave of increase in 
reporting from 2001on, after four years of asymptote consistent change in 
proportion of reporting sources, since 1997, the timing of establishment of the 
risk management department, from dominance of administrative reporting to 
dominance of self initiated reporting, was the significant factor in the increase in 











*In the years 2004-2009, this trend was stable and the portion of self –initiated reporting reached 




What is reported and  various origins and routes of reporting 
 
The risk management department at Macabbi considers the adverse event 
reports as a major input for the reactive and proactive risk management 
activities. The information reaching the department can be classified according to 
three dimensions: type of event, reporting channel and the reporting source: 
 
  Type of event – even though the department focuses on adverse events, 
as we have  already outlined,  which serve as the major input for the 
department's  activities in recent years, there are two more types of events 
the department handles: 
 Malpractice claims – reports of cases in which a patient or his 
attorney, submitted to the court of law a malpractice claim, following 
medical treatment received at Macabbi. Reporting of legal claims, 
might reach the department in several ways:  from the legal 
department, by an administrative physician,   by the insurer or by the 
involved physician. In most cases, despite the value of legal claims for 
preventing error reoccurrence, it is difficult to benefit from those 
reports, since in most cases they reach the risk management 
department a long time after the event took place. Thus the handling of 
a legal claim is aimed less at lesson learning and more at supporting 
the involved personnel and analyzing the event together with them, so 
they could learn personal lessons.  
 Complaints – the direct managers handle the complaint from a local 
point of view and the Ombudsman is trying to generalize from them, 
meaning for the entire organization.  In the year 2000, 3,115 
complaints were submitted, about 23 per 10,000 patients. It is 
important to emphasize, that since there were submissions of different 
types, such as gratitude letters and refund requests, the number of 
submissions regarding the  quality of medical care, was much lower. In 
the sixth report of the ombudsman (for 2001), it is noted that of all 
submissions, 514 dealt with the medical service, and only 102 of them, 
dealt with the quality of care aspects.  About one-third of complaints 
seemed justified. According to this data, only about 35 complaints a 
year are in the direct interest of the RMD. The department‟s reference 
to this source of reporting have been undergoing changes over the 
years, from no response at all due to the small number of relevant 
reports, through assistance in answering complaints following the 
request of administrative district physicians, to a periodic survey, 




relevant events. In the 4/2001 quarter, the department conducted a 
study of the subject, in which the complaints received at the 
department were analyzed. The results of this analysis were the 
following: “Out of the total number of 35 complaints studied, 8 (23%) 
were considered as adverse events and 6 (17%) had the 
characteristics of near misses. It means that the risk management 
department might be interested in about 40% of the total number of 
complaints. Two of the cases were reported as adverse events, in 
addition to being processed as complaints".  
In recent years*, the department has been receiving about 170 reports per 
quarter (about 80 adverse events and 90 near misses), complaints add about 
10% to events reported by other channels. Since the department‟s resources 
do not allow investigation of all events reported, it becomes clear that this 
channel should also be tested continuously in terms of costs and benefit, 
especially that in certain cases there is duality of reports: the same event was 
reported as an adverse event and was then received as a complaint. 
By analyzing the complaints data (see the following table) an interesting 
phenomenon can be observed, which may be associated with the activity of 
the risk management department. Despite the increase in complaints rate 
during 1999-2001, from 16.5 in 1999 to 21.3 complaints per 10,000 members 
in 2001 (a 29% increase), there was a 21% decline in the rate of complaints 
due to quality of medical care. Even though, this achievement should be 
attributed to all of Macabbi‟s medical staff and managers, it can be assumed 
that the activity of the risk management department was an important 
contributing factor. 
9002 9000 2222 year 
3222 2787 2247 Number of complaints. 
3..2 ...2 ...1 Rate per 10,000 members 
765 792 796 Number of complaints due to 
quality of care problem. 
... ..2 ..1 Rate per 10,000 members 
 
___________________ 
*This chapter was originally written at 2003. Since then the reporting rate has increased 
significantly. At the beginning of the year 2009, the estimated number of reports reaches the level 





 The reporting channel – reports might be received via different channels, 
though the most common is the “hot line” channel, which serves as a major 
link for information interchange regarding adverse events. 
 The “hot line” – is a dedicated telephone line, by which every Macabbi's 
clinician can call a risk manager directly and report an event in which he or 
she was involved in. The department‟s risk managers divide between 
themselves the shifts for answering phone calls via the hotline. A typical 
report via the hotline includes the following components: 
 Reception of the report, in the phrasing of the involved clinician, and 
clarification of significant details. 
 Giving support to the reporter, who might feel uneasy or be in a state 
of stress as the result of being involved in an adverse event. Giving 
practical advice to the reporter on how to continue handling the case: 
with the patient, insurer, legal representatives if needed, etc. 
 Giving initial feedback, professional and non-judgmental, if the 
type of event and available information, allows it. 
If the line is busy, or the call was made after the working hours, a message 
can be left and one of the risk managers returns to the reporter as soon as 
possible. 
The hotline serves for a two-sided communication, which means that the risk 
manager in charge of the case can use the line to get more information or to 
give feedback and the reporter can call the risk manager in order to discuss 
various issues regarding the event he was involved in. 
 Mail/Fax – a clinician can report an adverse event by mail/fax, using a 
special form and fill in the necessary information needed for handling 
the event by the department.    
 E-mail – following the distribution of case analysis with clear lessons 
learned, to all the physicians at Macabbi, the use of e-mail become 
more frequent. This channel has the advantages of simplicity, 





 Reporting agent – there is a clear relationship between the type of 
event and reporting agent. Thus, for example, reports received by the 
ombudsman, are reported mostly by administrative physicians, nursing 
events by a district nurse or senior nurse, malpractice claims by the 
insurer etc.  
To summarize, it can be said that in the last two years, the department‟s main 
reporting agents are the physicians themselves, via the “hotline”. The other 





How to classify reports and what is the importance of the classification?  
 
The classification system of reported events has several goals, which it should 
address: 
 
 Creating a distinction between events for the purpose of differential 
handling. The risk management department receives about 170 reports per 
quarter, from which 80 are defined as adverse events and 90 as near 
misses. The department‟s limited resources do not allow for the identical 
treatment of all cases, so they have to be classified according to 
preferences for investigation and depth of investigation. 
 Allowing for the retrieval of information according to report category, 
representing the severity of events for statistical and research purposes. 
 Creating a uniform and clear organizational language, allowing for the inter-
unit communication in the organization, both in the headquarters and in the 
field, with relation to the different classes of reports. 
It is important to note that in our experience at Macabbi, we found that there is an 
actual need, not just a theoretical one, for classification of events in order to 
solve practical problems as we have presented above. 
 
It is commonly accepted to classify accidents according to the severity of 
outcomes. Accepting this approach raises the question: what does the severity 
refer to - the results or the causes? In some cases the error is marginal, but the 






From an organizational point of view, it is important that events with grave results 
receive the maximal treatment, while non-damaging events receive minimal care.  
On the other hand, from a risk-management point of view, especially in the 
proactive approach, it is important to give most attention to events with the 
highest potential for damage, even if it was not actualized. 
 
Until the middle of 2002, the risk-management department acted according to 
two classification categories: adverse event, an event that was being 
investigated, and near miss– an event that was handled mainly administratively. 
In the middle of 2002, the department adopted a unique classification system 
combining the severity of results with potential risk existing in each report. The 
new classification system allows for the department a successful control of 
resources and prioritizing the handling of reports according to a combination of 
risk potential and actual damage. 
 
The new classification system distinguishes between the type of an event (three 
categories, according to the severity of damage) and the definition of type of 
handling of event (3 treatment categories). In this method, each event is actually 
classified twice: once by its results and once by its potential risk. The 
classification categories according to consequences are as follows: 
 
 Type A – An adverse event with potential for damage, which ended with 
minor or no damages at all. These events are termed “near misses”. 
 Type B – An adverse event that resulted in moderate damage to a patient, 
reversible or with estimated damage claims up to $250K. The event is 
classified by the severest of damages: to the patient or to Macabbi. 
 Type C – An adverse event that resulted in severe or irreversible damage 
to a patient, or an estimated malpractice claim of over $250K. Death of a 
patient is included automatically in this category. The event is classified 
according to the more severe of damages: to the patient or to Macabbi. 
The classification categories by type of treatment are as follows: 
 Treatment type 1 – Registering the event in the computer system for 
administrative and statistical needs. 
 Treatment type 2 – Investigating the causes of the event in a way, which 
allows for the definition of findings and conclusions and in some cases 
recommendations as well. The resources allocated by a  risk manager will 




 Treatment type 3 –, Detailed analysis of the  causation process and the 
sequence of events proceeding the adverse event, including field 
investigation if needed, reviewing of medical records and protocols, 
investigating the human factor issues , etc. For an event handled at this 
level there has to be at least one recommendation. The resources 
invested for this type of investigation would not exceed the average of 25 
working hours. 
In the following table, classification data is presented for the events reported 
during 11 months since the new classification system was integrated. The data 
shows that many events, type A, were classified at treatment level 2, while not all 
events type C were investigated in depth, level 3. 
We calculated the correlation (r=0.44, p<0.01) between the type of event and the 
level of handling in 342 events that took place over 6 months (November 2002-
april 2003). The correlation is statistically significant but relatively low and points 
to the fact that event type classification explains only 20% of the variance in the 
handling of it. The conclusion is that the risk management department applies the 
new classification system, which means that in addition to the severity 




Event Type (Level of Harm) Total 
A B C 
1 179 40 17 236 
2 68 120 97 285 
3 3 3 1 7 




Efforts to enhance reporting 
 
We believe that the value of reporting adverse events and the professional 
handling of them, is well acknowledged and widely accepted in Macabbi and in 
most healthcare organizations worldwide. Despite the small number of studies 
showing the linkage between reporting systems and positive outcomes for patient 





From our experience in Aviation, we have learned that there is a significant 
negative correlation between reporting of near misses and actual accident rates. 
In other words, the higher the reporting rate, the lower the accident rate. This 
finding was also established at the level of secondary units. It can be explained 
by the accountability process, which means, that a system reporting adverse 
events takes the responsibility and the needed steps for preventing their 
reoccurrence. 
 
It is also clear that the current reporting rate at Macabbi is lower than the actual 
number of errors. 
 
Treating the adverse event reporting as fuel for improving the quality of medical 
care and patient safety, is an acceptable process, thus the willingness to 
increase the report rates. In this regard, it is important to mention two 
reservations: 
 
 Leape (2002), in an article regarding reporting adverse events at  the 
national level , notes that despite the advantages of developing  the  
system, it can also confront  a serious   problem of lack of resources for 
handling the increasing number of reports. According to some estimates, 
the number of severe adverse events in the US reaches about a million a 
year, and if adding the near misses the number may reach up to 5 million 
a year. If only 10% of the events were reported and handled, it would be 
15 times more than the number of events handled by the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) in the US. According to ASRS‟ estimates the 
average cost of handling an event is $70, so if to assume a similar cost 
and a reporting rate of 10%, the costs of a national healthcare reporting 
system in the US could reach 35 million dollars a year. This is in addition 
to the need to recruit and train a very large number of experts in the field. 
According to Leape, a more practical approach is to encourage local 
reporting systems focusing on specific areas such as labor and delivery, 
neonatal units and adult intensive care units. In the terms of Macabbi, 
assuming that the current reporting rate stands at 10% of all reportable 
events, the meaning of increasing reporting rates up to 50% of the 
potential and keeping the same proportion of handling events means a 
fivefold increase in the number of positions in the risk management 




 Some say, especially among that objecting risk management, that the 
majority of factors leading to medical errors are well known, therefore 
there is no need for reporting, as means of identifying safety problems. 
In addition, some of the problems are general and shared by many 
healthcare organizations, such as: the issues of continuity of care, 
physician-patient communication gaps, wrong side surgery (errors of 
laterality), quality of medical records and more. Professionals 
supporting this opinion, suggest that, instead of investing resources in 
increasing reporting and handling reports, the focus should be on 
solving the known problems and implementing the solutions widely. 
These voices were heard when we started working with Maccabi in 
1997, and are still heard these days as well. 
In our opinion these  reservations do not take into account the added values of 
the adverse event reporting, as presented in chapter 6.8 (Producing value from 
adverse events reporting) , which  go beyond the concrete aspects of reporting. 
We believe that the value of these advantages is no less, maybe even higher, 
than the direct benefits of reporting. 
 
Assuming that the increase in reporting adverse events at Macabbi will continue 
in a linear scale, the expected increase in the next five years is an average of 9% 
annually, which leads to a total of 45% increase. It seems, that if we adopt this 
estimation, the benefits of increased reporting exceed the costs and the need for 
additional resources significantly. 
 
The second reservation does not take into account two important factors: 
 
 The value of accountability as a critical factor in risk management. It can 
be assumed, that a reporting organization takes responsibility for the 
event and is more ready to implement the necessary means to prevent its 
reoccurrence.  In our opinion this motivational and cultural factor is at least 
as significant as being aware of the problem. It can be said, that being 
aware of the problem doesn't necessarily result in actions directed towards 
prevention, and the high rates of medical errors, can be considered as 
supporting this argument. 
 The variance between different healthcare systems, in administrative, 
clinical processes and work interfaces is noticeable. Thus, a general 
definition of the problems, is insufficient for taking operative steps for their 




Macabbi‟s reporting system is a sound one, as we have previously shown, 
with regard to Leape (2002) and others criteria. It is plausible that the 
department‟s activity will continue showing increase in reporting rates. With 
regard to the resources needed, it seems to us that there is no need for taking 
further steps to increase reporting rates, except for focused accumulation of 
events in critical topics in order to enable the department to base its activity in 
these critical areas on a better based data. 
The value of reporting, beyond supplying the risk management department 
with information for reactive and proactive risk management, is becoming 
more and more evident in partnerships established between the department 
and other organs of Maccabi, aimed to achieve better quality of care and 






















“The human mind is prone to suppose the existance of more order and 
regularity in the world than it finds” 
 







Producing value from adverse events. 
 
 
What accounts for value?  
 
Almost all papers published lately, dealing with the issues of risk management 
and patient safety in healthcare, stress the importance of reporting, as a core 
principle in a system aiming at  lowering the errors rate and improving the quality 
of care. We will refer to only few of these papers by Berwick, Leape, Vincent and 
Reason.  
 
It is a common axiom in safety systems that ascribe a primary value to reporting. 
Thus, the report of IOM – Institute of Medicine, published in 1999, “To Err is 
Human”, recommends establishing reporting systems and procedures in health 
organizations as a crucial step in  reducing the amount of errors made by 
physicians. 
 
It is important for us to deal with the value of reporting,  from various aspects, in 
order to understand what motivates and what prevents the reporting of adverse 
events in health organizations, and in order to be able to suggest means for 
increasing the reporting, taking into account the value of reporting to caregivers, 
health organizations and society in general. 
 
The term „value‟ has many definitions – statistical, ethical and financial. From our 
point of view, we will relate to “value” as a desirable outcome for a certain 
system. This definition allows a spectrum of values, whether they are defined or 






It can be claimed that a medical organization ascribes value to the prospect of 
saving money as result of attention given to adverse events and also to 
secondary gains, such changing the organizational culture towards “Blame Free” 
culture and the hope that patients will appreciate the organization‟s efforts to 
prevent reoccurrence of errors. 
 
The handling of adverse events, requires the existence of a professional 
infrastructure and involves measurable investment of resources. The question of 
value is actually the question of what advantages the organization gets as a 
result of handling adverse events. We have referred to that question in chapter 
6.7 which deals with reporting. 
 
From our experience in risk management, it is possible to classify the values 
created by handling adverse events in healthcare organizations, into three 
phases: the reporting phase, the handling phase and the implementation of 
recommendations phase. 
 
Barach and Small (2000), referring to barriers and stimulators to reporting of 
adverse events, analyze those factors from three points of view - individual, 
organizational and social, relating to three aspects: cultural, legal and financial. In 
our analysis of the values created in the process of handling adverse events, as 
























 Compliance with 
the standards of 
medical ethics 




 Feeling of 
contribution to the 
quality of care 
 Participation in 







 Developing a 
sense of trust 
in the system 
 Deceasing personal 
involvement in adverse 
events. 
 Developing the sense 
of control over medical 
errors. 
 Developing the 
perception of 




























Material  Lowering the payments for claims 
 Decreasing errors volume and the attached costs 
 Lowering the costs of insurance 
 Increasing the number of patients 
 Improvement of clinical and administrative processes 




 Maintaining  a public 




 A cultural  statement 












them to other 
domains. 

















 Maintaining a public image of a quality 
healthcare system 





The value of reporting -  the core data for prevention efforts.  
 
We have already mentioned that an immediate report of adverse events, 
shortens the time needed to handle claims and reduces the payment for claims 
(Lindgren et al. 1995). These findings are based on the implementation of 
reporting system in 30 healthcare institutions during a period of 14 years. 
 
However, the work above, relates mainly to the advantages of reporting from the 
legislative aspect and not from the proactive risk management aspect. It may be 
speculated, that the issue of value of reporting is considered obvious, thus 
leaving this issue unexplored. 
 
Leape (2002), among others, mentions that the only reporting system which 
efficiency was studied empirically is the one of “National Nosocomial Infection 




implemented the reporting program were 32% lower than in hospitals that did not 
implement the program. 
 
The meanings of reporting and its advantages are also embedded in the 
reporting process itself and especially in the processed product returned to the 
physicians in various forms:  starting with a personal feedback to the reporter, 
through recommendations and to an applicative research of a phenomenon 
stemming from the reported events.   
 
According to Leape (2002), a more profound understanding of medical errors is 
required in order to develop suitable preventive means and thus the need in an 
improved reporting system of accidents, errors and near misses. In other words, 
a reporting system functions as the basic tier of all risk management activities. 
 
Since there are almost no empiric studies, dealing with the contribution of a 
reporting system to organizations that implement them, the discussion will be 
based on our experience from the Aviation domain  joint with Maccabi‟s 
experience. 
 
One can determine three types of advantages stemming from reporting: 
advantages to the reporter, advantages to the organization and advantages to 
patients. Despite the classification, it is obvious that the advantages have inter-
relations, thus for example, the advantages to the organization are often 
advantages to the patient and advantages to the reporter are also beneficial to 
the patient:  
 
 Advantages to the caregiver: 
 
o Breaking the caregiver’s solitude circle – As we have already 
mentioned, errors made by doctors are not rare occurrences. A 
physician that made an error, experiences guilt feelings, shame, 
anxiety, lack of certainty and often does not know how he should 
behave. In the absence of a reporting system he may experience 
feelings of solitude while coping with this stressful situation. . A 
reporting system might function as a supporting service able to relief his 
distress. 
 
o Competence in case of committing an error -   A reporting system 
gives the caregivers the feeling there is something that can be done 





o Legitimization – Giving legitimacy to a physician to resume 
functioning, after being involved in an adverse event and creating the 
awareness that to err is human. 
 
o Creating trust relationship between the caregiver and the system – 
Regardless the conflict related to reporting, we believe that every 
caregiver prefers to be part of a system that does not sweep errors 
under the rug, but handles them in order to prevent reoccurrence. 
 
o Professional Feedback – In some cases, the physician‟s error is 
caused by lack of knowledge, unfamiliarity with procedures and by an 
erroneous decision making. In these cases there is ground for a 
professional dialogue in order to examine the various alternatives he 
confronted, evaluate each one of them and evaluate the right 
alternative.   
 
o An Operative solution for the distressed caregiver- Serving as an 
supporting agent  for caregivers in distress following their involvement 
in an adverse event, and providing practical advices regarding how the 
patient and  his family should be treated according to procedures. 
 
 
 Advantages for  the organization 
 
o Organizational Learning – Is a very popular term among modern 
organizations, aiming to create cultural and technological conditions in 
which the knowledge of the individual in an organization becomes an 
asset, shared by all organization members. A medical organization that 
implements efficient reporting system, actually implements 
organizational learning. 
  
o Creating an inter-organizational dialogue –A reporting system can 
function as an organizational adhesive between the various sections of 
an organization, starting with the individual physician, through the 
medical clinic‟s managers, district manager, professional referents the 
headquarters and more. We have witnessed cases that have 
demonstrated how organizational dynamics aiming to improve a critical 
process originated from a single adverse event. It is even more 
prominent in applicative studies, based on the reports, in which 





o Improving the public image and strengthening the trust between 
patients and the organization – An organization that deals with 
adverse events, is considered as more reliable by the patients. This 
reliability and positive image have great value in the competitive 
market. 
 
o Lowering the extent of claims and the claim payments – It is 
plausible to assume that a systematic treatment of risk factors 
decreases the probability of errors, even though studies supporting this 
assumption are rare. 
.  
o Seismograph – Reporting of events can function as an organizational 
seismograph, for identifying administrative and clinical shortcomings. In 
addition, it is   possible to use the reporting system to evaluate the 
relative success of preventive activities.  
 
o Accreditation – Complying partly with the accreditation terms for 
healthcare institutions such as JCHAO. 
 
 
 Advantages to the patients  
 
o Improving patient safety – There is a ground to believe that 
systematic and consistent procedures for deriving lessons learned from 
adverse events and recommendations, targeted to the system, aimed 
to prevent reoccurrence, influence the quality of medical care and 
patient's safety.  
 
o Improving the trust relationship between the patient and the 
health-care system – Anisson & Wilford (1998), claim that most of the 
Americans do not trust their healthcare system and analyze the various 
factors for this distrust. A patient, who will believe that the healthcare 
system takes care of him, will have more trust in it. Trust is associated 
with compliance, a meaningful phenomenon in medicine. Patients often 




Changes in practice, changes in values -  The age of corporization  
 
The western healthcare system, has undergone radical changes in the last 
decades of the 20
th
 century. McKinlay and Marceau (2002), in their publication: 
"The end of the golden age of doctoring", has analyzed   extensively those 
changes.   
 
One of the prominent changes is the bureaucratization or the carbonization of 
medicine. Between 1983-1997, the part of physicians employed as salaried in the 
USA increased from 24% to 43%. Among young physicians (up to 5 years of 
experience), this tendency is even more noticeable – from 37% to 66%. It means, 
that more physicians, are employed today by large frameworks, motivated mainly 
by financial interests, as opposed to the past when the physician‟s loyalty was 
given first of all to the patient. It is obvious then, that health organization, 
ascribes great value to the financial efficiency of medical care, in order to achieve 
sounder business results. 
 
However, the health system in Israel, is in an intermediate state, in which the 
health services are being subsidized by the government and the public health 
systems is not required to be profitable, being basically nonprofit organizations. 
 
Despite this, since the health system in Israel suffers from chronic under 
budgeting, which causes from time to time striking in activities of both hospitals 
and ambulatory health services; it is obvious that financial savings are valuable 
to the system. 
 
Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that, a modern health system, motivated 
by financial interests, ascribes great value to efficiency and the financial aspects. 
The spiritual and cultural values, that we have presented in the above table are 
valued by external factors, especially patients and the public. 
  
There are few health systems   willing to invest resources for the sake of bearing 
fruits in the long term, financial in general and spiritual  and cultural in particular. 
  
The establishment and operating of a reporting system, that handles adverse 
events professionally, requires a substantial investment of resources. Therefore, 
in most cases, health systems, ruled by financial interests, choose not to invest in 
risk management, since they do not see immediate financial benefits. The 






 century, is related mainly to a move; lead by the government and 
legislation, and not by initiations from inside the healthcare system.  
 
In Israel, generally and in Macabbi particularly, in retrospect, it may be said that 
the initiative  to deal with risk management is a result of legislating the “Patient 
Rights Law”  in 1996, and a the verdict  by  the Supreme Court judge,  Judge 
Aaron Barak in 1995, according to which medical documentation, can‟t be 
confidential to the patient. In order to dramatize the sequence of events that led 
to the risk management initiative in Israel, in the mid nineties of 20 century in 
Israel, one can postulate that the process was associated with managing the 
risks arising from the situation following the publishing of the “Patients Rights 
Law”, Judge Barak‟s verdict and increase in the volume of claims due to 
malpractice. All this as opposed to the thesis that the initiative originated from 
intrinsic motivation to improve the quality of care and patient safety.   
 
The issue of the financial value of risk management system, might contribute to 
the health system, can‟t be approved for two fundamental problems: 
measurement and causation attribution. There is still no adequate answers for 
the question how to measure the financial value of a risk management activity. 
Risk management activity has face validity as a resource saving approach by 
improving clinical and administrative procedures and decreasing the extent of 
claims by improving patient safety and quality of care. 
 
Paradoxically, even though, increase in the extent of reporting is an indicator of a 
successful risk management activity, it doesn‟t result in lower insurance 
payments, but on the contrary, since the malpractice insurance companies 
estimate the extent of risks based on the extent of reporting of adverse events. 
We can argue that a risk management activity motivates intra-organizational 
procedures that might contribute to the organization generally, but since this 




What happens to an organization that establishes a RM  operation 
 
Even though, a risk management organ aims to support and assist physicians 
involved in adverse events, it is perceived by the system as critic, as a result of 
its exposure to failures and shortcomings. In addition and as we have already 
mentioned, operating the risk management system requires noticeable 
investment of resources, while it is impossible to prove its financial contribution. 




management activities. Moreover, when a new organizational entity is 
established, it expropriates some of the other bodies functions and 
responsibilities.   Thus for example, the legal department‟s role in risk 
management was minimized, some of the complaints once handled by the 
ombudsman are now handled by the risk management department and the 
manager's role in adverse events debriefing was almost canceled. In this context 
it is vital to mention that the dilemma: who is responsible for risk management in 
an organization, the “direct” managers or an entity that specializes in risk 
management, is an inherent dilemma that expresses itself in various ways, since 
the foundation of the department. For example, there is a recent eagerness in the 
districts, to deal with risk management by investigating adverse events, eliciting 
and implementing recommendations. 
 
Additionally, the relationship with the law department didn‟t stabilize yet since the 
latter perceives the department‟s activity as risky of exposing physicians to 
claims.*  
  
The managers of many of the organizational units in Maccabi have not 
assimilated yet their mission to implement the recommendations of the risk 
management department. From our observations we can retrospect that the 
activity of the risk management department created a stormy atmosphere that did 
not ease even after six years of operation. This stormy atmosphere may be 
related to the following factors: 
 
 The immunity of the reporters and the reports – The 
department‟s activity is not always clear to the decision makers due 
to the immunity given to the reporting physicians. The immunity 
makes it harder to cooperate with the different authorities in 
Maccabi in the study and lessons learning procedures, which are 
necessary conditions in developing a positive attitude towards the 
activity of the department. 
 
 Limiting the managerial authority – Managers might feel that the 
department‟s activity threats their authority, since it might be 
interpreted as if it expropriates from them the professional 




 Super-Authority- Despite the fact the department is relatively 
small and not the most senior in Maccabi‟s organizational structure, 
it has actually super-authority, since it has the mandate to 
recommend on actions to be taken following adverse events 
investigation.  
 
 Controlling body – Every caregiver and every unit manager might 
found himself in a situation in which his activities are reviewed, 
questioned and investigated as part of handling of adverse events. 
It is reasonable to assume that at least some of those interactions 
were not convenient. 
 
 A managerial bypass entity – the department conducts a direct 
dialogue with the caregivers, without the involvement and 
awareness of the managers. Managers might perceive this direct 
dialogue as a threat to their managerial authority. Furthermore this 
dialogue turns around errors and adverse events and occasionally 
focuses on the systemic aspects and not only personal aspects of 
the caregiver. 
 
 Unclear organizational benefits – As we have already mentioned, 
the department can‟t bear out its value to the organization directly 
and in hard terms of financial contribution, since its activity is 
performed through others or directly with the caregivers. 
 
In a contentment report  regarding the department‟s activity , published by 
Maccabi in December 2002, it was found that two thirds of the physicians are 
satisfied with the department‟s activity on the parameters of professionalism in 
handling adverse events (67%), support for physicians (64%), availability (68%) 
and the  response time (61%). 
 
This statistics are encouraging, since they indicate that the main department 






*It seems as these days (2009), a more harmonious relationship is developing between the RMD 




In the situation described above, it is obvious that the department can function 
only with complete backup and commitment of the CEO and the other senior 
managers that share the vision of risk management and examine the contribution 
of the department in the long term. The department‟s activity might be considered 
as a long-term organizational investment, while  in the short and middle terms, 




Can RM insights from one organization be transferred to another  
 
The question, to what level it is possible to generalize lessons learned in one 
system to another in the of risk management context, is a core question in every 
healthcare organization that deals with risk management. Do insights gathered 
from adverse events in one clinic are relevant and applicable to another clinic? Is 
an event of gynecologist, working in an outpatient environment is relevant to a 
gynecologist working    in hospital?  
 
One can claim, there is significant variability, between the medical working 
environments, for example when it comes to the characteristics of the patients‟ 
population, characteristics of the physicians and their employment manner, the 
characteristics of the physical infrastructure etc.  
 
In order to demonstrate this difficulty it is important to mention that Maccabi‟s 
clinics are spread all over Israel and provide health services to a variety of 
population sectors. 
 
On one hand, in order to create a representative database of a certain 
phenomenon, it should include as many events as possible and on the other 
hand, events reported from different work environments limit the generalization of 
preventive actions.  
  
This argument of the applicability of generalization from one medical setup to 




In our opinion, this approach reflects a kind of defense mechanism of healthcare 
systems, trying to restrict the value of adverse events and the implementations of 
its recommendation on a wide organizational scale. It is interesting to mention 
that the aviation approach is absolutely different. The findings of flight accident 
investigations are distributed as lessons learned to a very wide distribution and 
not only to a specific population that may be interested in a specific aspect. In 
this regard Vincent (2003), states: 
“Aviation accidents, for instance, are exhaustively investigated, and lessons 
learned are disseminated widely, with important changes made mandatory by 
regulatory authorities. In contrast, learning within the health care sector, with 
some notable exceptions, has generally been fragmentary and uncertain.” 
 
In our opinion, the issue of degree of generalization from one adverse event to 
another, is not relevant at all in the current state of medicine. The extent of 
knowledge distributed among physicians focused on lesson learned from 
adverse events, except few organizations, is minimal. Therefore, we recommend 
that healthcare systems should enable physicians to have the freedom to decide 
from which events to learn and which to ignore. The systems role should be of 
one that makes the information available. In addition to the educative role of wide 
distribution of lesson learned from adverse events, they serves also as an 
organizational statement that supports the attitude of “To err is Human” and the 
























The need for an information system 
 
On March 1997, at a presentation to Macabbi‟s managing board, intended to 
portray the background of risk management and the work plans, Dr. Miron, the 
department manager, defined the needs for the risk management computer 
system.  
  
The first requirement was computerizing the process of managing adverse 
events reported to the department. At that time, the department had several 
hundreds of files, that were not processed in a standardized method and were 
kept in an archive. The information in those files was not easily available. 
 
The first idea of computerizing risk management stemmed from the need for 
organizing the files, that accumulated in the early days of the department. In an 
internal document of the department, dated June 1997, the need was defined as 
follows: 
“Primary „technical‟ computerization of the files that were opened, by patient 
name, physician name, specialty and reporting” 
 
In the process of analyzing the system, which included studying the materials 
that were accumulated in the files, it became evident that the need for 
computerizing the information in the files is not the sole need. The information in 
the files was unsystematic and there was no common concept for investigating 
the reported events. Thus, before starting the computerization process, there 
was a need to format the investigation process and fill out many gaps in the 
events that were already investigated, so they could be recorded in the 
computerized system. As a matter of fact, the system analysis led to a reopening 








 1997, in   her first activity report to Macabbi‟s General Director, Mr. 
Shabtay Shavit, Dr. Miron stated, in regard   to the computerized system: 
“In explorations, conducted both in Israel and worldwide, there was not found 
existing software for assisting the medical organization to manage the risks in the 
outpatient sector. Software used by hospitals was designed for managing claims 
and costs only. It focuses on retrospective analysis of events and not on their 
prevention and so it does not satisfy our needs”. 
As was aforementioned, Eilat was chosen by Macabbi to serve as its consulting 





, 1997, after completing the assessment stage, it became clear 
to us that the department cannot continue to function effectively without a 
designated risk managing information system. Following the presentation of the 
assessment results, we submitted a proposal for a primary work plan in which the 
first product was “building a computerized system for handling the files”: 
 “In the risk management department there are already 300 files of claims and 
adverse events of various sorts. In addition, averages of about 40 new reports 
were being received every month. Eilat will specify and develop a computerized 
tool for handling and controlling the existing files”. 
 
According to the above, it seems that the need for a computerized information 
system, arose close to the time of the department‟s establishment and that the 
immediate need was associated  with finding a technical solution for being able 
to use the information from the files that accumulated by then. Still, the system 
that was finally developed gave a much wider solution and was based on our 
experience with similar systems in the Aviation in general and in the Israeli Air 
Force more specifically. 
 
It is important to note that in the mid 1990's, the concept of risk management in 
medicine was mainly reactive and its goal was to minimize the damage after it 
had already occurred, especially by minimizing the claims costs. The information 
systems were developed accordingly, and were targeted at the effective handling 
of the claim from the time of reporting to its closure. 
 
A computerized system for risk management, from a proactive point of view and 
without the focus on claims, did not exist, so there was no dilemma whether to 






Issues of confidentiality of information 
 
Health systems in Israel, and Macabbi especially, are highly computerized. It can 
be estimated that over 90% of the clinical activity in the outpatient sector in Israel 
is computerized. An electronical medical record (EMR) is already being used at 
Macabbi since the early 1990's. The original thought was to base Risk 
Management application on the existing computerized infrastructure at Macabbi, 
in which there was a wide information base on three major components of an 
adverse event: the clinicians, the patients and the medical encounters. Since it 
was impossible to apply a convenient security solution on Macabbi‟s main frame 
system, it was decided that a stand-alone system would be developed with the 
concept of client-server that would serve the department‟s personnel only. The 
downloading of the physicians file from the main frame and updating the risk 
management system with an updated list of active physicians would create the 
only interfaces with the main frame. Information regarding medical encounters is 
received in a printed form at the department and the relevant details are fed into 
the risk management system. It can be said that such an array, does not allow 
access of unauthorized personnel into the system. This way the information is 
protected from unauthorized access according to Prof. Alexander Aviram‟s 
commitment to Macabbi‟s physicians. 
 
In retrospect it is important to note that the issue of “ownership” of the risk 
management computer system generated organizational disputes between the 
different divisions, beyond the issue of specifying a solution for the information 
security problem.  The medical division, which is mainly a professional body 
staffed by physicians, is relatively weak compared to the divisions controlling the 
central assets and resources of Macabbi, such as organization and methods to 
which the computer department of Macabbi belongs. These non clinical divisions, 
measure their power by the degree of control over the resources and ability to 
influence professional decision-making. The fact that a stand-alone system for 
risk management was developed in the medical division, without the involvement 
of other divisions, meant that there was some organizational strengthening of the 
medical division and a statement regarding the organizational positioning of the 






Basic modules and functionality 
 
The system was developed with a flexible approach, allowing the handling of a 
variety of events of different classification categories, from the  simple event 
handled basically– A1 , to a severe event requiring the most in-depth 
investigation – C3 (See chapter 6.8). 
 
The system had to fulfill the reactive needs of handling adverse events, in 
addition to creating an information base for the proactive activities. 
 
The system created a common working standard for all the risk-managers, 
reflected in an unified conceptual language, common working protocols and 
minimization of variance in the quality of information coded into the system. 
  
The system can be considered as consisting of seven major tiers: 
 
1. The factual tier - factual details on the time, place, professionals and 
patients involved in the event. 
 
2. The descriptive tier - information gathered during the investigation, 
encounters details, procedures, interviews, etc. 
 
3. The analysis tier - classification of the event, definition of errors, severity 
of errors, definition of causality of findings, key words, conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
4. The personal tier- personal comments of the risk manager regarding the 
event or the investigation. 
 
5. The administrative tier - information serving the managing of the event. 
 
6. The insurance tier – includes information regarding the potential for a 
claim and if there was one, the claims details. 
 




1. The factual tier 
In the factual tier, the following major parameters are included: 
 Dates of opening of the file and last update 
 Site of the occurrence: district, branch 
 Medical specialty : primary, secondary, and tertiary 
 Definitions of the event: source of report and type of event 
 Patient's personal data: name, ID, date of birth and membership 
terms.  
 Physician's personal data: name, ID, year of birth, specialty, role in 
the event, occupational status, etc. 
 
2. The descriptive tier 
The descriptive tier includes, among others, the following fields: 
 Description of the event 
 Description of relevant encounters: date of meeting, type of 
meeting and characteristics of meeting. 
 Description of findings – the sequence of events leading to the 
adverse event. 
 
3. The analysis tier 
The analysis tier relates to all those parameters, the risk manager decides upon, 
based on the factual and descriptive tiers: 
 Classification of the event 
 Definition of errors in the clinical encounters 
 Definition of severity of errors 
 Definition of key words summarizing the event: up to five key words 
out of more than 1300 key words organized in 18 categories. 
 Definition of findings as causative or background findings.  
 Conclusions from the  event investigation  
 Recommendations following the event  investigation  
 
4. The personal tier 
The personal tier in the system is defined as the “private” area of the risk 
manager, in charge of the investigation. This area allows the risk manager to 
document thoughts, ideas, dilemmas and work plans, as well as findings, which 
are not established well enough, to be included in the formal section of the 




5. The administrative tier 
The administrative tier serves for managing the case and includes, among 
others, the following parameters: 
 Name of the risk manager in charge of  the case. 
 Name of the medical consultant that reviewed and approved the 
investigation prior to its closure. 
 Status of the case 
 Target dates for applying the recommendations and status of the 
recommendations. 
 
It is important to note that this is the least developed tier of all the tiers in the 
system, and there is a need to develop it further in order to manage the whole 
administrative process of handling the case from its opening to its closure. 
 
6. The insurance tier 
This tier includes information regarding the malpractice aspects of the event and 
the final outcomes of the claim if there was one. 
 
7. The retrieval tier 
The retrieval tier includes the various possibilities for retrieving the information 
from the system for a variety of purposes, from the routine work to projects of 
applicative research. Retrieving data from the system consists of three major 
alternatives: 
 Predefined reports – reports which are used frequently and 
therefore were predefined: single event report, number of events in 
a period of time, number of events according to case status/ risk 
manager / medical specialty, etc. 
 An event locating system allowing pinpointing of events according 
to each of the parameters in the system. This mechanism can be 
activated also for locating recommendations. 
 Statistical reports based on exporting the data to Excel and 
statistical analyses based on the functionality of Excel. 
 
At the end of 2009, a new information system for the Risk Management 
Department is planned to be deployed, after the current system has served the 
needs of Risk Management Department for almost twelve years. The new 
system will preserve the basic functionality of the old one, enabling additionally to 
operate the system via internet, thus enabling the referents to update the system 




thus improving the ability  to keep reporters immunity and lower damage in case 
of malpractice claim.   
   
 
The flow of data into the Information System 
 
The computerized system for risk management is used as a core system by all 
the department‟s personnel, from the department secretary through the risk 
managers and to the department director. The case management process 
in the risk management system includes four major stages, though between 
them there is much interaction with the system for updating, studying precedent 
cases and report generating. 
 
 Primary input – as soon as a report is received, the details are 
being recorded by the person receiving it: the department secretary 
or risk managers. The first phase includes coding of details 
regarding the factual, descriptive and administrative tiers.  
Information updating – during the managing of the case, according 
to the type of designated treatment, various details are being added 
to the primary input and data is being processed for the analytic 
stage. Updating takes place continuously during the work of the risk 
manager on the case, so at each given time, the system is fully 
updated with all the available information in a particular case. 
 
 Recommendations input – the creation of recommendations for 
an event classified as class 2-3 event is a compound process 
described in chapter 6.10.  The first draft of the recommendations is 
being coded into the system by the risk manager in charge of the 
case, as soon as they are phrased. After the medical consultant 
and department managers have reviewed and analyzed the 
recommendations, they are coded into the system with the status of 
action items. 
 
 Follow-up on the implementation of the recommendations – 
during this stage, which starts at the approval of the 
recommendations until their implementation, follow up and updating 





 Closure of the case – following the completion of the 
implementation of recommendations, the handling of the case is 
terminated. In the status field, the case receives the “closed file” 
status. Information in the file cannot be updated or changed after it 
has been designated “closed”. 
 
 
What is the meaning of data gathered in the system? 
 
The information accumulated in the risk management system has several limits, 
which should be taken into consideration, when it is used for decision making: 
 
 Representation of quantitative scope of a risk – as we have 
already mentioned in the Chapter 6.7   elaborating on the reporting 
system, the rate of reported events out of the total number of 
reportable events, is relatively low and in general, does not exceed 
10%. If a random sample would have been taken, it could be said 
that the reported events reflect a representative sample of the 
adverse events population. Since this is not the case, it is 
impossible to define a general rule able to explain the underlying 
factors controlling the phenomenon of reporting adverse events by 
physicians. In our opinion, the meaning of this is that attempts to 
determine the scope of risks on the basis of the reporting rates are 
not sufficiently valid. This is not to say that it is impossible to relate 
severity of the risks on the basis of the information accumulated in 
the computerized system. 
 
 Risk severity assessment – in this case, the question to be asked 
is whether the computerized database can be used to assess risk 
severity and create a priority list for preventive activity. From our 
experience we have learned, that the computerized system can not 
be used to identify risks and define their severity, but to support 
hypotheses generated as a result of investigating particular cases 
or input from other sources, such as field surveys, meetings with 
colleagues, professional discussions, etc. The meaning of this is 
that using the database in this context is more for the sake of 
supporting hypotheses than for identifying risks and relating 




the information in the database as representing the risk 
phenomenon at Macabbi, due to the partial and irregular reporting. 
 
 Information quality – the quality of information in  the data base is 
not uniform due to four reasons: 
 
o High degree of variance in the quality of investigation over the 
years – the department in its early days was lacking experience in 
investigation, experience that accumulated over the years. In addition, 
the ability to extract the information from the primary report was not 
well developed. Therefore, the quality of information for different 
events which were investigated and coded by the department is not 
uniform, though there is an evident improvement trend over the years. 
o Variance in deciding whether to investigate an event or not – the 
decision making regarding the classification of the events was not 
systematic in the first years of the department‟s existence and was 
influenced by various organizational factors. In addition, even after the 
establishment of decision making protocols in this area, due to the 
increase in reporting rates that was not followed by a due increase in 
personnel, it is possible that the decisions whether to investigate or not 
and to what depth, were influenced by personnel and resource 
limitations. 
o Personnel changes – since the department is relatively small, each 
change in personnel, due to leaving members or hiring new ones, 
affects the investigation quality. As we have already mentioned, a new 
risk manager needs between 8 to 12 months to reach a basic 
professional level of investigation ability. The meaning is that in those 
times of personnel changes, there is a due decrease in investigative 
quality. 
o Variance between risk managers in relating to various fields in the 
system, especially in the analytic tier. In the first years of the 
department‟s activity, the analytic process was not well established, 
which means that every risk manager could decide on the parameters 
of the analytic process almost independently, including: conclusions, 
key words, severity of error and more. As of today, the process is well 
defined and controlled to a higher degree and the decisions regarding 
the analytic parameters, are the result of a dialogue between the risk 
manager and the department‟s consultants and directors, a process 
which allows for some degree of standardization in the information 





The meaning of the above reasons is that the database is largely heterogeneous 
with regard to quality of handling of the events, and thus in every use of this 
information the limitations cited above, should be considered. 
 
  
The spectrum of usage 
 
The computerized system is the main tool in all of the department‟s activities and 
is intended, among others, for the following uses: 
 
 A variety of reports – the system allows for the creating of 
different reports for internal routine usage and for other units 
needs. For example, in processing a case of type 2-3, before 
the investigation process starts, there is an attempt to identify 
“precedents” and assess the severity and scope of the event. 
During the process of precedent check, previous events of the 
caregivers involved are studied, as well as events that took 
place at the same site. 
 
 Publishing case studies – in 2002, the department decided, 
despite much dispute around the issue of confidentiality of 
reported information, to distribute to Macabbi‟s physicians 
(3,500), case studies for learning purposes. The analyses are 
reported anonymously.  In addition, the conclusions and 
recommendations are presented for the physicians to act 
accordingly. The report is sent to the physicians‟ home 
addresses. Physicians‟ reactions to the case studies are highly 
positive. The computerized system serves for identifying 
candidate events for distributing and expanding the base of 
conclusions and recommendations from similar events. 
 
  Self Initiated surveys –the process is actually an applicative 
research, based on the information accumulated in the 
database and its expansion via field observations, 
questionnaires, interviews with professionals involved and more. 
The contribution of the computerized system in this regard is in 
indicating the directions of the survey and focusing the process 




conducted recently: errors in drug administration process, 
adverse events due to moving from one physician to another 
and unspecified chest pain as indication for MI Information for 
districts (organizational units in Maccabi responsible for all its 
activities in a certain geographical region) – special statistical 
reports were defined such as a report comparing reporting rates 
in different districts and different topics. These reports are part 
of the agenda in professional meetings between the department 
personnel and district managers, and provide a sense of 
adequate handling of the reported events by the risk 




The Information System as a means of feedback for the risk managers. 
 
As we have already mentioned, the computerized system is a major tool in the 
department‟s work and serves as the formal documentation instrument for its 
activity. The system holds most of the knowledge, which accumulated over the 
years. An interesting phenomenon in this respect takes place when a risk 
manager encounters an investigation file from the beginning of his work in the 
department.  In such an encounter, the following insights emerge: 
 
 The gap between the investigation levels is emphasized – the 
risk manager and the department managers, witness the 
development that took place in the department over the years. 
This gap is encouraging, on one hand, but could be just as 
frustrating, since it creates ambivalence toward the information 
recorded in the system in the past and the degree of its 
usefulness. We, personally experienced this phenomenon in 
other content worlds too, such as Aviation. 
 
 A mechanism of self-feedback regarding the qualities of 
investigations performed by the risk manager is formed, both 
from the relation to his own investigations and from those of 





 Professional frustration rises due to the gap in investigation 
quality: “how comes we didn‟t notice that…”, “we did not ask 
that….”, “we did not recommend that…” 
 
 It turns out that the information stored in the computerized 
system, reflects well the famous saying of IT people and which 
is sometimes denied by users: “Garbage in, garbage out” 
according to which, the computerized system represents the 
quality of information recorded into it. 
 
 It turns out, that risk managing in medicine is a professional 
discipline, acquired through experience, under supervision and 
that the medical background is a necessary condition, but is 
insufficient in it in order to work effectively and professionally. 
 
It seems that from a wider perspective after some time had past, the information 
accumulated on the events loses some of its value since it does not adhere to 
the current standards of handling events. In this respect, the question to be 
asked is what is the value of the information regarding adverse events if it was 
produced 5-6 years ago? 
 
Not only did the processes of handling events changed and improved, but also 
the objects of investigation, which means that the context itself changes: medical 
technologies change, work procedures change, therapeutic perspectives change, 
aspects of medical and fiscal policy change. The question that comes up is what 
the relevant “life span” of information gathered on an event is, way beyond of its 
documentary value. We hypothesize, that the answer is in the range of about 3 
years back. In addition, due to obsolescence and due to basic handling quality of 
adverse events, it will not be right to use this information, except for statistical 
purposes. 
 
The process of critical observation from a perspective of time, is true for the 
computerized system as well. In the stages of analyzing the system according to 
the department requirements during 1998, it seemed to the department 
personnel that the system to be developed is too complicated and demanding. 
From our experience in developing computerized systems for risk management 
for the IDF and the Israeli Air Force, we expected this natural response and knew 
that after some time, we will have to upgrade the system significantly due to 




using the system as the main working tool and the development of new 
technologies. 
 
After approximately three years of work with the system, new needs started to 
emerge that required the upgrading of the system, especially in the following 
areas: 
 
 Development of a module for managing the process of handling 
events– the need for this module emerged after the 
development of the multi-step handling of an event by different 
people: the department secretary, risk manager, medical 
consultant and department managers. In order to allow for the 
managing of an event efficiently, knowing in what stage the 
handling of the case is and what has been done in each stage; 
there is a need for computerizing the management of events. 
 
  The recommendations handling module– assimilating the 
current process of handling recommendations in the 
computerized system, including the intra-departmental work 
processes in the recommendations and working interfaces with 
outside factors. 
 
 Creation of interfaces with external computerized systems, 
especially EMR – Electronical Medical Record and standards 
such as HL-7 and ICD-9, in order to allow importing data into 
the system: information regarding clinicians, patients, medical 
encounters, etc. 
 
 Developing flexibility in creating reports and generation of 
statistical reports with a wider variety of options. 
 
The last version of the system, 2.05, installed in May 2003, includes several 
modifications that were needed, and toward the end of 2003 a new version of the 




*As by the end of 2009, a new RM computerized system has been deployed, based on the 













From our analysis of the relationships within and the interfaces between the Risk 
Management Department and other central and district departments, we 
deduced that these have gone through some transformations, influenced by 
three major factors: 
 
1. The department's activity - The declared policy of the department, was 
mostly preventive. However, its organizational image was a product of its 
actual activities. This image emerged from a customer (doctors) survey 
that was published in December 2002. According to 36% of the 
respondents, the RMD's main function is to prevent legal actions in cases 
of malpractice, and provide legal defense whenever it failed to prevent the 
action. 33% of the respondents viewed the department's role as mainly to 
"prevent or minimize errors." Regarding their appeals to the department, 
44% percent of the respondents appealed because they were 
apprehensive of being sued for malpractice, and 33% appealed in order to 
receive professional assistance. All this means, that in spite of its declared 
preventive role, at the time the audit, the department was firstly perceived 
as a provider of legal umbrellas and of professional  assistance, and only 
secondly as acting to prevent "the next error." However, one of the 
recommendations that were specified by the respondents was…,"  The 
role of the department in preventing accidents should be emphasized. 
____________________________ 
* In this chapter  we will describe the inner dynamics of the Risk Management Department, within 
the general dynamics at Maccabi. We will try to do our best to be faithful to the changing 
atmosphere, during the different phases of the development of the department, and will present 
the meaning of these phases, as we understood them, over the time of our professional relations 
with Maccabi. This is a complex endeavor, since the structuring and analysis that we present 
here, was not part of everyday reality at the department, but rather a post factum reflection -  a 
regrettable fact.  We believe, that had there been more reflections and learning during the 
process, some of the errors,  that were due to a pioneering spirit and a sense of mission, would 
have been prevented. We refer to chapter 2, where we broadly discuss our research methods, 




2. Fundamental changes within the Healthcare systems in Israel and 
worldwide - Among the changes that occurred with the proximity to 
establishment of the Risk Management department and continue to 
influence its activities are: Publication of the "Patients Rights Law – 1996, 
the legal precedent set up by Supreme Court Judge Barak in 1995, 
ratification of the IMA‟s (Israel Medical Association) treaty and more (see 
chapter 6.5 -  Managing the possible risks of “Establishing the Risk 
Management Department”). Additionally, during the1990's the necessity 
arose to deal in a systematic manner with medical errors. Due to 
Aviation's success in reducing the rate of errors and accidents, an 
association has been created between Aviation and Medicine, positioning 
Aviation as a model for Medicine in its struggle to reduce physician errors.  
 
3. Personal and organizational changes in Maccabi - Maccabi is a 
dynamic organization, that strives to foresee demands and expectations of 
its clients and those of the healthcare system. The RMD, was established 
during Mr. Shabtai Shavit's tenure as CEO of Maccabi, whose background 
was in the Israeli security system, and who had no previous experience in 
managing large healthcare systems. In 2002 Prof. Shuki Shemer replaced 
Mr. Shavit as CEO. Prof. Shemer, a physician, served previously as 
Surgeon General for the IDF, and as General Manager of the Israeli 
Health Ministry. We believe that each of the Maccabi‟s CEO's, leaded the 
organization in a manner suitable to his previous professional and 
managerial experience. These different directions have had direct 
influence over the Risk Management department's functioning and goals. 
 
The following table, presents the development over seven years of existence, of 
the relations between the RMD and other central and field organs in Maccabi. 
We identified three time-periods and six corresponding developmental phases, 
from a primary stage, that we identified at the beginning of our consulting 
activities until the first stages of established cooperation between the Risk 
Management department and other center and field departments. It is important 
to note, that the passage from one phase to the next, does no mean that the 
previous phase, is no longer active, rather all the stages are like layers built one 











and Stress on 
immediate 
results (The 
state we found in 
our initial audit) 
 Antagonism shown by 
administrative bodies: HR, Finance, 
Information systems, the legal 
department, Ombudsman, MCD 
(Medical Control Department) 





 A series of meetings, with 
Heads of departments, aimed to 
establish professional relationships 
and convince them, that RM is a 
necessity for promoting patient 
safety and that cooperation with 
them is critical for assuring 
success. 
 A series of lectures 
given by the head of the Risk 
Management Department at 
the districts, with the goal of 
exposing the staff in the 
districts to the activities of the 
department. 
 Meetings with the 
district managers with the aim 
of presenting the goals and 
modes of operations of the 
department.  
 Lack of continuous 
activities, despite the demand 
for such. The reason was the 
will to preserve the immunity of 
the reporting physician and 
preventing information 
exposure on adverse events, 






immunity of the 
reporting 
physicians  
 Establishing a stand-alone 
information system that prevents 
leakage of doctor's reports.  
 Total non-disclosure of 
information regarding information 
included in adverse events reports.  
 Non-disclosure of lessons 
learned from adverse events.  
 Disputes with the legal 
department regarding doctor's 
immunity and insurer's interfaces.  
 Working directly with 
the doctors, bypassing the 
formal organizational structure. 
 No prompt response to 
cooperation requests from the 
field.  
 A one-way reporting 
flow of information. Physicians 
are required to report adverse 
events, but the obligations of 
the Risk Management 






Period Phase Interfaces with the Center Interfaces with the 
districts 
4.Mutual signs of 
willingness to 
cooperate – from 
the center and 
the districts. 
 
 MCD (Medical Control 
Department) – the idea to use data 
from  medical activities control to 
locate risks, especially risks 
emanating from certain physicians 
activities 
 Cooperation at local levels, 
on a personal basis. For example, 
consulting the  senior cardiologist 




 Willingness of district 
managers to take an active role 
in the debriefing of  adverse 
events. 
 Willingness of center 
managers to receive 
information about adverse 
events. 
 Willingness of 
physicians to continue 
participating in doctors/patients 
simulation workshops, 
conducted in order to enhance 
the awareness of the 
contribution of sound doctor 
patient communication in 
prevention of medical errors. 
 
2002 5.Initial attempts 
to define 
responsibility 




 Utilization  of 
recommendations as a vehicle in 
the creation of working interfaces. 
 Cross organizational Risk 
Management audits serving as a 
vehicle for establishing 
multidisciplinary work groups to 
deal with specific high risk areas. 
 Defining exterritorial 
sectors for direct action by the 
department: pharmaceutics, 
nursing, dentistry, laboratories. 
  Defining standardized 
procedures for managing 
recommendations.   
 First pilots and 
experiential work procedures 
definitions.  
 Dealing with new 
complexity after the 
establishment of a QA 








 Cross organizational 
audits-at the data gathering phase 
and definitions of intervention 
plans.  
 Cooperation projects with 
professional and administrative 
managers of departments: medical 
informatics, gynecology, diagnosis, 
nursing, mental health.   
 Leading the writing of 
standards for critical procedures.   
 
 Joint debriefing of 
selected  adverse events.  
 Periodical meetings to 
discuss Risk Management. 
  Risk Management 
surveys for  new units, starting 








It is safe to say, that during the years of the department's existence, we have 
witnessed major changes in its mode of operation. From a semi-secret mode, 
that was directed to assist physicians in coping with adverse events, to a center 





Like a stone falling in calm waters - Broadening the impact circles. 
 
As heads of the new Risk Management organizational entity, set within an 
existing organization, with well-defined work procedures, the founders of the new 
department, had to take one of three possible strategic  decisions: 
 
1. Integration within the existing organizational structure, while  adopting  of 
the existing work procedures. The implication of this decision would have 
been that the department, subordinated to the Head of the Healthcare 
Division of Maccabi, should adopt existing work procedures and interfaces 
in its center and in the field.  
 
2. Defining unique modes of operation and interfaces, in order to give an 
optimal answer to the specific goals of the department, and to enable it to 
function effectively in achieving these goals.  
  
3. To delay the decision, while anticipating the emanation of work 
procedures, influenced by various forces and needs that exist within the 
organization.  
 
Following our advice, the heads of the department, decided on the second 
choice. We assumed, that a new department should establish its sovereignty with 
a view to the long term. Therefore, we suggested the adoption of the Israeli Air 
Force ASQAD mode of operation. This mode,  allows the entity that is in charge 
of safety within the organization a large degree of autonomy in defining its modes 
of operation, as a consequence of its direct subordination to the head of the 
organization. 
 
However, from the very beginning of the Risk Management Department activity, it 
became evident that this ambitious aim is for the long run and depends on 
organizational maturity and proofs of the department's competence. Therefore, in 
view of Maccabi's specific characteristics as an HMO, we suggested the 




It is important to note, that at the establishment of the RMD, the issue of the 
optimal mode of operation in order to achieve maximum affectivity, besides some 
general guidelines, was not officially discussed. These guidelines, in their turn, 
were molded into modes of operation different from those of other departments at 
the center of Maccabi. This deviant mode of operation on the behalf of the RMD, 
did not bode well for the department, and resulted in resentment against and 
isolation on the part of other heads of departments, joined with  limited 
recognition of the department's activities and achievements.  
 
The following  table presents the working assumptions, that guided the 
department from its onset , and their implications: 
 
 
Working assumption Manifestations Implications 
 The main clients of 
the department are 
physicians especially those 
involved in adverse events. 
 Focusing on 
physicians on the sharp end, 
and neglecting the promotion 
of Risk Management 
understanding and awareness 
among managers. 
 Creation of direct 
working interfaces with 
practitioners, over the heads 
of management.  
 The caregivers perceive 
the department, as their address 
in cases of involvement in 
adverse events (see the "Quality 
of Service" survey 2003). 
 The managers do not 
feel involved in the handling of 
adverse events, unless the 
event is undergoing some legal 
action.  
 Antagonism exhibited by 
managers in the center and the 
districts who resent the 
department's operating outside 
the normal chain of 
management. 
 Misunderstanding the 
goals of Risk Management 
Department and lack of support 
from  the management  
 Organizational isolation. 
The department was not 
involved in crucial decision 
making, where its expertise was  
essential.    
Creating awareness in the 
center and the districts for 
Risk Management 
Department‟s activities  is a 
necessity 
 A series of lectures 
and meetings intended to 
expose the department's 
activities to center and 
districts.  
 Academic activities 
and participation in 
professional meetings  within 
and outside Maccabi.  
 Antagonistic reactions 
from the center and districts, 
due to feelings of being  
informed, but not involved in 
Risk Management. 
 A feeling, that behind 
the department's intentions for 
cooperation with the center and 
field, there is only rhetoric, 






Working assumption Manifestations Implications 
In order to encourage 
reporting of errors, those 
who report should receive 
administrative immunity 
 A caregiver involved 
in an adverse event is obliged 
to report directly to the RM 
department.  
 The report and all 
personal details of the 
caregiver are kept within the 
Risk Management 
Department and aren‟t 
accessible to the entire 
organization and any other 
third party.  
 The meaning of the 
immunity is unclear to some of 
the caregivers and managers.  
 Disbelief in the 
possibility of 'real' immunity 
within the organization. 
 Possibly, some of the 
caregivers 'take advantage' of 
the immunity and report adverse 
events in order to avoid 
disciplinary or legal actions.  
 Severe limitations on 
using the data accumulated in 
the department's data base 
aiming  to prevent reoccurrence 
of errors.  
The debriefing of adverse 
events, and drawing of 
conclusions, should be 
performed,  solely by Risk 
Management Department 
personnel. 
 The process of the 
debriefing is confidential. The 
main sources of data, are the 
caregivers involved and the 
medical record.  
 In most cases, the 
debriefing involves only those 
in  the  'first circle', and avoids 
wider organizational circles 
(Reason 1997). 
 The depth and width of 
the investigation, are a function 
of the Risk Management 
Department‟s available 
resources: the number of risk 
managers, their experience and 
professionalism and the other 
assignments they are involved 
in. As a result of the increasing 
number of reports, the 
deepening of the debriefings 
and additional assignments, the 
percentage of the debriefed 
events decreased over the time. 
 Difficulties in 
implementation of 
recommendations due to the 
crucial role of the managers who 
are excluded from the 
debriefings. 
 Most of the findings in 
debriefings relate to those who 
are directly involved.  
 Conclusions and 
recommendations on the 
organizational level are intuitive 
and not well founded. 
 There are hardly any 
implications on the managerial 






Working assumption Manifestations Implications 
Safety and Risk 
Management activities 
should serve as an  
infrastructure for future QA 
activities.  
 Interest and 
involvement in projects that 
involve quality aspects. 
 An effort to adopt an  
organizational structure and 
work procedures that will 
support joint Risk 
Management and QA 
activities (RMQA).  
 Growing resource 
allocation, mainly managerial to 
QA activities, a tendency that 
culminated in 2001-2 
compromising depth of Risk 
Management activities.  
 “Marking” QA activities 
within the organization as 
belonging to Risk Management 
Department. 
 Organizational 
awareness for QA activities and 
attempts to become a part of it. 
 Steps within the 
organization to create 
management awareness to the 




Three points should be emphasized: 
 
1. During the years, facing a reality of fast turnover in senior management 
and changing organizational reality, changes and alterations, were made 
in the working assumptions hereby presented, but basically most of them, 
especially those dealing with RM,  did not change and are valid in the 
present.  
 
2. Senior management, particularly at the districts, was on more than one 
occasion impatient with these principles, and with the department's strict 
application of them. They found them isolative, patronizing and disruptive 
of normal work procedures, especially by the disregard to the hierarchic 
structure of Maccabi. 
 
3. These working assumptions, were the outcome of our reflections on the   
relations, that were created between the department and the entire 
organization. They were not defined beforehand at the establishment of 
the Risk Management department.  
 
We believe, although we cannot be certain, that the working assumptions were 
the outcomes, not only of the reactions within the organization to the aspirations 
of the Risk Management Department, but of the professional background and 





Looking for partners to produce critical mass  
 
When the department's debriefings produced, a sizable body of 
recommendations, the managers found themselves in a substantial paradox. On 
the one hand, they tried to stick to the principles described above, on the other 
hand they found themselves isolated in their strive to promote the  real 
preventive role of the department.  
 
On a declarative level, the  department received full management backing, as 
well as their colleagues' support. However, on the operative level, they faced 
more and more obstacles. By the end of 2001, the number of recommendations 
on the "waiting for implementation list" was well over 200.  
 
From our point of view, this situation posed a real danger to the very existence of 
the department, since the circle of Risk Management was cut at its most 
important link – the return to the scene of the adverse events with the aim of 
fixing the root causes, responsible for the error occurrence. There was a danger 
of ineffectiveness at the core of the department's operation. 
 
Recommendations that were implemented, were mostly those that were referred 
for implementation by the Risk Management department itself. This led to a 
feeling of effectiveness mixed with frustration that led to pronouncements like: "if 
we want something to be done, we should do it ourselves. 
 
In a strategic workshop, that took place at the end of 2001, and whose target was 
to shape a strategy and working plans for 2002, the problem of the piling up of 
recommendations was raised by the head of the department, who defined the 
situation in very grave terms. On the occasion, we suggested the establishment 
of a special task force, whose objective would be to cut the number of open 
recommendations by half during the coming year. This objective was achieved.   
 
With hindsight, it is clear that the paradox described above and its risks were 
predictable. It was possible to foresee that the principles and modes of 
operations, that were adopted by the department, would isolate it and cause 
antagonism and indignation on the part of the managers who felt removed from 
the process and kept away from Risk Management activities altogether. All this 
was detrimental to the department at the critical stage of trying to implement 
recommendations, derived from adverse events and changing the set up that led 





With the understanding that effective Risk Management depends on 
collaborating with the management in the center and in the field, it also became 
clear that the usual channels of management, would have to be utilized. For 
example, in order to start a process of change within Gynecology, the Chief 
Gynecologist, his superior and senior Gynecologists in the districts, would have 
to participate in the process and approve it.  
 
It became evident, that turning a recommendation to the Chief of Gynecology in 
the Risk Management data system, is necessary but insufficient in order to 
assure its implementation.  
 
It is important to note that in the Aviation, recommendations become directives 
for action by being endorsed as such by the head of the organization. By 
adopting the immunity principle above mentioned, findings, conclusions and 
recommendations from the debriefings of adverse events became protected from 
the management therefore this aspect of the Aviation model was not applicable 
and was not implemented.  
 
Thus, the authority of the recommendations, stemmed from the debriefing 
process, but not from management endorsement. Therefore, professional 
managers could apparently claim that any recommendation, that was directed at 
them have, for a variety of reasons, no validity. Those reasons might be 
incomplete debriefing, wrong professional attitude, unfamiliarity with aspects of 
the profession's domain, unfeasibility, etc. 
 
From the above said, we may deduce that the operating principles, that were 
adopted by the Risk Management Department at the beginning of its operations, 
created in fact a paradox; the severance of the Risk Management process at its 
most critical stage, that of the implementation of recommendations. This paradox 
is due to the inability of the senior management to endorse those 
recommendations, and the seclusion of the professional managers from the 
debriefing of adverse events.  
 
In the paragraph that deals with the definitions of the Risk Management 
Department functions, we shall try to get some insights into the factors that were 
behind the aforementioned paradox. Among these, the necessity to mark and 
protect the boundaries of Risk Management in general, against other 







The insights from the organizational feedback loop as means of 
effectiveness. 
 
In what manner is it possible to define and measure the department's 
effectiveness? The department defines its major aim as: "preventing the next 
error", therefore any reference to its effectiveness, should be deduced from this 
aim. The measurement of the effectiveness of Risk Management activities is 
critical due to several factors: 
  
 Being a relatively new domain necessitates an accurate measurement of 
its chosen modes of operation. The importance of Risk Management 
seems to have face validity, especially after the publication in recent years 
of the IOM reports and the various activities, lead by the American 
administration, which followed these publications. However, we did not 
find any written evidence on the relation between Risk Management 
activity and reduction in the number of errors and losses ensued by them. 
Some studies claim that Risk Management shortens the legal proceedings 
in cases legal steps are taken, and reduces the compensation payments. 
 
 From the standpoint of the RMD, the issue of effectiveness became more 
and more critical, as time has passed from its establishment. The 
importance of this issue was stressed by RMD's requirements for 
additional resources, needed for handling the increasing amount of reports 
on adverse events. In its yearly reports, RMD highlighted its activity: 
debriefing of adverse events, lecturing, Risk Management workshops in 
the districts, leading headquarters activities concerning issues that arose 
from the department's activities etc.; however it could present no proof for 
the department's effectiveness.  
 
 In Civil Aviation, the effectiveness of safety measures and Risk 
Management is measured by the rate of casualties/accidents per mile or 
per number of takeoffs. Thus, for example, the American NTSB (National 
Transportation and Safety Board) measures fatalities by the number of 
fatal casualties per one million miles, and accidents by the number of 
accidents per 100,000 takeoffs. According to the NTSB findings, between 
1983-2001 the rates of accidents dropped from 0.055 to 0.011' and the 
rate of fatalities decreased from 0.0013 to 0.0003. Similar statistics are 
presented by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and by 





 The measurement of the effectiveness and the outcomes of Risk 
Management activities demonstrate the difference between Risk 
Management in Civil Aviation and Risk Management in the Healthcare 
systems. While in Civil Aviation data is routinely collected and published, 
in Healthcare,   only in rare cases there are agreed indicators, 
measurement methods and agreed entities whose functions are to gather 
and publish the relevant data. Although, in Israel each fatality that occurs 
during a medical process is reported to the Ministry of Health, it is unclear 
how these reports serve to prevent similar deaths from reoccurring in the 
future. Thus the need to define Risk Management indicators and to 
constantly monitor the effectiveness of Risk Management in Healthcare, 
does not pertain only to Maccabi‟s Risk Management Department, but to 
the entire Healthcare system that invests considerable resources in Risk 
Management activities, and should care to find out how effective they are. 
 
 Risk Management, by its nature poses a mirror in front of the organization 
and deals with flaws and deficiencies. The entire process of handling 
adverse events has a potential of exposing the organization to additional 
risks, for example the possibility that entities outside of the system will get 
access to privileged information. This leakage of confidential information 
regarding adverse events may support taking legal  actions against the 
reporting physicians. These risks and others were very tangible to 
Maccabi's management, while the benefits of Risk Management still 
required proofs. 
 
 The resources needed for Risk Management - From 1996 to 2003 the 
department grew in personnel from 0.5 to 7.5 (see chapter 6.5). The 
growth was an outcome of the growth in reporting, the deepening of the 
debriefings and the initiation of Risk Management audits. However, 
Maccabi's management became aware of the need for growing resources, 
especially in the complex economical reality, common to all HMOs in 
Israel- permanent under-budgeting. The growing resources that had to be 
allocated to Risk Management resulted in greater concern by the 
management to measure and prove the effectiveness of the Risk 






In the first three years of the department's existence the six, above mentioned 
factors, were only marginally evident. However, with the passage of time, they 
became more conspicuous, as the department created more professional 
relations with center and district entities, and was demanding ever more 
resources to continue and to develop its activities.  
 
As has already been mentioned, the Aviation model ascribes major importance to 
the measurement of the safety indicators and their publication. It is commonly 
claimed, that within the healthcare domain, that it is very difficult to assess 
directly the effectiveness of Risk Management, due to the complexity of the 
processes and the practical difficulty in isolating Risk Management activities and 
proving their impact on errors, accidents and losses. However, after the 
publication of the IOM report entitled 'To Err is Human' in 1999, President Clinton 
defined a practical target for Risk Management on a national basis; to reduce 
preventable deaths (caused by physician errors) by 50% within 5 years. That is 
to say that the medical systems were to start measuring the effectiveness of their 
Risk Management operations, using mortality rate as their main indicator.  
 
The heads of the RMD were aware, from day one, that they should exhibit valid 
effectiveness measurement of their operations. However, in the routine practice, 
they avoided this aspect and preferred to focus on Risk Management activities, 
rather than trying to measure their effectiveness. Whenever a negative feedback 
was received, that questioned the contribution of the Risk Management 
Department, the need to demonstrate the effectiveness was stressed again, but 
the impetus would be obscured shortly behind daily activities. 
 
Feedback from the districts, was received mainly in regular meetings between 
the heads of the department and the districts managers. The districts managers 
perceived these meetings as an opportunity to express their expectations from 
the department and the measure of their satisfaction with its activities.  
 
These meetings with the districts' management and personnel, were defined as 
the 1
st
 goal in Risk Management Department‟s 2002 work plan. The goal was 
defined as following: "Enhancing the commitment of the caregivers and their 
professional capability to improve the safety of their clients". During 2002, six 
such meetings took place. They were analyzed and summed up in a report that 
was prepared by us (EILAT Company): “New format for Risk Management 





Some important issues were raised in the report:  
 
 Understanding the functions of Risk Management – although there 
has been much activity regarding the subject within the districts, there 
was still considerable un-clarity, regarding the role of the RMD and its 
activities. Of special notice was the blurring of the boundaries of the 
Legal and Risk Management departments. 
 
 Expectations from Risk Management – these are divided into different 
domains: 
o Providing feedback regarding previously reported adverse 
events – this is a recurring demand from all districts managers, 
who expect that their reporting of adverse events will be followed 
by proper and timely feedback, relating to the conclusions and 
recommendations derived from the debriefings.  
o Providing professional tools to carry out debriefings –the 
willingness of district representatives to attend Risk Management 
and debriefing workshops in order be become competent in the 
debriefing methodology. 
o Support in handling of adverse events – although such 
expectations exist, their nature was not clear.    
o Receiving Information – The districts were expecting to receive 
lessons learned, based on their reporting of adverse events.   
 
From this analysis, we deduced an existing remoteness and  lack of cooperation 
on the one hand and a will and expectation on the part of the districts to create 
and strengthen working relations with the department, on the other hand. 
 
The issue, why despite its clear criticality for the future development of the Risk 
Management Department, the working interfaces with the districts were not 
clearly defined and formalized, is still unanswered. We believe, the answer is 
related to the basic assumptions, the RMD adopted from the very beginning of its 
activities as its modus operandi, elaborated in  “Like a stone falling in calm water 







Efforts to establish cooperation – Partial successes 
 
In the period of its existence, and despite the aforesaid, efforts were made by the 
department to define patterns of cooperation and mutual work with the relevant 
entities within the organization. However, for unclear reasons these efforts were 
short-lived and unfruitful in most of the cases. 
 
In August 1998, the issue of cooperation with the districts was discussed by the 
department. The outcomes of these deliberations were summed up under the 
title 'Decentralization'. In the conclusions section of the document one can read 
the following statement, "We should teach the districts how to debrief… 
workshop for investigators”.  
 
In 1998, the issue was further emphasized as a part of Maccabi's strategy of 
decentralizing some functions to the districts. In an undated document from 
1998, it was noted among other that "As a part of the decentralization policy in 
Maccabi, Risk Management activities within the districts will be institutionalized 
within the districts". In the same document a division of labor and the interfaces 
between the central Risk Management department and the units in the districts, 
was also defined. The districts unit responsibilities were defined as: “Examining 
and clarifying adverse events, reaching conclusions and recommendations in 
cases that ended with no significant damage… initiated activities to identify 
potential risks in the district…”. Although this subject was often discussed by the 
Risk Management Department, these suggestions were never fully implemented. 
 
In October 2000, the activities of a joint committee of the Risk Management 
Department and the MID (Medical Informatics Department) „The Alerts 
Committee', were summed up. The original idea was to identify potential risks 
that Maccabi‟s computerized systems could alert about. Several specific alerts 
were defined, among them: periodical blood pressure tests, hemoglobin values 
lower than 6, prescribing Tycledil, low values of white blood cells etc. As far as 
we know,  the recommendations of this committee were not implemented.  
 
In the year 2000, after several meetings a framework of cooperation was defined 
between the Risk Management department and the physiotherapy unit, 
according to which: 
 
 The head of the unit will be in charge for receiving adverse events 




 Partial debriefing will be carried out at the facilities, were the incident 
occurred, by local managers.  
 Certain cases will be debriefed by the facility manager, under the 
guidance of Risk Management personnel. 
 Before summing up, the debriefing files will be sent to the Head of the 
Physiotherapy unit for his reference.  
 The recommendations from adverse events in physiotherapy, will be 
jointly discussed with the Head of Physiotherapy.  
 
This framework was realized only in the years 2007-2009, although its principles 
had the potential of creating a good professional infrastructure and high 
motivation to deal with the root causes of adverse events in physiotherapy, as 
early as in the year 2000. 
 
The picture we have  outlined  here may seem rather pessimistic, despite the 
willingness of the RMD  and other entities within Maccabi to promote Risk 
Management activities, and despite the initiation of joint projects. From the 
realization and diligence aspects, the success of Risk Management projects has 
been limited.  
 
However, it is important to note that during the years of its existence, the 
department had some major successes which are described in chapter 6.11, 
which deals with implementing recommendations and multidisciplinary risk 
audits. 
 
In our opinion it is important to debrief the department's own failures, which may 
be viewed, as adverse events on its part. We believe, the three discussed 
projects have some common denominators: 
 
 All three were initiated by the Risk Management department. 
 The processes included several meetings that were concluded by mutual 
understandings. 
 These understandings were expected to establish substantial system 
modifications to the modes of cooperation between the department and 
the other entities.  
 None of the initial plans were followed by a definition of a work plan 
consisting of: milestones, responsibilities and resources.   
 None of the projects were subjected to Risk Management of its own. No 
effort was made to identify obstacles; objections, the availability of 




 It is unclear, whether any of the projects were ratified by the senior 
management.  
 None of these projects went through a formal debriefing, thus no lessons 
were learnt from any of them, in order to improve future cooperations. 
 
In all of these projects we served as Risk Management consultants, and we 
expressed our positions regarding the aforementioned issues. However, due to 
our lack of experience in implementing large scale organizational changes in the 





Recommendations as means of establishing a working dialogue  
 
Recommendations can be viewed, as the main product of the Risk Management 
processes, although the debriefing process by itself and all other Risk 
Management activities do influence the risk factors. 
 
Hendrick and Benner (1987), claim that for the recommendations to be accepted, 
they should be viable and credible and their implementation should result in real 
improvements. Over a period of fourteen years, Hendrick and Benner 
investigated hundreds of recommendations, some that were implemented and 
some that failed during various stages of implementation. They concluded, that 
successful recommendations have fourteen common denominations that can be 
divided into three categories: 
 
 A recommendation should be clearly defined and operative. 
 Guidelines for implementation should be defined within the 
recommendation. 
 A clear criterion for success should also be presented.  
 
From our experience a valid recommendation, one that can effectively deal with 
the risk factors, should have the following characteristics: 
 
 Valid – a valid recommendation should be an outcome of the debriefing 
process of an adverse event or a number of cases that represent a 
phenomenon. If based solely on the experience of risk managers, 
however experienced they are, a recommendation's chances of being 





 Relevant – a recommendation should refer to the actual case, and not to 
other factors, however important these may be.  
 
 Acceptable – a recommendation should be accepted by the person or 
persons that should implement it. 
 
 Should be backed by the relevant management level in order to be 
transformed from a professional recommendation  into an approved  
system action item.   
 
 Feasible – the resources that are required for the implementation, should 
be proportionate to the risk they may prevent. 
 
 Avoiding new risks – an implementation of a recommendation should 
not result in further, and even graver, risks. 
 
It is interesting to mention, that a basic clinical Risk Management textbook, 
edited by Vincent (1995), includes no reference to recommendations as the 
major outcomes of debriefings, or to the significance of phenomenon analysis 
from clinical Risk Management aspects.  
 
In 2002, the RMD  published an internal report regarding its activities in defining 
and implementing recommendations, covering the years 1996-2002.  
 
In the preface of the report it was stated that: 
"The implementation of recommendations derived from debriefings of adverse 
events is the main challenge (if not the only one), that is facing any Risk 
Management system that intends to influence reality, namely to minimize the 
risks of accidents occurring during the delivery of medical treatment”. 
 
One of the challenges to implementation that are presented in the report was: "… 
maintaining a right tension at any given moment, between what is suggested by 
the Risk Management Department as a solution to problems that were revealed 
through the debriefing and the actual conditions". In other words, the 
recommendation implementation process, should keep a balance between the 




According to the report, 632 recommendations were elicited during the period 
cited, 452 (72%) of which were implemented and 48 (8%) were canceled. Of the 
452 implemented recommendations, 123 (27%) were personal in nature, that is 
they referred to the involved personnel and suggested providing a personal 
feedback. 145 (29%) of the recommendations, were referred to the Risk 
Management Department. 
 
The following table presents the recommendations, by professional entity to 




recommendations In charge of implementation 
29 145 Risk Management Department 
11.8 59 Gynecology 
10.8 54 District Managers 
9.8 49 Medical Division 
4.8 24 Medical Informatics Department 
33.8 169 Other 
100 500 Total 
 
 
Among the recommendations that were referred to the Risk Management 
department, we may identify six categories: 
 
 Feedback for the involved personnel – A phone call or face-to-face 
conversation between the risk manager and the involved caregiver, in 
case the risk manager believes, such an interaction may improve the 
quality and safety of care. The feedback may be provided, by whoever is 
assumed to achieve the maximal cooperation with the involved caregiver: 
the risk manager, the clinical consultant of the department, or the head of 
RMD  
 
 Caregivers Training – occasionally, during the debriefing, an insight is 
formulated that what seemed like an isolated incident has deep roots 
within the system. One of the most recurring recommendations is to bring 
into caregivers awareness the lessons learned from adverse events. 
Choosing the proper instructing method is an important issue. In 
organizations, as large as Maccabi, which are geographically 
widespread, existing channels of communication, were often employed:  





 Process In-depth examination – of a phenomenon, a process or a site. 
This kind of recommendations, are elicited if the risk manager concludes, 
that the actual case under investigation represents a “tip of an iceberg”, 
and that the organization may benefit from a deeper understanding of the 
entire process in which an error occurred. 
 
 Writing and improving guidelines or procedures – Such 
recommendations are normally directed to those in charge of a process 
or a domain. However, in some cases the risk manager may conclude 
that the guidelines writing or revision should be done at the Risk 
Management Department. This way of operation is adopted in order to 
assure that critical processes would be anchored in proper guidelines, 
which take into account all insights that emanated from the Risk 
Management debriefings. 
 
 Improvements in the information systems – Most Maccabi‟s 
caregivers, document the encounters in an EMR. The system alerts 
doctors to data that is meaningful for their decision making, such as 
critical values in laboratory tests, interactions between active ingredients 
of medications and general clinical guidelines. In order to preserve the 
effectiveness of the system regarding these aspects, the quantity of 
warnings and directives should not be so overwhelming, as to distract the 
physician from normal mode of work. In certain cases that have critical 
Risk Management implications, this channel was employed to minimize 
risks.  RMD's role in this type of recommendations, is to specify the alert 
and to be on watch, as to the volume of alerts in the system. 
 
The following table presents the distribution of the recommendations which were 
referred to the Risk Management Department. The most prevalent is the 
feedback category. This is an outcome of the fact that providing feedback, is one 
of the major functions of the department. In most cases, only the risk manager, 
who conducted the debriefing, can formulate the proper feedback from the 
gathered data and its analysis, combined with an understanding of the unique 






% Number Category 
35.2 51 Feedback to the involved physicians 
24.1 35 Training the caregivers 
17.9 26 In-depth analysis of a defined process 
9.0 13 Writing and improving guidelines 
5.5 8 Improvements in the EMR 
8.3 12 Other  
100 145 Total 
 
In order to examine the changes that occurred in the department's perception of 
the effectiveness of its recommendations over the years, we examined the 
distribution of the recommendation categories in the period 1996-2002, 
presented in the following table.  
  
Total 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 Category 
51 4 13 11 17 2 3 1 
Feedback for the involved 
physicians 
35.2 22.2 48.1 27.5 60.7 11.8 25.0 33.3 % 
35 3 3 2 6 11 8 2 Instructing the doctors 
24.1 16.7 11.1 5 21.4 64.7 66.7 66.7 % 
26 7 4 15     
In-depth analysis of a defined 
process 
17.9 38.9 14.8 37.5     % 
13 1 2 5 3 1 1  
Writing/Rewriting of 
guidelines 
9.0 5.6 7.4 12.5 10.7 5.9 8.3  % 
8 1 2  2 3   Improvement in the EMR 
5.5 5.6 7.4  7.1 17.6   % 
12 2 3 7     Other 
8.3 11.1 11.1 17.5     % 
145 18 27 40 28 17 12 3 Total 
 
It may be observed, that the sector in which recommendations were defined, 
were changing and unstable over the years. As for 2008- 2009, the majority of 
recommendations are aimed to improve the EMR, bridge the gaps regarding 
guidelines and procedures, specialty specific procedural improvements and RM 
training for caregivers. Personal feedback became a regular part of managing the 




“Not only will men of science have to grapple with sciences that deal with man 
but - and this is a far more difficult matter - they will have to persuade the world 
to listen to what they have discovered” 
 











What can be learned and generalized from a single event? 
 
As has already been mentioned, the main activities of the RMD, from its 
establishment until the time of writing this work, focused on handling adverse 
events in the wide sense: receiving reports, providing feedback to the caregivers, 
debriefing, coding and storing the data in the information system, defining 
recommendations and follow up until  implementation.  
 
During these years, in addition to the previously mentioned, the department 
established other channels of activities, which were intended to improve its 
abilities to learn from adverse events and to assimilate in the organization the 
lessons that were learnt. Therefore, the percentage of the department's 
resources, that were dedicated handling reports fell from 100% to around 50% in 
the years 2002-2003. It may be stated, that during the years, the number of 
reported cases, was on the ascent, while the resources allocated to these 
activities descended.  
 
Debriefing is a major Risk Management tool, therefore in this section we shall 
discuss the validity and value, that can be ascribed to the findings and 
conclusions of single case debriefing.  
 
There are two opposing approaches to the issue of the significance, that can be 






 The Systemic Approach – considers every adverse event an expression 
of the latent risks existing within the system (Reason et al. 1997). 
According to this attitude, the lessons that are learnt from a debriefing, 
based on systemic approach, that uncovers the defense failures, are valid 
representations of the entire defense weaknesses in the system. 
 
 The Limiting Approach (our definition) – according to which an adverse 
event has no meaning outside its immediate scene of occurrence. We 
coined the term as an expression of our experience, and it expresses the 
attitude according to which it is not reasonable to deduce lessons from a 
single incident to the entire system.  
 
The adoption of one of these approaches has deep implications for Risk 
Management. Within the systemic approach, a singe incident, may serve the 
impetus to far-reaching modifications in the organization, while the other 
approach limits all changes to the immediate factors within the close proximity of 
the incident.  
 
The systemic approach, allows for proactive Risk Management, as the outcomes 
of the debriefing of a single case, while within the limiting approach, only reactive 
response to single cases is possible.  
 
Presenting these approaches in terms of the 5M model, the accepted model for 








+++ +++ Man 
++ ++ Machine 
+ +++ Management 
+ +++ Medium 
++ ++ Mission 
 
 
 The Human Factor – both approaches value the human factor, but in 
wholly different manners. The systemic approach tackles the general 
aspects of the human factors: training, human engineering, cognitive 
processes of perception, decision making, and memory, while the limiting 





 Management – the systemic approach, emphasizes the role of 
management in promoting changes that are required by Risk 
Management, and in dealing with risks at the systemic level. 
 
 Medium – within the limiting approach, the environment (medium) is 
regarded as supportive of the argument that we cannot generalize from 
one incident, since the environment is unique to each incident. Within the 
systemic approach, the environmental factors are viewed as possible 
contributors to the materialization of the risk; long queues at the clinic, 
uncomfortable work environment etc.  
 
It is difficult to pinpoint, when exactly the Risk Management department in 
Maccabi adopted the systemic approach. However, in the work plan for 1999 we 
found  for the first time: "Initiation of activities to improve processes" as a goal. 
This was the first practical reference to systemic aspects, following investigations 
of adverse events. (See Work Plan 1999) 
 
In 200, this goal was explicitly defined as the main goal of that year: "Initiating 
and guiding quality improvement processes, which originate from 
recommendations derived from reported incidents" (See Work Plan 2001) 
 
The following two incidents were published in "Preventing the next error", a 
booklet, that was published by the Risk Management Department in 2001. The 
booklet was distributed among all Maccabi's physicians, with the aim of 
acquainting them with the Risk Management approach of Maccabi. We present 
the incidents in a summary manner, with the sole purpose of evaluating that 
approach.  (See  booklet  2001) 
 
 
 Incident A: 
 
A 41 year old male patient, was referred by the physician for a routine chest X-
ray examination, as part of a medical checkup, that was required by his new 
employer. There were no pathological findings. Eighteen months later, the patient 
was diagnosed with a primary tumor in the majority of his right lung. In a revision 
of the x-ray, a shadow, the perimeter of which was 2 centimeters, was observed 
in the right hemisphere of the lung. The tumor was partially hidden by the 
collarbone and the ribs. This late diagnosis necessitated the removal of the right 





In the debriefing of the incident, it was found that the man was a heavy smoker, a 
fact that was documented in his medical record. However, the radiologist was not 
aware of the patients smoking habits. 
 
Previous attempts to convince referring physicians to attach all relevant data to 
their referrals failed.  
 
Following the incident, two major recommendations were decided upon: 
 To define "Smoking Status" as an obligatory field in the medical record of 
all of Maccabi's patients.  
 To implement a process by which data about previous smoking history will 
be automatically attached to any referral for a chest X-ray examination.   
  
This incident is an example of how a single adverse  event can serve as the 
basis for drawing wider conclusions with implications for the whole system.  
 
However, the question of the borders of the generalization in the Risk 
Management process remains, of how wide the implications of a single case may 
be. For example, it could be claimed, that this single case demonstrated the need 
to examine all aspects concerning the data available to the radiologists; the case 
may have demonstrated a need to examine all aspects of all data that is 
available to all specialists. In short, how deep and wide should the investigation 
be? This is basically a practical matter. According to the RCA (Root Cause 
Analysis) approach, it is imperative to reach the roots of all the factors that 
caused the incident, because this is the only way to prevent similar incidents 
from occurring again. However, due to shortage of resources, this approach in 
not always practical. It is not economically feasible to investigate in depth all the 
abnormal incidents that occur in a multi-risk environment. Therefore, this 
approach, serves in the investigations of large scale accidents, the likes of: 
passenger plane crashes, mishaps in nuclear reactors, large scale epidemics 
etc. Since, most incidents are not investigated according to the RCA approach, it 




 Incident B  
 
Ticlidil  (Clopidogrel) is an anticoagulant  medication, prescribed in cases  blood 
dilution is required . It may reduce the count of white blood cells. Early detection 
of the side effect and termination of treatment with Ticlidil, may stop the count 




recommended to implement a computerized warning that will pop-up, whenever 
the medication is prescribed.  
 
"Attention! You have just prescribed Ticlidil, which has caused some deaths in 
recent years, due to suppression of white blood cell generation. Have you tested 
white cell count once every two weeks? If leukocyte values are 30 or more 
percent lower, than the values before the commencement of the treatment, even 
if the present values are within the norm – it is imperative to consider stopping 
the treatment".  
 
We may ask, as we did concerning the first case, how widespread the 
implications of the case may be:  
 
 Would it not be advisable to examine all serious side effects, resulting 
from medications that are within Maccabi's medication basket, and to seek 
ways to minimize all possible adverse events?  
 Was the above case described inevitable? Were it not possible to know, 
by the time that Ticlidil was included in  Maccabi's medications basket, 
that lack of due precautions, may result in serious repercussions?  
 
We may conclude that the degree of generalization from a single incident to the 
whole system depends on the following factors:  
 
 Adoption of the systemic approach by the Risk Management entity, and its 
acceptance by the organization.  
 The severity of the outcomes of the incident – readiness to invest in 
preventing future accidents is often a function of the severity of losses. 
Therefore, the degree of inclusion from an incident depends on the 
severity of the accident. 
 Detection of grave and chronic risks during the investigation of an adverse 




How to set priorities, when everything seems urgent?  
 
It could be claimed, that since Risk Management is usually responsive to appeals 
from other entities in the organization, it does not initiate activities and thus has 
no need to set priorities. However, this is only true of the reactive approach to 






It is important to note, that within the Aviation model in general and the Israeli Air 
Force model in particular, the yearly work plans are based on several inputs: 
 
 Analysis of adverse events that occurred in the preceding years, and an 
attempt to identify new tendencies and their meanings. 
 A wider analysis of trends, within the whole system, and their meanings 
from the Risk Management point of view.  
 Points of reference and directives from the senior management. 
 
In our view, Maccabi's Risk Management activities, were mature enough to 
consider all these inputs only in the years 2002-2003. The first yearly report 
covering all Risk Management activities, as well as debriefings of adverse events 
and their meanings, covered the year 2003.   
 
In addition, since the department was usually under-staffed in relation to the 
number of incidents that were reported or should be debriefed,  priority setting 
and resource allocation, were crucial to guarantee that some proactive Risk 
Management activities would be performed, beside all the routine reactive 
activities. 
 
Since, the department adopted the proactive approach, from its very 
establishment, working plans were defined, discussed and confirmed by the 
management, from the first year.  
 
The following table presents the essence of the Risk Management department 
work plans in the years 1997-2001 
 
The first plan for 1997, posts general, long term, strategic objectives. The 
objectives and assignments are general aimed to establish  the infrastructure for 
future assignments. The department lacked experience in forming operative 
plans, and the unknown was greater than the known. Therefore, the department 
based the work plan on the general premises of Risk Management. 
 
The main goal for 1998 was the augmentation of self- initiated reporting by 
physicians of their own errors, a precondition for effective Risk Management. 
Several other goals were defined, among them: establishment of a computerized 
data system, establishing an organizational infrastructure to deal with 
recommendations, and the establishment of a 'hotline' to receive physician's self 





The year 1999, was characterized by the intention to institutionalize the 
department's activities within the organization. Among those, were the obligatory 
reporting of adverse events, handling of recommendations and setting the 
debriefing as a part of the organizational culture. Other goals aimed at the 
absorption of Risk Management activities within the organization, such as the 
formalities of imparting Risk Management activities to the districts, development 
and assimilation of the Risk Management doctrines within the organization, 
establishment of physician/patient communication workshops etc. Physician's 
reporting of adverse events was declared as compulsory in August 2000.  
 
In 2000, the department started its field activities; these included initiated 
prevention and improving the quality of physician's self-reports. Some of these 
goals, were already set for 1999, but due to their complexity, they were continued 
in 2000. It is important to note, that every year; new layers of operations were 
added to the existing activities.  
 
In may be stated that in 2001, the department “closed circles”. In order to 
become effective,  within the organization it defined the main goal for that year as 
"Starting and accompanying quality improvement processes which follow 
recommendations from reported incidents". This was the fifth year of the 
department's existence, and it became clear, that professional debriefings and 
recommendations were not good enough to establish an active standing within 
the organization. In order to insure proper implementation of its 
recommendations, it was decided that the Risk Management department would 
take an active role in these processes.  
 
The work plan for 2002 included seven unique aspects which made it an 
important benchmark:  
 
 The plan was based on a resolution of Maccabi's secretariat, which ratified 
at the beginning of 2001 the functional model of the IAF's ASQAD. The 
Directorate is a professional body which: "Debriefs, advises, inspects and 
guides on all safety matters in the Israeli Air Force". 
 
 Supporting the plan with main insights from the department's activities, 
among these: "Ambiguity of management hierarchy, lack of uniformity in 
the definitions of tasks and boundaries of responsibility, a lack of 
professional cadres in the center and in the districts, the imbalance 





 The plan was based on the current standard of JCAHO - Joint 
Commission Standards in Support of Patient Safety and 
Medication/Health Care Error (January 2001). The standard aims at 
“Developing and implementing of a long term, continuous program of 
measurement, evaluation and improvement of performance, and 
improving patient's safety". 
 
 The plan was created by following the three major functions of ASQAD: 
Risk Management, Quality Management of the medical treatment and 
Research and Development..  
 
 Potential 'obstacles' were determined, concerning each activity within the 
program. For example, three 'obstacles' were identified regarding the 
debriefing of adverse events: "A lower than desired rate of debriefed 
incidents, lack of cooperation with other departments and problems 
regarding the interface between the administration and the medical 
departments". This attitude can be regarded as 'self' Risk Management, 
namely the implementation of Risk Management principles to the 
department's own activities. 
 
 Resources were allocated toward the achievement of each of the four 
program‟s aims. These are specified in the sequel. 
 
 A reference was made to the departments own resources, regarding the 
need to adjust and develop these toward the implementation of the plan.  
 
Four main targets were established within the plan: 
 
1. Deepening the awareness of the medical staff to patient safety issues. 
 
2. Treatment of mishaps, and investigation of risk factors. 
 
3. Implementation of the management decree, regarding the positioning of 
the department as an advisory, controlling, and guiding entity of safety and 
quality matters, according to the SQAD model.  
 
4. Matching the department resources (Standardization, Personnel 







It is evident that the diagram that most of the department resources, as well as its 
advisory resources, were allocated to the achievement of the first two targets: 
Deepening the awareness of the medical staff to the patient safety issue, 
mishaps handling and investigation of risk factors.  
 
The 2002 work plan reflects a determination to adopt the organizational structure 
of the IAF's ASQAD. This determination by itself reflects a growing understanding 
that the organizational structure has a crucial importance for the implementation 
of the department goals  and that the variety of activities developed through the 
years, necessitates a formal and compatible organizational structure.  
 
2003 work plan represents a partial transformation to the new organizational 
structure, based generally on the ASQAD model. Shortage of resources and 
personnel prevented a full transformation. Toward the end of 2002, a Quality 
Management setup was established as a part of the Health Division in Maccabi, 
with  two functional units:  
 
1. Quality of the medical service, headed by Dr. Racheli Wilf-Miron, the 
former head of Risk Management Department.  
 
2. Risk Management, headed by Dr. Michal Gindi. 
  
The transformation to the new organizational structure necessitated a redefinition 
of the domains of the new entities, their working interfaces one with the other and 





The 2003 work plan reflects three strategic targets: 
 
1. Continuation of Risk Management activities in their current form while 
establishing a working dialog with the districts, turning Risk Management 
output into management tools, collaboration of decision makers and of 
those involved in adverse events in the recommendations drawing 
processes. 
 
2. A redefinition of all domains of activity of the SQAD setup, its two units 
and redefinition of all inner and outer interfaces.  
 
3. Stabilization of the new organizational structure, and its positioning as the 
leading medical Q Management  organ  within Maccabi.  
 
Five main missions were defined for the Risk Management department: 
 
1. Augmenting the commitment and the capabilities of the medical staff to 
improve patient safety. 
 
2. Definition and implementation of work patterns with the districts and the 
attached units. 
 
3. Debriefing of adverse events, and preventing these from reoccurring. 
 
4. Analyzing and investigating risk factors and defining of preventive 
measures on the organization level. 
 
5. Development of professional and managerial infrastructure for the 
department.  
 
The allocation of the department's in-house and consulting resources is 








It is clear that, like in 2002, most of the department's resources were allocated to 
the investigation and prevention of adverse events. 
 
Two main targets have been added to the plan since 2002: 
 
 Definition and implementation of work patterns with the districts and the 
attached units. Although appearing in previous plans this subject gained in 
stature by being defined as a separate one.  
 
 Investigation and analysis of risk factors and defining systemic prevention 
plans. This was also not a new domain, but it gained new stature by being 
'promoted' as a separate target. It was supported by initiated risk mapping 
activities, which will be described later in this  chapter.  
 
The resources allocated to consulting activities were reduced in 2002-2003 
compared to previous years. These were un-proportionally allocated to support 








 Work plans 1997-2001 
 
Year Targets Missions Methods 
1997  Improving the 
healthcare quality  
 Reducing expenses 
due to malpractice 
claims 
 Improving reputation 
and public image 
 Developing tools to 
appraise activities and 
outcomes 
 Allocating and mapping of 
risk domains 
 Improving Risk Management 
quality of service 
 Management of legal actions 
 Establishing the Risk 
Management forum 
 Proactive clinical approach 
 Combining Risk 
Management with QA 
 Use of statistical tools 
 Identification of potentially 
risky behaviors  
1998  Improving physician's 
reporting 
 Establishing a follow-up 
committee that meets 
regularly 
 Forming and formulating 
Risk Management concepts, 
including work patterns with 
the districts 
 Establishment of a 
computerized data system 
 Promoting 2-3 subjects such 
as legal consent forms, alerts 
in the medical record etc 
 Establishing organizational 
infrastructure to deal with 
recommendations  
 Hot Line for Physicians' 
reports  
 Developing a computerized 
system and feeding 500 files. 
(Eilat) 
 Regarding the physician as 
the department's preferred 
client 
1999  Institutionalizing of an 
mandatory reporting 
 Initiating process 
improvements 
 Imparting the culture 
of reporting adverse 
events 
 Institutionalizing of 
recommendation 
treatment process 
 Continued development of 
Risk Management concepts, 
and assimilating them in  the 
organization 
 Setting the procedures of 
Risk Management 
decentralization in the 
districts 
 Checking  the feasibility of 
establishing a Risk 
Management company 
conjointly with EILAT   
 Risk assessment in  clinics, 
in cooperation with 
independent physicians 
organization 
 Establishment of Hot Line, 
active 12 hours a day 
 Initiation of physician/patient 
communication workshops 
 Handling the reports 
received by the department. 
 Consulting professionals in 
the center and districts 
regarding risk evaluation  
and  reducing the  exposure 
to them 
 Instructing the medical staff 
how to   avoid and manage 
errors 
 'Private' real-time Risk 
Management counseling to 
physicians 
 Partnership in planning new 
services and activities in 
order to reduce risk exposure 
 Integration of QA activities 










Year Targets Missions Methods 
2000  Transforming the 
focus from the center 
to the periphery 
 Risk identification by 
initiated mapping 
 Implementation of 
CEO decree regarding 
increasing  medical 
staff reporting  
 Developing and running a 
physician/patient 
communication workshop 
 Producing Maccabi's Risk 
Management dossier 
 Control and standardization 
of workflow  in the clinics   
 Risk Management 
instructions for new 
physicians 
 Widening the knowledge 
base of risk assessment and 
prevention 
 Continuing the development 
of Risk Management data 
base as means for risk 
identification, evaluation and 
recommendations follow up.  
 Retroactive feeding of 250 
debriefed incidents 
 Systematic and structured 
analysis of case-files 
 Active participation in 
conclusions drawing and 
defining of prevention plans 
 Control of recommendations 
implementation 
 Compulsory Risk 
Management instruction of 
new  physicians 
 Physician/patient 
communication  workshops 
 Initiated mapping in new 
established  high risk sites 
 Establishing an Risk 
Management interface within 
the medical record 
 Pilot quality audit at 
Physician's clinic, combining 
control and standardization 
 Marketing Risk Management, 
articles and conventions 
2001  Initiation and 
supervision of quality 
improvements, based 
on recommendations 
from debriefing of 
adverse events. 
 Continued activity of the hot-
line-  800 calls anticipated 
 Continued debriefings of 
adverse events-at least 300 
 Starting quality improvement 
projects-  at  least 3 








The following table presents the main characteristics and goals of each year, as 
they are reflected in the Risk Management work plans. Two cycles are 
identifiable, the second of which is at its beginning. They are characterized by the 
following stages: self-definition, operative focusing, institutionalize activities, 





Year Main Characteristic Main goals 
1997 Self definition according to the 
Aviation Model 
Posing strategic and infrastructural long term goals 
1998 Operative focusing Improving reporting of adverse events 
1999 Institutionalize activities Establishing reporting of adverse events and 
recommendations implementation. 
2000 Assimilation and bequeathing Field work,  proactive Risk Management, increasing 
physician's reporting 
2001 Closures Starting quality improvement following 
recommendations 
2002 Redefinition of goals and 
means 
Reorganization along the working principles of 
SQAD, Internal Risk Management to achieve 
effectiveness and exhaustion of resources. 
Standardization of work processes 
2003 Institutionalization of activities 
and transformation to a quality 
setup 
Risk Management developing, definitions of working 




What is the meaning of an X number of events sharing similar 
characteristics? 
 
The topic that we discuss in this section is crucial to Risk Management, as it 
considers two basic issues concerning the usefulness of debriefing adverse 
events:  
1. Are there any common characteristics of adverse events, or is each 
incident unique? 
 
2. Assuming, that there are common characteristics, how can this serve 
preventing reoccurrence of adverse events?  
 
Of course, if there are no common characteristics in adverse events, then 
debriefing them is meaningless, since the lessons that are learnt, have no use in 
preventing similar occurrences. In this case the reason for debriefing an adverse 
event, is related to managing the event in order to minimize losses and provide 
professional feedback to the involved staff.  If we assume, there are common 
characteristics, then the lessons learnt from one incident may help preventing 








A qualitative study, based on analysis of reported adverse  events   
 
Despite, the awareness to its beneficial outcomes in preventing future mishaps, 
initiated mapping of probable risks, was first introduced to Maccabi in the work 
plan for 2000.  
 
In a report of an initiated risk mapping, dealing with errors in the medication 
process (2004), initiated mapping was defined as: "A proactive process of 
studying and analyzing a phenomenon within the Risk Management domain, 
based on various sources of information, in addition to reports of adverse 
events". 
 
The first attempts to perform risk mapping, were an expression of a desire to deal 
in a deep and systematic manner with two major risks, which were identified by 
the Risk Management Department. In retrospective, we may say that despite 
their significance, or maybe because of it, dealing with them at that time, was 
beyond the competence of the department and the organization.     
 
 Case A – Continuity of Care 
 
The first issue allocated for initiated mapping was “Continuity of Care”. Modern 
medicine is characterized, among others, by a fragmentation of the medical 
process. That is, the patient when approaching medical assistance interacts with 
more than one physician or medical institution. It is crucial that all institutions 
share all data concerning the patient; therefore, a great importance is ascribed to 
the manner by which the patient is transferred between physicians. 
 
Since the transition between physicians is sometimes bumpy, it may present a 
risk to patient's welfare. For example, a GP in the community may be informed 
that a patient is sensitive to penicillin. If this information is not available to the 
hospital staff, they may prescribe penicillin with grave consequences. There are 
other issues, concerning the transition of patients between physicians, for 
example: a transition of patients to another physician after their physician departs 
his duty; transfer of data among specialists, especially in view of Maccabi's policy 
of enabling patients‟ free choice physicians, etc. 
 
Complex technological issues are also involved, especially those concerning 
interfaces between information systems. In addition, there are, medico-legal 
issues involved, such as patient‟s information immunity and  according  to 




In order to proved the subject due attention, a committee was formed that 
comprised representatives from the Risk Management Department, from the 
districts, and us as consultants. After few months of working on this project, a 
decision was taken to halt it. Among other reasons for this decision was the 
difficulty to maintain routine committee meetings.  
 
In retrospect, we may say that the failure to promote the subject, was an 
outcome of the following factors: 
 
 A lack of a clear, uniform definition of the term 'Transition between 
physicians', which could have refer to either of the following: 
o Transition from the community (outpatient) to the hospital (inpatient) 
environments and back.  
o Flow of data between physicians in order to assure Continuity of Care. 
o Departure of a physician and the transition of his patients to another 
physician.  
o Continuity of treatment while a physician is temporarily missing.  
 
 Lack of knowledge and experience in leading and managing a process of 
that complexity. This was the first mapping project conducted by the 
department.  
 
 Lack of a research plan and a clear definition of the subject. The planning 
and definitions of subject and scope were made in the course of the 
process.   
 
 A lack experience in cooperation with representatives of the district. This 
was the first mapping that was carried out by the department in 
cooperation with the districts. 
 
 The nature of the issue. Transition between physicians is a known 
characteristic of modern ambulatory healthcare system, which has 
negative and positive aspects. Actually, there was no need to map the 
subject in order to conclude that Risk Management is needed to minimize 






 Case B  - Physician- Patient Communication 
 
The second issue, Physician- Patient Communication, was selected because of a 
large number of adverse events, that were attributed  to inadequate Physician- 
Patient Communication. A number of studies focusing in this issue were 
published in the late 1990's, and which attributed Risk Management value to 
Physician- Patient Communication, added to the impetus. 
  
Consideration of the issue began at the end of 1999, when it became evident that 
15% of all reported adverse events were caused by deficient physician- patient 
communication. 
 
Studies that dealt with the subject described the typology of communication and 
the effect of positive communication on the rate of malpractice claims and on the 
quality of the medical treatment.  
 
Levinson (1994) presented the following findings regarding the subject: 
  
 Within obstetrics: No significant correlation was found between the quality 
of medical care and the history of legal actions. This finding is consistent 
with findings of other studies that found that the quality of treatment is not 
the crucial factor in the patient's decision of whether to sue or not to sue.  
 Patients of physicians that had a record of legal actions were less satisfied 
with the treatment, than patients of physicians who had no such record. 
 The same proficiencies in inter-personal communication that decrease the 
chances of legal actions, effect satisfaction of the patients and 
improvement in the quality of care.   
 
Levinson et. al. (1997), defined several indicators that distinguish between 
physicians, in Primary Care, who were legally sued and those that were not: 
 
 A longer duration of the physician/patient encounter. 
 More intensive use of facilitation statements. 
 Dispensation of more information regarding the encounter. 
 Use of humor.  
 






 The Paternalistic – the physician plays the role of a health guardian of 
the patient. He defines and implements all particulars of the treatment.  
 
 Informative consumerism – the physician supplies technical information 
so that the patient can choose the treatment which suits him. The 
physician is in the role of a technical expert. The patient's values are not 
scrutinized and his sovereignty is preserved.  
 
 Interpretative Communication – the physician interprets the values and 
needs of the patients, so that he can assist the patient in deciding on the 
course of treatment.  
 
 Deliberative Communication – the physician tries to assist the patient in 
choosing the most suitable option for treatment. The physician goes well 
beyond dispensing technical data, by employing his moral authority in 
convincing the patient that a certain treatment is preferable to all others.  
 
The initial Idea, raised by the project team was to find an existing communication 
workshop, customize it to the medical surrounding and run in with the 
participation of Maccabi's physicians. The workshop had to fulfill two functions: to 
gather information on the unique characteristics of physician/patient 
communication problem in Maccabi, and to address it in a thorough manner.  
 
We observed, some workshops in action, among which a designated workshop 
which was developed at  Beer Sheba University's social work department, for the 
Soroka medical center. None of the off the shelf workshops was found suitable 
for Maccabi.  
 
It was decided to develop a designated workshop, according to Maccabi's special 
needs, by a team that included the deputy of RMD, a professional workshop 
supervisor and one of our Risk Management consultants. Throughout many 
design meetings, adverse events were studied and the workshop was developed.  
 
The first pilot workshop was run in February 2000 in the Sharon District, thanks 
to the willingness of the district manager to participate in it. The workshop took a 
full day to deliver and it was divided to following sections:  
 
 Opening remarks, given by the district manager 
 Introduction of the  instructors 




 Introduction of the participants 
 Topic A: Physician- Patient Communication as a possible source for errors 
and  mishaps 
 Topic B: Physician- Patient Communication as a professional concept 
 Topic C: Physician- Patient Communication – identifying obstacles  
 Summing up and a feedback questionnaire  
 
Thirteen physicians, participated in the workshop, most of them GP's. The 
feedback was very positive; a strong emphasis was put on the importance of 
case studies as a Risk Management tool.  
 
The following rable presents the feedback for the 1
st
 workshop  (on a 1-5 scale) 
 
Topic Average 
To what degree did the workshop increase your knowledge of the subject? 3.88 
To what degree did the workshop provide you with tools to cope with the 
subject? 
3.77 
From the professional point of view, was the workshop conducted well? 4.33 
 
The feedbacks from similar workshops that had been run by the end of 2000 in 
different districts were almost similar. However, due to a shortage of resources it 
was decided that not all off Maccabi physicians will participate in the workshops.  
 
In a report submitted by the project team in May 2002, three factors were 
presented, as being responsible for the difficulties in Physician/Patient 
Communication within Maccabi: 
 
 The professional perception of the physician, dictates the amount of 
significance he or she allocates to Physician/ Patient Communication as 
influencing the quality of care. It seems that regarding this issue, there is a 
significant variance among the medical specialties.  
 
 The physician compensation concept encourages them to see as many 
patients as possible in given frame of time. Besides the impact on 
Physician/ Patient Communication, this system may transmit a hidden 
message that values quantity more than quality.  
 
 In most cases, the expectations, the cultural background and the values of 
the patient are disregarded. The physicians, indicate a difficulty to deal 




The project team reached some general conclusions regarding the project: 
 
 Managing the Physician/Patient Communication, is the core of proactive 
Risk Management. 
 
 Improving Physician/Patient Communication may significantly reduce 
Physicians' errors and diminish their damages.  
 
 Managing the Physician/Patient Communication depends on the 
physician; therefore it is imperative to reinforce the physicians' 
commitment in this respect. 
 
 The physicians' commitment is influenced by the messages which they 
receive from the organization, compensation concept is crucial in this 
respect. 
 
 The absence of one medical entity that is in charge of all aspects of the 
medical treatment, does not allow for neither professional control, nor 
nurturing communication with the patient. 
 
 Those who attended the workshops, perceived them in a positive light, 
and as a mean to improve Physician/Patient Communication.  
 
The team recommended the continuation of the project with different audiences: 
new physicians, specialists in different domains, administrative physicians and 
district physicians.  
 
The submission of the report, signaled the termination of the project.  
 
We feel, however, it is important to understand, considering the criticality of the 
subject and considerable resources already invested, why the project was 
terminated.  
 
Some factors, similar to those that contributed to the failure of the 'Continuity of 
Care' project, collaborated to the untimely termination of this project: 
 An attempt to define and implement a solution before all particulars of the 
problem were investigated with regard to: 
o Analysis of the current situation based on a representative survey. 
o A thorough analysis of adverse events representing the subject.  






 Lack of research experience, and an attempt to define the subject matter 
and the methods of research while running the project. 
 
 Physician/Patient Communication is a fundamental and very complicated 
issue, comprising many factors and implications. It was preferable to 
define and cope with a narrower issue.  
 
 The solution that was selected was visibly impractical due its high cost, 
coordination problems and the difficulty in delivering the workshop to all of 
Maccabi's medical staff.  
 
The following table presents a cost estimate of a full solution. 
 
Item Cost of unit Num of Units Total 
Developing a designated 
workshop 
$3,000 15 $45,000 
Instruction – cost of the team $2,000 250 $500,000 
Loss of work days by physicians $600 3,500 $2,100,00 
Total   $2,645,000 
 
Assuming a 10% per year turnover in physicians, an additional sum of 
$250,000 would have to be invested in providing the new physicians with 
the required skills.     
 
 The heterogeneity of Maccabi's clinical staff, requires development and 
customization of the workshops to specific audiences, according to 




 Case  C – Adverse Drug Events – ADE 
 
In the middle 1990's, ADE has become very popular within the Risk Management 
community due to three factors: 
 
 The process of medication may be considered as a simple one, when 
compared to other medical procedures, that involve complex decision 
making under condition of uncertainty and complex proficiencies that 
require high level psychomotor skills and high level crew coordination. 
Therefore, we can assume that it is feasible to improve these processes 





 The rates of errors in the issuance of medications are relatively high – 
between 5%-10% of all prescriptions. Leape (1991) claims that ADE is the 
leading adverse phenomenon in hospitalization (19% of all medical 
errors), followed by post operative infections (14%) and technical errors 
(13%). These findings are based on an analysis of more than 30,000 
hospital files in 1984 in the USA. Other studies, conducted in hospitals 
indicate different rates. One of them states that the rate of severe ADEs, 
those leading to hospitalization, irreversible damage, or death to be 6.7%. 
The rate of ADE's causing death was 0.32%. This rate places ADE as the 
4-6 cause of death in the USA (Lazaou, 1998). In 1993 ADEs killed 7,000 
people in the USA as compared to 6,000 killed in work accidents. Classen 
et al (1997) report a 2.9%-3.7 rate of ADE among inmates, half of them 
were preventable. Brennan et al, report a 3.7% rate of ADE among all 
inmates, 28% of which, were caused by negligence. They surveyed more 
than 30,000 inmate files in NY and found that 2.6% of ADEs were causes 
of permanent disabilities and 13.6% caused death. 
 
 Publication of the IOM reports, ”To Err in Human” and “Crossing the 
Quality Chasm”, set in motion some processes, at the level of the 
American administration, that were intended to reduce mortality, caused 
by preventable  medical  errors by 50% within five years; reducing ADE 
seemed like a suitable domain to start with.  
 
In 2002, the Risk Management Department decided to initiate a study within a 
domain where it can prove effectiveness, and complete a whole process, 
including a definition of an intervention plan. Following a spate of ADEs, it was 
decided to focus on this subject.  
 
The process was carried out by a multidisciplinary team that included physicians, 
nurses, pharmacists and medical informatics and was lead by deputy head of 
Risk Management Department with our assistance.  
 
 
o Background and Method  
The mapping dealt with medication errors that occur all along the medication 
process, starting with the doctor's prescription and ending with the patient 





Studies, carried out throughout the world, mostly in hospitals, have shown that 
programs that deal with ADE, tend to have positive results. Studies among 
ambulatory and inmates patients proved that errors in medication dispensation, 
especially ADE's, are more common than was reported in conventional studies. 
ADE's have a great damage potential to the patient, cost a lot to the healthcare 
system, and are preventable in about half of the cases, since most mishaps are 
due to the human factor.  
 
Studies that have been carried out since the late 1980s, reported clear 
recommendations from public, governmental and private bodies, concerning 
more accurate documentation of ADEs. In addition, many plans intended to 
reduce ADEs were devised. These were proven successful. 
 
The mapping team posed three main goals for the project: 
 
 To fully map the process of medication dispensation in Maccabi.  
 To define all risks, within the different phases of the process and its 
interfaces. 
 To define an intervention plan aimed to reduce the probability of errors in 
the process, to minimize the damage therein and to implement the plan.  
 
During 1996-2003, 3,400 adverse events were reported to the Risk Management 
department, 127 out of which had to do with medication dispensation. 109 
incidents were analyzed in depth.  
 
Two thirds of the incidents were caused by physicians and the rest by 
pharmacists, nurses and other clinical staff.  
 
The most common physician errors in this respect were: prescribing the wrong 
medication, prescribing a medication despite a known sensitivity and errors in 
dosage. 
 
The  project  team, employed a variety of methods to gather data: analyzing 
reported incidents, observations in clinics, nurses' rooms and pharmacies, 





The mapping process came out with a list of  24 risks in different phases of the 
process, 11- within the physician's domain, 4 in the nurses' and 9 in the 
pharmacy domain. All risks were described and possible solutions were 
suggested.  
 
Four risks, were defined as acute and demanding immediate solutions, six were 
defined as second grade risks and fourteen as third grade. The following is an 
example of an acute risk and possible means to control it:  
 
The risk  
Prescribing a certain medication and its dosage, based on personal 
acquaintance with the patient and relevant data from the medical record. The risk 
arises when the personal familiarity is superficial and the medical record is 
lacking in relevant data. 
 
A possible Control (solution) 
To study the feasibility of defining clinical conditions,  relevant to making a 
decision as to what medicine to prescribe, for example chronic diseases and 
making  this information easy accessible by the physician. 
. 
Updating, in the anamnesis sheet, the weight of youngsters, younger than 18 
years, at age intervals to be defined by a professional team.  
 
Upon opening the medication module in the EMR, data concerning age, weight, 
and relevant clinical conditions will be presented automatically.  
 
The teamwork proved, that it is possible to create a multidisciplinary, mission 
oriented team, and successfully perform a complicated task within Maccabi.  
 
Toward the end of 2004, the project won acclaim from Maccabi's higher 
echelons. The project's steering committee authorized the intervention plan and 
allocated the resources needed for its implementation.   
 
The third initiated Risk Management project in Maccabi was successful in its 




In our opinion, the ADE project was successful due to the following factors:  
 
 The topic – ADE may not be the most significant phenomenon within 
medical Risk Management, however, it is a well-defined one and the risks 
entailed, are manageable. Previous two topics, are fundamental to 
medicine, and have serious implications concerning patient safety and 
quality of care; however, treating them is very complicated, because they 
are touching on amorphous aspects like 'professional culture', the 
boundaries of the moral and professional responsibility of the physician 
etc. The manageability of ADE was the reason for choosing it as one of 
the first frontiers for Risk Management in healthcare in Britain and the 
USA.    
 
 Managing the mapping as a project – the previous projects run in the 
available time of the department managers, while priority was assigned 
from time to time, especially when a new relevant incident was reported. 
In contrast, the ADE affair was a fully fledged project, including clear 
definitions of assignments, timetables and responsibilities. Most 
assignments were carried out as planned.  
 
 A multidisciplinary team – at the early stages of the project arrangement, it 
was recognized that in order to assign to all stages their due authority, all 
interests concerned with ADE should be represented in the team. The 
team included Risk Management personnel, physicians, nurses, 
pharmacists, a representative from medical informatics department and 
us, as Risk Management consultants. 
 
 The appointment of a steering committee – the members of the committee 
represented Maccabi‟s senior management, among them also the Head of 
the “Health Division” in Maccabi. The steering committee, besides its 
professional contribution, served as an emblem of organizational 
commitment. The project team, reported to the steering committee at the 




 Employment of a variety of data gathering methods – the medication 
process is very common one. All participants in the process are very 
experienced and have predetermined opinions and positions regarding the 
risks and the means to control them. In order to overcome these 
preconceptions, it was very important to study the process from all 
possible aspects, employing a variety of tools, among which were 
observations, structured interviews, analyzing of the work environment 
and tools, and learning from other  ADE studies.  
 
This year (2009) a new ADE project was initiated by the RMD, focusing on 
pharmacist errors, based on a relatively large data base of about 500 reports. 
This project is conducted as collaboration between the pharmacy division in the 












Lots of data without meaning – EMR as a source of 




Somewhere the organizational databases contain lots of meaningful 
information for improving Patient Safety. 
 
The widely quoted studies on physicians' errors, were based on a structured 
analysis of a relatively large number of medical records. An attempt was made to 
identify medical errors and deviations from the standard procedures, which were 
neither identified by the medical system, nor reported by the doctors involved. 
For example, in the Harvard University study, 30,195 randomly selected patient 
records were analyzed. It was found, that in 1,333 (3.7%) cases some harm was 
caused to the patients by physician errors (Brennan, et al (1991).  
 
In Israel, unlike in western medical systems, the ambulatory medical systems are 
mostly computerized. All Israeli HMO's, including Maccabi Healthcare Services , 
were computerized, starting in the mid 1980‟s and throughout the 1990‟s. The 
first systems were alpha-numeric, administrative, and they were upgraded to 
Windows-based systems that include clinical tiers. Currently, it's rare to find an  
Israeli ambulatory clinic, that documents medical encounters on paper.  
 
Porter (1999), reports that until 1989, when the computerization of the clinical 
processes started, the main computerized processes were administrative and 
dealt with members' entitlement and doctors' compensation. Later on, the clinical 
processes that were computerized included: uniformed recording of medical 
diagnoses and medications, a direct interface between the laboratories and the 
doctors' desk computers, automatic distribution of referrals to specialists and 
medical institutes, etc. Porter enumerates among the system's specifications and 
advantages: 
 
 Physician support: the system issues clinical reminders. For example 
when Otitis Media is diagnosed, a prompting window pops up the screen 
designating the proper antibiotic medication. In addition, specific 




stored in the system.  For example: "The patient did not undergo a routine 
blood pressure test, would you like to order one now?" 
 Quality control – the system issues a variety of reports, which serve the 
doctor and his superiors to compare the overall treatment with the 
common standards.  
 
Additional efforts are under way presently to further computerize private and 
public hospitals in Israel. Other projects will improve data sharing between the 
hospitals and the communities.  
 
The Patient's Rights Law, issued in Israel (1996), decreed that all medical 
information, accumulated during medical processes, belongs to the patients. 
Following the issuance of the law, new web applications, based on smart card 
technology, were developed which enable the patient free access to all his 
medical information. 
 
Beyond its managerial and clinical functions, the wide computerization of the 
medical information has wide Risk Management implications:   
 
 Continuity of care  – the information systems which document in a 
systematic and uniformed manner all medical encounters, and are 
available to all doctors, support medical treatment continuity, which is of 
utmost importance to the overall safety of the patients. However, the mere 
existence of the technology, does not insure that continuity, as witnessed 
in adverse events, in which doctors did not make use of all  the available 
information in their clinical decision making.   
 
 Medico-Legal aspects - The first document sought, after by a lawyer, 
who probes the feasibility of taking legal action against the medical system 
on behalf of his client, is the medical record. A computerized, well 
documented medical record, that faithfully reflects the medical process, 
may serve as evidence for the prosecution as well as the defense in cases 
of medical negligence. The growing availability of medical information, 
obliges the doctors to acquaint themselves with this information and 
consider it while deciding on the treatment processes. Moreover, the 
doctor is obliged to accurately feed the computerized system, since an 






 Debriefing – When a debriefing is required following an adverse event, 
the extensive medical record (encounters with the primary physicians, 
expert opinions, lab tests results etc.) is a first source of information 
regarding everything that occurred before, during and after the incidence. 
The medical record, enables a reconstruction of the medical process, 
during which the incidence occurred. This data is than compared to the 
versions submitted by all involved persons. Without the medical record, 
the only available source of information regarding the incident would have 
been the evidence of the people involved and their interpretations of the 
event. The function and the usefulness of the medical record, can be 
compared to the use of automatic data collection systems (the black box), 
and video cameras in Aviation. 
 
 Recommendations – Since computerized systems, are a significant aid 
to the doctors, it is possible to use them to influence work processes, to 
assist them in their decision making and in avoiding errors. In recent 
years, the rate of debriefing recommendations to be implemented using 
the computer systems of Maccabi is growing. It has become evident, that 
a minor modification of the computerized system may solve major Risk 
Management problems. For example, sounding an alert about patient‟s 
sensitivity to certain medications while writing down a prescription. The 
following diagram presents the rate of debriefing recommendations, that 









 Proactive prevention – The EMR, allows for the implementation of 
administrative and clinical guidelines that improve the medical treatment 
and patient‟s safety.  For example, it is relatively easy to implement 
directives regarding the performance of mammography to women above a 
certain age and at certain regularity, or to immediately stop prescribing a 
medication that has been found to be dangerous. Some published studies 
report the positive contribution of the use of EMR‟s in computer based 
clinical decision systems. These systems reduce the probability for errors 
and ameliorate patient's safety, Johnson et al, (1994).  
 
Traditionally, adverse events serve as 'raw material' for Risk Management 
processes, although considerable amounts of relevant data are stored in the 
medical records and other computerized systems, data that can be used for 
proactive prevention of errors. Researches that analyzed medical records and 
administrative process data, were able to discern considerable rates of medical 
errors. However, at present these processes are very costly and suffer from a 
lack of unequivocal criteria for the quality of the treatment. It is reasonable to 
assume, that in the future, we shall see better and more cost effective artificial 
intelligence systems, that will be able to analyze medical processes, to identify 
errors and pre-warn of them. 
 
For example, during our debriefings of grave adverse events in 'Maccabi', we 
discerned modifications in patient‟s encounters behavior, prior to the occurrence 
of a major adverse event. In most cases, the physicians were not aware of the 
changes in the encounter behavior and their meaning.  This type of patients 
encounter meta-analysis, can make the physician aware of possible changes in 




How EMR systems can be used to serve Risk Management needs.  
 
At the beginning of 1998, we participated in some meetings between 
representatives of the Risk Management department and managers of the  
Medical Control Department (MCD), whose function is to examine and certify the 
entitlement of members of the medical staff to receive payment for their activities. 
The information gathered by MCD, and its possible use for risk identification, 
were the reasons for these meetings. One of the examples demonstrated by the 
department, was of doctors who refer their patients for biopsies, but neglect to 
continue the process by reviewing the results and recommending the proper 




pathology, didn‟t receive the proper treatment. MCD, can deny payment to 
doctors who have not completed the process. In addition, the information that is 
at the disposal of the MCD, enables it to detect those doctors that significantly 
exceed the norm of certain clinical procedures, and to examine the necessity of 
each procedure recommended by them.  
 
Although, these meetings did not result in definite directions for actions, a sense 
that the information gathered by MCD has the potential to contribute to the 
identification of risks and the management of some of them does exist.  
 
In December 2001, we submitted, at the request of the heads of  the RMD, a 
detailed proposal for 'The application of Medical Control as a tool of Risk 
Management'. Among the specific suggestions for use of the information at the 
disposal of the MCD were: 
 
 Use of the MCD data as exposure indicators in calculating the rate of 
adverse events that occur in the performance of certain medical 
procedures. For example, the rate of adverse events in laparoscopy 
procedures. 
 
 Identification of excesses – for example, excessive performance of certain 
activities by doctors in certain areas of the country, during certain periods, 
etc. After establishing the reasons for these excesses, proper actions to 
reduce them can be recommended.    
 
 The study of other assumptions based on the ongoing risk management 
activities. For example, the relations between workload and physicians 
involvement in adverse events, and the study of the influence of 
demographic variables.  
 
In the end, no risk management operational processes based on the MCD data 
were developed by now. The main reason for this, was probably the new 
emphasis at Maccabi on the Centralized Medical Record project. This project 
was aimed to  make all the information concerning the patients and the medical 
procedures available, to all those who can make use of it in their work, including 
the RMD. 
 
The characterization phase of the project began towards the end of the year 
2000. The aim was to concentrate all the medical information concerning a 





The formal starting date of the project was on October 10, 2000, at a special 
seminar, that was lead by Maccabi‟s head of IT department. The Risk 
Management Department was represented by its head, Dr Racheli Wilf-Miron, 
who presented the alerts needed by physicians at the implementation of the 
Centralized Medical Record. The presentation was the summing up of the work 
done by the alerts subcommittee that was also lead by Dr Wilf-Miron. The 
subcommittee, defined the following objectives: 
 
 Patients – improving the quality of treatment by promoting improved 
healthcare and preventing errors.  
 
 Physicians – reducing exposure to errors, (preventive medicine) and more 
efficient usage of time. 
 
 HMO – improving total quality and minimizing errors = better economic 
results.   
 
It is evident, that these three objectives aim at minimizing errors made by 
physicians, as means for improving the quality of healthcare and reducing the 
costs of treatments. 
 
Some of the committee's recommendations have been implemented in recent 
years, among which are alerts on drug interactions, patients' sensitivity to certain 
medications, irregular outcomes of laboratory tests, including life-endangering 
indicators and more.  
 
The RMD bases its debriefings of adverse events on two major sources of 
information: interviews of all staff and management members that were involved 
in the incident, and a reconstruction of the incident using the electronically 
medical record. Since, the record is immuned to alterations and editing after it 
has been stored, it serves as an accurate documentation of the medical process. 
However, it should be noted that the quality of the medical records, varies with 








Summary   
 
Computerized data systems in Maccabi, as well as in all modern medical 
organizations, have great potential to assist in reactive and proactive Risk 
Management activities.  
 
Their main contribution in the reactive domain is the wealth of data that they 
contain, data that facilitates the reconstruction of the medical process prior to and 
during the adverse event. By reconstructing the causation process and errors, it 
becomes possible to examine how the incident developed, and to recommend on 
steps and means to prevent its reoccurrence.  
 
As for the proactive domain, computerized systems enable early identification of 
deviations from the suggested procedures, prior to error actual occurrence. They 
support clinical procedures through alerts, memos and clinical guidance, and by 
the application of preventive medicine. 
 
We observed, that the reactive implementation of the computerized systems is 
well developed, while first steps are being taken to make use of them in the 
proactive domain. We are certain, that future developments in both Medical 
professional culture and technology, will usher in an era when doctors will 
receive and implement computerized assistance in their clinical functions, 
























What about ROI (Return on Investment)? 
 
 






Risk Management activity requires resources. 
 
From the very start, as we introduced our proposal for Risk Management  
consulting, based on our experience in the Aviation sector, to Macabi‟s top 
management, a question was raised by the top managers "We understand how 
much this is going to cost us, but we do not quite understand the benefit to us" 
(Head of Procurement in 1998). 
 
As we have already discussed in chapter 6.5, the department headcount, grew 
with the years in order to better respond to the increase in overall activities. The 
department grew from 1/2 position in 1996 to 7.5 positions in 2003. This increase 
resulted in a substantial increase in the department's budgeting. 
 
The question whether the expenditure in the Risk Management is worthwhile 
economically, is a fundamental question for healthcare organizations which are 
increasingly operating under economic constraints and are required to prove they 
are not losing money. This is the reality of the of healthcare system in Israel and 
in other Western countries. Under these circumstances, investing in Risk 
Management, perceived as an expense, whose results are unclear and certain in 
the short run, is a question often raised, especially by managers who are in 
charge of allocating resources in healthcare organizations. 
 
It is important to note, that this question was resolved years ago in the Aviation 
domain because of the high cost of accidents as compared with the cost of 
running Risk Management activity. In addition, the insurance companies required 






From its very nature, Risk Management activity is fruitful in the long run. 
Therefore, vision is required from managers of healthcare organizations in order 
to be able to invest in the short term while others will reap results in the long 
term.   
   
It is important to note that this chapter, is not dealing with the many benefits of 
Risk Management but rather with the economic aspect of investing and profiting 
from Risk Management.  
 
The basic model showing investments in Risk Management and yields is 
illustrated in the following diagram. One can notice, that the relationship between 
investments in Risk Management and cost of risks is complex and linked by 
variables such as "Risk Management Awareness", "Level of Reporting of 
Adverse Events", "Claim Level", "Reactive and proactive Risk Management 
Activity", "Public opinion" etc.  
 
The model is based mainly on our experience in the Aviation sector and serves 
as an "Awareness Model" used by the Israeli Air Force in order to explain the 
variations in the level of "Near Accident" reporting and its relationship to lessons 
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How much does Risk Management cost? 
 
The reference in professional literature to the costs of Risk Management is 
mainly from the insurance point of view. This is because evaluating the cost of 
risk, is used in order to determine the premium paid to the insurance company.  
 
Moscicki and Wrobel (1996), describe the Cost of Risk Index by Barlow, who was 
President and Risk Manager of Risk and Insurance Management Society in the 
USA. In 1962, Barlow developed the Cost of Risk Index, which included four 
main components: 
 
 Insurance premiums and other transfer costs. 
 
 Losses that were not insured – deductibles, amount of loss greater than 
allowed in the policy and loss not covered in the policy. 
 
 Expenses associated with Risk Management activity – salaries to Risk 
Management team, fire protection, security, contingency plans, 
environmental, medical, transportation etc. 
 
 Cost of executing Risk Management plans and insurance. 
 
The authors claim, that the most difficult component to measure is "Risk 
Management Expenses" due to the fact that there is no uniform and agreeable 
definition of what this component includes and the complexity associated with 
collecting the data. These are the reasons why in majority of studies conducted 
on the costs of Risk management, this component is not defined.   
 
The theoretical dilemma hidden behind the attempt to estimate the cost of Risk 
Management activity is economical and does not take into account the added 
benefits of Risk Management activities as described in chapter 6.8.  
 
The dilemma, being mainly economical, presents, on one hand, the cost of Risk 
Management activities as a component in the CRI – Cost of Risk Index – and, on 
the other hand, the influence of Risk Management activity on the total CRI value.   
 
Our experience shows, that in most cases this dilemma can not be easily 
resolved, because the fruits of Risk Management activities are long term while 





In Aviation, this dilemma is quite secondary, because one accident, resulting in 
loss of human life and of the aircraft, is equal, in economic terms, to the cost of 
Risk Management activities on a wide range for several years. In Medicine, on 
the other hand, even if a significant harm was caused to a patient, It does not 
necessarily translate into financial costs, and if it does, it is already imbedded in 
the insurance policy.  
 
Since the consequences of an adverse event in the medical sector are more 
remote in time and influence, the dilemma of investing resources in Risk 
Management is often brought up, mainly by managers and financial managers.  
 
 
How to measure RM benefits in Healthcare ? 
 
In most modern organizations, those which are not philanthropic or non-profit 
organizations, the main measurement of success is the financial profit.   
 
Therefore, if we wish to measure immediate results, we encounter an inherent  
Measurement problem. Head and Horn II (1991), indicate that while measuring 
the contribution of Risk Management activity, one can consider Result Standards 
and Activity Standards. They believe that many Risk Management managers do 
not feel comfortable with good results in a certain year since they are not 
convinced that their activity is what caused the achievement. They feel that luck 
may be the reason rather, than their own activity that year. Therefore, Risk 
Management managers, often prefer to be evaluated on activities which they 
performed, quantitative and qualitative, but not necessarily on actual results. This 
approach suffers from apparent detriments in organizations which have  business 
orientation since they do not use the spoken language in the organization, i.e. 
return on Investment.  
 
The issue of measuring the department's effectiveness, came up mainly at 
important junctions, while the department was developing: during year end 
summary and preparation of next year work plan, during discussions on 
manpower requirements and during discussions regarding organizational 






Most of the times, the department chose to show its activities using the Activity 
Standard approach. This was accepted by the medical staff, but less so by 
management, which strived to evaluate the department's activities in economic 
terms.  
 
The indicator adopted by the Risk Management Department to reflect its 
affectivity, was related to the reporting rate of adverse events in general and 
particularly to the proportion of self initiated reporting.    
 
In the following diagram, the trend of reporting adverse events in the years 2000-
2004, is presented, without reports that were classified as A1 (without harm to 
the patient, that were handled  only basically, see chapter 6.7) 
 
It can be observed that, in these 5 years the reporting level has doubled, which 
reflects an average early increase of about 20%. 
 
Although, this index,  doesn't serve as evidence for the financial gain, due to Risk 
Management activities, this argument is mentioned by Risk Management 
professionals, widely as supporting the case of association between increase in 
reporting scope and improvement in patient safety. 










In Aviation, we ound an indirect correlation between the number of "near misses" 
reports and the number of "major accidents" reports. That is, as the number of 
reports of minor events increased, while the number of major accidents 
decreased. The explanation given to this phenomena has to do with the 
increased awareness to safety. That is, high level of awareness to safety results 
in more reporting of "near misses" and in more activity intended to prevent 
accidents.      
 
Although, the data presented in the following diagram is of events in which harm 
was evident and "near misses", we can consider  this as a major achievement, 
reflecting an increase in Macabi‟s awareness to Risk Management  
.   
The diagram, which shows the trends of reporting of severe adverse events by 
source of reporting, stresses the increase in level of awareness to Risk 
Management by Maccabi physicians. Over the years, their level of reporting of 
their own errors, increased while that of the administrative source decreased.  










Measuring the financial benefits of RM in Healthcare 
 
It is interesting to show the various points of view voiced during the initial stages 
of the Risk Management department. We encountered three points of views:  
 
 From senior management (General Manager and Head of Medical 
Division) – strategic view which regards the contribution of Risk 
Management, not only as means for  saving or making money, but also for 
its intrinsic values as presented in chapter 6.8. 
 
  From the caregivers - desire to give the risk management activity a fair 
chance, while acknowledging the existence of doctor's errors which are 
not handled in a professional and systematic manner. The caregivers, 
viewed the Risk Management department as some sort of "confession 
department" which allowed them to confess about errors, without being 
judged or punished, while reporting to their direct supervisors could entail 
an element of blame and punishment. 
 
 From middle management   - Disbelieve that Risk management activity, 
will result in any saving and any return on investment. This came out 
during the meetings we held with the Head of administration for the 
purpose of closing  our contract details with Maccabi. During one of the 
meetings, when it was hard for us to explain the financial benefits of our 
activity he said: "I know how much it is going to cost me, but I am not sure 
about the value that I will receive".  It is worth noting that after a while, 
when the activities of the Risk Management department started to show 
results within Maccabi, the same person became one of the supporters of 
Risk Management activity.   
 
We found out, that there is almost no literature, which deals with ways of 
measuring the effectiveness of Risk Management in Medicine. When such a 
measurement does exist it usually refers to insurance aspects. That is, cost of 
malpractice insurance and management of claims after harm has already 
occurred.  Troyer and Salman (1986) ed., Head and Horn II (1991), Youngberg 
(1994) and others.      
 
It is reasonable to assume, that the main reason for that is due to the fact that the 
volume of Risk Management activity in healthcare organizations is still limited 
and not significant enough to raise questions regarding their contribution to the 




mostly limited to being the Point of Contact (POC) to the insurance companies 
for the compilation of adverse events to be submitted to the insurance 
companies.   
 
Therefore, we consider the ROI issue also from the point of view of a discipline 
which, is close to Risk Management – Quality Assurance Management (QAM). 
McLaughlin and Kaluzny (1994), in a discussion of the advantages of 
implementing QAM methodology in medicine, considered the economic aspects 
too. It is important to note that Quality Assurance Management activity is 
intended to achieve efficiency and not only quality and therefore it is only natural 
that some of the projects end up saving money while, also improving the quality 
of the processes.  
 
Work done in this area by Harkey and Vraciu (1992) report about a relationship 
between profitability and satisfaction of patients in 82 hospitals of Health Trust. 
 
Other works report on "cost of quality",  while in fact, the intention is to costs of 
"No quality", Crosby (1979). According to McLaughlin and Kaluzny, who report 
estimates of senior medical managers, the costs of "no quality" in medicine runs 
between 20-40% of the total expenditure of healthcare in the USA. 
  
So why do so many managers doubt the viability of investing in QAQM? 
Mclaughlin and Kaluzny offer this explanation: The expenditure is here and now 
while the probability of future savings is unknown.  
 
It is worth noting that this was the exact argument brought up by Head of 





The results of risk management must be explicit and well communicated. 
 
Head and Horn II (1991), while discussing Standards of Acceptable Risk 
Management Performance note that:   
 “One of the major barriers risk management professionals must overcome in 
gaining recognition for their action is the absence of consensus on standards for 




There is no consensus, among professionals in the Risk Management field on 
how to estimate and measure the effectiveness of Risk Management activity. As 
noted before, in most cases, the preference is to consider process indicators, 
rather than results indicators. This is because, among other reasons, results are 
evident in the long term and are also influenced by many un-controlled variables 
and not only by the Risk Management activity. For example:  Government health 
care policy, changes in malpractice law suits, legislations, public opinion, etc.   
 
According to Head and Horn II (1991), exposure to damages due to errors and 
accidents, exposes the organization to costs, which can be divided into 3 
categories:  
 
 Property, revenues, life and other valuable assets lost or damaged as a 
result of the accident. 
 
 Revenues which could have been generated from activities which were 
not performed, because they were considered as "too dangerous" 
following accidents in the organization.    
  
 Resources allocated to deal with harms due to accidents and errors, which 
could have been assigned for other purposes in the organization.  
 
They claim, that Risk Management activity, can lower the costs of losses in the 
first and second categories and therefore, it is a worthwhile activity for the 
organization. For example, the economic benefits can be expressed as:  
 
 Costs of accidents for which there is no reimbursement from an insurance 
company or other external sources. 
 
 Premiums paid to insurance companies or other external sources. 
 
 Costs associated with actions and activities designed to prevent or reduce 
loses as a result of accidents. 
 
 The managerial cost of managing the  risks or its outcomes.   
 
The main outcome of Risk Management activity in Maccabi is expressed in 
modifying the working procedures, as a result of recommendations 
implementation, based on adverse events debriefings. This, of course, together 
with changing the organizational culture towards the principles outlined in   




Therefore, indicators which reflect the number of recommendations, issued each 
year, number of managers to whom these recommendations are referred for 
implementation and the number of recommendations which are implemented, 
can become valuable process indices, which reflect the effectiveness of the Risk 
Management in Maccabi and any other healthcare organization. 
 
For example, in 2004 the department formulated 270 recommendations, which 
were directed to 27 different managers within the organization for implementation 
and among them: Chief Nurse, Head of  the Diagnostic Division, Head of Medical 
Division, Head of Pharmacology,  MID etc. Before the end of the year, 50% of the 
recommendations were reported as being implemented.    
 
Thus, despite the complexity and dispute among Risk Management 
professionals, it can be stated that indices based on recommendations, can 
serve as interim indications of risk management impact in improving patient 




Developing measures for monitoring the effectiveness of RM activities. 
 
As we have  indicated before, the subject of indices, which  may  indicate  the 
effectiveness of Risk Management activity in Maccabi became more urgent 
towards the end of 2001, when the RMD was in the midst of considering  
merging with   the QAM,  along with  the organizational structure of the Israeli Air 
force – ASQAD.   
 
One of the main principles of quality assurance in general and in particular in the 
field of medicine, is the principle of measurement, McLaughlin and Kaluzny 
(1994). As part of the preparation to work according the IAF's ASQAD, the need 
arose to present the department's effectiveness using quantitative indices. The 
difficulties of defining the indices became apparent as presented in this chapter.  
 
It seems, that the model shown below, expresses the directions in the 
development of indices which may indicate  the effectiveness of Risk 




































The organization managers would like to see direct correlation between the Risk 
Management activity and the level of premiums paid to the insurer and the level 
of claims.  That is, what is the saving in insurance premium for each dime 
invested in Risk Management? 
  
As we have already presented in the beginning of this chapter, the level of 
premium and the amount of claims is influenced by parameters, which are not 
under the control of the RMD, such as: public opinion, government healthcare 
policy, trends in malpractice lawsuits, court decisions regarding malpractice suits, 
etc. Therefore, the model described above, presents an indirect correlation 
between Risk Management activity and the level of insurance premium and 
amount of claims due to medical malpractice, the indicators which measure Risk 




























We feel that the indicators as presented above are not process indicators and not 
result indicators but rather Intermediate Result Indicators (IRI). 
 
The IRI suggested by us are:  
 
 Mean time between adverse events occurrence and reporting time to Risk 
Management Department. 
 
 Number of recommendations   formulated, compared with the number of 
events reported and/or investigated. 
 
 Number of recommendations  which  were implemented as compared with 
the total number of recommendations.   
. 
 The average time it takes to investigate an adverse event and create  
recommendations   
 
 Average time it takes to implement a recommendation.   
. 
 Number of "near misses" reports. 
 
 Number of deaths resulting from medical errors, as compared with the 
overall population treated by the organization and/or the number of 
medical procedures/encounters provided by the organization.   
 
We feel, that if the above mentioned indicators and their likes, were implemented 
in the organization, over time , risks level  and their influence, should   decrease 























The contribution of the Aviation Risk Management Model to 
Macabi's Risk Management Activities   Summary and 
Discussion* 
 
“If I were able to live my life anew, in the next I would try to commit more error…       
I would run more risks..." 
 
Jorge Louis Borges (Instants) 
 
 
"Everything is foreseen, but freedom [of will] is given to every man" 
 





We would like to summarize this work starting with describing the current 
situation and positioning of the Risk Management Department and Risk 
Management in Maccabi. 
 
Most probably, some considerations were omitted by us, not intentionally, but 
because we described the events and developments from our point of view, 
being consultants.  This means we are a part of these developments but also 
observing them from an external point of view, they are interpreted by us, based 
on our previous Aviation experience and emotional involvement in the Maccabi 
project.  
 
We will refer to events and developments in the last year, 2009, which as many 
other years was turbulent for the Risk Management Department on one hand and 




*The main part of this chapter was originally written in 2006, thus most of the facts and 
considerations are updated accordingly. Though, while editing this chapter we have added some 




The rate of reporting continues to increase, reaching a rate of about 150 reports 
per month.   This stream of reports is causing the Risk Management Department 
to consider new strategies for handling the reports and its resources allocation. 
Among the alternatives being considered is to empower 
 
The referents, assigning them more responsibility in the process. The number of 
referents and their commitment grew over the years.  
 
At the last referents forum held on June 2009, more than 30 referents, 
representing all of the districts and medical professions, participated actively. 
This alternative raises many challenges e.g. how to train and supervise all of the 
referents in order to achieve a standard and high quality   process of handling 
adverse events. Another alternative being considered is to lower significantly the 
number of events being debriefed and deepening the debriefing process, by 
focusing on the organizational and human factors and widening the debriefing 
team. 
 
By the end of 2008, a process of separation between the Quality Directorate, of 
which the RMD was a part, and the RMD, originated and became a fact in 2009. 
The rationale for this separation was mixed and consisted of differences in vision 
and strategies between managers and the will of the Risk Management 
Department manager to base the Risk Management activities on a sovereign 
orientation and not as a part of striving towards improving Quality in various 
domains. As a part of the separation process, the RMD was subordinated to the 
Head of the Healthcare Division and the Quality Directorate remained under the 
CEO, as it was until the separation was declared.  Anyhow, this move is 
discrepant with the original idea of establishing in Maccabi  of an organizational 
entity analogous to the ASQAD (Aviation Safety and Quality Assurance 
Directorate- MAVKA) of the IAF. In our opinion the Quality Directorate took in the 
last years a very clear approach towards promoting Healthcare Quality in 
Maccabi, based on the principles published in the IOM report: Crossing the 
Quality Chasm (2001). In the last year, a special consideration was given to 
equality of healthcare services provided by Maccabi to its patients. This route 
with all its significance and contribution to quality of care put in some  shade the 
issue of patient safety and strategies to improve it. The possibility of joining 
forces, thus sticking to the original Air Force ASQD model, didn't succeed. From 
the theoretical point of view, we can state that these decisions were based on 
Risk Management thinking, in order to assure better chances for success for the 





In June 2009, the 2nd Ashqelon Patient Safety Symposium took place with about 
200 participants, representing all of the Israeli Healthcare professional 
community. This time, the Symposium was dedicated to various approaches and 
methodologies of debriefing medical adverse events. The entire forum was 
divided into 6 working groups that had to fulfill a briefing mission and reflect on it 
in the plenary session. Each of the groups was headed by a Risk Management 
professional.  Two of the groups were headed by Maccabi's Risk Management 
Department managers, Dr. Michal Guindy and her deputy Mrs. Orly Manor. Two 
other groups were headed by ex Air Force fighter pilots with experience in 
debriefing. The 5th group was headed by Dr. Hasner, Deputy manager of the 
Ichilov Medical Center and in charge of Risk Management for the last fifteen 
years. The 6th group was headed by us. We have mentioned this, to illustrate 
Maccabi's positioning on the healthcare Risk Management arena in Israel, which 
is without doubt a pioneering and leading one.  
 
Training activities are a major pillar in Risk Management activities, being an 
efficient way to disseminate knowledge and experience and getting feedback 
from the participants as to validity of approaches and methods. Just to mention 
few of the latest encounters in this domain of activity: As we have ready 
mentioned in this work, we run conjointly with Dr. Guindy, her deputy Mrs. Manor, 
Adv. Halamish-Shany and RN. Gershtansky on behalf of the Madanes Group 
(The Malpractice insurer) the Patient Safety Course at the CME (Continuous 
Medical Education) of Tel-Aviv University Medical School. This year (2009), 
about 40 students participated in the course and the course got very high 
students evaluation, 4.2 average score out of 5.  In the second semester of 
academic year 2009/2010, the next class is planned to be open. 
 
As part of a tradition, the Risk Management Department runs a yearly Risk 
Management course for Macabi's staff. This year we run the 5th class, of the 
course with 32 participants, including: physicians, nurses, lawyers and 
managers. Some of the graduates become referents and continue their 
professional Risk Management education by getting regular supervision from the 
Risk Management Department team. 
 
WHO (World Health Organization) originated, recently,  with the collaboration of 
the  Safety Alliance, the Patient Safety Curriculum for medical students, to be 
piloted for the 1st time in the upcoming academic year, 2009/10,(Ellis, 2009).  The 
idea that healthcare actually harms patients, has been widely acknowledged in 
the last decade, (Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson, 1999, 2001), but until the WHO 




possible solutions. In several publications considering the issue of Safety and 
Quality training for medical students (Lockwood et.al, 2004, Sandars et.al, 2007), 
it was concluded that this issue is far from being a satisfactory part of medical 
education. Dr. Amitay, an Israeli pilot and a physician, heading the Medical 
Simulator Center at Sheba Medical Center in Israel, was among the developers 
of the curriculum. The Tel Aviv University Sacler Faculty of Medicine is among 10 
medical schools around the world to pilot the curriculum. Dr. Guindy was 
assigned to be in charge of this curriculum on behalf of the Tel Aviv University 
Medical School. Personally, we feel feelings of proud and satisfaction, being  
Macabi's Risk Management consultants and having the privilege to witness the 
fruits of our effort flourish.  
 
In the 1st Ashqelon Patient Safety Symposium (September 2007), initiated by 
IMA,  a resolution was passed  to develop a curriculum for a certificate course for 
Risk Managers in Healthcare.  These days, after a long pregnancy period, this 
idea is going to become a reality at the auspices of Ben Gurion University in 
Beer-Sheba, a one year course is going to be deployed in the 2010/11 academic 
year,  consisting of theoretical courses and practical training with the participation 
of hospitals. Healthcare funds, insurers, IMA (Israel Medical association) and 
more.  Once again, Macabi's Risk Management Department managers are going 
to play a significant role in this encounter. For the next years, the intention is to 
run a M.A. program, specialized in Healthcare Risk Management, with the 
cooperation of Ben Gurion University School of Management, Department of 
Health Systems Management, headed by Prof. Fliskin. 
 
The current Risk Management Department's information system is already about 
12 years old. It was developed in few months after we started our collaboration 
with Maccabi and was based on knowhow, we brought from the IAF. These days 
a new system is about to be deployed, implementing web technology, enabling 
remote access, essential for the referents routine work interdigitation in the Risk 
Management Department's routine work. The new system will preserve many of 
the original functionality with upgraded technology and a clear separation 
between adverse events handling and recommendations management. 
 
From the very beginning, back to 1997, when the Risk Management Department 
was established, it adopted with great  enthusiasm and commitment the Blame 
Free Culture principle, that guides the Aviation Risk Management approach 
worldwide. We may state, with great appreciation, that after 12 years of activity 




Macabi as an organization, succeeded soundly in preserving this critical 
principle.  
 
Between 22-25 February 2005, the 40th IMA (Israeli Medical Association) 
Convention took place in Jerusalem.  The last day of the convention was 
dedicated to patient safety with the participation of about 200 leaders of Israeli 
Healthcare system. Dr. Poulsen, Head of Danish Medical association and Prof. 
Helmreich, a psychologist that specialized in Aviation Safety and Medicine, 
presented their ideas.  A patient safety panel was assembled with 
representatives of the various organs of the healthcare system in Israel. Dr. 
Israeli, CEO of Healthcare Ministry headed the panel. We were asked to present 
the Aviation Risk Management Model (ARMM), as a possible reference to follow. 
 
To our surprise, while preparing the presentation, we became aware of the fact, 
that there is no a formal publication that outlines the principles of ARMM. The 
basic ideas of ARMM were more of a consensus how things should work in the 
Aviation, transferred from one generation to another as a culture is transferred 
and as opposed to inheritance of a methodology.  
 
In order to be able to present the principles of ARMM, we have summarized the 
highlights of our experience and perception of what ARMM consists of, in 29 
principles grouped in 4 categories: 
 7 concepts 
 7 basic principles 
 8 methodological considerations 
 7 cultural aspects 
 
We will cite (translate) the symposiums resolution,s that actually served as 
foundations for the intense commitment of IMA to Risk Management, in the 
following years: 
 
1. There is no option to establish wide spectrum   true and right Risk 
Management activities, without physicians' partnership and collaboration. 
 
2. A process of growth and improvement may arise from reporting and 






3. Cultural and legislative changes are needed, in order to enable an open 
discussion that may lead to recuperating and fixing steps instead of 
disciplinary ones. 
 
4. To minimize failures, new medical and information technologies should be 
incorporated with recognition of their limitations. 
 
5. A systemic shortcoming is usually the cause of medical errors, thus, the 
management  is mandated to derive lessons learned and to fix what has to 
be fixed. 
  
6. Debriefing and investigation of adverse events is a mission that has to be 
based on knowledge and experience, thus should be conducted by first 
line professionals.  
 
No doubt, the input from Aviation Risk Management experience, presented by 
Dr. Helmreich, by some of the participants in the symposium and ourselves, 
served as a facilitating factor in defining the above resolutions.  
 
Follows, the ARMM, as formulated and presented by us for the first time at IMA's 
Patient Safety Symposium in Jerusalem 2005. 
 
The principles are presented here in a generalized mode, without referring to 
specific Aviation terms, so they can be viewed from every contextual point of 
view, e.g. Healthcare. 
 
We have evaluated the current assimilation status for each principle in Maccabi, 
as for the mid of 2009 and presented it in the following table. It should be 
mentioned, that a dispute may arise as to validity of this evaluations, due the fact 
that they reflect our subjective point of view. We may assume that if the 
evaluation was done by Risk Management Department's managers, the scores 







Principle Extent of 
implementation 
in Maccabi in  - 
2009 (1=poor, 
5=sound) 
Concepts 1. Errors are inherent in every human activity 5 
2. Errors should serve personal and 
organizational learning and improvements 
processes 
5 
3. Personal errors as a result of systemic 
shortcomings are not punished. Negligence 
is punished. 
5 
4. In most cases the system enables the 
occurrence of errors, thus the system 
should be the major object for 
improvement.  
5 
5. Safety and Risk management should be 
positioned equally to operations in the 
organization. 
3 
6. An ideal of  0 accidents should be 
promoted and advocated. 
2 
7. ROI- Return on Investment argument can't 
serve as a major argument for Risk 
Management activities, due to complexity 
to prove direct ROI. 
3 
Principles 1. Adverse events reporting supply the critical 
raw material for Risk Management 
activities. 
5 
2. The immediate factor causing errors is in 
many cases the Human Factor, but means 
that may reduce probability of errors are 
systemic. 
5 
3. Safety and Risk Management, are unique 
professional disciplines, that should be 
acquired and developed by learning, 
supervision,  experiencing and studying.  
4 
4. Safety climate influences the level of risk 
taking and errors. 
3 
5. Managers are responsible for the safety 
and  Risk Management records,  as they 
are for the operational results.  
3 
6. Every member of the organization has the 
potential ability to prevent and error and not 
just those involved directly in the mission 
(Sharp end., Reason, 1998)  
4 
7. A clear distinction should exist between: 
managerial debriefing, legislative actions 
and Risk Management debriefings. 
Information shouldn‟t pass between these 











Principle Extent of 
implementation 
in Maccabi in  - 
2009 (1=poor, 
5=sound) 
Methods 1. Measuring the rates of errors and events, 
should provide the basis of Risk 
Management activities. 
2 
2. The error and accident phenomena are 
multi factorial, thus models for debriefing 
should be multi factorial too. 
4 
3. Risk Management should treat phenomena 
in addition to particular adverse events. 
4 
4. Risk Management activities should be 
based on a yearly work plan and not just on 
reacting to adverse events, after they have 
occurred. 
4 
5. Priorities in resource investment in events 
which causes are severe and not only  in  
those which results are severe.  
4 
6. Promoting briefing and debriefing activities 
as a routine part of any mission or 
procedure. 
2 
7. Emphasis on proactive activities in addition 
to reactive ones.  
3.5 
8. Reporting and debriefing "Near misses" 
and not just events  in which harm, damage 
or loss was caused. 
5 
Culture 1. Transparency and equality of all the 
information and all the involved parties, 
directly and indirectly, in case of debriefing.  
4 
2. Managers' personal commitment to Risk 
Management and the model is an essential 
factor for successful Risk Management 
implementation. 
3 
3. An accident provokes a moral obligation to 
learn lessons and to do whatever  can be 
done, to reduce the probability of 
reoccurrence.  
3.5 
4. Successful Risk Management 
implementation is conditioned by 
establishing and  maintaining "Blame free 
culture" 
5 
5. Safety and Risk Management education is 
a basic professional asset, which should be 
continuously acquired, as an essential part 
of professional development.  
4 
6. A sound professional is one that performs 
his missions in maximal safety. 
3 
7. A "Good organization" is one that performs 






We have calculated average scores for each category and have found that 
Concepts and Principles got higher scores than Methods and Culture (4.0 and 
4.1 as compared to 3.6 and 3.8).  
 
In each category we found principles that were fully assimilated (scores 4-5) and 





The weakest assimilation by category is as follows: 
 
 Concepts - : An ideal goal of 0 accidents should be promoted and 
advocated. (2)  
 Principles - : Safety climate influences the level of risk taking and 
errors.(3) and Managers are responsible for the safety and  Risk 
Management records,  as they are for the operational results (3). 
 Methods - Measuring the rates of errors and events, should provide the 
basis of Risk Management activities (2) and promoting briefing and 
debriefing activities as a routine part of any mission or procedure (2). 
 Culture - Managers' personal commitment to Risk Management and the  
model is an essential factor for successful Risk Management 
implementation and a sound professional is one that performs his 




We may state, while analyzing the evaluation above, that Maccabi's standing 
regarding the assimilation of ARMM principles is sound. This is especially 
significant in light of the fact that the above evaluations were given without 




Summing up ten years of collaboration: successes and failures. 
 
Defining "success" and "failure" in activities as complex as risk management at 
Maccabi, poses considerable difficulties in a dynamic and intricate organizational 
reality, changing sometimes as a result of multiple needs, not necessarily related 
to risk management.   
  
Therefore, in this  section,  we will deal with successes and failures, as  
perceived  by us and our partners in Macabi, but not  necessarily on the level of 
actual results, as for example:  a decrease in the rate of medical errors and in the 
extent of harm  caused to patients.  
 
We will highlight here any factual proofs of successes or failures. The 
"successes" and "failures" presented in this section  reflect retrospection on the 





The successes shown here are part of successful processes and products, which 
were initiated and managed by the department and they are shown neither in 
chronological order nor in the order of their importance.   
 
 An Increase in the Reporting Rates – As we mentioned in Chapter 6.7,  the 
extent of reports to the department on adverse events increased by hundreds 
of percents in the course of its activity, from about  200 reports in the first 








 It is important to mention that beyond the increase in the extent of the 
absolute reporting, the mix of the reports changed as concerns the source of 
the reporting, so that the proportional part of self initiated reporting of the care 
givers on their errors, exceeded the proportional part of the managerial 
reports being mostly patient complaints, appeals by lawyers and claims.  This 
finding is particularly important, as it reflects an increase in the level of 
awareness to the importance of reporting as a tool for preventing the next 
error, the depth of assimilation of the commitment to report, which was 
introduced at Maccabi and familiarity with the activity of the department.   
 
 Department Team Growth and Quality System Establishment - In Chapter 
6.6, we described the manner in which the department developed from the 
aspect of its manpower.  The department developed from a norm 
establishment of a half-time nurse in its first days to a norm establishment of 
more than 10 physicians and nurses in 2005. In 2000, the department 
instituted a "Quality System" consisting of two main departments, based on 
the risk management department and new activity in the quality field.  
Although we did not study the subject, at first sight it seems that no activity at 
Maccabi grew in such a dramatic pace during those years, not even 
information systems, which, by nature, grew most significantly during the last 
decade.   
 
 Subordination of the Quality System to the General Manager – From our 
experience in Aviation we knew that in order to achieve organizational impact, 
the Risk Management entity  should be subordinated directly to the Head of 
the organization as it usually is in organization with sound Risk Management 
activities. We suggested, upon its establishment,  that the RMD  should be  
subordinated to the Macabi's CEO. The initial motivation of Risk Management 
Department's founders was to subordinate the RMD to   the Head of            
Healthcare Division, as it was thought that most of the work interfaces and 
most of the activity would be associated with medical processes. This was 
true in most of the cases. However, as we stated already, a considerable part 
of the recommendations of the department was related to administrative 
factors and to the medical information systems as well as to the 
pharmaceutics system. On a level of principle, the goodwill of these factors 
induced them to realize the recommendations of the department, but not 
being motivated by their position in the chain of management. Upon the 
establishment of the quality system, it was clear that in order to achieve broad 
effectiveness in the organization; it would be advisable to subordinate the 




numerous discussions on the subject, part of them were quite vehement 
discussions, and when the manager of the Quality System was even ready to 
resign from her position in order to prove the point, it was decided to 
subordinate the system directly to the General Manager. In the beginning of 
2009, after the separation of Risk Management Department from the Quality 
system, as mentioned above, the Risk Management Department was 
subordinated to the Head of Healthcare Division, while the Quality 
Department was left under the General Manager. Although this step was an 
organizational and personal necessity, we view it as a loss of potential impact 
that must be compensated by other creative processes and ideas. 
 
 Establishment of a Field Referents Infrastructure -   Despite the growth in 
its manpower in the course of the years, the department had to establish a 
field system of referents in order to enable two-way communication with the 
field and to encourage the field to initiate Risk Management activities. The 
establishment of a referents system was necessary to increase the scope of 
events debriefed, to raise the rate of reporting and to assist in the field level 
implementation of the recommendations. Although, the indecision in this 
matter continued for many years, the referents system commenced to 
crystallize as from 2002, comprising, as at today (2009), thirty persons both 
from the districts and from the center.  In these days  the referents concepts 
has reached a junction and decisions must be taken as to modus operandi of 
the referents system, the expectations from them, the need to invest 
resources in training and supervision and regarding various  conflicts of 
interests between their day to  day duties and being RM referents.. 
 
 Implementation of a Differential Adverse  Events Handling System - The 
increase in the reporting volume constituted proof of a rise in the awareness 
of the contribution  of reporting as a result of the activity of the department. 
From the outset, it had been clear that from each and every reporting 
something can be learned and can be used as a lever for improving the 
system as a whole.  However, even after adding more personnel, the 
department couldn‟t deal in a uniform way with all reported events. To be able 
to deal with all reported events, it would have been necessary to develop a 
differential classification and handling system to enable differential and 
efficient handling.  Such a system was developed in 2001 and is implemented 
with minor modification until today. The system enables making the most of 
the reported risk management potential from the events reported with the 





 Execution of Organization-wide Multidisciplinary Projects, such as the 
ADE – Adverse Drug Events Project - The need to provide administrative 
immunity to care givers reporting adverse events at Maccabi, caused, 
unintended by the department, remoteness and alienation between the 
department and the other factors of the Maccabi head office. To bridge this 
gap, and to return to the organization the knowledge and insights relevant for 
controlling the risks in order to improve patient safety, the department initiated 
multi-disciplinary projects. The last multidisciplinary project carried out dealt 
with the subject of the medication administration process and was extensively 
described in Chapter 6.11.  The project was successful in that it was able to 
create a work team, which comprised relevant representatives of all fields of 
activity at Maccabi, working together for approximately a year and a half on 
learning about the errors in the process and to suggest appropriate solutions 
to minimize these.  
 
 Execution of Proactive Risk Audits – To carry out pro-active risk 
management activity, based not solely on reporting, the department 
performed initiated risk audits in organizational units and on selected 
subjects. In the beginning, the surveys were on the initiative of the 
department, resulting from the investigation of adverse events. In recent 
years. Since 2002, in addition to the initiative of the department to perform 
risk surveys, requests from managers have been reaching the department to 
perform risk surveys in their units in order to assist them in locating risks to 
patient  safety and to deal with them in due time.  We consider the approach 
by the managers to perform risk audits in their units, as an expression of 
confidence in the activity of the department and its team. 
 
 The Insurer's Appreciation of Maccabi as the most Professional Factor 
in Israel in the Field of Risk Management - The Insurer, the Madanes 
Group, maintains constant work contacts with its major insurants, among 
them the Maccabi Health Care Fund. Madanes appreciates the risk 
management activity carried out by the Risk Management Department of 
Maccabi, which is aimed at managing adverse events and drawing from them 
conclusions to minimize probability of reoccurrence.  Maccabi's unique model 
of risk management activity based on the Aviation Model attains the 
appreciation of Madanes. This appreciation is expressed in the current 
meetings between the two factors as well as in internal forums at Madanes. 
Starting in 2007, a team was established and budgeted with representatives 
from Maccabi and Madanes, in order to raise creative ideas as to how 




team initiated training activities aimed to instruct physicians how to ensure 
patient safety in their practices. .  
 
 Risk Management Abstracts on Defined Subjects – During 2004, on the 
conclusion of the medication administration project, when it became clear to 
the Department heads that the resources required for conducting such a type 
of project, were non-existent, the Manager of the Department, Dr. Michal 
Gindi, raised the idea of a "Risk Management Abstract or Position Papers".  
The intention was to meet the requirements of the organization for information 
derived from analyzing the adverse events, as a basis for making 
organizational decisions. Risk management abstracts are mostly based on 
the analysis of events stored in the department‟s data base, and the 
resources required for making the abstracts are relatively modest – about 200 
hours of work. As at 2006, in addition to the current work, every risk manager 
is involved at any given time in the preparation of a risk management 
abstract. At the end of 2005, risk management abstracts were completed on 
the following subjects: Adverse events in treating chronic diseases and 
adverse events related to Violence in the family.  The abstracts were 
distributed among relevant factors at Maccabi and found a positive 
repercussion. At the beginning of 2006, the following abstracts are in various 
stages of work: Breast Cancer, Hospital-Community Interface, Compliance 
problems and Environmental Aspects in the Physician's Clinic: Secretariat, 
equipment and availability of physicians. *  
 
 Ongoing  Work with managers  at The Head Office and in the Districts 
for the Implementation of Recommendations based on Investigations of 
Adverse Events – At about the end of 2001, when a review was made of 
handling recommendations status, three facts arose:   
 
 There was a considerable delay in the realization of recommendations – 
more than 200 recommendations were not implemented yet.  
 





*As for the end of 2009, the RMD is in various stages of summarizing RM insights on various 
subjects : Continuity of care,  Telemedicine -  regarding usage of Tele-E.C.G, adverse events in 





 A majority of the recommendations referred to the department were handled, 
while many of the recommendations referred to those responsible for 
handling outside the department, were not implemented.  
 
To deal with the problems related with the implementation of recommendations, it 
was decided to change the approach to implementing the recommendations and 
to base it on the following principles: 
 
 Participation of the factor responsible for implementing the recommendation 
in the recommendation forming process.   
 
 Summary of recommendations, which accumulated in a given period of time 
within the scope of responsibility of a certain factor and transferring those 
recommendations for execution by the factor, while stating the event, the 
arguments for choosing a certain recommendation as a solution, a description 
of the recommendation (solution) and the expectations for the implementation 
thereof as far as the time schedule is concerned, the mode and supervision of 
the implementation process.  
 
 Periodical meetings with all factors responsible for the execution of 
recommendations at Maccabi in order to examine the implementation status, 
problems in the implementation process or any other problem solution ideas, 
which came up in the course of the implementation of the original 
recommendation. 
 
The new process of managing recommendations was successful as far as the 
previous approach was concerned. There was greater commitment of the factors 
responsible for the implementation of the recommendations and also the scope 
of recommendations implemented increased. The proportional part of the 
recommendations referred to the department, out of all recommendations, 
decreased and there was substantially less delay in the realization of the 
recommendations.  
 
Thus, for example, in the years 2004 and 2005, approximately 50% of the 












In referring to "failures", we will make a distinction between our failures as 
consultants and what we consider to be "failures" of the risk management activity 
at Maccabi, in general. The definition of "failure" as such is subjective and based 
on our point of view solely. Therefore, it is fair and proper to presume that each 
and every partner to the process will, to some extent or other, have different 




 Insufficient understanding of the gaps between the world of Aviation 
and the world of Medicine in general and regarding risk management in 
particular - In 1976, when we started to be involved in safety and risk 
management in aviation, we encountered a world, which refers to the subject 
of flight safety in all seriousness and most intensively searches for ways to 
reduce the rate of accidents. At the end of the 70's and the beginning of the 
80's of the previous century, Aviation was in the middle of a transition process 
from the "pilot error" concept to the systemic concept. At the end of the 90's, 
when we started our activity in the medical field, medicine was in a stage of 
discovering the scope of the problem associated with errors during medical 
treatment. In retrospect, we understood that we did not estimate correctly the 
extent of the gap between the two content worlds.  Our ignorance in the field 
of medicine led us to presume that it was advanced much more in everything 
associated to the understanding and handling of the risk management issue. 
This mistaken presumption, gave rise to an attempt to carry out processes at 
an accelerated rate, sometimes even without properly preparing the ground 
for it, as it would be required.  
 Inaccurate evaluation of the degree of difficulty involved in the 
assimilation of a new concept in a large organization – We did not 
estimate correctly the degree of difficulty involved in introducing a new 
concept into a large organization and into a system, which had been 
operating in a certain manner for many years. We estimated that the power of 
the assimilation process of the risk management concept would meet with 
less resistance, as the concept suggested by us was supposed to solve a 
problem, of the importance of which the organization was aware and had 
been looking for solutions for it on its own initiative. To be true, this estimate 
was based on a certain naivety, but it may well be that without it, we would 





 Excessive reliance on the personal attitudes of the first department 
managers – In the field of risk management, Maccabi was the first medical 
institution to receive consulting services from us. It had been our work 
assumption that we will become familiarized with the domain of medicine with 
the assistance of the department‟s first managers. In fact, the first managers 
of the department possessed extensive medical experience both in hospitals 
and in the community. However, they brought with them also a fair measure 
of frustration, based on their personal experience. Ultimately, the frustration 
concerned the belief in the ability to make a change in such a complicated 
system and so conservative in its approach. Our failure in this respect was 
related to adopting this frustration as a starting point in the first stages. As 
time passed, we learned to distinguish between the personal frustrations, 
based on experiences in the past, and frustrations caused by failure to 
promote some subject or other.  The insights gained from this failure were 
associated with the creation of a distinction between the professional 
familiarity with a world of certain domain, personal experiences and the 
impact these had on the personal approach to the subject of risk 
management. In retrospect we should strengthen the belief in the ability to 
make a change in parallel to building professional capability in the 
department.   
 
 Getting used to being in a state of mind of "There is nobody to work 
with" – At this point, the failure is, in fact, the expression of the previous 
failure. As we know from our experience, there is no risk management without 
partners within the organization.  From enterprises at the "sharp end", 
according to the concept of Reason (1997), through intermediate managers 
and up to organization managers. Though being aware of the importance of a 
partnership as a critical component in a cultural change, at the beginning of 
our activity at Maccabi we were affected by the state of mind of "there is 
nobody to work with", which prevailed in the department during its first days. 
Later, this state of mind disappeared, when it turned out that many factors in 
the organization consider the risk management activity to be of much 
importance and are ready to cooperate in order to identify and reduce the 




 Postponing the subject of measuring the effectiveness of the risk 
management activity to some later stages – In the Aviation Model, 
measuring the various parameters is of special value, and in particular, 
achievements expressed by the rate of accidents and incidents. Over and 
above all the activity performed with the aim to improve flight safety, great 
importance is ultimately given to the bottom line: the rate of accidents. For 
many reasons, at Maccabi, the subject of measurement did not advance at a 
sufficient rate, although it should have been dealt intensively, already from the 
first days of the department. As we were emphatic about the problems 
associated with measuring the rate of medical errors and the extent of 
resulting damages, no progress was made in this subject. This problem was 
related to its being dependent on reporting and on the necessity to base it on 
legal indicators, such as claims, request by lawyers demanding indemnity, 
complaints, and similar, which in themselves are no indicators reflecting 
organizational reality, but rather a reality outside the organization, which may 
be influenced by public state of mind, reference to the subject made by 
Courts, etc.  
 
 Failure to formulate the principles of the Aviation Risk Management 
Model (ARMM) - In spite of the fact that the aviation model was used by us 
as our guide; its principles were never formulated nor defined by us in a clear 
and unequivocal manner.  When examining in depth the subject of ARMM's 
principles, we discovered that not only we have failed to formulate its 
principles, but to the best of our knowledge, neither had such principles  have 
been formulated by others. When various factors in medicine refer to risk 
management in aviation, they actually mean the transfer of successful 
experiences in risk management from the field of aviation to the field of 
medicine. That is to say, it concerns practical experience rather than 
principles. Furthermore, we did not find any source, which would serve as a 
basis for the "Aviation Model".  It was more like the 'oral law' and less like the 
'written law' with clearly formulated principles. The first time we encountered a 
problem related to the subject, was when, at a convention  of the Israel 
Medical Association (IMA), held in 2005, we were asked to state the 
principles of the aviation model. The request to present the principles gave 
rise to the necessity of formulating those principles, which we did (See  




Anyhow, when we started working with Maccabi, the principles of the aviation 
model were not yet formulated. This issue is particularly important in light of the 
fact that the basic question of transferring the aviation model from the field of 
aviation to the field of medicine, is depending thereon.  In this context, the 
subject might actually be reformulated in the following manner:  "Transfer of 




Failures of the Department 
 
It is important to point out that a considerable part of the failures described here 
found expression in the first years of the activity of the department, while later on, 
the lessons were learned and failures corrected.   
 
 Lack of well established organizational procedures and mechanisms to 
mandate the whole organization to implement adverse event 
recommendations - The purpose of the risk management activity is to make 
changes, which may reduce the probability of risk realization, therefore, 
recommendations are means for achieving this am. Despite the crucial nature 
of the subject, it was not intensively addressed from the outset. Much more 
emphasis was placed on increasing the scope of reporting and on 
investigating events, whereas the subject of implementation processes for the 
recommendations was dealt with in later stages. The  lack of a concept  and 
mechanisms for implementing the recommendations, created essential gaps 
between the investigating ability of the department, which developed 
satisfactorily in the course of the years, and a lesser ability to implement the 
recommendations.  
  
 Lack of proper reaction to the feelings of antagonism in the Head Office 
and in the field towards the activity of the department – In Chapter 6.5, 
we referred to the reactions of Maccabi to the establishment of the 
department. Partly, the reactions were not positive. In our opinion the 
antagonism towards the activity of the department resulted, on one hand from 
the necessity to provide privilege to the reports and the reporters, which 
limited the possibility of sharing the information with the organization, and on 
the other hand, from the approach of the department itself, which sometimes 
was felt to be patronizing.  Anyhow, this antagonism was seen in the 
department as a necessary evil, and therefore, no immediate activity followed 





 Lack of sufficient differentiation between the activity of the department 
and the activity of other organs – In an internal  customer survey carried 
out at Maccabi  in 2003, in respect of the RMD's activities , it appeared that 
many physicians of Maccabi percept  the department as being associated 
with legal handling of adverse events. This lack of differentiation on the part of 
the physicians of Maccabi might have caused damage to the image of the 
department.  The department did not find it necessary to invest resources in a 
focused marketing effort in order to create this differentiation.  However, in the 
course of the years, this differentiation was achieved as a result of the field 
activity of the department. It is reasonable to assume that had the customer 
survey been carried out today, the missions of the department would have 
been conceived as being more appropriate to reality.  
 
 Lack of cooperation between the Head Office and the field in defining 
and implementing recommendations– This subject is related to the issue of 
definition and implementation of recommendations. In its first years, the 
department perceived itself as an separate entity from the organization,   thus 
failed to consider the resources of the organization as resources, which might 
be used for solving the problems which were discovered as a result of the 
investigation of adverse events. In retrospective, it is obvious that this was a 
wrong attitude, since without the cooperation of those responsible for the 
implementation of recommendations, the chances of implementation are 
significantly less. 
 
 Delay in the establishment of Risk Management referents network– The 
need to go beyond the boundaries of department's activities and enable 
collaboration with the field and the Head Office, was discussed almost from 
the very day the department was established.  
 
However, on the practical level, this need was not addressed until the end of 
2004, when the first risk management course was held on behalf of the 
department, with the participation of representatives from the districts and from 
the Head Office. The initial intention and expectation was that the majority of the 
participants in the course will someday become Risk Management referents, 




Major insights derived from the implementation of the ARMM at Maccabi 
 
Lacking a unique risk management model for the world of medicine, the adoption 
of a model, which was successful in another domain, constituted a positive 
starting point, based on the assumption that there is a certain similarity between 
the domains of medicine and aviation, on which there is not necessarily a broad 
consensus, as we have already pointed out in several occasions. 
 
Presented in this section are our primary insights derived from the 
implementation of the ARMM (Aviation Risk Model Management) at Maccabi. 
These understandings are not presented according to their significance or 
according to chronological order. It may be correct to say that they are presented 
in an associative manner, as they arose from our discussions and debates during 
March 2006. 
 
1. Before starting the implementation of a model taken from another domain, it is 
of considerable importance to learn first about the new domain and about the 
specific organization. Since we acted under considerable pressure of time 
and motivation to start the activity, we limited this stage to a minimum and did 
not perform it as required.  
 
2. In order to carry out an intervention with good chances of success, there is a 
wider need to understand the complex professional culture of the world of 
medicine in general and in Israel in particular, and not only that of the specific 
organization. It is important to understand that physicians are first affiliated 
and committed deeply to their profession and only secondly to a particular 
organization. Physicians swear the universal Hippocratic Oath when joining 
the profession, thus their commitment is above all professional and less 
organizational. 
 
3. As a long-term process is involved, mixing varied emotions and interests in 
the organization, it is of great importance that the senior management will be 
committed to the process and that the management will not be replaced while 
the process is in its initial stages. At Maccabi, there was no decrease in the 
commitment of senior management on its replacement, since the crucial 
stages of the initial process were implemented within one and the same 




4. It does not seem that the process had fair chances of success without our 
continuous consulting intervention, which dealt systematically with two crucial 
aspects: Instruction and professional development of the department's staff 
and the personal and professional supervision  of the staff, during its 
interactions and  confrontations with the world inside and outside Maccabi.   
 
5. It appeared that, in the process of transferring the aviation model to medicine, 
the aviation model became more pronounced and crystallized into a rule of 
clear principles, which resulted from the need to "translate" and adjust it to a 
new professional, cultural and organizational environment. Thus, for example, 
work assumptions, which in the world of aviation had been self-evident, 
needed new proof in the world of medicine.  E.g. the value of transparency of 
information for all concerning errors in aviation is clear, is hard  to implement 
in medicine, where it raises complex  juridical  and  ethic problems, due to the 
emotional involvement of patients and their  relatives.   
 
6. The need to learn the professional language and its deep and intimate 
meaning as a necessary condition for transferring the model from another 
content world. Thus, e.g., in medicine, "complication" is considered to be an 
inherent part of the medical treatment process, while in the world of aviation it 
is by all means an "adverse event".   
 
7. Addressing objections and antagonism in earlier stages of the process and 
viewing them as an opportunity for cooperation. Denial of existing resistance   
while claiming that "they do not yet understand the model, and when they do, 
they will become convinced", may worsen things in later stages and 
complicate the possibility of relations' rehabilitation. 
 
8. In our opinion, the main contribution of the aviation model to the field of 
medicine lies in that it serves, in fact, as an important lever to mobilize the 
organization to provide the subject of risk management a chance to develop, 
among others, on basis of the prestige and credibility  of the world of Aviation, 
in general and in the eyes of the physicians, in particular. In the eyes of 
physicians the genes of the ARMM are perceived as good genes, thus 
despite difficulties and debates about amount of similarity between Aviation 




9. It is important to implement the changes arising from recommendations 
following investigations of adverse events, by means of organizational and 
infrastructural procedures and mechanisms, to assure the survivability of the 
change. Thus, for example, recommendations, which will be implemented in 
the computerized system of Maccabi for managing the medical records, will 
practically become part of the routine work processes and in this way, be 
optimally assimilated in the organization. 
 
10. The type of our activity for assimilating a model from another content world 
required, by nature, organizational development skills, as it concerned not 
only professional intervention, but a large-scale cultural change.  This being 
so, we were, in fact, involved both in professional activity in the content world 
of risk management and in the activity of bringing about a cultural change, 
which apparently created confusion in parts of the organization, as well as 
personal difficulties. Therefore, we consider it right to emphasize the need to 
differentiate our professional consulting activities in the field of Risk 
Management from the organization development (OD) activities, which 
became an apparent necessity in order to assure success.   
 
11. The importance of coordinating expectations with partners in Maccabi while 
interacting with them in various instances. As it concerned a new activity, it 
was not clear to the two parties – both to the department and to factors, with 
which the department interacted with – what might be expected from these 
relationships. Mostly, the exposure of the activity of the department, whether 
following lectures, workshops or investigation of  adverse events, created on 
the part of the participants involved in the activity, the wish to continue the 
cooperation, something which the department was not necessarily in a 
position to do.  It may be reasonably assumed that the failure to attribute 
sufficient value for coordinating expectations, in part of the cases, gave rise to 
disappointment and a negative approach towards the department. 
 
12. In Aviation, one of the central characteristics is that the individual is part of a 
system, and as such, is obligated to behave according to the regulation and 
procedures of the organization and to act according to the organizational 
culture. It may be said that, in the evolution of the world of medicine, the 
physician had been sovereign and it was only in later stages of the 
institutionalization of the world of medicine, that he became part of a system – 
McKinlay and Marceau (2000). This process, which is still in development, 





13. It may be said that, already from the early days of aviation, air crew members 
are committed to team work, whereas ancient medicine was the heritage of 
individuals, who jealously kept its secrets to themselves. The inherent conflict 
between being a team player and belonging to an organization, while 
preserving the autonomy to make  medical decisions aimed to the benefit of 
the patient solely, seems still an open issue. For example in Maccabi a 
physician isn't authorized to decide for his patient on a costly procedure or 
test and he has to appeal with his recommendation to a professional 
committee, which  may  decide whether to approve the physician's request or 
not.  
 
14. Quite a significant part of the physicians are working in more than one 
system, which reduces their feeling of belonging to a defined organization. A 
prominent example of this phenomenon is the difficulty to assimilate the duty 
of washing hands when passing from one patient to the next.   According to 
Moss (2004), approximately 5000 patients die every year as a result of 
infections acquired in British hospitals. Part of these infections is the result of 
failure to wash hands. This state of matters became clear to us in the course 
of the process and it constituted and constitutes still an essential difficulty in 
the assimilation of changes in the organization, which result from risk 
management activity. In Maccabi, about 1,500 physicians, about 40% of the 
practicing physicians, are free lancers working also in others systems. 
 
15. The characteristics of ambulatory care are closer in our opinion to those of 
Aviation. Most of the care in primary medicine is performed in solo practices 
interrelated in some manner with other parties collaborating in providing 
healthcare services. The setting of primary care is different in many ways 
from the hospital setting. Just to mention few of the differences: in many 
cases primary care has to do with healthy people while hospitals treat acute 
and chronic states, primary care is based on short interactions while in 
hospitals usually it‟s a matter of days and weeks, in hospitals the care is 
provided by means of teamwork and radical procedures while in ambulatory 
setting care is based on symptomatic treatment, maintenance, diagnosis and 
prevention. The meaning of these differences regarding our work means that 
ARMM maybe more easily adapted and accepted in ambulatory settings due 
to its resemblance to the aviation setting and the issue of adaptability of 







Considering the original decision to adopt ARMM  
 
Basically, it seems to us that the selected model, named ARMM-  Aviation Risk 
Management Model, is actually a generic model for risk management, that was 
adopted and successfully implemented in aviation. In retrospect, judging 
according to achievements and shortcomings in Maccabi, we may say that this 
model is a sufficiently appropriate model, also for the world of medicine.  
 
Therefore, in our opinion, the issue of replacing the model is not on the agenda, 
neither on basis of our experience with the Maccabi project, nor on basis of our 
additional professional experiences in our work with the Madanes Group, the 
leading insurer for medical malpractice in Israel, as well as other medical 
institutions, with which we are working, among them some major hospitals in 
Israel. 
 
All these experiences strengthen our approach that ARMM is valid also for the 
content worlds outside aviation, as it is, in fact, a generic model. 
 
However, as aforesaid, in order to assure a successful implementation of the 
model, reference shall be made to the insights specified by us hereinabove, 
because, in most cases, the success of the implementation does not depend on 
the validity of the model, but rather on other issues, entirely unrelated to it. We 
found that quite many physicians try to refute the validity of ARMM by stressing 
the differences between the world of aviation and the world of medicine. Such 
differences do exist, and the most prominent among them is an essential 
difference in the extent of uncertainty encountered by the physician in his work, 
as compared to the civil aviation pilot.   
 
However, the differences should not prevent the implementation of the model, 
but rather motivate searching for ways to adjust it to the dissimilar reality, 
Thomas and Helmreich (2002). 
 
Moreover, it seems that the trend of adopting the aviation model as well as 
similar models from  high risk content worlds, such as nuclear reactors, military 
operations, sea operations, and similar, to the world of medicine, continuous to 
gain impetus.  
 
To examine the measure of penetration of references from the world of aviation 
risk management into medicine, we checked the scope of publications containing 
the word Aviation in the headings of articles and in the articles themselves, in a 




of Quality and Safety in Health Care, of the BMJ Group.  The findings are shown 





It can be seen that the scope of Aviation references in articles published in 
QSHC has dramatically increased in the years 2002 – 2004, as compared to 
previous years. This increase was slightly halted in 2005. It is also possible to 
observe  the state of matters, in which not even one article dealing with aviation ( 
title  including the word 'Aviation') was published in 1998 – 2002. Between the 
years 2007-2009, each year an article was published having the word "Aviation" 
in its title and many others referring to aviation in the text?  No doubt, these data 
reflects the trend of medicine to get inspiration and encouragement from aviation 
for improving patient safety. If we will refer to the articles published in QSHC 
Journal in the last four years, (2006-2009) having the word "Aviation" in their 
titles we will find three articles : 
 
 2006 - Understanding diagnostic errors in medicine: a lesson learned from 
Aviation. The article advocates adopting the aviation concept of "Situational 
awareness" and cognitive and systemic factors affecting diagnosis as means 





 2008 – Aviation is not the only industry: healthcare could look wider for 
lessons on patient safety. In this article arguments are raised to look for 
additional industries to learn lessons regarding safety and not to narrow the 
scope of search just to Aviation. The authors refer to an accident that 
occurred recently, stating that Aviation may be not the perfect comparator.   
 
 2009 – The effects of aviation style non-technical skills training on technical 
performance and outcome in the operating theatre. In one teaching hospital in 
UK a training based on the aviation CRM (Crew Resource Management) was 
given to surgical teams specializing in laparoscopic cholecystectomy and 
carotid endarterectomy. Before and after training results were compared. The 
results suggested improvement in the non-technical skills, less operative 
technical errors, cultural resistance to adoption of the training, particularly was 
difficult to adopt debriefing procedures and challenging authority.   
 
These briefs from recent literature may summarize the state of mind in medicine 
regarding the ARMM: 
 
 The existing need to learn from others due to lack of experience in medicine. 
 
 The argument for widening the scope of search and not limiting it to Aviation. 
 
 Encouraging results while implementing Aviation proven methodology,  mixed 
with cultural resistance 
 
In our opinion, both the results of our project at Maccabi and the trend of 
increasing reference to the world of aviation as a source of inspiration for the 
world of medicine, encourage the continuation of the activity in accordance with 




Is it time to consider a new model? 
 
Establishing the quality system, in which two units are operating conjointly, 
created, in fact, a new system with the potential for managing risks in Maccabi 
from two angles, similar to the System of Safety and Quality Control 
Administration of the Israel Air Force.  Although the new structure was launched 
at the end of 2002, the issue of the work relations between the two entities 




the beginning of 2009, it was decided on separation between these two units, as 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
In our opinion, the balance of successes and failures due to implementing ARMM 
at Maccabi is clearly positive. That is to say, the model justified the investment 
therein and gave Maccabi an appropriate infrastructure for the risk management 
activity, as from the establishment of the department until today. 
 
However, it is clear to us today that the model will have to undergo adaptations to 
the world of medicine, in order to meet in a more precise manner its needs and 
characteristics. Thus, e.g., the definition of work interfaces between the health 
care providers, the organization, the insurer, professional unions, Ministry of 
Health and IMA, will have to find appropriate expression in the risk management 
model adapted to medicine.  
 
This work sharpens the point that the aviation risk management model actually is 
a generic model, which was first implemented in aviation with the necessary 
specific adaptations. Therefore, it may be claimed that, in fact, it does not 
concern an aviation model, but rather a general model which was successfully 
implemented in aviation and which may be implemented with adaptations also in 
other content worlds. 
 
Actually, Aviation constituted a certain type of large field laboratory, wherein the 
model was tested, underwent adjustments and was successful. As aforesaid, 
most of the principles of the model are generic. 
 
Consequently, in our opinion, what is required now for Maccabi is not the 
development of a new model, but rather a better adjustment of the present model 
to the present needs of Maccabi and bridging the gaps in assimilating the 
principles which implementation wasn't satisfactory.  
 
And on a wider view of the world of medicine, it may be said that the aviation 
model, which actually is a generic risk management model, adopted by aviation, 
is certainly a model suitable to start activity on the basis thereof, while carrying 
out the necessary adjustments according to the specific characteristics of the 





As we mentioned previously ARMM was implemented successfully in Maccabi, 
which is by its essence an Ambulatory healthcare fund. In retrospect, we may 
say that primary care shares many common characteristics with aviation, which 
are nonexistent in the hospital setting. This assumption limits the generalization 
of the insights we have described above to primary setting only.  
 
Thomas and Helmreich (2002), in a chapter in "Medical Error", a book edited by 
Rosenthal and Sutcliffe, consider the issue of adjustment of safety models, 
adapted from aviation to medicine. They claim that many researchers, studying 
errors in medicine, among them Leape (1994), Berwick & Leape (1999), Kohn 
Corrigan & Donaldson (2000), suggested that health care systems adopt from 
aviation the know how in order   to prevent errors. Moreover, they claim that few 
critical reports were published, which look into the likelihood of this suggestion. 
They sum up their reference by saying that: 
“There are differences between health care and aviation, but similarities also 
abound, and there is a great opportunity for all of us in health care to learn from 
aviation….Medicine is just learning how to implement these methods for 
monitoring error in patient care.  Their usefulness in actually reducing error and 
improving patient safety is promising but far from proven.. For example there is 
no research available even to inform the basic design of incident reporting 
system...” 
 
As far as we know, our project with Maccabi is a most prolonged and intensive 
one when considering adopting the aviation risk management model in medicine. 
Therefore, in our opinion, there is considerable value in the description of the 
project, its meaning and the insights we acquired in the course thereof. All these 
might serve as a superior starting point for health care organizations trying to find 

















Aviation Psychology vs. Medical Psychology 
 
In February 2008, while preparing a lecture for the CME Risk Management 
course in the Medical School of Tel-Aviv University, on the topic "From Aviation 
to Medicine, we noticed that Aviation Psychology is a well developed discipline, 
actually we knew it, from 1985 when we for the first time attended the 3rd 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology at Columbus Ohio.  
 
According to our personal knowledge and the mission statement of AAP as cited 
in its web site, the Association for Aviation Psychology (AAP) is a non-profit 
professional organization, founded in 1964: 
"Our purpose is to promote aviation psychology and related aerospace 
disciplines. We address four specific areas:  
 Dissemination of knowledge 
 Meetings and publications  
 Improved education and research 
 Application of psychological principles to aviation safety and welfare:  "Our 
members work in a diverse range of aviation fields, from pilot selection 
and training, aviation safety research, maintenance human factors, cabin 
safety, air traffic control, and accident investigation".  
 
We have searched the web in order to find an analogical discipline in Medicine, 
which mission statement should be similar to that of AAP. 
 
What we found instead, are the following definitions for Health Care Psychology 
and Medical Psychology 
 
 Health Care Psychology- Objective: students gain basic information and 
knowledge in the field of applied psychological disciplines. Based on better 
understanding of needs and feeling of a patient, these psychological 
disciplines contribute to higher quality of health care services. 
 
 Medical Psychology refers to an emerging specialty of clinical psychological 
practice in which psychologists, who have undergone additional specialized 
education and training, may prescribe medications in the care and 
management of patients. In the United States, New Mexico and Louisiana, 
and several branches of the military, currently authorize these psychologists 
to prescribe medications. From 2001, the Ministry of Health in Israel has 




a clear specialization pattern for this profession. Medical Psychologist, are 
staffed in 12 major hospitals in Israel and their mission is to assist the medical 
staff in diagnosis, treatment and research (Yaakobi, 2009). 
 
What is missing is a discipline that will focus on medical staff, the medical 
environment, interfaces between medical specialties and institutions, team work, 
ergonomics, communication between the involved parties in providing and 
consuming care, the sociological  aspects if medicine and more. This missing 
discipline may provide better ways to understand the entire framework of 




Where are we now? 
 
We are now in a position that, in no aspect ,  resembles in a way the state of 
affairs, six years ago, when we started to write this work. Then, we were involved 
for about 5 years in the Maccabi project, being our first major activity in medicine. 
Since, then we have been involved in Risk Management consulting in medicine 
with the Madanes group (the largest  Israeli malpractice insurer in medicine), IMA 
(Israel Medical Association), GPO (Government Physician Organization), 
MESER (Medical Simulation Center at Sheba Medical Center), CME program at 
Tel-Aviv Medical School and more. We may say that our ability to provide Risk 
Management consulting in Medicine, which originated in Maccabi, was fed by our 
attempt to formalize our experience on one hand and growing confidence that 
ARMM is of value for medicine, on the other hand.  
 
Almost four years ago, we started a new adventurous project, starting from 
scratch to consult in Risk Management to MEKOROT, Israel National Water 
Company. MEKOROT has now a Risk Management Department, staffed with 3 
senior engineers promoting Risk Management in the organization, with our 
assistance. This time we were much more confident that ARMM will contribute 
significantly to this major utility company to manage its risks. But this is another 
story, which maybe we will tell someday.  
 
When we started writing this work, we expected from ourselves to be able to 
share our experience and insights regarding transforming ARMM to Medicine 
and more precise to a large ambulatory healthcare organization. We were 
surprised to discover that it was a  fascinating journey, that had to do with our 
personal and professional past,  it shaped our present, being influenced 




of our work and no doubt our future. Compared to the starting point of writing this 
work, although we had all the ground to consider ourselves as professionals 
then, we know now, that we had still a lot to learn and inquire. Writing this work, 
challenged us to ask many unanswered questions about what we were doing in 
our professional practice. Many questions are still unanswered, like the issue of 
right mixture of soft and hard disciplines to get sound results while implementing 
Risk Management in a large organization, should the scope of Risk Management 
activities be limited to a certain critical activity (like patient safety) or be expanded 
to all organizational activities, what is the right mix between reactive and 
proactive Risk Management activities and many others.  We believe, we have 
now a deeper understanding of Risk Management philosophy and not only 
technical knowhow. We believe this deeper understanding will enables us to 
move more easily between domains and organizations, providing them the 
deeper meaning of Risk Management and not just "things that work". We believe 
that this approach may recruit more motivation and commitment, so critical for 




30 years after Captain's G.G. accident 
 
Lieutenant Asaf Ramon was the son of Brigadier Ilan Ramon, the 1st Israeli 
Astronaut, killed in the Columbia accident, six years ago. 
 
Asaf was killed two weeks ago, (13 September 2009) in an air accident, flying an 
F-16 fighter, while performing a high G maneuver in an air combat training.  
 
Asaf has graduated the three year flying academy as number one in his class, 
just three months ago.  
 
Exactly 30 years ago, captain G.G. was killed in an air accident while attempting 
landing after a night sortie (29 September 1979). We referred to this accident in 
Chapter 1, as one of our major motivations to commit our careers to Risk 
Management.  
 
The last accident triggered many publications in the media that enabled the 
public a more intimate view into fighter pilots live and of course the 
circumstances of this particular accident and human factors that are present in 
each and every sortie, potentially endangering it. One of these publications was 
an article by Dror Ben-David (2009), a former fighter squadron leader that, in our 




cockpit experience. Ben-David describes the extreme physiology of G forces, of 
cognitive and emotional stresses, typical to combat flying. 
A fighter pilot is demanded to make critical decision in fraction of seconds and 
most of the time he is on his own. Experience means being able to balance 
wisely between many factors in an extreme environment, aiming to fulfill the 
mission while preserving personal and team safety. To be a fighter pilot, means 
to be a juggler. Thus there is no wonder, that a young and inexperienced pilot 
may drop a ball and cause a fatal accident.   
 
We don't know yet what are the causes and root causes that may explain Asaf's 
accident, but we are definitely reluctant to tag it  is a "Pilot error'. No doubt Asaf 
was flying the aircraft in the moments before the crash, but he was a part of a 




What is it all about? 
 
Risk management is about understanding past and present and to mobilize these 
understandings to save lives, spare sorrow, and essential resources. Risk 
management is about providing a more optimistic attitude to life, perceiving it as 
manageable and controllable and not dictated to us by fate only. 
 
Risk Management mandates continuous commitment and vigilance. 
Complacency harms and in many cases kills. The concept of "Situational 
Awareness" promoted in aviation to motivate pilots to be continuously aware of 
the operational arena and which is this days also being promoted to become a 
part of physicians' attitude, (Wright et al., 2004) should be also adopted by those 
dealing professionally with Risk Management and Safety issues.   
 
Peter Bernstein (1998) in "Against Gods" tells brilliantly the story of risk as part of 
mankind's cultural evolution from the ancient days until nowadays. Basic 
attitudes to risk have to do with our faith to control our lives. As long as mankind 
perceived live as a matter of fate and determinism, there was no place for risk 
management.  Only in the renaissance, when human beings started to perceive 
their central role in the creation and the ability to unfold mathematical and 
physical regularities, the foundations for risk management were established. 






"The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern times 
and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that future is more than a 
whim of the Gods and that man and women are no passive before nature. 
Until human beings discovered a way across that boundary, the future was 
a mirror of the past or the murky domain of oracles and soothsayers who 









5 M A model that serves for RM debriefings and addresses 5 tiers of factors: Man, 
Machine, Mission, Management and Medium. 
AAP Association for Aviation Psychology  
AAR After Action Review 
ADE Adverse Drug Event 
AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
AMIA American Medical Informatics Association 
ARRM Aviation Risk Management Model 
ASHRM American Society for Healthcare Risk Management 
ASQAD Aviation Safety and Quality assurance  Directorate (MAVKA) 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System operated by NASA 
CKO Chief Knowledge Officer 
CME Continuing Medical Education 
COSO Committee of Sponsoring Organizations – a private organization,   recognized the 
world over for providing guidance on critical aspects of organizational governance, 
business ethics, internal control, enterprise risk management, fraud, and financial 
reporting 
CRI Cost of Risk Index (Impact of Risk event x Probability of Occurrence) 
CRM Crew/Cockpit Resource Management 
DB Data Base 
EBM Evidence Based Medicine  
EILAT  EILAT Ltd. – A private owned Israeli  company that specializes in Risk 
Management and safety in various domains , established in 1987 by Itzik 
Lichtenfeld and Yossi Tal. 
EMR Electronic medical record 
FAA Federal Aviation Agency 
GP General Practitioner 
GPO Government Physician Organization 
HL-7 Health Level Seven, Inc. (HL7), is an all-volunteer, not-for-profit 
organization involved in development of international healthcare standards. 
IAF Israeli Air Force 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization  
ICD-9 International Classification of Diseases 
IDF Israel Defense Force 
IMA Israel Medical association 
IOM Institute Of Medicine 
IRI Intermediate Result Indicators 
IT Information Technology 
JCHACO Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 




MCD Medical Control Department 
MCI Medical Consultants International ltd.  – A  Madanes group company, the largest 
medical malpractice insurer in Israel.  
Mekorot Israeli National Water Company 
MESER Israeli  Medical Simulation Center at 'Sheba' Medical Center  
MI Myocardial Infraction 
MID Medical Informatics Department 
MMI Man Machine Interface  
MOH Ministry of Health 
MRM Medical Risk Management  - A Madanes group company that specializes in 
Medical Risk Management and operates conjointly with MCI.  
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OD Organizational Development 
OJT On the Job Training 
POC Point Of Contact 
PSRS Patient Safety Reporting System based on the principles of ASRS 
QA Quality Assurance 
QAM Quality Assurance Management 
QD Quality Directorate 
R&D Research and development 
RCA Root Cause Analysis 
RM Risk Management 
RMD Risk Management Department 
RMQA RM & QA Activities 
ROI Return On Investment 
SOAP Subjective, Objective, Assessment and Plan 
SOX Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
TQM Total Quality Management 
VA Veterans Affairs- a US based Medical Organization providing Healthcare Services 
to American Army Veterans  
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Appendix A: Healthcare Risk Management Organizations  
 
Organization Internet Address  
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality www.ahcpr.gov 
AMA National Patient Safety Foundation www.npsf.org  
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management www.ashrm.org  
American Society of Consultant Pharmacists www.ascp.com 
American Society of Health-system Pharmacists www.ashp.org  
Doctor Quality www.doctorquality.com 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement www.ihi.org  
Institute for Safe Medication Practices www.ismp.org 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations 
www.jcaho,org 
Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical 
Errors 
www.mhalink.org 
National Academy for State Health Policy www.nashp.org  
National Coalition on Health Care www.nchc.org 
National Council on Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention 
www.nccmerp.org 
National Patient Safety Foundation www.npsf.org  
Partnership for Patient Safety www.p4ps.com 
Quality Interagency Coordination (QuIC) Task Force www.quic.gov 
The Advisory Board www.advisory.com 
The Free Medical Journals Site www.freemedicaljournals.com 
The Healthcare Safety Supersite www.healthsafetyinfo.com 
Today on Medscape www.medscape.com 
United States Pharmacopeia www.usp.org 
 
 
 
